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# Frontier crossings from north China to Liao, c.900-1005

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1994



27 JUN 1994

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Ph.D. 1994

## **Frontier crossings from north China to Liao, c.900-1005**

### **Abstract**

This thesis is concerned with those who crossed the frontier from the north China regimes to the Kitan Liao, from the end of the Tang to the treaty of Shanyuan in 1005. It contributes to an understanding of frontiers by analysing a specific frontier situation, and by considering the construction of real and imagined frontiers, both in the tenth century and by later historiographers.

Chapter 1 narrates the movement of the political frontiers between the north China regimes and Liao (including a series of maps.) Chapter 2 analyses over 200 'acts of crossing,' chiefly according to the degree of volition involved.

Chapters 3 to 7 present five case studies exploring how various forces acted together to affect individuals, and the changes taking place by 1005. The manner of recording is considered alongside the events.

Those who crossed the frontier to Liao have often been regarded as disloyal to China. Chapter 8 surveys the meaning and uses of the concept of *zhong* ('loyalty') up to the eleventh century, and applies the results to the actions and recording of the case study subjects. Those who crossed to Liao are assumed to have felt a Chinese identity, which should have kept them loyal to the Middle Kingdom. Chapter 9 uses the modern concept of ethnocentrism to examine how a continuing sense of ethnic identity was ignored in the early tenth century, then increasingly utilised in later decades, as one aspect in the sharper definition of regimes. Loyalty thus acquired an ethnic content, limiting individual choices.

The multiple frontiers - real and conceptual - of the early tenth century gradually converged to make the single line fixed by the treaty of Shanyuan. Subsequently, the concepts of 'China' and 'Chineseness' were reconstructed by historiographers seeking to make sense of the tenth century in their own terms.

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## **Declaration**

I declare that none of the material contained in this thesis has previously been submitted for a degree at any university.

## **Statement of copyright**

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*For Mike, of course*

## Conventions

The name of the Kitan regime alternated irregularly between 'Great Kitan' and 'Great Liao.' The regime and its people are referred to here as 'Liao' or 'Kitan' without reference to the official title in force at the time. The Five Dynasties 五代 are known as the Wudai, for convenience. There are two Jin 晉 regimes in the tenth century. The leaders of the principedom of Jin founded the Later Tang in 923; they are referred to as Taiyuan Jin where differentiation from the Later Jin (936-947) is necessary. In line with the usual convention, emperors are referred to by their temple name, frequently prefixed by the regime name. This is anachronistic but convenient, especially when dealing with so many emperors and regimes. For ease of reference, dates are converted to the Gregorian calendar, modified to use the western year within which most of the relevant lunar year falls, in the form Western year: Lunar month. Where a date falls within the next western year, this may be given in brackets, eg. 946:12 (947.)

Romanisation of Chinese is in *pinyin*. For non-Chinese peoples standard usage is employed, except for the Kitan, where I follow Sechin Jagchid. All quotations have been standardised to *pinyin* and British spelling. Characters are included in the text for the first appearance of each historical name or title in each chapter, except for the commonest regime and temple names, which only appear once. A character list and glossary of titles are also appended for ease of access. Translations of titles come largely from Hucker, *A dictionary of official titles in imperial China* (1985), with occasional adaptation. The names of historical figures are abbreviated to their given names; family names are used for writers. The pronunciation of the character 澶 has changed to *chan*, but the traditional pronunciation has been retained for the place-names Shanyuan 澶淵 and Shanzhou 澶州.

Many places in tenth century north China were commonly known by more than one name. There is a tendency to use the name favoured by the text in use; alternatives are noted in brackets the first time they appear. If it subsequently seems helpful to keep two alternatives in mind, they are hyphenated. Where different places have the same romanisation, subscript numbering is used to differentiate, unless there is no possibility of confusion. The suffix *zhou* 州 is frequently omitted, as in the texts. Regions referred to in the texts by combining two prefectural names are indicated thus: YiDing 易定, etc. The maps are based upon those found in the *Ditu chubanshe* series of historical atlases. I regret that it has proved impractical to enlarge them satisfactorily.

In quotations, round brackets () are used to mark insertions needed to make sense in English; square brackets normally [] enclose explanatory notes; and curly brackets {} show differences between very close texts.

## Abbreviations

CB	<i>Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian</i>
CFYG	<i>Cefu yuangui</i>
CHC	<i>Cambridge history of China</i>
conc	concurrently
DDSL	<i>Dongdu shi lüe</i>
HJAS	<i>Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies</i>
JAS	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>
JTS	<i>Jiu Tang shu</i>
JW	<i>Jiu Wudai shi</i>
LDN	<i>Liao dachen nianbiao</i>
LFN	<i>Liao fangzhen nianbiao</i>
LPJ	<i>Long ping ji</i>
LS	<i>Liao shi</i>
LSH	<i>Liao shi hua</i>
LSJ	<i>Liao shi ji</i>
LSJSBM	<i>Liao shi jishi benmo</i>
LSSY	<i>Liao shi shiyi</i>
LSSYB	<i>Liao shi shiyi bu</i>
LWC	<i>Liao wen cun</i>
LWK	<i>Liaodai wenxue kao</i>
pacfd	pacified
QG	<i>Qidan guo zhi</i>
QLW	<i>Quan Liao wen</i>
QTS	<i>Quan Tang shi</i>
QTSB	<i>Quan Tang shi bubian</i>
QTW	<i>Quan Tang wen</i>
QWDS	<i>Quan Wudai shi</i>
QWDSB	<i>Quan Wudai shi fubuyi</i>
SBBY	<i>Sibu bei yao</i>
SBCK	<i>Sibu congkan</i>
SHY	<i>Song hui yao jigao</i>
SS	<i>Song shi</i>
SSJSBM	<i>Song shi jishi benmo</i>
SSXB	<i>Song shi xinbian</i>
THY	<i>Tang hui yao</i>
TJ	<i>Zizhi tongjian</i>
WDHY	<i>Wudai hui yao</i>
WDSB	<i>Wudai shi bu</i>
WF	Karl A. Wittfogel & Feng Jiasheng, <i>History of Chinese society: Liao</i> (907-1125) (1949)
XTS	<i>Xin Tang shu</i>
XW	<i>Xin Wudai shi</i>
YLDD	<i>Yongle da dian</i>



## Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the frontier between north China and its non-Chinese neighbour, the Kitan Liao 遼 regime (907-1125), in the tenth century, from the death-throes of the Tang 唐 dynasty (618-907) until the fixing of the line between Song 宋 (960-1276) and Liao by the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵 in 1005. Despite the number of general theories propounded about the nature of China's northern frontier, notably by Lattimore, but more recently by Thomas Barfield,<sup>1</sup> there have been very few, if any, studies of how specific frontiers worked in real terms. This thesis contributes to an understanding of frontiers by providing an analysis of the detail of what was happening on one frontier in a particular period.

In the present age the word 'frontier' tends to conjure up the image of a linear divider which can be drawn on a map. This is reinforced by the attempts, in times and places continuing up to the Berlin Wall, to reify the concept of a 'frontier' by physically creating a concrete marker of the boundary line. The 'Great Wall' of China is a fine example of this endeavour, and although the monolithic existence of a real 'Great Wall' has recently been challenged,<sup>2</sup> the *idea* of the Wall recurs throughout Chinese history. It is, for instance, the single constant feature on a series of historical maps from the Southern Song 南宋,<sup>3</sup> even when they show the kingdom ruled by the legendary Shun 舜, and the travels of the mythical Yu 禹, two thousand years before the Great Wall is supposed to have been created by Qin Shihuang 秦始皇.<sup>4</sup>

This series provides us with some of the earliest maps of any kind surviving from China,<sup>5</sup> but, as twelfth century representations of former times, they clearly cannot be regarded as contemporary evidence for tenth-century views of the frontier. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the maps for each of the Five Dynasties (Wudai 五代, 907-959), and for the expansion of China under the first two Song emperors,<sup>6</sup> show the boundaries of the states concerned. Whilst the same area - China proper - is shown on each map,

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1. Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian frontiers of China* (1951); Thomas Barfield, *The perilous frontier: nomadic empires and China, 221 B.C. to A.D. 1757* (1989.)

2. Arthur Waldron, *The Great Wall of China: from history to myth* (1990.)

3. Shui Anli's *Lidai dili zhi zhang tu* (Reproduction of a Song edition by the Shanghai guji chubanshe 1989.)

4. In 221 B.C. Waldron discusses what is known about Qin Shihuang's Wall and its predecessors, *Great Wall*, pp.13-21.

5. No maps survive from earlier than the eleventh century. Joseph Needham, *Science and civilisation in China*, vol.3 (1970), pp.547-50. Cf. Chang Sen-dou, Some observations on the cartographic nature of Chinese thematic maps, *Chine ancienne* (1977), pp.25-30. Also Endymion Wilkinson, *The history of imperial China: a research guide* (1990), p.109.

6. The map of Song Taizong's achievements is literally called 'Map of the emperor Taizong's unification' 太宗皇帝統一之圖, pp.90-1.

there is no fudging of reality: where territory within the Wall was held by other powers, this is clearly marked. Hence although the Wall is there, it seems to function more as a point of reference than as a line to be held. It defines the limit of China as the Song wished China to be; it did not have to reflect the limit as it actually was. As Arthur Waldron puts it, 'without any such line to rely on, the full magnitude of the problem of defining China becomes clear,'<sup>7</sup> and this question of what we mean by China is one important issue indirectly addressed by this thesis. In deference to the problem I have avoided unqualified use of the name 'China,' preferring the 'Central Plains' 中原 with reference to a geographical entity, and the 'Middle Kingdom' 中國 when talking in more abstract terms.

The representativeness of maps is always limited by the necessity they introduce of rigidly defining situations, and particularly boundaries. Hence the series noted above provides one map for each of the Wudai, but gives no indication of territorial changes within the period of each dynasty. The problem has not been surmounted in the present-day counterpart of this series: the set of historical atlases produced by the Ditu chubanshe (Cartographic Publishing House.) The detailed maps for the Tang dynasty are drawn according to the *dili zhi* 地理志 in the Tang dynastic history, and thus freeze Tang China as it was in 741. The addition of two further general maps of Tang China are an inadequate attempt to convey the many boundary changes which took place over nearly three centuries. This is unavoidable if such reference works are not to become unwieldy, but it does tend to make frontiers look more fixed than they may have been at the time.

This is especially a problem in times of great upheaval like the tenth century. During the Wudai, pieces of territory changed hands constantly between all the competing powers in north China, including the Liao, who also regularly raided south, to a greater or lesser depth. The northern frontier, like all the other frontiers at the time, was thus not the static entity it appears to be on maps, but was a 'shifting frontier.' This is the subject of Chapter 1, which, in the absence of a standard account of the period, concurrently provides a general narrative to help the reader negotiate details about minor players.<sup>8</sup> It also includes its own series of maps in an attempt to convey the frontier changes visually. But although it is instructive to consider the frontier as a line defined in political terms, this will only take us so far.

Lattimore's description of frontier zones has for long provided a corrective to the notion that frontiers are necessarily linear, and it is this conceptualisation of the frontier as not merely a *line*, but a *place*, which provides the springboard for the main part of the study here. Studies of the late Tang-Wudai-early Song period have tended to focus, not

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7. Waldron, *Great Wall*, p.9.

8. A chronology is also appended.

unnaturally, on relations between the court and the provinces: the centre-periphery axis. They have thus regarded the frontier from, as it were, a viewpoint within a power on one side of it. Although this is, of course, a valid approach, it tends to restrict the view of the frontier, seeing it in terms of what authority could be imposed on it from a central power of some kind. The frontier is seen as the line *around* one particular polity, when it is also the line *between* two (or more) different polities. Seen from this altered perspective, the frontier assumes a life of its own, not merely dependent on the powers it divides and defines, but also crucially having an effect on those powers from the outside. This kind of viewpoint gives rise to different questions. Hence this study is concerned with the frontier itself, and aims to treat it almost as an entity in its own right, with forces pulling and pushing not just from within a single power, but from the *two* powers *between* which the frontier is drawn. We aim to see what it is on both sides that makes the line of the frontier exist where it does. This requires that we see the groups involved as equal in status, rather than as 'civilised' versus 'barbarians.'

As soon as we start looking at a real frontier, we find that it is made by people. A frontier is given reality only because it exists in the minds of human beings. Hence it is clear that despite the fluidity in the 'line' of the tenth-century north China frontier, the concept of demarcation always remained. The reports of frontier officials indicate that they had an acute consciousness of when their state had been invaded, there are numerous references to frontier patrols, and individuals were never in any doubt about which side of the line they were on, even if they were unsure of which side they would rather be. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to approach the frontier via the people who gave it shape, and the people most actively involved in this were surely those who crossed the frontier, and thereby consciously acknowledged its existence.

People could acquire experience of both sides of the frontier through crossing in either direction, and although a parallel study of southward movement would undoubtedly contribute to our understanding of the issues, it is beyond the capacity of this thesis to study both; hence I have looked only at those Chinese who went north and took service with the Liao. Over two hundred of these, whom I shall call the first generation Liao Chinese, are discussed in general terms in Chapter 2. They are widely mentioned in the secondary literature, but even now are usually dismissed as 'renegades,' (Arthur Waldron, 1990), 'turncoats,' (Zhou Jun, 1990) or even 'traitors' (Thomas Barfield, 1989),<sup>9</sup> implying that it is somehow inherently wicked to serve a non-Chinese. The writers mentioned are all trying to take new approaches to the history of China, and are strongly aware of the prejudices of earlier scholarship, but the cultural assumptions

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9. Waldron, *Great Wall*, p.135; Zhou Jun, Xu Xuan qiren yu Songchu 'erchen,' *Lishi yanjiu* 1989:4, passim; Barfield, *Perilous frontier*, p.52.

are so deeply ingrained in the written materials (primary, and to a large extent, secondary) that it is hard to escape the perpetuation of the damning view expressed by the neo-Confucian and later sources.<sup>10</sup> There is no previous study of frontier crossers in a western language, and where such people are discussed in more depth in the Chinese literature, it is almost always in terms of their role in the 'sinicisation' of the Kitan. Such an approach focusses upon what happened after these people crossed to Liao, but it says nothing about their behaviour in making the crossing. The Liao Chinese have been labelled, and their actions have been used to demonstrate China's cultural superiority, but there has not yet been any attempt to explain what they did and why. Hence we seek here to examine the act of crossing itself, for its significance in defining not just the physical, political frontier, but also the conceptual frontiers created by ideas of loyalty and ethnic identity.

Loyalty and ethnicity are aspects of the same problem, but it has proved useful to separate them out for analytical purposes. The concept of loyalty, discussed in Chapter 8, occurs throughout Chinese history, taking many different forms. In the tenth century central authority had broken down to be replaced with a plethora of leaders, lords, rulers and emperors; territory changed hands constantly and there was no guarantee that one's lord of today would last the night. This had been sporadic since An Lushan's 安祿山 rebellion, and endemic since Huang Chao's 黃巢. For over two hundred years from the middle of the eighth century and through most of the tenth, decisions about where to place their loyalty were faced by almost every official at some point in their career, and in many cases more than once. The problem of where and how to place one's loyalty did not affect a single group, but was the dilemma of several generations. The relationship of these decisions to the issue of legitimation could be critically important to leaders, and accordingly, they took a keen interest in the practice and encouragement of loyalty.

Ethnicity was not a concept recognised as such in the tenth century, but it is clear that there was a sense of ethnic identity. Throughout this thesis, we will be talking, conventionally enough, about 'the Chinese' and 'the Liao,' which are taken to mean, respectively, 'the inhabitants of north China who lived in what they and their recorders regarded as a Chinese fashion,' and 'the Kitan, with associated tribal and sedentary peoples (excluding "the Chinese") who accepted Liao rule.' These are generous definitions which are intended to be as unobjectionable as possible so that analysis can be concentrated upon the act of crossing itself and not distracted by debate as to which

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10. It is particularly easy for Chinese writers to maintain a linguistic prejudice against the Kitan, because the Chinese vocabulary for non-Chinese peoples exists in a historical context where words and concepts associated with the non-Chinese have been contrasted unfavourably with Chinese words and concepts. We have yet to see the coining of non-discriminatory Chinese words, and to use the words *hu* 胡, *waiguo* 外國, and the like, is to remain within the predominantly anti-foreign thought-world of those who wrote the majority of the records.

'incidents of crossing' should be counted. In fact, they simply reflect the basic division observed in our texts, and are therefore effective in the sense that where the people studied identify themselves, or are identified by others, it is as members of one of these two groups. The aspects used for identification vary from case to case, and there is often an active non-identification with the other group. The sources identify Chinese by stating the name of their place or region of origin, showing them in service to a north China leader, or sometimes quoting them declaring a regional affiliation. By these means, people who could not strictly be defined as Han, such as those with Shatuo ancestors, are included in the category of 'Chinese.' That the Liao at least could accept justifications of behaviour couched in terms of the cultural differences between themselves and the 'Chinese' suggests that the idea of Chinese identity in some form was recognised at the time as having explanatory power in the appropriate situations.

However, a systematic study of something as complicated as ethnicity requires materials in which we can observe identification, by self and others, over a large number of individuals. It is not entirely impossible that the materials could be found; there is, for instance, a fair amount of surviving poetry from the tenth century,<sup>11</sup> but the search required to do justice to the topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. In addition, the writings of court-based literati officials, which are most likely to have survived, are not necessarily related to the acts of crossers, as the two groups frequently operated in very different circumstances. There is very little evidence for what people are said to have thought, and this is deeply prejudiced by the preconceptions and aims of those who did the recording. We can, however, look more dispassionately at what people *did*.

Studying crossings, the real acts of real people, we can see that at some times many people crossed, at others very few did. This reflects a variation over time in the range of possibilities perceived to be available. Individual decisions about crossing were made with reference to the perceived options. These options were partly defined by the prevailing attitudes of the time. At certain times attitudes strongly militated against crossing, at others there was less concern. Hence whilst crossings are not a completely reliable guide to what people were thinking, they do point towards possible trends. For this reason, the emphasis here is on annalistic information, concentrating on what people are said to have *done* rather than attempting to interpret what they or others wrote. With the predominantly factual information presented in this study, the concept of ethnocentrism has proved to be a more fruitful approach to the question of ethnicity than the attempt to locate any overt sense of ethnic identity, and it is this which is the main focus of Chapter 9. This does not mean that ethnic identity is never visible in the sources used here, but it can be seen in only a small selection of individual cases, who may or

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11. Collected in QWDS, QWDSB, QTS, QTSB, etc.

may not be representative. Unfortunately, there is, as yet, no comprehensive study of historical Chinese attitudes to foreigners and to being Chinese, which makes it hard to place what we can see for the tenth century in a longer context of fluctuations in attitude. There have been a number of recent works dealing with ethnicity in the Qing 清 and later periods, for example, Pamela Crossley's *Orphan warriors* (1990), and Frank Dikötter, *The discourse of race in modern China* (1992), but the quantity of materials assembled for these books give an indication of the scale of enterprise that would be needed to produce a work of wider scope.


It is apparent, then, that we are dealing with a number of different frontiers, and that these do not necessarily coincide. People who identified themselves as Chinese could give faithful service to the non-Chinese Liao, indicating that the frontiers defined by the concepts of loyalty and ethnicity ran in different places. And this is not to mention the constant movements in the political frontier. The task here is to try to show how the different frontiers interweave and interact over time, and how these relationships affect, and are shaped by, individual human beings. In addition, we have to consider the influence of the recorders upon our picture of the tenth-century world. The five case studies presented in Chapters 3 to 7 show something of the interplay of the various forces at work, and of the different kinds of frontiers; they set individual frontier crossings in the context of the pressures of an individual life, and of the mode of recording of that life. Although it is necessary to isolate certain issues for purposes of analysis, it is in the case studies that the issues come together and can be seen in human terms.

We have hinted that our sources will be under scrutiny alongside the people they discuss. Since frontiers are the creations of human beings, in historical terms this means that they are created by our use of the historical evidence. Successive historians reexamine and reevaluate what survives, and then 're-create' - create again - their own conception of the frontier.<sup>12</sup> That understood, the nature of the written sources for the tenth century can create considerable problems when we try to assess the contemporary view of the frontier and those who crossed it. These problems are such that they justify a consideration of what we might call the 'historiographical frontier' as an inescapable part of the task to be undertaken.

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12. For historians as active creators of the past, see, *inter alia*, Edwin Ardener, 'The construction of history: 'vestiges of creation,' *History and ethnicity* (1989), edd. Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald & Malcolm Chapman, pp.22-33.

Figure 1: The filiation of the *Liao shi* 遼史



Adapted from Denis Twitchett, personal communication.

## The texts

Although many of the questions under discussion here are clearly already issues in the texts, we have to consider that they might have *become* issues because later assessments of the period were coloured both by hindsight and by greatly changed views of what constituted right behaviour. This is particularly noticeable over the question of loyalty. Some of the problems can be highlighted by some notes on the production of the texts concerned, which will also show how some of these problems can be turned to advantage.

As we are dealing with people who crossed to the Liao regime, it has obviously been necessary to use the Liao dynastic history, the *Liao shi* 遼史 (LS.) This has also been taken as the endpoint for materials, because with the compilation of the official history, the record of the dynasty was considered, symbolically, to be 'fixed.' The work was not produced under regular circumstances, and was not completed until 1344, some 350 years after the events discussed here.<sup>13</sup> In parallel with this text, I have also used the various histories and related works produced in the main north China regimes; a group of texts referred to here as the 'southern sources.' However, one peculiarity of the LS derives from the slowness with which Chinese-style historiographical practice was adopted by the Liao.<sup>14</sup> Accordingly it was chiefly compiled not from archival material collected by the Liao bureaucracy, but from a collection of works surviving in the fourteenth century, only some of which had any connection with the Liao historiographical office. These included, directly or indirectly, almost all the southern sources. The relationships between these works are illustrated in Figure 1, and there follow a few words about each of the main surviving texts in chronological order of compilation.

The main source for north China in the first half of the tenth century, and the most contemporaneous, is the dynastic history of the Wudai, the *Jiu Wudai shi* 舊五代史 (JW.) It was a tribute to the perceived importance of history writing, being produced in less than two years in the early Northern Song 北宋, from 973-4, from an almost complete set of government records kept even in the confusion of the Wudai. It was re-written as the *Xin Wudai shi* 新五代史 (XW) in 1055 and this revisionist work became

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13. There are numerous works on the compilation of the LS, including Chan Hok-Lam, Chinese official historiography at the Yüan court: the composition of the Liao, Chin and Sung histories, *China under Mongol rule* (1981), ed. John Langlois, pp.56-106; Richard Davis, Historiography as politics in Yang Wei-chen's 'Polemic on legitimate succession,' *T'oung pao* 69:1-3 (1983), pp.33-72; Feng Jiasheng, *Liao shi yuanliu kao yu Liao shi chu xiao* (1933); Herbert Franke, Historiography under Mongol rule: the role of history in acculturation, *Mongolia studies* 1 (1974), pp.15-26; Qiu Shusen, Tuotuo he Liao Jin Song san shi, *Yuan shi ji beifang minzu shi yanjiu jikan* 7 (1983), pp.10-21.

14. This should perhaps be less surprising if we take account of Denis Twitchett's overall point in his *The writing of official history under the T'ang* (1992), that historiographical practice did not begin to become regularised until the Tang dynasty, and was still subject to serious disruption by political events.



preferred to such an extent that the old one was banned in 1207. It was lost sometime after the early fifteenth century but by this time most of it had already been broken up and included in the *Yongle da dian* 永樂大典 (YLDD.) From this and other works on the same period Qing scholars were able to reconstruct between eighty and ninety percent of the JW. The annals and the biographies of commoners are almost completely intact and despite some of the obvious problems with this work, it has a good reputation. In its own day it was criticised for following the Wudai Veritable Records (*shilu* 實錄) too closely.<sup>15</sup> This is something for which to be grateful, although we do not know exactly how close the correlation was, and there is still potential for mistakes, corruptions and interpolations in such a reconstructed text.

The XW was basically a rewriting of the JW using some additional materials.<sup>16</sup> Ouyang Xiu 歐陽修 wrote the XW with clear motives. He was critical of the JW for its lack of interpretation and moral judgement and his own work was a conscious attempt to rectify this. He has himself been criticised for going too far; he used the selective presentation of information to argue his case for a particular moral judgement and followed up at the end of most chapters with a commentary on the moral conclusion to be drawn, which can be exclamatory in style.<sup>17</sup>

The major narrative work covering this period is the *Zizhi tongjian* 資治通鑑 (TJ), produced for the court under the direction of Sima Guang 司馬光, with the explicit aim of providing instruction for rulers. It was compiled in the period from 1067 to 1085 and covers the whole of Chinese history to date in annalistic form, without biographies or other sections, from 403 B.C. to the end of the Wudai in 959. It is known to have used 322 different sources, from the dynastic histories, including the JW, to various unofficial works, many little known. Despite being highly regarded for its general adherence to declared historiographical principles, it naturally still shows signs of the pressures and prejudices of the time of compilation and there are said to be many mistakes in the Wudai section.<sup>18</sup> Sima Guang, like Ouyang Xiu, wrote from a firmly neo-Confucian viewpoint, and Sima follows Ouyang in criticising the minister Feng Dao 馮道, who served under five different regimes, including the Liao. Not only is the TJ important for its quality and

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15. Wang Gungwu, *The Chiu Wu-tai shih and history-writing during the Five Dynasties*, *Asia Major* 6:1 (1958), pp.1-22.

16. Including the *Wudai tongjian* 五代通鑑, *Wudai hui yao* 五代會要, *Tang yu lu* 唐余錄, *Jiu guo zhi* 九國志, *Beimeng suoyan* 北夢瑣言, *Wudai shi bu* 五代史補 and *Wudai shi quewen* 五代史闕文. Chai Degeng, *Shi ji juyao* (1982), p.118.

17. See notice on the *Wudai shiji* 五代史記 (the alternative name for the XW) by Tonami Mamoru, *A Sung bibliography* (1978), ed. Yves Hervouet, p.63; and James T.C. Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu: an eleventh-century neo-Confucianist* (1967), pp.105-10.

18. See Ming K. Chan, *The historiography of the Tzu-chih T'ung-chien: a survey*, *Monumenta serica* 31 (1974-5), pp.1-38; notice by G. Lewin in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography*, pp.69-70.

scope, it also has a vital role as a transmitter of information. When we come to the *Qidan guo zhi* 契丹國志 (QG) and the LS, it is often the case that their ultimate source is the JW: a work which had been banned before either the QG or LS was compiled. In these cases the information is always found in the TJ as well, suggesting that without the TJ to carry information forward from the JW, the QG and LS would have been more deficient sources.

The draft for the continuation of the TJ, Li Tao's 李燾 *Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian* 續資治通鑑長編 (CB), was written in the same spirit as the TJ, and partly as a reaction against the intrusion of Southern Song factionalism into historiographical works. It appeared in several instalments before the final version was produced in 1183, but parts of it were lost as early as the end of Southern Song. Like the JW, what remained was preserved by its inclusion in the YLDD and recompiled by Qing historiographers in the Qianlong 乾隆 reign.<sup>19</sup>

Surviving works specifically concerned with the Liao are all considerably later in date. The QG was presented to the Southern Song court by Ye Longli 葉隆禮, probably in 1247, when the Song were concerned to stave off Mongol advances. It was based entirely upon Song written materials, but most heavily used were the TJ and its continuation. Via the TJ there was an indirect link with the JW. There is said to have been a direct connection too, but the JW had been out of favour and falling into disuse for 40 years and its tolerant viewpoint was unfashionable. Whilst copies must have existed and could have been used in theory, for the sections of the QG used here, a direct link with the JW is not immediately obvious.

The LS, as noted above, was finished in a rush in 1344. It is based on three main works. The first was the Veritable Records of the first seven Liao reigns, a single work presented at the Liao court in 1085 and which made its way to the Liao's successors, the Jurchen Jin 金. The second work was an incomplete history presented to the Jin court by Chen Daren 陳大任 in 1207. It was partly based on the Veritable Records and also used an earlier Jin work, itself based on the Veritable Records. The third work was the QG. The TJ would have been available and there is evidence for its limited use. The JW was also a source for the LS, both in its own right, and in its use in the compilation of the Veritable Record, Chen Daren's history and the QG. At each stage of the compilation, the LS ran into political problems, mostly concerned with the legitimacy of the Liao regime and the implications of recognising it for the dynasties which co-existed with and followed it.<sup>20</sup>

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19. Notice by Shiba Yoshinobu; Hervouet, *Sung bibliography*, pp.72-5.

20. See n.13 for references.

It is well known that the SS was compiled at the same time as the LS, being presented in 1345. The work was, however, conducted quite separately, save for the overall direction of the history projects by Toghto 脱脱, Ouyang Xuan 歐陽玄 and a number of others.<sup>21</sup> The four LS compilers appear to have had little communication with their 23 counterparts on the SS project. Discrepancies between the two works abound, making it unlikely that either made extensive use of material collected for the compilation of the other.<sup>22</sup> The SS was largely compiled from the well-kept government records of the Song and would have had less recourse to a chain of works derived one from another. The SS can therefore be assumed to provide an independent view of events, without the need to interpret or re-interpret slim available evidence. Coming from a totally different perspective, it could also be expected to contain at least a certain amount of different information.

The nature and functions of Chinese historical writing influenced what was recorded and how it was written, and we should be aware of these factors when working with the texts. The historiographer had a responsibility to produce a 'truthful record,' but history also had an instructional purpose. This didactic function was not necessarily perceived to be in opposition to the search for accuracy, but the historiographers' need to explain the correct moral verdict means we must beware of taking accounts recorded in a Chinese history at face-value. They often have a point to make. In addition, the concern and care over the production of what was intended to be the 'truthful record' shows a conscious awareness of how powerful a tool of government history can be. It had a legitimating function which was consciously exploited. Despite this, the historiographers do seem to have been genuinely concerned to preserve the integrity of their texts, but the claim that large amounts were simply copied verbatim and that therefore we can treat a dynastic history as a contemporary work, does not stand up to scrutiny. The compilers would edit for style and would even re-write when they thought it was necessary. Passages can often be very close, and odd phrases might survive untouched through a whole series of texts, but successive historiographers were not merely collectors and copiers; they were always, at the very least, active editors.

The works discussed above were produced in the period in which the neo-Confucian orthodoxy was becoming dominant, and revisionism in the name of textual purification was rampant. Any study of the pre-neo-Confucian periods of Chinese history necessarily has to pay attention to later versions of what happened, because those views have conditioned our vision of the period actually under consideration. In some cases the issues raised by the later historiographers and commentators have taken on such a

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21. The project compiled three histories in all; the third was the *Jin shi* 金史.

22. For details see Chan, *Official historiography*, esp. pp.64-8, 75-9.

powerful life of their own that whilst they may not, in fact, bear any relevance to the earlier historical situation, they nevertheless cannot be ignored. Although we would do well to consider these later works as in one sense secondary materials, with which we may disagree subsequent to reconsideration of primary evidence, the complication is that in many cases these works are widely treated as primary sources.

For the tenth century there is a particular shortage of materials of all kinds, beset with the problems described; but we are fortunate in two ways. First, there is more than one official source, giving the tenth century an advantage over periods with only one dynastic history. Secondly, the sources leading to the LS are unusually closely related. This offers the opportunity to use the sources comparatively, allowing the changes and lacunae to reveal changes in concerns, even if not the initial concerns themselves, and thus lead to consideration of questions which might otherwise be overlooked. Such an approach also reduces the danger of unconsciously internalising the viewpoint of the canonical texts. Hence I have taken a close comparative approach to a relatively small number of sources: chiefly the annals and biographies sections of the works mentioned above, supplemented where appropriate by collections such as the *Cefu yuangui* 冊府元龜 (CFYG) and the *Liao shi shiyi* 遼史拾遺 (LSSY, a compilation from Song and Yuan works), along with the small amount of surviving poetry and personal writings. The subjects for the case studies were selected on the basis of available biographical material, in order that a method of close textual comparison might be applied. As these individuals have very few surviving writings, information about them has to come largely from annalistic and biographical materials. For most periods of Chinese history there is such a wealth of surviving literary material that the annals and biographies tend to be relegated to providing narrative structure and mundane information, as background to the institutional studies for which the *zhi* 志 and *biao* 表 in the dynastic histories seem designed to provide. Yet as sources for historical events, rather than for the analyses of individual writers, the annals and biographies are the closest we can now get to what really happened. When used comparatively they can reveal a surprising amount.

As a final point here, it is worth reiterating that in dealing with the tenth century we are looking at a period of transition: we are concerned with a process of change at the moment it happened, and about the structuring of that change after the event. In trying to do so we are dealing with process rather than structure, and we must therefore keep in mind the dynamic nature of the multi-faceted situations that we have to describe in a linear fashion.

**PART ONE**

**PALPABLE FRONTIERS**

## Chapter One

# The shifting frontier

The history of tenth-century China is extremely complicated, and still lacks a narrative treatment in English.<sup>1</sup> This chapter does not attempt to fill that gap with a comprehensive account of events, although it is intended to provide a certain amount of historical background. The focus will be upon the movements of the northern frontiers of the Middle Kingdom 中國, the people who made them happen, and the significance of the changes in terms of the legitimation and consolidation of regimes.

In setting out this goal, we immediately run into the problem of defining what we mean by 'the frontier.' In 1005 the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵 laid down a well-defined border line between Liao 遼 and Song 宋, putting the seal on the reunification of the Middle Kingdom and marking the beginning of 120 years of diplomatically-maintained peace.<sup>2</sup> The clarity of this demarcation, both historical and territorial, should not blind us to the fact that a century earlier this frontier could not be said to exist. Of course there were territorial regimes and of course their leaderships were conscious of where the boundaries of those territories lay. But the region through which the unified 1005 border would one day run was divided between a multitude of small, inconstant powers, whose relationships, and thus their borders, shifted continually as each strove for survival and advantage. There was not a single frontier line dividing 'China' from 'the barbarians,' but a whole network of borders between regimes led by families variously of 'Han 漢,' Bohai 渤海, Kitan 契丹, Shatuo 沙陀, Tangut 党項, Xi 奚, or other origin.<sup>3</sup> Rather than being a 'frontier region' between two states, there was a 'region of frontiers' comprising many regimes. Movements of the frontiers could leave an individual stranded in what had suddenly become enemy territory. The same individuals were in a position to themselves contribute to the shifts of the frontier by taking the territory they controlled over to

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1. There are two well-known accounts of political and military developments, focussing on structural and institutional changes. Wang Gungwu, *The structure of power in north China during the Five Dynasties* (1963), (hereafter Wang), which covers up to 947, and Edmund Worthy, *The founding of Sung China, 950-1000: integrative changes in military and political institutions* (Ph.D. diss. 1976), which includes a chapter of narrative. An account for the Liao now exists to fill out the spare chronology in WF. Denis Twitchett, *The Khitan and the Liao dynasty*, in *CHC 6: Alien regimes and border states*, forthcoming. In Chinese, narratives include Tao Maobing, *Wudai shi lue* (1985), Shu Fen, *Liao shi gao* (1984), and Yang Shusen, *Liao shi jian bian* (1984.) The annalistic primary material has been discussed in the Introduction.

2. For a detailed account of events leading to the treaty, see Christian Schwarz-Schilling, *Der Friede von Shan Yüan (1005 n. Chr.)* (1959); for the diplomatic maintenance of peace see, Melvin Thlick-Len Ang, *Sung-Liao diplomacy in eleventh- and twelfth-century China: a study of the social and political determinants of foreign policy* (Ph.D. diss. 1983.)

3. The significance of these designations varied; a topic discussed in Chapter 9.

allegiance to the 'other side.' This situation changed over the century, so that although in the first half the Kitan were just one of many competing powers, by the end only they and the Song were left, and a clear line could then be drawn between them without reference to those who lived on the frontier. It is this changing role of individuals in defining where frontiers lay which is traced below.

### Background situation

Tang Taizong 唐太宗 (r. 626-649) had managed to bring the Middle Kingdom and the steppe under united rule but after his death the empire began to contract again. So, for instance, the confederation of Kitan tribes which had formally submitted to him in 628 rebelled, and only submitted again in 715. The Kitan continued to resist Tang 唐 control, and in 751 the Youzhou 幽州 governor An Lushan 安祿山 was sent against them. It took him until 755 to defeat them, and later in that year his rebellion marked the beginning of decline in Tang fortunes. It was Uighurs 回鶻 who crushed opposition in 763 and kept the dynasty going, and it was Uighur suzerainty that the Kitan then accepted. After the rebellions, and until the end of the dynasty, the northeastern provincial governors, some of them of Kitan origin, retained a very high degree of autonomy, despite the efforts of Tang Dezong 唐德宗 (r. 779-805), Xianzong 憲宗 (r. 805-820) and Muzong 穆宗 (r. 820-824) to recover control there, in the region known as Hebei 河北. Two years after the collapse of the Uighur empire in 840, the Kitan submitted to Tang again. Meanwhile, in the Yellow River 黃河 heartlands of the empire successive rulers could not halt the growth of local unrest during the ninth century, which culminated in the rebellions of Huang Chao 黃巢 and others from 875 to 884. It was during this period that the leading players in the early tenth century rose to prominence, as the most powerful of the northern governors were enlisted on the side of the dynasty.<sup>4</sup>

These governors were the latest generation to hold the title *jiedushi* 節度使. Originally this referred to a general, temporarily given concurrent prefectural and military powers in order better to deal with a frontier emergency. By the end of the seventh century increased pressures on the frontier brought a professionalisation of the Tang armies and an end to the temporary character of the *jiedushi* post. *Jiedushi* were appointed to large areas including several prefectures. During An Lushan's rebellion, the

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4. For fuller coverage of this background see Barfield, *Perilous frontier*; Charles Peterson, *Court and province in mid and late T'ang*, and Robert M. Somers, *The end of the T'ang*, CHC 3: *Sui and T'ang China 589-906 pt. 1* (1979), pp.464-560, 682-789; Twitchett, *Liao*. For detail and dispute see E.G. Pulleyblank, *The background of the rebellion of An Lu-shan* (1955), and Peterson, *The autonomy of the northeastern provinces in the period following the An Lu-shan rebellion* (Ph.D. diss. 1966); also Pulleyblank's *The An Lu-shan rebellion and the origins of chronic militarism in late T'ang China*, and Twitchett, *Varied patterns of provincial autonomy in the Tang dynasty*, *Essays on T'ang society* (1976), edd. John Perry & Bardwell Smith, pp.33-60, 90-109; and Wang.

Tang court was forced to spread the provincial *jiedushi* system from the frontier to the interior, only to find that it could not unilaterally undo this *de facto* decentralisation. In the northeast the court effectively ceased to have any control over appointments to governorships, and only rarely could do anything but accept the succession of a governor's son or the takeover by a powerful local general. Those taking power in this way never failed to request court confirmation in their post. They did not usually declare themselves *jiedushi* straight away, but first took the title of (*jiedu*) *liuhou* 節度留後 before applying to the court for the full title of *jiedushi*. A feature of the system was that regional army units would sometimes 'elect' their leader to a particular official post, frequently that of *liuhou*, and with this backing the pretender would seek confirmation from the court. During the ninth century it was a mark of court strength if an emperor was able to impose his own choice of governor on a northeastern province, while in the tenth there were occasional confirmations in the post of *liuhou*, not *jiedushi*; an indication of the evolving character of these posts.<sup>5</sup>

In what follows it will be apparent that the frontier region suffered greatly from the disruption brought by constant fighting. Refugeeism is a recurrent problem mentioned throughout all the sources, and the deliberate, forced transfer of populations was widely practised. Even when there was no war going on, cross-border raids, in both directions, were so common that our sources mention only those which were particularly significant. From this it seems likely that a relatively large proportion of the frontier population, both Chinese and non-Chinese, was involved in such raiding. But raiders must have something to raid, and it appears that their main objectives were grain and livestock. This implies that people on both sides of the frontier practised both agriculture and stock-raising, supplemented by raiding. Trade continued despite military activity, but it is impossible to say how much because there are no figures for official trade, and unofficial exchange is necessarily a matter of conjecture. Life was evidently simply a matter of survival, but whilst members of the ruling classes could make some individual choices, the common people only rarely had any say in deciding which regime they should place themselves under.<sup>6</sup>

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5. Translating these two titles runs the risk of implying that their functions and powers were fixed throughout the period. As this was not the case it has been decided to leave them in transliteration for the most part. Where they are translated, 'military governor' or 'governor' is used for *jiedushi*, and 'successor governor' or 'successor' for *liuhou*. The best description of the system is in des Rotours, *Traité des fonctionnaires et de l'armée* (1948), pp.656-8, 820-1, 824ff, 825 (*liuhou*) and notes. See also Peterson, *Autonomy of the northeastern provinces*, pp.2-8, 55n; and Wang, *passim*.

6. It is hard to pin down what *frontier* life, specifically, was like. The overall socio-economic situation of the 'mature' Liao dynasty, with some references to the tenth century, is described in WF; see esp. Sections II, III, V, XI, and Section XII for refugees. The many Chinese articles on the subject do little more than reiterate the information collected there, concentrating on the process of 'sinicisation.' Amongst these, Yao Congwu, *Qidan hanhua de fenxi* (includes discussion), *Dalu zazhi* 4:4 (1952, repr. 1988), pp.507-22, is probably the most balanced, despite its age. Japanese materials, eg. Shimada Masao, *Ryôdai shakaishi kenkyû* (1952), also



## Part 1 - Fragmentation in the early tenth century

### Raids, alliances and allegiances at the end of the Tang, c.900-907

In the years leading up to the forced abdication of the last Tang emperor, north China was controlled by two main leaders. They were Li Keyong 李克用, leader of the Shatuo principedom of Jin 晉, based at Taiyuan 太原 and controlling the territory known as Hedong 河東, and the Chinese Zhu Wen 朱溫, also known as Zhu Quanzhong 朱全忠, ex-Huang Chao rebel, the governor of Bian 汴 and a number of other provinces, broadly comprising Henan 河南. Their competition for control of the dying Tang empire was fuelled by personal hatred, and when it was not played out in direct fighting between them, it was conducted by proxy, using any available lesser power. While the Tang dynasty survived they treated the court and emperor as an ultimate reference point, but consultation was nominal and done simply out of the need for formal legitimation of actions, whether they were the attacking of a fellow governor or a request for confirmation in a newly gained territory.<sup>7</sup> Once the Tang had ended, the submission or support of other powers became an important indicator of the legitimacy of a regime, which equated with military strength.

Of the lesser leaders, the most important were the Hebei governors Liu Rengong 劉仁恭, the Youzhou *jiedushi*; and Wang Chuzhi 王處直, the Yiwu 義武 *jiedushi*. Youzhou was the northernmost of the Hebei governorships, and throughout the 150 years since the rebellion of An Lushan had been the province least under central government control.<sup>8</sup> However, the dominance of the new power-brokers was such that when the governorship of Youzhou changed in 895, it was now caught up in the rivalry between Zhu Wen and Li Keyong. Keyong supported Liu Rengong for appointment to the province, thereby becoming 'patron' to Rengong's 'client.'<sup>9</sup> Yiwu was much smaller, being a 2-prefecture fragment broken off Youzhou by Tang Dezong after the rebellions of 781-6.<sup>10</sup> It was strategically important as it offered the potential to outflank Youzhou. Wang Chuzhi came under Zhu Wen's control when Wen recommended him to the governorship in 900.<sup>11</sup>

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tend to focus on 'influences.' Owen Lattimore still provides the most vivid impression of life in these regions: *Inner Asian frontiers*; and cf. Barfield, *Perilous frontier*.

7. For details of this situation, see Wang, chs. 1-3.

8. See Peterson, Court and province, pp.547-52, and Autonomy of the northeastern provinces, *passim*.

9. JW 26:350; TJ 260:8465, 8475. The terms 'patron' and 'client' are borrowed from European history of a similar period. Rengong yearned for independence, so for instance he tried to avoid responding to Keyong's demand for troops in 896-7. JW 26:354-5.

10. Pulleyblank, Origins of militarism, p.49; and Peterson, Court and province, p. 99.

11. TJ 262:8537.

At this time the future founder of Liao, Abaoji 阿保機, was the *yuyue* 于越, or commander-in-chief, of the Kitan tribal confederation, and one of the lesser leaders in the region. Although Abaoji did not seek to rule the Central Plains 中原, he did want to enlarge his authority and enrich himself. His main point of contact with north China was through Youzhou, with whom the Kitan already had a longstanding relationship. In the eighth and ninth centuries the governor of the region had traditionally held a concurrent title giving him responsibility for controlling the Xi and Kitan, and Kitan missions to China regularly left behind large parties at Youzhou to conduct trade.<sup>12</sup>

There is not space here to give a detailed account of all the territorial changes of this period. Suffice it to say that by 901, Zhu Wen controlled much of the old Tang realm on both sides of the Yellow River. Apart from the provinces governed by himself or his appointees, Wen also received the submission of other governors, most significantly Wang Chuzhi and the *jiedushi* at Zhenzhou 鎮州 (also prince of Zhao 趙王.)<sup>13</sup> Wen dominated the Tang court and was able to maintain his own candidate on the Tang throne, while continuing to present himself as the loyal defender of the emperor. Li Keyong cultivated a similar image,<sup>14</sup> while his strength in Hedong was increased by the firmer adherence of Liu Rengong, driven to swallow his pride and ask for Taiyuan Jin assistance by the attacks of Zhu Wen.<sup>15</sup> This request improved Li Keyong's control of the band of territory across the top of north China, although neither he nor Zhu Wen were ever able to assume such submissions were permanent. Zhu Wen was unable to conquer Hedong or Youzhou and so never had a frontier with the Kitan, but he was soon to have dealings with them anyway as they came under the dynamic leadership of Abaoji.

Abaoji's first concern was not with the faraway Zhu Wen, but with his immediate neighbours, whom he variously attacked on an annual basis.<sup>16</sup> In north China the first incursion recorded by the LS was in 902, but there were others before that. Most of the raids recorded were on Li Keyong's Hedong, but Abaoji's attention was really focussed on Keyong's 'client' Liu Rengong in Youzhou (Lulong 盧龍.) Rengong started raiding into Kitan territory soon after he was made governor in 895, burning pasture land, taking prisoners and driving off herds. Abaoji must have reciprocated because when Rengong refused to send troops to join Li Keyong's forces in 897:7, he used the excuse of a Kitan raid.<sup>17</sup> In 903:12 Rengong captured Abaoji's brother-in-law, and this is said by the JW to

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12. Twitchett, Liao, pp.14-15.

13. JW 26:357; TJ 262:8534; XW 1:7


14. Twitchett, Liao, pp.25ff, Wang, pp.62ff.

15. Attacks began in 900. JW 26:356-7; TJ 262:8530.

16. LS 1:1-3. There is a brief summary of events up to the founding of Later Han in JW 137:1827-37.

17. JW 137:1827; TJ 261:8505-6.

**Map 1: North China, 907**



have prevented Kitan raids for over ten years.<sup>18</sup> The raids just a couple of years later, in 905, 906 and subsequently, show the JW to be exaggerating, but its claim makes more sense in the context of constant annual raiding by both parties; raiding so commonplace it barely warranted being recorded.

Raiding Rengong's 'patron,' Hedong, was clearly profitable, providing booty and population,<sup>19</sup> but in 905 or 907<sup>20</sup> Abaoji made an agreement of brotherhood with Li Keyong, which stopped the raids. (Map 1.)<sup>21</sup> The JW and TJ say that the agreement was for a joint attack against Liang 梁; the LS relates an alliance against Liu Rengong, which produced results in the form of several captured prefectures.<sup>22</sup> The emphasis in the records reflects the chief worries of the leaders with which each text was concerned, but the significance of the agreement for us is that for the first time Abaoji became directly involved in the 'internal' affairs of north China. This involvement moved Abaoji into a different league, for in swearing brotherhood it is clear that Li Keyong was willing to recognise Abaoji as his equal, at least for the sake of immediate interests.<sup>23</sup> But Abaoji felt no commitment to Keyong's cause against Zhu Wen and the joint attack never materialised. Abaoji remained more concerned with his neighbour Rengong, and the 906 attack on Youzhou was accompanied by gifts to Zhu Wen.<sup>24</sup> Our sources do not relate these gifts to Wen's own attacks on Rengong a few months later,<sup>25</sup> but given his earlier efforts to control Hebei he doubtless welcomed the opportunity to attack a Youzhou already softened up.

An important feature of the political environment which Abaoji was entering was that individual members of the ruling classes, down to a relatively low level, could significantly influence the balance of power through the placing of their allegiance. To take one example, when Rengong came under Zhu Wen's attack in 906, he sent for Jin help, and a joint force attacked Ze 澤 and Lu 潞 in order to draw Wen back south. The

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18. TJ 264:8623; JW 137:1827. Twitchett has suggested that it was this aggressive behaviour that provoked the Kitan to unite in defence of their livelihood. Twitchett, *Liao*, p.26.

19. Most notably 95,000 people and countless animals from Hedong in 902:7. LS 1:2.

20. JW 26:360; LS 1:2 give 905. JW 137:1828 gives 907, and TJ 266:8679 with note from the *Kaoyi*, argues for this date.

21. Place names and boundaries from 907 appear on Map 1, which can be referred to until superseded by the next map, and so on. These are effectively only sketch maps, because despite the large amount of information in the standard works, exact boundaries cannot always be determined, especially for the northern regimes.

22. LS 1:2. 'Keyong offered troops for the avenging of Liu Rengong's deeds at Muguajian 木瓜澗; Taizu 太祖 agreed to this.' This phrase has been much overlooked by commentators on the agreement.

23. Depending on the date of the agreement, it could have been Abaoji's first act as a newly ascended emperor (907, LS 1:3) or he could still have been *yuyue* (905), in which case he was undermining the authority of the then *khaghan*, Hendejin 痕德堇. See Twitchett, *Liao*, pp.33-5 on the problem of dating the start of the dynasty.

24. LS 1:2; JW 2:39.

25. JW 26:360; TJ 266:8668, 8670.

governor of Lu, Ding Hui 丁會, surrendered, and this loss forced Zhu Wen not only to abandon his attack on Cangzhou 滄州 (a satellite of Youzhou) but hastily to take the throne himself, apparently in an effort to regain control of the situation.<sup>26</sup> It was thus a defection and the corresponding territorial loss which forced Wen finally to end Tang and establish his new Liang dynasty.<sup>27</sup> The act of a single person changing their allegiance could thus have a tremendous impact. We might further note that in such a scenario the court has only a secondary role, and the focus is instead on the frontier zone itself as the origin of events. Zhu Wen's accession did not change this state of affairs.

### **The Liang 梁 dynasty and the Yan 燕 dynasty, c.907-914**

Almost as soon as Zhu Wen took the throne as emperor of Liang (temple name Taizu 太祖), Abaoji sent an envoy to establish peace with the new court. Keyong was singularly unimpressed by this total disregard of their agreement, and is said to have hated Abaoji from then on. Not only had Abaoji not joined in an attack on Zhu Wen, he had now recognised his legitimacy,<sup>28</sup> thus effectively reneging on the agreement of brotherhood with Keyong. Bonds of brotherhood were standard currency amongst the military classes of the time, being a good way of making certain of another's loyalty; to break one was a crime against morality.<sup>29</sup>

Although the ally was different, Abaoji's involvement with north China was still channelled through Youzhou. Wen's 906-7 attack had failed to conquer the province, but it does seem to have finally provoked Rengong's son, Shouguang 劉守光, to usurp his father's position in order to lead an effective defence.<sup>30</sup> However, at some point not long after Wen became emperor, Shouguang submitted to him and was confirmed as *jiedushi*. This action of Shouguang's was that of a lesser ruler seeking moral backing for their authority from the power perceived to be strongest at the time; it also contributed to the legitimation of Zhu Wen's new dynasty.

In Youzhou, Shouguang's brother Shouqi 劉守奇, the Pingzhou 平州 *jiedushi*, fled to the Kitan. According to the LS he arrived with several thousand troops, and was

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26. Wang, pp.83-4.

27. TJ 266:8671-5; JW 26:360; LS 1:3.

28. TJ 266:8679-80; JW 137:1828.

29. This subject is worthy of more discussion, for which there is not space here. The operation of the brotherhood to which Song Taizu 宋太祖 belonged is highlighted by Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, p.165 and in Yang Lien-sheng, A 'posthumous letter' from the Chin emperor to the Khitan emperor in 942, HJAS 10 (1947), p.421, referring to the XW.

30. Rengong had retreated to a mansion in the mountains, where he sought an elixir of youth, and hoarded money. Zhu Wen's general Li Sian 李思安 had led an army into Youzhou territory. TJ 266:8671; JW 137:1827.

given a post.<sup>31</sup> The TJ, on the other hand, claims that although Shouqi set off for Kitan, he was diverted to Hedong.<sup>32</sup> Only four months later (907:11), Shouguang's older brother Shouwen 劉守文, the Yichang 義昌 *jiedushi* in Cangzhou (under the Jin), requested the Liang to punish Shouguang for his unfilial behaviour towards his father.<sup>33</sup> Shouwen's province would be the first place attacked in the event of renewed hostilities against Youzhou, so this was a pragmatic choice. These two incidents illustrate the range of possible options available at this time to those with regional authority, and emphasise the immediacies upon which decisions were based.

While Zhu Wen's authority was bolstered by the submissions of Shouguang and his brother, Keyong's successor Cunxu 李存勗<sup>34</sup> was reinforced in his position by the stubborn refusal of the beleaguered Jin city of Luzhou to surrender to repeated Liang attacks. The great Jin general Zhou Dewei 周德威 contributed to this confirmation of legitimation by bringing his army to Taiyuan and demonstrating his allegiance. Nevertheless the military situation was serious for the Jin. Luzhou was considered strategically crucial to the holding of Hedong, and so help was requested from Fengxiang 鳳翔 (Qi 岐) and money sent to the Kitan for cavalry assistance.<sup>35</sup> No response came from Fengxiang and it seems unlikely that the Kitan helped either as in 908:5 Abaoji asked Zhu Wen for investiture, which was agreed on condition that he help Liang to destroy the Jin. Meanwhile Cunxu asked for cavalry to attack Lu, citing his father's agreement with Abaoji.<sup>36</sup> Zhu Wen's effort to make use of Abaoji to neutralise Jin suggests that Abaoji was now taken seriously in the north China power circuit, but there do not appear to have been any Kitan attacks on Jin.

Towards the end of 908 Liu Shouwen attacked his brother Shouguang at Youzhou. Shouguang promptly asked the Jin for help, and they took the opportunity to back him, successfully, against their rivals.<sup>37</sup> Shouwen next turned to the Kitan for help, apparently hiring a tribal force which in the spring of 909 helped him to win a battle at Jisu 雞蘇.<sup>38</sup> Shouwen was captured in the course of this battle, and Shouguang was thus able to push

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31. LS 1:3.

32. The reason is unexplained. TJ 266:8672.

33. TJ 266:8686. Shouguang apparently sent gifts to Liang in 908:1, perhaps to remind Zhu Wen of his value. JW 4:59.

34. Keyong died in 908:2.

35. TJ 266:8694.

36. TJ 266:8700; JW 137:1828.

37. TJ 267:8706.

38. TJ 267:8710 gives 909:3, LS 1:4 gives 909:5.

on to Cangzhou, where the commanders made Shouwen's son their leader and resisted Shouguang.<sup>39</sup>

The options available to the smaller independent power at this time, and the uncertainty over which of Liang and Jin was going to end up holding the Mandate is demonstrated by Shouguang's attempt to play the situation both ways. In 909:6 he asked for deals with both powers, offering Zhu Wen the opportunity to pacify the Jin, and the Jin the opportunity to destroy the usurping Liang.<sup>40</sup> The Liang accepted Shouguang's offer and honoured him with the title prince of Yan in 909:7,<sup>41</sup> ignoring their backing for Shouwen. The Kitan offered no further help to Shouwen's son, and Cangzhou fell at the beginning of 910, allowing Shouguang to secure himself in his province.<sup>42</sup> In mid-911 Shouguang's ambitions were such that he needed appeasement, extracted in the form of titles from six northern governors, including Li Cunxu of Jin and Wang Chuzhi of Yiwu, as well as the Liang court.<sup>43</sup> But only two months later, still dissatisfied, Shouguang declared himself emperor of Great Yan 大燕. Despite his imperial pretensions, Shouguang clearly had yet to secure his northern border, for on the day of his investiture the Kitan captured Pingzhou.<sup>44</sup> Given the usurpation in Yan the Liang were hardly likely to intervene on Shouguang's behalf, and meanwhile the Kitan continued to send envoys to Liang, with missions in 911:4 and 11.<sup>45</sup>

Shouguang does not seem to have tried to recover Pingzhou. Instead he managed to turn all his neighbours in north China against him by first killing a Jin envoy who refused to treat him with imperial rites, then threatening to attack Jin, and finally invading Yiwu.<sup>46</sup> The Yiwu *jiedushi*, Wang Chuzhi, sent urgently to Jin, and Cunxu sent Zhou Dewei with 30,000 troops, and, helped by the surrender of Zhuozhou 涿州, the Jin swept through to beneath the walls of Youzhou in the first month of 912. According to the LS, at this point the Kitan joined in, with Abaoji personally leading an attack which reached Youzhou in 912:3.<sup>47</sup> Shouguang, in desperate need of support, turned to Zhu Wen, who was prepared to overlook the declaration of Great Yan if it meant he could

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39. TJ 267:8710; JW 135:1803.

40. TJ 267:8712.

41. TJ 267:8713.

42. TJ 267:8720. He executed Shouwen in 910:1.

43. TJ 268:8742 (911:6); JW 27:375 (911:3-5.)


44. TJ 268:8744-5; JW 27:376; LS 1:5. Only the TJ mentions the capture of Pingzhou.

45. LS 1:5.

46. 911:10-11. TJ 268:8746-8; JW 27:376. He also conducted a despotic registration of his population.

47. LS 1:5.

Map 2: North China, 914





prosecute his quarrel with the Jin and extend his own authority.<sup>48</sup> In fact, Zhu Wen's attack in support of Shouguang was to be his last act. The Liang throne changed hands twice within a year,<sup>49</sup> and Shouguang, left to defend himself as best he could, appealed unsuccessfully to all and sundry, including the Kitan. It seems that the Kitan continued to take part in the war, attacking and taking Pingzhou in 912:7, and sending envoys to Liang straight afterwards.<sup>50</sup> This is strange because there is no record of Yan, Jin or Liang retaking the prefecture from the Kitan after 911:8. Stranger still, as Yan collapsed in the course of 913, a Jin general is recorded as taking 'Yan Pingzhou' and capturing its prefect.<sup>51</sup> There is no time here to attempt to reconcile the conflicting accounts, but the confusion over this one case shows how fluid the boundary could be and how individual commanders could influence its line.

The fall of Yan is simply a larger case in point. Shouguang's generals, officials and population had been fleeing his side since the moment he disregarded Feng Dao's 馮道 warning that it was folly to attack Jin. Some, like Dao, fled to Jin, others went to the Kitan. As Shouguang's regional officials left him, they often took their territories with them, until only the stronghold of Youzhou itself was left.<sup>52</sup> Shouguang asked everybody he could for help, including the Kitan,<sup>53</sup> but none came. He held out until early 914, when he and Rengong were executed.<sup>54</sup> The Liang then turned their attentions back to the south rather than continue a lost war in the north. With the Jin conquest of Yan, the Kitan were left with only one southern neighbour.

### The rise of the Taiyuan 太原 Jin 晉, c.915-922

In 915:3 the death of the WeiBo 魏博 *jiedushi* Yang Shihou 楊師厚 and the rebellion of the garrison provoked the next round of the Liang-Jin conflict which ended in 916:9 with Li Cunxu the master of all Hebei.<sup>55</sup> (Map 2.) While Cunxu was occupied to the east, in 916:8 Abaoji took the Jin prefecture of Yu 蔚 with the capture of the Zhenwu 振武

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48. TJ 268:8751; JW 28:379. Wen had no scruples over accepting the mutinous murderer of Liu Shouguang's son as the new Yichang *jiedushi*. (JW 28:380) Yichang (seat: Cangzhou) was too strategic an acquisition for niceties, even on behalf of an ally.

49. Zhu Yougui 朱友珪 killed his father in 912:6, and was himself killed in 913:2, to be succeeded by his younger brother Youzhen 朱友貞 (temple name Modi 末帝.) JW 28:380-1; TJ 268:8759, 8767.

50. LS 1:6.

51. TJ 268:8772; JW 28:381.

52. Feng Dao's flight: TJ 268:8747. Other examples: Zhao Feng 趙鳳 fled to Jin, 912:1, TJ 268:8750; Liu Xun 劉訓 took Xizhou 隰州 to Jin, 912, TJ 268:8764; Shouguang's 'generals and troops surrendered one after the other,' and loss of all but Youzhou, 913:10, TJ 268:8777; refugee populations, XW 72:886.

53. Kitan, TJ 268:8777; Yang Shihou, JW 28:382.

54. JW 8:118, 28:383-4; TJ 268:8777-269:8781, *passim*; LS 1:6, misdated to 913:1.

55. TJ 269:8786-8806; JW 8:121-7; 28:385-9.

*jiedushi* Li Siben 李嗣本, and attacked Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> 雲州 in Cunxu's lands. Abaoji clearly did not intend to take any territory that was going to be difficult to hold, because as soon as he heard Cunxu's relief force was on its way, he withdrew from Yunzhou.<sup>56</sup>

Shortly after Cunxu emerged victorious in Hebei, he saw the advantages of trying to re-establish an alliance with the Kitan. Although Abaoji had risked a breach with the Liang by declaring himself emperor (temple name Taizu 太祖) in 916:2 and rejecting use of the Liang calendar in favour of his own, relations remained cordial, with the Liang sending envoys in 916:4 and subsequently.<sup>57</sup> In 916:12 Cunxu sent his uncle and aunt as hostages to the Liao court, strongly suggesting an agreement had been made, but any court decision was overturned by activity on the frontier, centred once again in Youzhou. The Jin Xinzhou<sub>1</sub> 新州 *jiedushi*, resented for his poor governance, was killed by his army under Lu Wenjin 盧文進. When they were refused entry to Xinzhou, Wenjin led them over to the Kitan. The following month, Wenjin, appointed Youzhou *liuhou* by the Kitan, led an army against Xinzhou and defeated the new (Jin) Youzhou *jiedushi* Zhou Dewei, whose seat was besieged until reinforcements forced a Kitan withdrawal in 917:8, and some kind of peace was achieved.<sup>58</sup> An indication of the haziness of the boundary in this area is that Wenjin is said to have raided from Pingzhou for some years, and the Kitan to have pastured flocks in Ping and Ying 營, with the knowledge of Dewei.<sup>59</sup>

The Kitan left the Liang and Jin to their struggles for the next couple of years but were soon to become much more active players in the north China scene. In 921:2 Chengde (seat: Zhenzhou) was taken over to Kitan allegiance by the 'elected' *liuhou*, Zhang Wenli 張文禮. He killed the former *jiedushi* Wang Rong 王鎔, who had held his post from Jin while maintaining a semi-autonomous position as prince of Zhao. Wenli promptly asked the Liang for help and the Jin for confirmation as *jiedushi*. Cunxu's continuing struggle with Liang Modi put Wenli in a strong position, and Cunxu agreed to confirm Wenli as *liuhou*, though not as *jiedushi*. The Liang agreed to help Wenli, then changed their minds, and so he turned to the Kitan for backing.<sup>60</sup> Ironically, it was Wenli's wax-ball letters to them which provided a convenient reason for Cunxu to launch the desired attack when he found himself in a strong enough position to do so in 921:8.

56. TJ 269:8805; JW 28:388, 137:1828; LS 1:11. The LS says that Siben's seat was at Shuozhou 朔州, and that Abaoji *attacked* rather than *took* Yu, Xin<sub>1</sub> 新, Wu 武, Gui 媯 and Ru 儒.

57. LS1:10-11; TJ 269:8808-10.

58. TJ 269:8811-270:8819; JW 28:389-90, 137:1828-9; LS1:11-12.

59. TJ 269:8812-3.

60. TJ 271:8864-67; JW10:146, 29:397, 137:1829.

Wenli was killed in the first clashes, but his son Chujin 張處瑾 continued the struggle, holding Zhenzhou against a siege.<sup>61</sup>

The Jin attack on Zhenzhou worried the Yiwu *jiedushi* Wang Chuzhi, who controlled the other minor power in the region. He feared that once Zhen fell, his own territory of YiDing 易定 would be next. One of Chuzhi's sons, Yu 王郁, had fled to the Jin when his brother was given more favour, and had been made prefect of Xinzhou 1, which bordered Kitan territory. When Cunxu refused to pardon the Zhenzhou leader, Chuzhi sent to Yu for help. Chuzhi asked him to offer payments to his neighbours, the Kitan, in return for the relief of the siege of Zhenzhou, and agreed to make Yu his heir. This worried the previously favoured brother, Wang Du 王都, who deposed his father and declared himself *liuhou*. He was swiftly confirmed in his post by Liang, leaving Cunxu free to deal with Zhenzhou, which, ignorant of the changed circumstances, had now sent to Chuzhi for help.<sup>62</sup> The help that arrived at Zhenzhou was Kitan, under the guidance of Wang Yu. Their attack on Dingzhou 定州 provoked Wang Du to send for Jin help.<sup>63</sup> These two appeals show that the Kitan were now seen as a viable backer by the minor powers of the region, even though they were not infallible. In 922:1, they were defeated by Wang Du and the Jin at Dingzhou, with heavy losses. Zhenzhou remained unrelieved, and fell in 922:9.<sup>64</sup>

### Later Tang 後唐 and Liao 遼, c.923-936

Cunxu was now in the ascendant, and after more fighting was able to declare himself emperor of the Later Tang (temple name Zhuangzong) in 923:4, receiving the submission of the Liang ruling classes six months later.<sup>65</sup> Paying no attention to this change, and despite their setback at Dingzhou, the Kitan not only continued, but intensified their regular raids on Youzhou, with nine recorded in the LS between 922 and the beginning of 925.<sup>66</sup> These were of varying depth, but the most important was yet another capture of Pingzhou from the Jin in 923:1.<sup>67</sup> For the most part though, these were just more of the usual raids, and they appear to have stopped after Zhuangzong appointed Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞 as Youzhou *jiedushi* in 925:2.<sup>68</sup> The Tang then took 75 days to conquer Shu 蜀

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61. TJ 271:8867-8; JW 29:398.

62. TJ 271:8868-9; JW 28:399; LS 2:17.

63. TJ 271:8870; JW 29:399, 137:1829-30; LS 2:17.

64. TJ 271:8871-3; JW 29:400-2.


65. TJ 272:8879-8902; JW 29:404-30:417.

66. LS 2:18-20; TJ 272:8884-273:8929; JW 137:1830.

67. TJ 272:8881, 8884; LS 2:18, 3:27.

68. TJ 273:8930; JW 32:445.

Map 3: North China, 925



in the south.<sup>69</sup> After this the Kitan made peace with the Tang, leaving Liao Taizu free to fight the Bohai without fears of an attack from the south.<sup>70</sup>

In fact, the Kitan need not have worried, because the Tang almost immediately became preoccupied with the mutiny of the WeiBo army in 926:2. (Map 3.) Li Siyuan 李嗣源 was sent to suppress the rising, but was acclaimed emperor by his troops in 926:4 (temple name Mingzong 明宗.)<sup>71</sup> He then had to spend the next few months putting down rebellions in Yedu 鄴都 (Weizhou 魏州) and Bianzhou and consolidating his position. According to the TJ, the Kitan tried to take advantage of the death of Zhuangzong by demanding territory in return for an undertaking not to invade the south.<sup>72</sup> However, this appears to have been an opportunistic demand as the Kitan were preoccupied with the subjugation of Bohai, which took until 926:8, and the succession to Taizu, whose death in 926:7 was followed by several months of tension until his brother Deguang 德光 (temple name Taizong 太宗) secured the throne.<sup>73</sup> Hence neither major power was in a position to exploit the other's situation, but it was an ideal opportunity for smaller leaders. In 926:10, the *jiedushi* of Liao Lulong (now centred on Pingzhou), Lu Wenjin, took a huge army, and his strategic territory, back to Tang allegiance. He had held the governorship since fleeing to Kitan in 917, but apparently he and his Chinese troops missed their homeland.<sup>74</sup> At this point the Kitan had been in Pingzhou for more than ten years, and they were not prepared to see it return to the Central Plains, so despite agreeing a peace with the Tang in 927:9, they retook the territory early in 928.<sup>75</sup>

Mingzong's real concern was not, however, the Kitan themselves, but the problem of Wang Du in Yiwu. Du, the son of Wang Chuzhi, had successfully chosen his allegiances so as to become and remain governor.<sup>76</sup> He was now inciting the other Hebei governors to refuse tribute or taxes, and not to take part in punitive expeditions. Mingzong sent Wang Yanqiu 王晏球 to deal with the recalcitrant governor, so in 928:5, Du brought Xi and Kitan reinforcements (his former enemies) to fight the Tang. Yanqiu defeated both them and a second force, and Zhao Dejun and the people of Youzhou

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69. Planning began in 925:9; it was all over in 925:11. TJ 273:8936-274:8946; JW 33:454-460.

70. TJ 274:8956. The other sources do not mention either Kitan fears or requests for peace. LS 2:21-2; JW 34:468.

71. TJ 274:8957-275:8983; JW 34:469-35:491.

72. TJ 275:8989-90.


73. LS 2:23-3:28; TJ 275:8988-8991. Twitchett, Liao, pp.48-50 gives a clear account of the events around the succession.

74. TJ 275:8994; JW 37:511. In 936 Wenjin fled the newly-established Later Jin for Shu. TJ 280:9166.

75. TJ 276:9013; JW39:533. The LS does not record this capture, although it says that two people 'fled' from Lulong in 926, implying that the territory did not change allegiance. LS 2:23.

76. See above, p.27.

Map 4: North China, 929



harried the Kitan retreat, capturing several generals.<sup>77</sup> The effect of this on the local perception of the power structure might be seen in the actions of Zhang Xichong 張希崇, the Liao Chinese *jiedushi* of Lulong who had replaced Lu Wenjin after his flight. In 928:8, after the Kitan defeats, he killed his Kitan general and brought his army of 20,000 over to Tang.<sup>78</sup> This must have affected the morale of the defenders of Dingzhou, but they continued to hold out for another six months before Yanqiu was finally able to take the city in 929:2, with the capture of 2000 Kitan.<sup>79</sup> The Chinese sources credit Yanqiu's two victories of 928 with keeping the Kitan from further breaches of the northern frontiers, and with bringing them to send tribute to the Tang court, but the Kitan raids on Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> a few months later would seem to negate this claim.<sup>80</sup>

With Wang Du out of the way, Mingzong could continue to consolidate his rule, a process symbolically assisted by the flight of Abaoji's son to Tang in 930:11.<sup>81</sup> (Map 4.) This son, Yelü Bei 耶律倍, prince of the conquered Bohai territory of Dongdan 東丹, was by all accounts highly sinicised: a bibliophile and painter.<sup>82</sup> It is however, less likely to have been these inclinations that led him to flee, than the continuing suspicion he was under as former heir apparent, and the proximity of Dongdan to Tang territory.

As the star of the Later Tang ascended, the Kitan conceded to the extent of sending envoys, in early 932, to request the return of their generals captured in the Dingzhou campaigns. Mingzong was confident enough to refuse to send back all but one, despite Kitan raids said to be intended to force his hand. Yet the fact that Mingzong returned one general shows that he was trying to tread the fine line between maintaining his prestige and avoiding war, and he emphasised this when he sent back a Kitan envoy who had asked to stay.<sup>83</sup> Fear of Kitan strength and intentions now began to grow at all levels of leadership in the Central Plains. The usual Kitan raids on Tang Lulong-Youzhou were stopped by the defensive building of the governor Zhao Dejun,<sup>84</sup> so they started raiding the more westerly Yunzhou<sub>1</sub>. When reports came from Yunzhou that the Kitan were building siege equipment, the Tang decided they had to deal with the 'barbarian' (*hu* 胡) threat. Discussions on the matter resulted, in 932:11, in Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 being appointed Beijing 北京 *liushou* 留守 (vicegerent) and Hedong *jiedushi* concurrently with

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77. TJ 276:9017-22; JW 39:537-41, 137:1832; LS 3:28-9.

78. TJ 276:9023; JW 39:541 (928:int 8.)

79. TJ 276:9024-7; JW 40:548.

80. TJ 276:9029, 9030.

81. TJ 277:9052-3; JW 41:571; LS 3:32.

82. See his biography LS 72:1209-11.

83. TJ 277:9067, 9072; JW 43:589-90.

84. TJ 278:9076; JW 43:592.

four other governorships. He was to be based at Jinyang 晉陽 (Taiyuan), the traditional heartland of the Tang ruling house, in an almost impregnable strategic position.<sup>85</sup> This appointment apparently resulted in the Yuzhou prefect Zhang Yanchao 張彥超 taking his city over to the Kitan, for the simple reason that he had a grudge against Jingtang.<sup>86</sup> That he had the option of joining the Liao was due to Yuzhou's frontier position.

Yanchao's willingness to turn to the Kitan was exactly the kind of behaviour which provoked court fear of them, which in turn lay behind many responses to events in this period. In 933:2, Li Renfu 李仁福, the Dingnan 定難 *jiedushi* at Xiazhou 夏州 died and his son declared himself *liuhou* in his father's place. The court's reaction was governed by their fears that the son, Yichao 李彝超, would join forces with the Kitan. To try to prevent such a scenario, the court attempted to transfer Yichao to be Zhangwu 彰武 *liuhou*. This had the opposite effect to the one desired, as Yichao was provoked to rebel. After an unsuccessful Tang punitive action, Yichao was confirmed, belatedly, as Dingnan *jiedushi*. When Yichao died in 935:2, he was replaced as *jiedushi* by his brother without a murmur from the court. In fact, it was Renfu who had approached the Kitan, but they had refused him any help, even though their own internal position was secure.<sup>87</sup> This government-by-paranoia which had produced the débâcle over Dingnan was soon to destroy the Later Tang, as they engineered the fulfilment of their own worst prophecy.

The greatest dangers for the Tang at this point came from the inside. A coup by the imperial prince Congrong 李從榮 was foiled in 933:11, and then Mingzong died. His successor Li Conghou 李從厚 (Mindi 閔帝) lasted five months before an attempt to transfer his adopted brother, Congke 李從珂, the prince of Lu 潞王, provoked Congke's rebellion, which led to his succession as Feidi 廢帝 in 934:4.<sup>88</sup> At this point the self-exiled Yelü Bei, now known to his Tang lords as Li Zanhua 李贊華, sent to Liao Taizong requesting that he send a punitive mission against Feidi. It is notable that up until now, the Liao had made no effort to take advantage of Tang troubles, and that once again, their intervention came only in response to a request.<sup>89</sup>

It took the Kitan another four months to attack south, and when they did, from 934:9, it was still not a major expedition, but raids which the *zongguan* 總管 (area

85. TJ 278:9079-80; JW 43:596.

86. TJ 278:9080. Although it was in the frontier region, Yu did not have a border with Liao, so the territory might not have changed allegiance in practice.


87. TJ 278:9082-5, 9090, 279:9127-8; JW 44:603-5.

88. TJ 278:9091-279:9117; JW 44:609-46:632.

89. LS 3:36. Of course, we would expect the LS to justify Liao attacks on the Central Plains in this way, but in most of the earlier cases the Central Plains sources confirm that major Kitan attacks were a result of invitations from within the Middle Kingdom.



**Map 5: North China, 938**



commander-in-chief) Jingtang was able to drive off easily. Nevertheless, the raids were continuous, and Jingtang requested more troops and supplies to deal with them. Jingtang was by now under suspicion with the court and when he was ordered to transfer from Hedong to Tianping in 936:5 he was provoked into rebelling. The Tianxiong 天雄 (WeiBo) general Zhang Lingzhao 張令昭 was amongst several leaders who promptly joined Jingtang with units of troops. At the same time the Tang mobilised a punitive force under Zhang Jingda 張敬達, and as this army invested Jingtang's capital at Jinyang in 936:7 he quickly turned elsewhere for support, contacting the very people he had once been sent to defend against, the Kitan. According to the TJ, Jingtang had already discussed making such a move with his closest advisors two months beforehand.<sup>90</sup>

## Part 2 - Alliance and war in the middle years

### The Liao-Jin 後晉 alliance, c.936-942

Jingtang had the highest status of any 'crosser' to the Liao, and his agreement with Taizong is probably the most famous event of the Wudai period, resonating down through the entire Song dynasty (and beyond) as marking the beginning of the 'barbarian' encroachment on north China which culminated in the Yuan 元 conquest of the whole country. Under the agreement Jingtang subordinated himself to Taizong by treating him as a father, promised annual payments of gold and silk, and handed over what were to become known as the Sixteen Prefectures 十六州.<sup>91</sup> (Map 5.) Into Liu Zhiyuan's 劉知遠 mouth are put warnings of the dangers of going beyond a pledge of allegiance to a father-son relationship, and beyond annual gifts of gold and silk to parcelling out land. These fears were precisely the ones over which Jingtang's son was to bring his dynasty to its end and the ones which the Song were most concerned about.<sup>92</sup> While the Kitan waited until the autumn before coming south, Zhang Jingda built an encircling wall around Jinyang in the eighth month, and settled down to a siege. Although this pressed hard upon the occupants of Jinyang, it did not last long, because when the Kitan did arrive in 936:9, they inflicted a heavy defeat upon Jingda's forces and turned the besiegers into the besieged at their camp, Jin'an zhai 晉安寨. After sending a

90. TJ 279:9124-280:9147 (earlier discussion at 280:9142); JW 46:639-48:663, 75:983-4; LS 3:36-8.

91. The original offer of 'the circuit of Lulong and all the prefectures north of Yanmen pass 鴈門關' (TJ 280:9146) translated into the prefectures of You 幽, Ji 薊, Ying<sub>1</sub> 瀛, Mo 莫, Zhuo 涿, Tan 檀, Shun 順, Xin<sub>1</sub> 新, Gui 媯, Ru 儒, Wu 武, Yun 雲, Ying<sub>2</sub> 應, Huan 寰, Shuo 朔 and Yu 蔚 (TJ 280:9154.) The palace edition of the LS used by WF gives Ying<sub>3</sub> 營 and Ping 平 instead of Ying<sub>1</sub> and Mo, but the Liao already held Ying<sub>3</sub> and Ping, and the list has been changed without comment in the Zhonghua shuju edition, to agree with the TJ. They are marked and highlighted on the map for 938, this being the date of formal handover.

92. TJ 280:9146. Also see Chapter 9 for further comment on the significance of this story.

message to tell the Tang court of his defeat, Jingda was cut off, and a long siege began.<sup>93</sup> The Tang court, most of whose imperial forces were committed in the north, was now constrained to conscript a new army to try to help Jingda, in order to supplement the provincial armies of Zhao Dejun at Youzhou and Fan Yanguang 范延光 at Tianxiong (seat: Weizhou).<sup>94</sup> Some sources claim that Dejun communicated with the Kitan from this early stage and negotiated with them to replace Jingtang as the ruler of the soon-to-be-conquered Central Plains. Whatever the truth of this or the order of events, Dejun was not successful in persuading the Kitan that they should back him rather than Jingtang, for Taizong did not go back on his formal investiture of the latter as emperor of Later Jin 後晉 (temple name Gaozu 高祖) in 936:11.<sup>95</sup> Not long afterwards, the fortress of Jin'an, which was running out of food, was surrendered by one of its generals, who had killed the stubbornly loyal Zhang Jingda. Zhao Dejun and his son Yanshou surrendered to the advancing Jin-Liao force and with them went the last effective fighting force on the Tang side. The Tang capital, Luoyang 洛陽, surrendered, Feidi killed himself, and the Later Jin replaced the Later Tang. One constant continued through this upheaval: the chief minister Feng Dao, who took office under Jin Gaozu as he had under Mingzong, Mindi and Feidi.<sup>96</sup>

Although Taizong had been careful not to send his army to Luoyang with Jingtang, he was happy to mark the Kitan possession of Youzhou by renaming it as the Southern capital, Nanjing 南京.<sup>97</sup> However, even in this province Kitan rule was not accepted everywhere. As the Kitan army withdrew after seeing Jingtang safely installed, Wu Luan 吳蠻, the *panguan* 判官 (administrative assistant) of Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> in the Sixteen Prefectures, refused to accept Taizong's rule and was attacked for his pains. Luan held out for six months and sent to the Jin court for help. Although Jingtang had offered to buy back the Sixteen Prefectures, his dependent position was such that he could not but meekly accept the Kitan refusal. Naturally he was not now going to create trouble for an ally to whom he was so deeply indebted, but he did write to the Kitan asking them to lift the siege, while he recalled Wu Luan to the south.<sup>98</sup> Another official, this time at Yingzhou<sub>2</sub> 應州, similarly would not suffer the shame of serving the Kitan and removed himself to the south.<sup>99</sup> Such reactions were by no means the only ones found amongst

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93. TJ 280:9147-9; JW 48:663-4, 75:984-5, 137:1833; LS 3:38.

94. TJ 280:9149-52; JW 48:665, 137:1833; LS 3:38-9.

95. LS 3:38; TJ 280:9152-3, 9155-6; JW 137:1833. For further discussion see Chapter 5.

96. TJ 280:9157-281:9188; JW 48:666-8, 76:992; LS 3:39-40.

97. TJ 281:9167; JW 76:995, 137:1833; LS 4:44.

98. TJ 281:9169, 9175, s.a. 937:2, 6; LS 3:40, s.a. 937:1. The LS reports that Luan surrendered and was killed.

99. TJ 281:9169. His was one of the Sixteen prefectures handed over to the Liao. See n.91.

Chinese, and their overall significance is diluted by the fact of the alliance being at the highest possible level. Just as the subordinates of *jiedushi* found their choices governed to a large extent by the actions of their superiors, so the subordinates of the emperor found themselves with limited room for manoeuvre.

Apart from resistance to Kitan control of the Sixteen Prefectures, there were also recurrent objections to Shi Jingtang's rule, but the success of either was ultimately limited by the removal of the Kitan as possible supporters of opposition. The first of these was the rebellion in 937:6 of the Tianxiong *jiedushi*, Fan Yanguang, which lasted until he was pardoned by Jingtang and moved to Tianping 天平 in 938:9. Yanguang was apparently testing the sincerity of the alliance, because according to the LS, in 937:3 he asked for Kitan help against Jingtang, which was refused and followed by Liao-Jin discussions of how to handle the affair.<sup>100</sup>

Such cooperation continued throughout the reign, bearing out the statement that Jingtang was keen to render good service to the Liao.<sup>101</sup> In 940 over a thousand tents (tribal units) of the Tuyuhun 吐谷渾, complaining of poverty and cruel treatment, fled to the Jin. The Kitan sent envoys to chastise the Jin for accepting the fugitives, and Jingtang, adhering to a tacit agreement, returned those Tuyuhun living in the four northern prefectures to their original lands.<sup>102</sup> This action is generally interpreted by Chinese commentators as a sign of Jin weakness against the 'barbarian' Kitan, but it could also be read as a further indication of the extent to which it had become possible to maintain peace on the northern frontier through negotiation rather than warfare. The next time such a situation arose was in 1005, with the treaty of Shanyuan, in which agreements such as the return of fugitives were set out explicitly.<sup>103</sup> Viewed in the light of that later agreement, it may be possible to see the Jin-Liao arrangement as a prototype of working relationships between Chinese and non-Chinese states on the northern frontier, but this early version was destroyed in the next Jin reign by the forces of court politics allied with irredentism.

In a similar incident, the *jiedu fushi* 節度副使 (deputy governor) of Liao Shuozhou, Zhao Chong 趙崇, drove out his *jiedushi* and asked to submit to the Jin in the spring of 941. This was followed, in the sixth month, by the revolt of the Chengde *jiedushi*, An Chongrong 安重榮, at Zhaozhou 趙州. He claimed to Jin Gaozu to be resentful of the Jin subordination to the Kitan and of the transfer of goods to the Kitan,

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
100. TJ 281:9168-9189 passim; JW 76:1003-4, 77:1018; LS 3:40-1.

101. TJ 282:9210.

102. TJ 282:9219, s.a. 940:12; JW 79:1045, s.a. 941:1; LS 4:48, s.a. 940:9.

103. It may well be that there were similar documents for the Jin-Liao agreement, but so far as I know, none survive.

Map 6: North China, 943



and to demonstrate the strength of his feeling he killed Kitan envoys who had come to him and raided the southern border of Youzhou territory. He then demanded a war against the Kitan, pointing out that the Tuyuhun and Tuque 突厥 subjects of the Kitan were willing to fight. This proposal was quashed by the prudent Sang Weiha 桑維翰, who advised against making enemies of the Kitan. An envoy was despatched to Liao, where he defused the anger of Taizong by some fast talking, but was not allowed to return.<sup>104</sup> Chongrong remained in place, but in 941:12 he rebelled again and marched on Yedu. On hearing of this, the Liao released the Jin envoy. Chongrong was defeated, and withdrew to defend his provincial capital of Zhenzhou, where in 942:1 one of his garrison generals led the imperial forces into the city. Chongrong was taken and executed, and his head sent to the Kitan as a gesture of good faith.<sup>105</sup>

### **The Liao-Jin war, c.942-947**

These regional murmurings were added to on the level of contact between courts. Shi Jingtang died in 942:6 and was succeeded by his young son Chonggui 石重貴 (temple name Chudi 出帝 or Shaodi 少帝.) Chudi was much influenced by irredentist generals and officials at court, who encouraged him to refer to himself only as the grandson of Liao Taizong, not as his subject. Taizong took this as an insult and reminded Chudi of the debt owed to the Liao by Jingtang for his kingdom.<sup>106</sup> After this first diplomatic shot, patched up thanks to the still-influential Sang Weiha, there was a long, slow build-up to war, which could be read as further evidence for the extent of agreement achieved between Jingtang and Taizong. With greater will from the south, it is possible that such agreement could have been transformed into something more institutionalised, as happened between the Song and Liao. However, Chudi's attitude was to ensure that the 936 arrangement remained an entirely personal deal between two individual rulers, conferring no benefits, or, in Chudi's mind, obligations, upon their successors.

The TJ claims that the Jin heard of an impending Liao invasion in 943:2, but discussions continued for another seven months, until the leader of the irredentist party, Jing Yanguang 景延廣, had all Kitan merchants in Jin killed, and the official responsible for them imprisoned. (Map 6.) The official, Qiao Rong 喬榮, was sent back to Liao with a message from Yanguang declaring that whilst the emperor could accept being called a grandson, he refused to be called 'subject,' and was quite ready to fight about it. Taizong was angered, and it is a mark of his restraint that he only imprisoned the Jin envoys then

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104. TJ 282:9222-3, 9228; JW 79:1048; LS 4:49-50.

105. TJ 282:9231-283:9233; JW 80:1054-6; LS 4:50.

106. TJ 283:9237, 9242-3; JW 80:1062, 81:1068, 137:1834; LS 4:51-2.

present at the court, rather than killing them as the Kitan merchants had been killed.<sup>107</sup> In the twelfth month of the year, the Liao were apparently encouraged to attack by reports of Jin weakness from the Jin Pinglu 平盧 *jiedushi* (seat Qingzhou 青州), Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠, and by the ambitions of their own general Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽, son of the Zhao Dejun whose earlier similar ambitions had helped to ensure the fall of Later Tang.<sup>108</sup> The sources thereby absolve Taizong from much of the responsibility for this attack, preferring to confer the blame on individual ministers. The sources clearly implicate the supporters of war at the Jin court with pushing the situation over the brink, leaving Chudi at best without blame for the war, and at worst as a pawn of his own ministers.

Whoever the driving forces behind the start of the war, there is little doubt that it started with a huge Liao advance at the very end of 943 led by Zhao Yanshou, who had apparently been promised emperorship of the southern regime if he were able to conquer it. In 944:1 the eastern arm of a two-pronged attack took Beizhou 貝州 and advanced to Liyang 黎陽, while the western arm attacked Taiyuan. These setbacks were enough to prompt Chudi to ask for a restoration of the old peace, but the Liao, as if the size of the force and length of preparation time were not enough to indicate, were not simply conducting a punitive raid: this time they meant business, and were led by a general with a great deal to gain by success. The request for peace was refused.<sup>109</sup>

However, as soon as the Jin actually fielded a defensive army, the military situation balanced out somewhat. In 944:2 Yang Guangyuan defected to Liao as he had promised, and the Liao eastern army attacked Yunzhou<sub>2</sub> 鄆州 in order to help him. But when faced by Jin armies on the battlefield, the Liao were defeated. This defeat is credited with halting their eastward advance, which in turn removed the possibility of relief for Yang Guangyuan. Instead, Taizong personally led an attack on Shanzhou 澶州, but the battle resulted in no clear victory and the Liao forces withdrew north by separate routes, taking the opportunity to wreak savage destruction on the way.<sup>110</sup> The actual fighting war slackened off at this point, while the Jin taxed the people fiercely to pay for it. A punitive expedition was sent against Yang Guangyuan, with the Liao sending him assistance, an apparent reversion to the interference techniques used widely during the first two Wudai regimes. The relief force was defeated, and Guangyuan's son eventually persuaded his father to submit to the Jin besiegers. Guangyuan was killed.<sup>111</sup> Meanwhile in the west,

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107. TJ 283:9253-4; LS 4:52, s.a. 942:7; JW 137:1834.

108. TJ 283:9243, 9256; JW 137:1834.

109. TJ 283:9260-3; JW 82:1084-6, 137:1834; LS 4:53.

110. TJ 284:9265-8; JW 82:1086-9; LS 4:54.

111. TJ 284:9271-2, 9278-9; JW 82:1090, 83:1097-8; LS 4:54.

Guo Wei 郭威, a general of the powerful Hedong *jiedushi* Liu Zhiyuan, was inciting Zhiyuan to declare his separation from Jin and form his own regime, instead of defending Jin as he had been appointed to do.<sup>112</sup>

In 945 the Jin took the upper hand for a while, and following a Liao defeat at Yangcheng 陽城 once again requested peace. The Jin advantage was not so very great, as the emperor was willing to concede to the designation as subject in order to end the hardships caused by the war. The Liao were also suffering from the prolonged fighting but made demands for territory and for the handing over of Sang Weihai and Jing Yanguang that the Jin refused to meet.<sup>113</sup>

A new Liao invasion came in 946:6, apparently at the instigation of Sun Fangjian 孫方簡, who had set himself up in Dingzhou as a frontier power, pledging allegiance to Jin or Liao to suit his best advantage.<sup>114</sup> After a series of minor actions the Jin, in 946:10, sent the Tianxiong *jiedushi* Du Chongwei 杜重威 with Li Shouzhen 李守貞 to attack the Liao. They were delayed by ceaseless rain, and as they waited supplies became harder to transport and morale flagged. Eventually they were defeated and in 946:11 the Liao marched on Jin in force. In the next month the Liao army faced Du Chongwei's force at the Hutuo river 滹沱水, with Chongwei too nervous to cross it and join up with the Jin forces at Hengzhou 恆州-Zhenzhou. While Du fretted, the Liao were able to cut his supply and withdrawal line. Du felt obliged to surrender, despite the unhappiness of his army at this move. The surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze 張彥澤 was sent by the Kitan to take Bianzhou where Jin Chudi submitted and the Jin dynasty was ended. Liao Taizong entered Bian in 947:1, keeping on Feng Dao as chief minister and receiving the surrender of almost all the capital and provincial officials, save for a couple: Shi Kuangwei 史匡威, the Zhangyi 彰義 *jiedushi*, rebelled at Jingzhou 涇州, while He Chongjian 何重建 at Xiongwu 雄武 killed the Kitan envoys informing him of the change of regime.<sup>115</sup>

### **The Liao occupation of the Central Plains, 947**

The Liao attempted to rule the Central Plains for about five months, against increasing resistance. According to the TJ this was not least because of the policy of 'smashing the

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112. TJ 284:9275.

113. TJ 284:9280-9294; JW 83:1099-1104; LS 4:55-6.

114. TJ 285:9303-4; JW 84:1115; LS 4:57.

115. TJ 285:9306-286:9330; JW 84:1116-26, 99:1324; LS 4:57-8.



pasture and grain' and greatly increased taxation.<sup>116</sup> In Hedong, Liu Zhiyuan, who like so many others had at first accepted the Liao conquest as a *fait accompli*, was encouraged by his general Guo Wei amongst others, to assume leadership of the opposition forces. Zhiyuan declared himself emperor in 947:2, without, however, changing the name or reign era of the dynasty, and ordered all circuits to punish the Kitan.<sup>117</sup> Quickly there broke out all over the Central Plains a whole series of revolts, involving the occupation of cities, the killing of Liao envoys, and a widespread transfer of allegiance to Liu Zhiyuan.<sup>118</sup> Taizong was dismayed at the extent of discontent with Liao rule and was later to observe that one of his oversights in the conquest was not to have transferred all the provincial governors at an early stage.<sup>119</sup> In the third month he set off for home, leaving Xiao Han 蕭翰 in charge of Bianzhou, now renamed Xuanwu jun 宣武軍. Taizong's entourage included several thousand Jin officials, as part of his stated intention to transfer the whole official body to the north.<sup>120</sup>

Taizong died in 947:4 before seeing the very end. Zhao Yanshou promptly tried to claim his promised reward, declaring himself regent for the southern realm, but Taizong's son Wuyu 兀欲 got Kitan noble backing to remove and imprison Yanshou, before returning to the north in 947:5 to consolidate his grip on power.<sup>121</sup> Wuyu was thus effectively abandoning the Central Plains, following the lead suggested by his father in his dying days. Even under a Chinese puppet ruler, it seems unlikely that the Liao could have maintained control over the Central Plains without a great deal of expenditure and effort, and possibly not even then. If Wuyu had not headed north to make sure of his control there, he might have lost the Liao state as well as the Central Plains.

### Part 3 - Approaching stability in the later years

#### Chinese recovery of the Central Plains under Later Han 後漢, 947-950

With the new Liao emperor departed, the Liao forces in the Central Plains began to head north as Liu Zhiyuan exerted increasing authority over the Chinese provinces, receiving submissions but also facing some surprisingly stubborn opposition. Xiao Han, left to

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116. TJ 286:9334-5. The destruction of crops would have had an immediate impact, but the taxation measures might not have had time to take effect. See Zhao Guangyuan, *Lüe lun Qidan jundui zai Zhongyuan 'da caoyu,' Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan yanjiusheng yuan xuebao* 1986:6, pp.67-71.

117. TJ 286:9339-41; JW 99:1324-5; LS 4:59.


118. TJ 286:9340-48; JW 99:1325-6; LS 4:60. The previous defections from Liao were to the Southern Tang, demonstrating very clearly that the discontented would seek alternative higher authorities wherever they could be found.

119. TJ 286:9354; LS 4:60.

120. TJ 286:9348-51; JW 99:1326-7; LS 4:60.

121. TJ 286:9356-287:9364; JW 99:1329; LS 4:60, 5:63.

Map 7: North China, 948



mind the southern realm by the late Liao emperor, now returned north, leaving the son of Tang Mingzong, Li Congyi 李從益, in charge of the south. Congyi, a reluctant deputy, sent an invitation to Liu Zhiyuan, who had him killed. The following month Zhiyuan entered Bian and declared a new dynasty, the Later Han 後漢. His temple name was Gaozu 高祖.<sup>122</sup> Du Chongwei, left behind by the Liao withdrawal, sent his submission from Yedu to the new emperor in 947:7. Gaozu tried to transfer Chongwei to be governor of Guide 歸德. Chongwei rebelled, occupied Yedu and made contact with his erstwhile captors and rewarders in the shape of the Liao general Mada 麻荅. Chongwei surrendered to Han after a four-month siege and was executed in 948:1.<sup>123</sup> This failure was followed by a Han attack on Hengzhou in 947:8, helped by the city population and the former Jin officials being held there. Mada cut his losses, abandoned Hengzhou and headed north to Liao-controlled Dingzhou, governed by Sun Fangjian. Han Yindi 漢隱帝 succeeded his father Gaozu in 948:2, and shortly afterwards the Liao tried to transfer Sun Fangjian from Dingzhou. This provoked him to return his allegiance to the south, which resulted in his restoration to his former post as Yiwu *jiedushi*, and the abandonment of Dingzhou by a Mada fearful of full-scale Chinese rebellion. Fangjian's realignment of Dingzhou meant that the last of the Jin territory lost to the Liao at the end of the war had been recovered by Han.<sup>124</sup>

Despite the alacrity with which the Central Plains provinces had turned to Liu Zhiyuan in order to be rid of the Liao, they were less keen to accept Han rule in the longer term. (Map 7.) In 948:3, the month of the final Liao withdrawal, there were three rebellions. Zhao Siwan 趙思綰 occupied the newly recovered Chang'an 長安, Li Shouzhen occupied Hezhong 河中 and Wang Jingchong 王景崇 occupied Fengxiang. Siwan and Shouzhen joined forces and turned to the Liao for assistance, as they were once again available as allies for rebels. Having bought support with generous gifts to officials at all levels, Han Yindi and Guo Wei were able to raise an army against Li Shouzhen, whose requests for Liao help had been fruitless. When Hezhong was placed under siege in 948:11, Shouzhen's requests for help were no longer directed northwards, whence there had been no response, but to the Southern Tang 南唐, whose force was beaten back. Shouzhen and his ally Siwan both submitted in 949:7, having received no Liao help at all, despite repeated requests.<sup>125</sup>

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122. TJ 287:9359-68; JW 100:1331-35; LS 5:63-4.

123. TJ 287:9368-9, 9376-8, 9384; JW100:1340.

124. TJ 287:9371-2, 288:9389; JW 100:1336, 1347-8.

125. TJ 288:9387-9411; JW 101:1346-102:1359.

Although the Liao and Southern Tang discussed a joint expedition against the Han in 948:4, nothing came of this for nearly 18 months, and even then the attack was really a return to the old Kitan habits of raiding Hebei and withdrawing before any advance against them. To counter these attacks, Yindi appointed Guo Wei as Yedu *liushou* and Tianxiong *jiedushi* in 950:4, effectively placing a great deal of power in his hands. This was exactly the same kind of overreaction to the Liao threat which had given Shi Jingtang his opportunity, and in 950:11 the dangers of such concentration of authority were seen once again as the previously loyal Guo Wei raised an army in rebellion. Yindi was killed by a mutinous army and Guo Wei set up a relative of Zhiyuan's on the throne, retaining the trust of the imperial house such that when the next Liao raid hit Neiqiu 內丘 in the same month, Wei was sent to deal with it. En route, he was proclaimed emperor by his army. The real extent of the danger posed by the Liao raids may be measured by Guo Wei's willingness to ignore his mission and return forthwith to the capital, where in 951:1 he established the Later Zhou 後周 dynasty, with the temple name of Taizu 太祖.<sup>126</sup>


#### Later Zhou 後周 and Northern Han 北漢, c.951-958

Although Feng Dao was again given employment under the new dynasty, Zhou Taizu's actions in this period suggest an emperor determined to start afresh, with a new austerity in the style of government. Liao, responding more quickly than usual to a change of dynasty, sent envoys to request peace. However, at almost the same time, the brother of the Han founder, Liu Chong 劉崇, declared himself emperor at Jinyang in order to continue the dynasty, an extension now known as the Northern Han 北漢. Recognising the need for support, Liu Chong turned immediately to the Liao for an alliance and a joint force attacked Jinzhou 晉州, although without success. In 951:2, the Liao congratulated Zhou Taizu on his accession whilst acknowledging Han requests for military aid, but after Liu Chong requested formal investiture as emperor from Liao, they became less friendly towards Zhou, detaining some envoys in 951:5. At this point the frontier governor of Dingnan, Li Yiyin 李彝殷, placed himself under his neighbours the Northern Han. Liu Chong was formally invested in 951:6, and repeated his request for troops to attack Zhou.<sup>127</sup> There is no doubt that despite their inability to hold north China directly, the Liao were still the other power in north China which counted, and were the natural recourse for the Han restorationists seeking to oppose the Zhou. Meanwhile, the

126. TJ 288:9415-290:9450 passim; JW102:1362, 103:1370-77, 110:1457-62; LS 5:64-5.

127. TJ 290:9452-62 passim; JW 110:1464, 111:1468-72; LS 5:65-6 (envoy exchanges recorded regularly to LS 9:101.)

Map 8: North China, 952



exchanges of envoys between Liao and Northern Han were the first in a relationship between rulers that was to be conducted entirely through such contacts.

Liao Shizong 遼世宗 sent troops to join the Northern Han attack on Zhou in 951:9, but the advance was delayed by his assassination. After the succession of his cousin Muzong 穆宗, the allies besieged Jinzhou, but Zhou reinforcements inflicted a heavy defeat. Meanwhile, the people of Northern Han were taxed heavily by Liu Chong, and are said to have resented the subordination to the Liao such that many of them fled to Zhou territory. Such flight only emphasised the claimed legitimacy of the Zhou dynasty, as it was taken to prove the righteousness of rule by that regime. On the other hand, Murong Yanchao 慕容彥超, the Taining 泰寧 *jiedushi* (seat: Yanzhou 兗州) under Later Han, at first sent tribute to the Zhou, then joined up with the Southern Tang and Northern Han to rebel, but his allies failed him. The Southern Tang assisting army was defeated, and the Northern Han-Liao force withdrew from Jinzhou, leaving Yanchao in a much weakened position.<sup>128</sup> Once again we see the mixed reactions to a new regime arising from differing circumstances, with challengers appealing to the strongest alternative sources of authority for support.

Zhou Taizu began to apply a stricter definition of the northern frontier. (Map 8.) In 952:9 he sent out an order to the people there that they were not to raid the Liao borders for captives and plunder. In the same month, the Liao raided Jizhou<sub>2</sub> 冀州 and took several hundred able-bodied people north with them, killing them en route because they were rebellious. These two pieces of information make it clear that population movement was two-way, and that the Liao were not the only group who practised frontier raiding for profit. Only the month after this raid, the Liao prefectures of Ying<sub>1</sub> 瀛, Mo 莫 and You 幽 suffered severe flooding, forcing many people off their land as refugees who moved south into more hospitable terrain. This happened to be Zhou-held Hebei, where they were received and given relief. At the end of the year the prefect of Linzhou 麟州 turned from Northern Han to Zhou allegiance. With Liao raids on Ding and Zhen and Northern Han raids on Fuzhou 府州 the situation looked as fluid as it ever had been.<sup>129</sup> A difference was soon to come, brought by a change of emphasis at court.

In 954:1 Zhou Taizu died and Liu Chong took advantage of the change of ruler to launch an attack on the Zhou in 954:3, with a large force of Liao allies. At Gaoping 高平, Zhou forces turned defeat into victory by a night attack, in which they slaughtered over a thousand Zhou infantry who had earlier surrendered to the Han on the battlefield; but the

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128. TJ 290:9462-78; JW 111:1474-112:1482; LS 6:69.

129. TJ 291:9482-97; JW 112:1484-113:1487; LS 6:71.

subsequent Zhou siege of Jinyang was abandoned after two months.<sup>130</sup> After a smooth succession to the Northern Han throne in 954:11, in which the relationship with Liao was firmly maintained, Liao attacks continued on Hebei. In 955 the new Zhou emperor Shizong 世宗 began extensive work to defend his territory, dredging the river between Shen 深 and Ji<sub>2</sub>, building fortifications and posting garrisons. The Zhou regime also strengthened itself from within, with Shizong declaring his desire to restore the old borders, holding discussions on gains and losses, and ordering senior ministers to write on remaining loyal to the lord in times of trouble.<sup>131</sup> Such determination suggests a change from the previous Wudai regimes. Although certain ministers had adopted an irredentist stance to further their own ends, earlier rulers had either been fighting for the Central Plains or accepting of Liao refusals to return the lands. The initiative was now for expansion, and came from the highest level. Most importantly, it was also backed by a conscious programme of preparation in many areas, not least of which was the renewed awareness of the uses of moral obligations. The Liao themselves were also showing less interest, despite many requests for their intervention. They did nothing to help Southern Tang when they sought help against a Zhou attack beginning in 955:11, and provided only half-hearted support in 957:11 for a Northern Han attack on Luzhou, which failed. The Zhou campaign against Southern Tang continued for some years, but it was apparently not until 958:4 that the Liao took advantage of this to recommence frontier raiding, to which the Zhou retaliated almost immediately by taking Liao Shucheng 東城.<sup>132</sup>

### **Zhou assault on Liao, c.958-959**

After the formal submission of the Southern Tang ruler in 958:5, the Zhou turned straight back to the Northern Han, and took six of their fortresses. Then, in the spring of 959, Zhou Shizong moved to recover the Sixteen Prefectures. Taking the newly cleared water routes from Cangzhou deep into Liao territory, the emperor led a land and water force which swiftly took the three passes of Yijinguan 益津關, Waqiaoguan 瓦橋關 and Yukouguan 淤口關 (all in the area north of Mozhou.) The Liao defending generals of Yingzhou<sub>2</sub>, Mozhou and Yizhou 易州 surrendered with their cities, and the Zhou armies are accordingly said to have taken southern Yan (i.e. southern Youzhou) without bloodshed. They withdrew only because the emperor became ill.<sup>133</sup> It was of course in

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
130. TJ 291:9501-20 passim; JW113:1503-17 passim; LS 6:72.

131. TJ 292:9523-7; JW115:1525-28; LS 6:73.

132. TJ 292:9527-294:9583 passim; JW 115:1528-118:1573 passim; LS 6:74-5.

133. TJ 294:9595-7; JW 119:1580-1; LS 6:75.

Map 9: North China, 959





the interests of the recorders to show Zhou Shizong as having the Mandate and being a generous victor, and a bloodless war suggested that there was no strong attachment to the other side, thus reinforcing Zhou claims to legitimacy.

The Northern Han provided some distraction to the Zhou by attacking across their frontiers, but the immediate danger to the allies was withdrawn when Zhou Shizong died in 959:6, to be succeeded by a child of seven. (Map 9.) The Southern Tang immediately took advantage of this to assert their independence, covering their backs through renewed friendship with the Liao, whose envoys they feasted. Although the Zhou were not actively attacking either party at that point, espionage flourished, and Zhou agents at the feast murdered the Liao envoys. Ignorant that the Southern Tang were not to blame, Muzong cut off relations, robbing them of a much-needed ally.

Such friendship was to be all the more missed after the founding of the Song dynasty, which came just six months later. In the New Year of 960 came a report from Zhen and Ding that the Northern Han and Liao were attacking. It is said that Zhao Kuangyin's 趙匡胤 army, who had long served under him, considered it inadvisable to have a minor on the throne in such dangerous circumstances and refused to fight Liao unless Kuangyin was emperor. As had been the case with Guo Wei and the founding of the Zhou, a Liao attack provided the opportunity and excuse for the change of regime, as once again the pretender ignored the supposed danger from the north in order to march to the capital to declare himself emperor.<sup>134</sup>

### Early Liao-Song relations and the Northern Han, c.960-979

The Southern Tang and Wuyue 吳越 promptly sent their congratulations to the Song, but the Northern Han incited raids on Hexi 河西 by the local tribes, and the Liao invaded Dizhou 隰州 in support of their allies. In addition, not all the provincial governors were delighted at Zhao Kuangyin's accession (temple name Taizu.) The Zhaoyi 昭義 *jiedushi* (seat: Luzhou) Li Yun 李筠, although given a senior court appointment by Kuangyin, decided to rebel, weeping endlessly over a portrait of Zhou Taizu. The Northern Han invited Yun to join them, asking in their turn for support from the Liao, but then marched south without waiting for them. Yun, meanwhile, did not stay with the Han forces, and the Song were able to crush him in 960:6, at which the Han returned to Jinyang.<sup>135</sup>

While the Liao dealt with high-level rebellion in 960:7 and 10, Song Taizu concentrated on asserting his control over the new dynasty. There were no big campaigns, only border skirmishes, but the perceived strength of the Song was

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134. TJ 294:9597-9606; JW 119:1583, 120:1591-7; LS 6:75-6; SS 1:3.

135. CB 1:10-18; LS 6:76; SS 1:4-6.

demonstrated in 961:9 by the surrender to them of the Liao general Jieli 解利, whom they appear to have accommodated. Nevertheless, the Song concern with the border is shown in an edict of 961:10, which banned frontier people from making cross-border raids, and ordered that previously pillaged horses be returned.<sup>136</sup> This repeats the Zhou move of 952:9 and appears to have been calculated to keep the peace on the frontier by providing no excuses for attacks from the north. The importance of controlling this kind of activity is demonstrated very clearly by parts of the 1005 Shanyuan treaty, which provides for the return of fugitives and the regulation of border trade. The continuing concern of Song Taizu not to make trouble for his northern neighbours, at least just yet, was shown in his non-exploitation of the internal troubles in Liao resulting from poor rule and ambitious imperial relatives.

In 962:4, Taizu made the first of several frontier appointments which aimed to secure the north from attacks by the Northern Han, Kitan, and the Dingnan *jiedushi* Li Yixing 李彝興, in order to allow the confident prosecution of the conquest of the southern states. The chief means used by the new officials to achieve this was apparently intelligence information, but a certain amount of fighting continued, for in 963:7 the Anguo 安國 *jiedushi* (seat: Xingzhou) Wang Quanbin 王全斌 led an attack on the Northern Han. In the autumn, the Han ruler urged the Liao to raid the borders, but did not wait to join up with the Liao force. Relations between the allies deteriorated when the Han stopped paying the agreed subsidy to Liao and Han envoys were detained in return, but in the absence of other supporters the Han had little choice but to patch things up and restart payments at the end of 963. Although relations remained uneasy, a Song attack on Han Liaozhou 遼州 in 964:1 brought the Liao south in response to a Han request for help. The prefect of Liaozhou surrendered to the Song and both sides claimed victory in the subsequent battle. In the last months of the year, both powers became preoccupied with the regions furthest from their common frontier and hostilities there ceased for the time being.<sup>137</sup>

The Northern Han and Liao raided separately in 966:1, and although such skirmishes happened occasionally, both major regimes were more concerned with ongoing internal problems than with creating external ones. Hence it was not until a new Northern Han ruler acceded in 968:7 that Song Taizu, perhaps prompted by a steady trickle of Han submissions, ordered preparations for a serious attack, which came in 968:9. The Han sent for Liao help, their advance prompted the Song to withdraw, and the Liao pillaged Song territory before returning north. A more determined attack the

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136. LS 6:76; CB 1:19-2:55 passim; SS 1:7-10.

137. CB 3:66-5:139 passim; LS 6:78, 7:81; SS 1:13-16.

following year led to a siege of Taiyuan-Jinyang and a defeat of relieving Liao troops coming from Dingzhou in 969:5, after which the Song managed to divert the river to flood the city. A Han minister who wanted to surrender was killed by his own side, and as the Song camp began to suffer from illness, the Liao sent more assistance to Han. The Song withdrew, but took with them over 10,000 households from the Taiyuan district, for resettlement in Henan and Shandong 山東 with gifts of grain.<sup>138</sup>

In the middle of this campaign the emperor Liao Muzong was murdered, but the accession of Jingzong 景宗 went smoothly enough that there was no disruption in the war effort. Jingzong's style of rulership came to resemble more closely that of a Central Plains ruler, with an increased emphasis on the role of Chinese officials in policy making. It may have been this reorganisation which prompted sixteen Kitan tribal groups to give their allegiance to the Song in 969:10. This was quite a coup for the Song, but the tribes' motives are unclear. They were moving to an alien regime where, culturally, they were going to suffer privations, and the leaders could hardly hope for greatly increased status. Whilst welcoming such defections, the Song continued to seek closer regulation of the frontier. In the first half of 970 there were several edicts aimed at stamping out undesirable trading practices. Related to this was the movement from Xizhou 隰州 of a Song prefect, noted for having kept the Liao from breaching the frontiers for ten years. The value of such officials, who were able to provide frontier security, is further demonstrated by the recording of the death of the *jiedushi* He Jiyun 何繼筠 in 971:7, after some twenty years of keeping out the Liao. He is said to have understood them, and to have filled them with fear.<sup>139</sup>

Although skirmishes continued through the early 970's, the Liao-Song war had more or less petered out by now and peace discussions began. Sources favouring the Song claim that the Liao initiated the talks and vice versa, but in any case, it is clear that both sides were willing to talk. Accordingly, this was an unusually mutual peace-making, with neither side in an overwhelming position. Such a balance was to characterise Song-Liao relations throughout their long association. Following the practice used between Liao and Northern Han, Liao-Song relations now focussed around regular envoy contacts, as is especially clear in the LS annals. In 975:3 a Liao envoy to Song was feasted and given generous gifts, Song envoys returned the visit in the seventh month, and new year greetings were exchanged. Liao envoys were sent to discuss substantive issues in 976:3 and the Song sent birthday greetings in 976:5. Regular exchanges

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138. CB 7:166-10:225 passim; LS 7:84-8:90; SS 2:23-9.

139. CB 10:234-11:249, 12:269-70; LS 7:87, 8:89-91; SS 2:31.

continued until the Song launched the campaign which destroyed Northern Han in early 979.<sup>140</sup>

It seems likely that peace with the Liao was part of a deliberate ploy on the part of the Song to remove the Han's ally and thus weaken that state further to allow Song to crush it. In 976:8 Song envoys arrived in Liao while one arm of a large Song expedition defeated the Han beneath the walls of Taiyuan. The Han sent to Liao for help, and according to the LS this was immediately sent, regardless of all the Song diplomatic cultivation of Liao. However, as the other Song force withdrew, it captured some 37,000 people from the Han population 'behind the mountains,' further depleting Han resources. Despite the recent fighting, the Liao resumed regular envoy contact with the Song only a few months afterwards, prompted by the need to acknowledge the death of Song Taizu 宋太祖 and the accession of his brother as Taizong 太宗.<sup>141</sup>

The beginning of a new state of affairs is suggested, in 977:1, by the Jurchen 女真 tribes in the northeast bringing tribute to Liao instead of raiding them. Later in the year they asked for posts, suggesting that they now regarded the Liao rather than the Song as the best repository of legitimate authority. They also resumed the sending of regular tribute, followed a couple of months later by the Uighur in the northwest. The Liao continued to support the Han, now with food sent in response to a request in 977:3.<sup>142</sup> Such a dependence on outside resources did not bode well for the continued survival of the Han regime.

The effective functioning of envoy relations on the frontier in this period is demonstrated by the Liao demand to Han that 400 Tuyuhun rebel households be returned whence they had fled in Taiyuan district. However, the envoy activity between both friends and potential enemies was conducted alongside plans for, and actual, warfare. At the end of 977 the Han ruler became afraid on hearing from his border lords that the Song were stockpiling siege weapons and supplies in the prefectures of Jin, Lu, Xing 邢, Ming 洺, Zhen and Ji<sub>2</sub>. He knew what such preparations were likely to mean for Han, and he also seems to have become afraid of what the continued Liao-Song contacts meant for his own regime. In 978:1 he sent his son as a guarantee to the Liao court to encourage a positive response to yet another request for help.<sup>143</sup> In fact no Song attack came in 978, but this was to prove the lull before the final attack on Northern Han, which came at the beginning of 979.

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
140. CB 328-20:446 passim; LS 8:94-9:101 passim; SS 3:42, 44-4:60 passim.

141. CB 17:372-87; LS 8:95-6; SS 3:48-4:54.

142. LS 9:99.

143. CB 18:418, 19:420; LS 9:100.

Map 10: North China, 979



After consultation, Taizong ordered attacks on Taiyuan from all sides. When Liao Jingzong sent to ask the reasons for this attack, Taizong said that Hedong (Northern Han) was opposing the Mandate and that Song would fight Liao if Jingzong sent help to the Han. When the Han asked for help, Jingzong did not hesitate but sent troops under some of his leading tribal officials. Meanwhile Taizong marched in person from his capital and reached Zhenzhou during 979:3. After a Song victory over Liao on the way to Taiyuan, which put paid to serious help from the north, there was fierce fighting around the city until in the fifth month the Han ruler sent money and admitted his crimes. With this surrender, Northern Han was finally brought under Song control, providing not only territory and population, but also an army of 30,000. Not all the Han generals surrendered when their ruler did, the most notable example being Liu Jiye 劉繼業, who only surrendered in 979:8 when Taizong made the ex-Han ruler order it. Taizong treated Jiye with honour and generosity, and gave him a prefecture.<sup>144</sup>

### **Initial hostilities between Liao and Song, c.979-982**

Having had such swift and total success against not only the Northern Han but also in the defeat of a large Liao army, Taizong sought to take advantage of his victory by marching north against the Liao. (Map 10.) An initial victory over one Liao army brought Taizong to the south of Liao Nanjing (Youzhou.) A second Liao force also got into difficulties and sent to Nanjing for help, but the city was itself soon besieged. The temporary vicegerent there was the Liao Chinese Han Derang 韓德讓, who organised the city's defences while help under several different generals set out for Nanjing. One Liao army met the Song at the Gaoliang 高粱 river and was defeated, but then two other forces arrived, joined up and attacked the Song, at which point they were supported by a force sallying out from within the city. The people are said to have raised a great shout and the Song were soundly defeated, leaving the emperor to flee south ignominiously. Taizong's reaction to this setback was to come to the belief that the Liao were now bound to invade, and he ordered a mobilisation to ambush them when they did.<sup>145</sup>

The Liao came south in 979:9, only to be defeated by a Song force at Mancheng 滿城, and pursued with heavy losses. The war was conducted in a low-key manner for the next twelve months. The destruction of Northern Han as the third power in the north brought a realignment of individual allegiances, and in 980:3 the former Northern Han general Yang Ye 楊業 defeated his erstwhile allies the Liao at Yanmen 鴈門, killing their general, an imperial son-in-law. It is said that the Liao were so scared of Ye that the mere

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144. CB 20:442-52, 459-60; LS 9:101; SS 4:60-2.

145. CB 20:453-8; LS 9:101-2; SS 4:62-3.

sight of his banner was enough to drive off raiders. In 980:10 Liao Jingzong in person surrounded Waqiaoguan, and a Song attack on the camp was chased off by Xiao Han and others, leading to a Song defeat and the capture of several generals. Having achieved this much the Liao withdrew, perhaps made cautious by the experience of the unhappy occupation of the Central Plains in 947, and more immediately, by a knowledge that the Liao and Song forces were now too evenly balanced for success to be easy. Song Taizong was apparently less cautious in his approach, lacking the chastening experience of the Liao imperial house. When he saw the Liao withdraw after their success, he wanted to attack Youzhou-Nanjing again, but was persuaded he would do better to wait, a decision criticised almost immediately. As it was, Taizong contented himself with ordering the repair and improvement of the northeastern defences.<sup>146</sup>

In 981 there were two brief Liao raids on Yizhou, and an unsuccessful attempt by Song Taizong to make an alliance with the Bohai for a campaign. In appealing to a group which had once been a border power in its own right, Taizong was applying methods from the earlier part of the century, but now that the Bohai were firmly part of the Liao empire, Taizong's actions amounted to subversion. The Bohai expressed some interest in the plan, but in the end did not follow through. In 982:5 the Dingnan *liuhou* based at Xiazhou, Li Jipeng 李繼捧, presented five prefectures to the Song court.<sup>147</sup> This Li Jipeng was the grandson of the Li Yiyin who had placed Dingnan under the Northern Han in 951, and the first Xiazhou governor to come to court for four generations. Jipeng's distant cousin Jiqian 李繼遷 objected to this subordination, and fled to set himself up in opposition to the Song. Nevertheless Taizong was delighted at this political coup, and he could only have been happier when in the same month the three arms of a large Liao invasion force were driven off with heavy losses.<sup>148</sup>

### Renewed war, c.982-999

With the death of Liao Jingzong and his succession by Shengzong 聖宗 in 982:9, both Song and Liao focussed on internal matters. The Liao were keen to deal with various tribes which were resisting their authority, whilst Taizong worked on securing the frontier zone against attack so as to encourage cultivation. Activities related to this policy created worry in Liao in early 983. They saw the Song building fortifications along the north bank of the river near Zhuozhou and stockpiling provisions along the frontier.

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146. CB 20:462-21:485; LS 9:102-4; SS 4:63-5.

147. Ruth Dunnell, *The Tanguts and the Tangut state of Ta Hsia*, (Ph.D. diss. 1983), gives five prefectures, but SS 4:68 gives only four, and CB 23:519-21 does not note the incident at all s.a.982:5. Dunnell provides a clear narrative, but does not detail the subsequent changes of allegiance.

148. CB 22:488-23:521 passim; LS 9:104-5; SS 4:65-8.

Their response was to make preparations in their turn, which included the retrieval of a thousand households which had migrated to Song.<sup>149</sup> In 985 the Koreans made an agreement with the Song for a joint attack on Liao, and in 986:1 a large force marched north. By the fourth month the Song armies under Cao Bin 曹彬 had pushed through in the west as far as Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> and Yuzhou in the Sixteen prefectures, helped by local risings against the Liao. However, the Liao were able to cut Cao Bin's supply route at Zhuozhou, eventually forcing a Song withdrawal which was harried and heavily defeated at the Juma 巨馬 river.<sup>150</sup>

While the Liao were dealing with this invasion, they received an approach from Dingnan-Xiazhou. Li Jiqian had fled Xiazhou in 982, then in 985:2 had occupied Yinzhou 銀州 and set himself up as Dingnan *liuhou*. He was presumably hoping for Song confirmation, but instead they sent a punitive expedition. In 986:2 Jiqian offered his submission to the Liao, who confirmed him as Dingnan *jiedushi*, and later in the year married a princess to him.<sup>151</sup> Jiqian was never an active or reliable ally of Liao, but they were willing to encourage him to be an irritant to the Song.

The Liao retook Yuzhou in 986:7 and defeated the Song commander Pan Mei 潘美. As the Liao advanced into Huanzhou 寰州, Pan Mei and the ex-Han general Yang Ye rounded up whole populations and moved them south. Ye disagreed with Pan Mei's plans, and ended up being wounded and captured in battle, abandoned by his general. His firm adherence to the Song is demonstrated by his refusal to eat, which in three days brought about his death.<sup>152</sup> Towards the end of the year the Song were defeated at Wangdu 望都, and Xiongzhou 雄州 fell, after which the Liao troops were let loose for a great pillaging of the southern territories. They took Xingzhou and Shenzhou, conscripting the common people into their depleted armies, demanding frequent military training, and transferring the populations. These depredations were such that Taizong agreed in 987:5 to an army levy of one in eight. The urgency of the operation was emphasised by reports at the end of the year from the northeast that the Liao were about to invade again, which proved to be wrong.<sup>153</sup> When the Liao did attack in 988:9, they took as far south as Qizhou 祁州 and Xinle 新樂, defeating three Song armies, before Li Jilong 李繼隆 led a Song recovery from 988:11. Jilong drove the Liao out of Yizhou, but they attacked it again in 989:1. They drove off a Song relief force, and the defending

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149. CB 23:527-43; LS 9:105-10:111; SS 4:69-70.

150. CB 27:602-20; LS 11:119-12:130; SS 5:76-80.

151. CB 23:519; LS 11:119, 127; SS 4:68-5:76 *passim*.

152. He is an early example of extreme loyalty to the Song anti-Liao cause; see Chapter 8.

153. CB 27:620-28:642 *passim*; LS 11:123-12:129; SS 5:78-81.



general abandoned the city and went south. In 989:7 the Song general Yin Jilun 尹繼倫 caught the Liao army unawares and killed a senior general, resulting in the withdrawal and scattering of the army.<sup>154</sup> A desire for peace brought a lull in direct hostilities which lasted nearly ten years while the two major powers continued to support opposite sides in the struggle between the Dingnan rivals, Li Jiqian and Li Jipeng.

Li Jiqian had increased his raids on the Song frontier from 988:5, prompting Song to restore his cousin Jipeng to the Dingnan governorship, with the name Zhao Baozhong 趙保忠, and orders to deal with Jiqian. In 988:12 Jiqian turned briefly from his allegiance to Liao to accept the post of Yinzhou prefect from the Song, but then changed his mind in 989:3 and again sent tribute to the Liao. In 990:3 he was defeated by Jipeng-Baozhong's Xiazhou army, and at the end of the year was given a noble title by the Liao. Jiqian's friendship with Liao lasted until he heard in 991:7 that a Song punitive force was heading his way, at which he returned to Song allegiance, was made Yinzhou *guanchashi* 觀察使 (surveillance commissioner) and bestowed with the name Zhao Baoji 趙保吉. Three months later Jipeng-Baozhong surrendered to Liao, receiving a noble title, senior posts and his old name. However glad the Liao were that Jipeng had come over to them, they did not want to lose Jiqian-Baoji without a fight, and so sent a senior official, Han Dewei 韓德威, to try to win back his allegiance. When Jiqian refused this, Dewei pillaged in Dingnan on his return home. Later, in 994, Jipeng and Jiqian clashed again, with Song, but not Liao, involvement, resulting in the Song imprisoning of Jipeng and pardoning of Jiqian.<sup>155</sup>

The Liao used the hiatus in direct hostilities to strengthen their position with their other neighbours. The Jurchen were in a weaker position than their Dingnan rivals, so when an appeal to the Song for military help against a Kitan attack received only a letter in return, the tribes gave their allegiance to the Liao. The next target was Koryo 高麗, attacked in 992:12, with peace made the following month, and Korean use of the Liao calendar beginning some fourteen months after that. Although this indicates that the Koreans perceived the Liao to be the stronger of the two main powers, the Liao still attacked again in 994:6. Koryo appealed to the Song, who refused assistance, fearing to disrupt the peaceful conditions on the northern frontier. Accordingly, the Koreans stopped sending tribute to Song and continued their attachment to Liao. In 995:11 they sent tribute, and boys to learn the Kitan language. In 996:3 the Liao married a member of the consort house to the Korean king.<sup>156</sup>

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154. CB 29:657-30:685; LS 12:131-35; SS 5:83-4.

155. CB 29:653-30:685, 32:718-36:790 *passim*; LS 13:141-2; SS 5:88-95.

156. CB 32:728, 36:789-90; LS 13:143-7; SS 5:88-98. Liao-Koryo relations are not mentioned in the Song sources.

In all this time, although direct fighting had long ceased, there had been no formal peace agreement between Liao and Song. In 994:9, Song Taizong again sent envoys to request a peace, but this was refused. This may have had a practical reason. The Liao were now more concerned than ever to make use of those they had captured. In 994:11 an edict required the names of all Song captives with any skills or talents useful to the regime. The Liao might also have been trying to increase their population by raiding. In 995:1 Han Dewei led a large cavalry force south from Zhenwu, and another attack hit Xiongzhou in the fourth month. Both were defeated by local forces, suggesting that they were not invading armies.<sup>157</sup> Raids aside, relations continued to be conducted partly through third parties. Despite his submission to Song, Li Jiqian had continued his attacks in the Lingzhou 靈州 region. In late 996 and early 997 he was twice defeated by local Song forces, after which the Liao gave him the noble title they had earlier granted to Jipeng. However, at the end of the year he again sought a post from Song, whilst they had decided that punitive measures would not work, and so restored his name as Zhao Baoji. In this year both Song Taizong and the king of Koryo died. In the latter case, there was an abortive attempt to return allegiance to Song, and it was the Liao who sent envoys to invest the new king.<sup>158</sup>

### War and the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵, c.999-1005

Liao-Song hostilities recommenced in 999. In the seventh month the new Song ruler Zhenzong 真宗 despatched a general to prepare the region around Ding for the expected Liao raids. Li Jiqian provided a softener by attacking Lingzhou and Fuzhou in 999:9. The Song army defeated him, but then when the Kitan army headed south, the forces at Zhen and Ding were too afraid to leave their camps and those who suggested fighting were cursed by the others. The Liao were therefore free to attack Suicheng 遂城, a small and unprepared city defended by a resourceful official who created a skating rink around his walls, forcing the Liao to withdraw, pillaging as they went. Despite a rebellion in Xichuan 西川, at the beginning of 1000 Zhenzong went north in person. The army stationed at Dingzhou now emerged from its camp to face the Liao, only to be defeated, as was an assisting force. The Liao plundered as they withdrew, with the Song pursuit force not daring to press its mission.<sup>159</sup>

The next couple of years were punctuated by Li Jiqian's harassment of northwestern Song territory and the improvement of Song frontier defences. In 1002:3,


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157. CB 37:807-9; LS 13:145-6; SS 5:95-7. The Song peace initiative does not appear in the Song sources.

158. CB 41:862-3, 42:896; LS 13:149-50; SS 5:100-6:106.

159. CB 45:955-46:988 *passim*; LS 14:154-5; SS 6:109-113.

Map 11: North China after the treaty of Shanyuan, 1005



the Liao sent another army south and in the fourth month this defeated a Song army, leading to a hard-fought attack on Taizhou 泰州, followed by a Liao withdrawal. One can see why the later Chinese interpreted these attacks as softening-up or testing operations, looking for an opportunity to break through weak defences into the heart of the empire, but in fact the Liao never pressed on beyond a certain point, and never maintained any attack in the face of concerted resistance. Nevertheless, Song fears were real enough, and were expressed in an edict telling all frontier officials to report daily by fast courier on Liao activities. They also ordered the digging of fields in order to hinder enemy cavalry.<sup>160</sup>

The Liao-Song war sputtered on with a new Liao attack in 1003:4, during which the Song general Wang Jizhong 王繼忠 was captured. Although preparations were ordered, it was not until 1004:4 that the Song frontier defence forces were gathered for a counter-attack, only to be pre-empted by the next Liao assault in 1004:intercalary 9. The campaigning was inconclusive, and peace talks began while the fighting continued. In 1004:11 Zhenzong himself went up to the front at Shanzhou, or Shanyuan, to finalise arrangements for the peace treaty. This was agreed in 1004:12, and the two emperors returned home. Liao Shengzong took his army with him, whilst the Song dispersed their forces more slowly, returning them to agricultural labours with gifts of draft animals, and making new arrangements for the garrisoning of the frontier. There was a restoration of regular envoy exchanges between Liao and Song, which was to form the framework for a peace lasting over a century and providing a successful, non-violent means of resolving disputes between the two states.<sup>161</sup>

The terms of the treaty are well known, but those of most interest here are the less commonly cited provisions for the institutionalisation of the frontier. (Map 11.) The border populations were to 'maintain' the frontier line and were not to raid each other, while the emperors pledged themselves to the return of fugitives.<sup>162</sup> These arrangements imply the prior existence of a known frontier line; the difference was that it was no longer locally negotiable. The treaty located one very definite point on that line by naming Xiongzhou as the place for handing over the Song payments to Liao, and the new fixed line came to be punctuated, and thus partly defined by, official trading posts on either side.<sup>163</sup> The intention seems to have been to freeze the situation exactly as it was when the

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160. CB 47:1015-53:1172 passim; LS 14:155-8; SS 6:112-18.

161. CB 54:1190-58:1301; LS 14:158-60; SS 7:121-7. See also Schwarz-Schilling, *Friede von Shan-yüan*, ch.2, pp.40-63 and section 3 for translations and full references; and Ang, Sung-Liao diplomacy, passim.

162. See QG 20:189-90; CB 58:1299.

163. There may even have been maps, as disagreement between them was raised in the territorial dispute of 1074-5. See Ang, Sung-Liao diplomacy, 88ff. The provision for markets does not appear in the 'oath letters' exchanged by the emperors. See CB 59:1313ff; SS 186:4562, and Shiba Yoshinobu, Sung foreign trade: its scope and organisation, *China among equals: the Middle Kingdom and its neighbors, 10th to 14th centuries*

treaty was made, and to seal the frontier except for limited and carefully controlled trading and diplomatic activity.<sup>164</sup>

As Schwarz-Schilling has pointed out, this put an end to crossings,<sup>165</sup> but it is only when we look at the preceding century that we can see just what had changed. The freedom of movement, both physical and of allegiances, enjoyed by a large group of individual officials and frontier populations in the first half of the century had become progressively more restricted in the second half as the rivalries in the region coalesced into the two major powers of Song and Liao. By the beginning of the eleventh century it was possible for the imperial centres to prevent any further changes of allegiance by anybody who was not the ruler of a power in their own right. The multiple options of the earlier years had been reduced to a polarised duality, made concrete in the frontier line fixed by the treaty. The history of the eleventh century frontier is one of competition or cooperation between *centres*, to the exclusion of those who actually lived and worked in the frontier zone. The power of the frontier to influence events had been lost, and the focus shifted into the interiors, symbolised in both cases by the removal of the emperor from the battlefield and from close personal contact with his aides, into the ritualised remoteness of the inner palace.

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(1983), ed. Morris Rossabi, pp.98-100.

164. As exemplified in the story of Wang Jizhong. See below Chapters 7 and 9.

165. Schwarz-Schilling, *Friede von Shan-yüan*, pp.56-7.

## Chapter Two

### The first generation Liao Chinese

Having outlined the general political background in which a continually shifting frontier was partly defined by the act of crossing it, in this chapter we will consider those acts of crossing in more detail.

Given the nature of our sources, the majority of the 200 or so cases recorded are of individuals from what we might call the 'ruling classes,' and although we can but work with the record as it survives, we should not forget that the total number of Chinese taken into the Liao regime was very large indeed. Wittfogel estimated the number to be some two-and-a-half million, and whilst his calculations rely on available information largely relating to the stabilised empire of the eleventh century or later, his figures do at least suggest what order of population we are thinking about.<sup>1</sup> Naturally the vast majority of these people are the *laobaixing* 老百姓 who are rarely mentioned in our sources and even more rarely appear as individuals. Their reasons for entering the Liao regime were usually nothing to do with their own free choice. If their area was conquered or captured, or handed over by one regime to another, the common people came under new masters, with a more or less changed set of obligations, and they had little choice in the matter.

Hence, ordinary Chinese came under Liao control mostly not when they themselves moved, but when the frontier shifted over their heads, leaving them in Liao territory. As these changes follow the course of wars with great precision they simply confirm what we already know about the transfer of control over territory and population. In any case, most of this multitude of changes produce no annalistic record of the size of population involved or what happened to them. At best we might hear general remarks about the economic situation of the people, for instance in terms of levels of taxation, or that the population of a particular place was moved to some other place. Even where we have that much information, we have to remember that population registers were never highly accurate in this period, not least because the population moved so much between each registration. In addition, when territory changed hands, although the new owner might acquire the relevant registers, there was no guarantee that those appearing on them had not left the area, either to avoid the fighting which had ended in their changed ownership, or long before that.

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1. WF pp.52-6, especially table p.55. Wittfogel discusses some of the problems involved in trying to produce his figures, and suggests that they should be regarded as minimums. His presentation of the information in the LS *dili zhi* 地理志 provides a listing of those places in the stabilised empire which are noted to have had Chinese populations acquired by migration or capture.

The most infamous example of crossings as a result of the shift of the frontier is the handover of the Sixteen prefectures under the agreement between Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 (Jin Gaozu) and Liao Taizong in 936. Some Chinese argued against such a move at the time, and most have smarted ever since under the shame of voluntarily surrendering control over what has been seen as inalienably Chinese territory.<sup>2</sup> In political terms there is a big qualitative difference between losing territory after a spirited military defence and giving away the same territory. Yet for the populations concerned the peaceful change of ownership, in which it seems that they retained their officials and administrative system intact, was undoubtedly a good deal better than finding themselves under different rule after having armies march and fight across their lands, destroy their crops, rape the women and probably kill or take captive at least some of the population, leaving the villages impoverished for years to come. In addition, the territories handed over to Liao were perennially frontier lands, and had already changed hands and been fought over innumerable times, chiefly by powers considered to be Chinese. The handover of registers for the Sixteen prefectures is recorded because of its unusual political significance, but it is the exception that proves the rule. Normally it is enough for the annals to indicate what territory changed hands, recording movements of population only when there is something unusual about them.

This, of course, included much movement of frontier populations as a result of natural or man-made disaster, most often famine as a result of flooding or war. These have been excluded from consideration here on the grounds that the records in the main sources are too vague to be of use in this study. In any case, refugeeism is a topic in itself, and it is likely that refugees frequently gave little thought to where they might go, and often returned as soon as circumstances improved.

### Method and criteria

Most of this chapter consists of the presentation of and commentary on information extracted from the annals sections of the relevant dynastic histories, as well as from the TJ and CB. Information about crossings has been set out in the table which follows (Table 1.) This information is analysed according to various criteria in a series of histograms. The table and graphs have been produced from inevitably incomplete data, and they should not be taken as representing an accurate count of the actual number of people who crossed the frontier. They chiefly measure recorded incidents of crossing, in

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2. Sima Guang records Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 as advising that no territory should be included in the offer. TJ 280:9146, and see Chapter 9. Cf. almost any present-day Chinese writing mentioning these lands, eg. Wang Jinlu, *Liaodai jiangyu kaolüe*, *Dongbei difang shi yanjiu* 1987:1, pp.81-5 and He Tianming, *Lun Liao zhengquan jiequan Yan-Yun de biranxing ji lishi zuoyong*, *Liao Jin shi lunji*, vol. 4, pp.100-15.

Table 1: Frontier crossings arranged by date

- All crossings have a reference number. Where people considered crossing or tried to cross, but were unsuccessful: these incidents are enclosed in brackets and not numbered. Where an offer to cross was used to deceive the other side: these have been omitted from the table altogether.
- A description, date or code applies until superseded by the next one.
- Types of crossing (see text for detailed definitions): V = voluntary crossing D = crossing under duress N = involuntary crossing A = alliance  
Where groups are involved: C = civilian M = military X = mixed military and civilian  
R = returned In brackets, indicates planned or attempted return which failed, or return of only some of those who crossed.
- Where different sources suggest different classifications of crossing, one classification has been chosen for use in the graphs; the others are enclosed in brackets.
- Where there is more than one source, they are listed according to the following criteria: 1st - source giving preferred date, 2nd - sources in date order, 3rd - sources in the following sequence: LS is given first, because it covers the whole period, followed by JW, TJ, XW or CB, SS
- Groups are indicated as follows: H = Han Sh = Shatuo Turk = 'Tuque' Turkish Kit = Kitan Bo = Bohai
- Other abbreviations have only been used where it would save space. They should be self-explanatory.

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group	Biography	Notes
1	95,000 people	902:7	Daibei, Hedong	NC	LS 1:2			captured in raids; set up in cities
	large Ch population	?	?		TJ 266:8677			Abaoji claimed he acquired many N Ch in his early years
2	prisoners	903:10	Ji <sub>1</sub>	NC	LS 1:2			captured in raids; set up in cities
3	Han Zhigu 韓知古	903:10? <sup>a</sup>	Jizhou <sub>1</sub>	N	LS 74:1233	H	LS 74:1233	captured in raid as a child; later given post
4	Kang Moji 康默記	903:10?	Jizhou <sub>1</sub>	N	LS 74:1230	H?	LS 74:1230	captured in raid; placed under general
5	Zhao Ba 趙霸	904:9	Wuzhou Taoshan	N	LS 1:2	H?		captured in battle
6	Li Keyong <sup>b</sup> 李克用	905:10	Taiyuan Jin	A	LS 1:2	Sh	JW 25:331ff	alliance against Liu Rengong; prefectures taken
7	populations	905:10	Yanzhou territory	NC	LS 1:2			captured in raids; set up in cities
8	Liu Shouqi + sev thou trps 劉守奇	907:7	Pingzhou	VM	LS 1:3	H		Liu Shouguang's brother. Submitted; set up in Pinglu cheng
					TJ 266:8672			fled to Kitan; then to Hedong
9	Li Cunxu <sup>c</sup> 李存勖	908:4	Hedong	A	TJ 266:8694	Sh		bribed Abaoji, requesting cavalry to fight Liang
10	Liu Shouwen 劉守文	909:3	Cangzhou	A	LS 1:4	H		asked for troops to fight brother Shouguang; Shouguang pushed back
		909:5			TJ 267:8710			paid heavy bribe for troops to fight Shouguang; captured by Shouguang

a. The date of Zhigu's crossing is likely to have been earlier than this, otherwise he would have been too young to do what he is said to have done. The probable date is c.886. See Tang Tongtian, Han Zhigu ru Liao nianling shangque, *Liao Jin Qidan Nizhen shi yanjiu dongtai* 1986:2, pp.11-13.

b. Li Cunxu's father, known in Later Tang sources by his temple name of Wuhuang 武皇. He has the biography of a dynastic founder, JW j.25-6.

c. Future Later Tang founding emperor Zhuangzong 莊宗.



No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
11	many Shouguang troops 劉守光	911-3?	Youzhou	VM	TJ 269:8808 JW 137:1828 XW 72:886		because of Shouguang's cruelty. Recorded c.916 because of Shouguang's cruelty because of Shouguang's cruelty
12	Zhang Xichong 張希崇	911:8? <sup>d</sup>	Pingzhou	NR	TJ 276:9023	H	JW 88:1147 captured defending Pingzhou for Liu Shouguang; R with 20,000 928:8; JW 39:541, 928:int 8
13	gentry and commoners	c.912:1	N frontier Youzhou	NC	TJ 269:8808 JW 137:1828 XW 72:886		captured while Shouguang besieged in Youzhou captured while Shouguang besieged in Youzhou
14	Han Yanhui 韓延徽	c.912:1?	Yan envoy	NR	TJ 269:8810 XW 72:890	H	see Ch. 3 A baoji took advantage to raid; set up Tang-style cities to settle captives detained for not making obeisance; herding flocks, given posts detained for not making obeisance; herding flocks, given posts
15	Han Yanhui	c.913:12?	Taiyuan Jin	V	TJ 269:8810 XW 72:890		escaping quarrel; given posts escaping false accusation; given posts
	(Liu Shouguang	913:10	Yan (Youzhou)	(A)	TJ 268:8777	H	JW 135:1799 to fight Taiyuan Jin; refused)
16	Qi Xingben 齊行本	+3000 m/f					
17	Lu Guoyong 盧國用	915:6	Youzhou	VCR	LS 1:10	?	asked to submit with family, troops; fled to You, on Zhou Dewei's staff
18	Li Siben 李嗣本	916:4 916:8 <sup>e</sup>	Youzhou Yuzhou-Zhenwu Yuzhou-Zhenwu	VR NX	LS 1:11 JW 28:388 XW 5:43; 72:887	H ? ?	came to submit; R 926:10, LS 2:23 fell into Kitan hands when they entered city captured when Yuzhou taken
	+city		Yuzhou-Zhenwu		TJ 269:8805		city fell, Siben captured
19	Li Cunxu's uncle	916:12	Shuozhou		LS 1:11		city fell, Siben captured
20	Li Cunxu's aunt	916:12	Taiyuan	A	TJ 269:8810	Sh	served emperor
21	Lu Wenjin 盧文進	917:2	Taiyuan Xinzhou <sub>1</sub>	A VMR	TJ 269:8810 LS 1:11	Sh? H	served empress dowager came to submit; took Xinzhou for Liao
	+army				JW 28:389 <sup>f</sup>		killed governor, rebd, to Kitan; led Kitan v Xinzhou; R 926:10, JW 37:511, TJ 275:8994: +100,000 +baggage carts. Fled to Wu 936:12, TJ 280:9166
22	Liu Yin 劉殷	917:2	Xinzhou <sub>1</sub>	(D) D	XW 72:887 TJ 269:8812 LS 1:12	? ?	killed governor for poor rule, came over; Kitan took Xinzhou Wenjin reluctant to kill gov, Jin sent punitive force, fled; led Kit v Xinzhou general of Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect

d. Cf. *LS bingwei zhi* 兵衛志 34:396, Taizu raid on Youzhou, 912:spring.e. Cf. *ibid.* Taizu captured innumerable people in Yu, Xin, Wu, Gui and Ru.

f. Also JW 137:1828-9.

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group	Blography	Notes
		917:3			JW 28:389 TJ 269:8814 XW 72:887			general of Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect general of Wenjin; made Xinzhou prefect general of Wenjin; posted to defend Xinzhou
23	Song Yao 宋瑤 +army	920:10	Tiande	DMR	LS 2:16	?		besieged, submitted; given gifts, army renamed
24	Song Yao +family, city	920:10	Tiande	NX	LS 2:16			rebelled, city fell, captured; population moved
25	Zhang Wenli <sup>g</sup> 張文禮	921:7	Zhenzhou-Zhao	A	TJ 271:8866-8 LS 2:18	H	JW 62:829	sent to Wenjin for Kitan help, Jin sent punitive force; Wenli died of fear
26	Wang Chuzhi 王處直	921:10	Yiwu	A	TJ 271:8868-9	H	XW 39:419	Cunxu besieged Zhenzhou, requested help; defeated Jin
27	Wang Yu 王郁 +troops Wang Yu	921:10 921:11 921:12	Xinzhou <sub>1</sub>	(VR) VMR	XW 5:44; 72:888 LS 2:17	H	LS 75:1241	asked son Yu to bribe Kitan for help v Jin; son Du imprisoned him rebd, allegiance to Kitan; son Du imprisoned him, submitted to Liang came to allegiance; rewarded well, d having R to Yizhou <sub>2</sub> , LS 75:1242
28	populations	921:11	Tan, Shun, Anyuan, Sanhe, Liangxiang, Wangdu, Lu, Mancheng, Suicheng, etc (more than 10 cities) <sup>h</sup>	(A)	TJ 271:8870			jealous of brother, offered Kitan the wealth of Zhenzhou; Kitan came S
29	Li Sibi 李嗣弼 +city	921:12	Zhuozhou	(V) (A)	JW 29:399-400 XW 72:888			enticed Abaoji to invade Youzhou; led them to take Zhuozhou offered Kitan the wealth of Zhenzhou; Kitan took Zhuozhou
29	Li Sibi 李嗣弼 +city	921:12	Zhuozhou	NC DX	LS 2:17 LS 2:17	Sh	JW 50:683	captured in raid; people sent into interior surrendered with city
30	200 of Cunxu's cavalry	921:12	near Youzhou	(N)	JW 137:1829 <sup>i</sup> TJ 271:8870			captured when city fell city besieged, assaulted, Sibi captured
31	a Youzhou pijiang 裨將	921:12	Tanzhou	NM	LS 2:17			pursuers captured when quarry turned reconnaissance troops. Captured
32	Zhang Chujiin 張處瑾	922:4 922:5	Zhenzhou	N A	LS 2:17 TJ 271:8868	H		captured in battle Wenli's son. Continued father's cause
33	Hu Qiong 胡瓊	922:4	Jizhou <sub>1</sub>	N	LS 2:18	?		continued allegiance captured when prefecture fell
34	Zhao Siwen 趙思溫	923:1	Pingzhou	N(R)	LS 2:18; 3:27	H	LS 76:1250	captured when prefecture fell; son failed to negotiate return, TJ 281:9189
35	Zhang Chong 張崇	923:1	Pingzhou	NR	LS 2:18; 3:27	?		captured when prefecture fell; rebelled and fled to Tang 926:7, LS 2:23
36	Pei Xin 裴信+son, tens (Li Jitao 李繼紹	923:4 923:12	E/S of Youzhou	NM (VR)	LS 2:18; 3:27 TJ 272:8908-9	?	JW 52:706	captured in battle considered crossing when heard of fall of Liang, debate, decided not to)

g. A.k.a. Wang Deming 王德明.

h. Also LS bingwei zhi 34:396.

i. Also JW 29:399 (no names.)

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing	place	Type	Sources	Group	Biography	Notes
37	Li Jida 李繼達	923:12			V	TJ 272:8909	?	JW 52:708	family destroyed, heading for Kitan, followers dispersed, suicide bef arrived
38	prisoners presented	924:9	SW	from Liao	NC	LS 2:20			presented by chief minister (Yellu Su)
39	Yao Kun 姚坤	926:7		Jin envoy	NR	TJ 275:8989-90?			returned after life saved by Han Yanhui
40	Wang Du 王都+province	928:3		Yiwu-Dingzhou	VX	LS 3:28	H	JW 54:731	pledged allegiance of province; suicide when Ding fell 929:2, TJ 286:9027
						JW 137:1832			rebelled, requested Kitan help; rebellion crushed 929
						XW 72:891			rebelled, requested Kitan help; defeated
41	Wang Wei 王威	c.928			V(R)	TJ 282:9204	H		fled brother Wang Du's rebn; Taizong wanted him to succeed father Chuzhi
42	Zhang Yanchao 張彥超+city								
43	city	932:11		Yuzhou	VXR	TJ 278:9080	Sh	JW 129:1706	grudge v Shi Jingtang, made Datong <i>jiedushi</i> ; R to Han 947, JW 129:706
44	city	934:11		Yangcheng (Wu)	DM	LS 3:36			besieged, surrendered
		934:11		Wazhi cheng	DX	LS 3:36			surrendered; able-bodied registered
45	live prisoners	935:12		Jinpingluo area	NC	LS 3:37			captured by officials Huage, Kululi, Alusaogu
46	Sang Weihuan 桑維翰	936:5		Jingtang retinue	V	TJ 280:9143	H	JW 89:1161	argued for Kitan alliance
						XW 8:79			agreed should ask for Kitan help
47	Liu Zhiyuan <sup>j</sup> 劉知遠	936:5		Jingtang retinue	V	XW 8:79	Sh		agreed should ask for Kitan help
48	Shi Jingtang <sup>k</sup> 石敬瑭	936:7		Hedong	A	LS 3:38	Sh		Tang were sending punitive force against him, sent for help
					(V)	TJ 280:9146			asked for help, offered to be subject and son, and territory
						XW 8:79; 72:892			asked for Kitan help
		936				JW 137:1833			besieged by Zhang Jingda, requested troops, willing to be subject
49	Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠	936:int	11	Jin'an zhai	VMR	LS 3:39-40	Sh	JW 97:1290	killed Zhang Jingda in order to surrender; served Jin Gaozu
	+army					JW 48:666; 76:992;		137:1833	killed Zhang Jingda, surrendered (to Kitan); (berated for wickedness)
						XW 8:75			killed Zhang Jingda, rebelled, surrendered to Kitan
						TJ 280:9157-8			urged Jingda to surrender, beheaded him, letter of surrender to Kitan; berated,
									trps given to Jin
50	An Shenqi 安審琦	936:int	11	Jin'an zhai	VMR	LS 3:39-40	Sh	JW 123:1614	killed Zhang Jingda in order to surrender; served Jin Gaozu
	+troops					TJ 280:9157-8			urged Jingda to surrender, not prepared to kill him; troops given to Jin
51	Gao Xingzhou 高行周	936:int	11	Jin'an zhai	DR	TJ 280:9157-60H		JW 123:1611	backed Jingda, in Jin'an at surrender; remained in governorship, urged Zhao
									Dejun to surrender
52	Fu Yanqing 符彥卿	936:int	11	Jin'an zhai	DR	TJ 280:9157-60H		JW 56:760	backed Jingda, in Jin'an at surrender; served Jin Gaozu
53	Ding Shenqi 丁審琦+city	936:int	11	Xinzhou <sub>2</sub>	VX	TJ 280:9158	?		refused to follow Lu Qi to Zhenzhou, surrendered to Kitan

j. Future Later Han founding emperor Gaozu 漢高祖.

k. Future Later Jin founding emperor Gaozu 晉高祖.

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
54	10,000 of Dejun's infantry	936:int 11	Tuanboyu	DM	LS 3:39		caught fleeing, surrendered
55	Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞	936:int 11		(A)	TJ 280:9155-6 JW 137:1833	see Ch. 5	sent Yanshou to offer alliance against Tang; Liao wanted to accept asked to be emperor
			Zhaoyi	(V)	JW 76:992		Jin Gaozu received surrender
			Luzhou	V	JW 137:1833		came out to surrender to Kitan, Liao Taizong chained him
			Gaohe		TJ 280:9159-60 XW 8:79		came to greet Jin Gaozu, Liao Taizong near Luzhou; died 937, TJ 280:9161 rebelled against Tang, came to submit; sent to Liao in chains
			Luzhou	(N)	XW 72:893		Liao Taizong seized him; sent to Liao
	+troops		near Tuanboyu	(DM)	LS 3:39		caught fleeing, surrendered
56	Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽	936:int 11		(A)	TJ 280:9155-6	see Ch. 5	requested alliance for Dejun against Tang; Liao wanted to accept
			Zhaoyi	(V)	JW 76:992		Jin Gaozu received surrender
			Luzhou	V	JW 137:1833		came out to surrender to Kitan, Liao Taizong chained him
			Gaohe		TJ 280:9159-60 XW 8:79		came to greet Jin Gaozu, Liao Taizong near Luzhou rebelled against Tang, came to submit; sent to Liao in chains
			Luzhou	(N)	XW 72:893		Liao Taizong seized him; sent to Liao
	+troops		near Tuanboyu	(DM)	LS 3:39		caught fleeing, surrendered
57	Zhang Li 張礪	936:int 11	Luzhou	D(R)	TJ 280:9161	see Ch. 4	on Zhao Yanshou's staff; given posts. R TJ 281:9170, recaptured
			near Tuanboyu		XW 72:898		sent to oversee Yanshou, transferred to Liao with him; learning valued general. Followed Yanshou into Kitan; made <i>huitushi</i>
58	Qiao Rong 喬榮	936:int 11		D	TJ 283:9253	?	welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post
59	Sha Yansun +prov, trps 沙彥珣	936:12 937:2	Datong	VX	LS 3:40	?	came to welcome Liao Taizong; detained, not allowed back to province
					TJ 280:9169		welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post
60	Zhangguo <i>jiedushi</i> <sup>1</sup> +prov	936:12		VX	LS 3:40		welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post
61	An Shuqian 安叔千 +prov	936:12	Zhenwu <sup>m</sup>	VX	LS 3:40	Sh	welcomed Liao Taizong; kept in post
62	Wu Luan 吳鸞 +city	937:1	Datong	DXR	LS 3:40	H	opposed Liao, besieged, surr to Taizong; served Jin Gaozu
63	Guo Chongwei 郭崇威	937:1?	Yingzhou <sub>2</sub>	DXR	TJ 281:9169	?	official of 1 of 16 prefectures. Ashamed to be subject to Kitan; returned S
64	lady Zhao 趙氏	938:9	Luojing	V	JW 77:1018	Sh	Liao envoy to fetch her
					TJ 281:9190		Zhao Yanshou's wife, L Tang princess. Liao envoy to fetch her
	(Yang Guangyuan registers	938:11 938:11	Tianxiong You, Ji <sub>1</sub> , Ying <sub>1</sub> , Mo, Zhuo, Tan, Shun, Gui, Ru, Xin <sub>1</sub> , Wu, Yun, Ying <sub>2</sub> , Shuo, Huan, Yu	(A)	TJ 281:9194	see above	rebellious because Sang Weihai dividing Guangyuan's army, talks w Kitan)

1. I have not been able to establish who this was.

m. JW 48:661.

No. Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
66 Zhe Congyuan 折從遠	938:11	Fuzhou (16 pref's)	DR	NC(R) LS 4:44 <sup>n</sup> TJ 284:9273	H	JW 125:1647 the 16 prefectures, given by Jin Gaozu. Shucheng (Hejian) asked to R 946:11, TJ 285:9314 prefect. Kept in post, rebelled in opposition to transfer of population 944:6, TJ 284:9273; to Han 947:4, TJ 286:9352
67 Yang Yanyun 楊彥詢	941:9	Jin envoy	NR	TJ 282:9228	H	JW 90:1186 nearly killed; sent back 941:12, LS 4:50; allowed back TJ 282:9232
68 30 senior rebel households	941:12	Shuozhou	NC	LS 4:50-1		An Congjin rebellion v Jin; able-bodied killed, rest given to Niaoguzhi
69 Shi Yanxu 石延煦	943:8	Jin court	A	LS 4:53	Sh	JW 87:1141 Jin Chudi sent him as a hostage
70 Jin spy	943:11		N	LS 4:53		captured; information that Jin treacherous
71 Yang Guangyuan	943:12	Qingzhou	A	TJ 283:9256		information to Kitan about weakness of Jin
	944:1			JW 82:1084	see above	rebelled against Jin
72 Shao Ke 邵珂	944:1	Beizhou	V	LS 4:53	?	rebelled; Jin sent punitive force
				XW 72:894		officer, besieged, opened gate to Liao; commander Wu Luan suicide
73 Zhou Ru 周儒+city	944:1	Bozhou	VX(R)	TJ 283:9260-1		resented <i>jiedushi</i> , info to Kitan, let them in; popn comforted TJ 284:9266
	944:1			TJ 283:9264	?	communication w Yang Guangyuan; population comforted TJ 284:9266
	944:2			XW 9:93		rebelled, submitted
74 Cai Xingyu 蔡行遇	944:1	Majiadu	(DX)	JW 82:1086	?	communication with Yang Guangyuan; 67 soldiers escaped Kitan <sup>o</sup>
	944:2		N	LS 4:54		attacked, surrendered
75 Yang Chengxin 楊承信	944:1	Qingzhou	A	TJ 283:9264	?	captured in battle
76 Yin Jufan 尹居璠	944:3	Dezhou	NX	JW 82:1086		ambushed, captured; so badly wounded he had to travel in a basket
	944:4			LS 4:59	Sh	backed his father against Jin and brothers Chengxun, Chengzuo
+27 generals, officials	944:5			TJ 284:9268	?	Mada took prefecture as main Liao army withdrew, captured prefect Jufan
77 Zhang Hui 張暉	944:7	Jin envoy	NR	JW 82:1089		captured when prefecture fell
78 city garrisons	c.944	Shanzhou to Yedu	NM	LS 4:54		captured when prefecture fell
79 Du Zhimin 杜知敏	945:1	Yulin	NR	TJ 284:9286	H	peace letter, detained; welcomed Hanzu SS 272:9318
80 several Jin	945:2	Yulin	NM	LS 4:54		distance of 150 li; defences improved as a result
81 thous /hunds Ch prisoners	c.945:5	Tianxiong prov	NC	TJ 284:9281	?	captured in battle; rescued by lord Murong Yanchao
82 Jin spies	945:12	Yunzhou	N	XW 72:895		captured in battle
				TJ 284:9292		Du (Chong)wei would not rescue prisoners driven beneath his walls
				LS 4:56		captured by <i>jiedushi</i> Yelu Konga

n. TJ 280:9154 notes their offer; this appears to be the formal or administrative handover, as they were clearly already under Liao control. The return of Shucheng has been counted.

o. This return has been counted.

No. Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
83 Liu Yanhan 劉延翰	946:4	Du Wei general	NR	TJ 285:9304	H	SS 260:9025 buying horses for Du Wei, capt'd by Sun Fangjian, given to Kitan; fled back
84 Sun Fangjian 孫方簡	946:5	Yizhou	VMR	LS 4:57	Bo?	JW 125:1649 asked to come to allegiance
+fortress	946:6	Langshan		JW 84:1115		rebelled, occupied Langshan, allegiance to Kitan
	946:4			TJ 285:9303-4		self-defence, Jin court mistrusted him, allegiance to Kitan, raided for them.
						948:3 rebelled against Kitan, went to Han, kept out Kitan TJ 288:9389
	946:6			XW 9:96		rebelled, pledged allegiance to Kitan
85 1000 +garrison, popn	946:11	Luancheng	DXR	TJ 285:9316		surprised by Liao advance, helpless, surrd; Jin people tattooed, released S
1000 cavalry				XW 72:896		Luancheng xian taken, submitted; Jin people tattooed, released S
several thou cavalry				LS 4:58		taken after assault; population tattooed, released
86 An Shuqian +city	946:11?	Xingzhou	VX	LS 4:58	see above	secretly asked to come to allegiance early in war; made general, <i>jiedushi</i>
	947:1			TJ 286:9327		had secretly asked to come to allegiance; made general
87 Zhang Zuo 張祚 etc	946:12	Du Wei messenger	N	TJ 285:9317	?	captured returning from court; court-Du Wei communications cut
88 Du (Chong)wei +armies	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	TJ 285:9318-9	H	JW 109:1433 planned surrender, army unhappy; received robe, made <i>taifu</i> . Allegiance to Han 947:7, TJ 287:9368 below
杜重威				JW 99:1324; 137:1835		surrendered
				XW 9:97		rebelled, surrendered
			(DM)	JW 85:1123		cut off, surrendered
+ 200,000	946:12		(VM)	XW 72:896		besieged, cut off, surrendered
				LS 4:58		led armies to surrender; made <i>shou taifu</i> , Yedu <i>liushou</i> , kept half of army, half placed under Zhao Yanshou
89 Li Shouzheng +armies	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	TJ 285:9318-9	H	JW 109:1437 planned surrender, army unhappy; made <i>situ</i> . Allegiance to Han 947:7, TJ 287:9368 below
李守貞				XW 9:97		rebelled, surrendered
			(DM)	JW 85:1123		cut off, surrendered
			(VM)	XW 72:896		besieged, cut off, surrendered
+ 200,000	946:12			LS 4:58		led armies to surrender; made Tianping <i>jiedushi</i>
90 Song Yanyun 宋彥筠	946:12	Zhongdu	VMR	TJ 285:9318	H	JW 123:1623 planned surrender, army unhappy; retained in post LS 4:58
91 Gao Xun 高勳	946:12	Du Wei army	D	TJ 285:9318	?	LS 85:1317 messenger to Liao; retained in post LS 4:58
92 Zhang Yanze +armies	946:12	Xiangzhou	VM	JW 85:1123-4	Turk	JW 98:1305 accepted Kitan orders after surr; pillaged Jin capital. Executed JW 85:1126
張彥澤				JW 99:1324		accepted Kitan orders, took Jin capital Daliang
				TJ 285:9320		sent to take Jin capital Daliang
				XW 9:97		rebelled, surrendered
			(DM)	XW 72:896		besieged, cut off, surrendered; sent ahead to capital

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group	Biography	Notes
93	+200,000 Wang Zhou 王周+city	946:12 946:12	Heng/Zhenzhou	(VM) DXR	LS 4:58 TJ 285:9319	H	JW 106:1391	led armies to surr; retained in post, took edict to capital, executed LS 4:59 surrendered in person to Taizong after hearing of Du Wei's surrender; Liao entered Hengzhou, Zhou given posts
94	Wang Hui 王暉+city	946:12	Daizhou	DX	TJ 285:9319	Sh? <sup>p</sup>	SS 261:9049	surprise attack, surrendered; executed when Han Shi Hongzhao retook Daizhou, TJ 286:9344
95	Jin force	bef 947:2 946:12	Yizhou	(V) DM	JW 99:1325 TJ 285:9319			rebelled, allegiance to Kitan; executed when Han Shi Hongzhao retook Dai surrender requested after Du Wei's submission, commander Guo Lin could not prevent host's surrender; killed by Geng Chongmei
96	Li Yin 李殷+province	946:12 946:11	Yiwu	(VXR) DXR	TJ 285:9319 LS 4:58	H	JW 106:1395	<i>jiedushi</i> . Simple surrender; replaced by Sun Fangjian to rear of main Liao advance, Zhenzhou besieged, surrd; joined Liao army
97	Fang Tai 方太+province	946:12	Anguo	VXR	TJ 285:9319	H	JW 94:1244	<i>liuhou</i> . Simple surrender; replaced by Mada, given posts. Chosen by rebellious troops 947:4, fled to Luoyang, killed before could submit to Taiyuan (Han) TJ 286:9353-4
98	Huangfu Yu 皇甫遇	946:12	Du Wei army	D(R)	TJ 285:9320	H	JW 95:1259	did not help plan Du Wei's surrender; refused Liao commission, suicide
99	Li Song 李崧	946:12 947:1	Daliang-Bian	VR	TJ 285:9323 LS 4:59	H	JW 108:1419	refused to give wine to imprisoned Jin emperor. R 947:9, TJ 287:9377 made <i>shumishi</i> , N with Taizong 947:4 LS 4:60 made <i>xiting shumishi</i>
100	Li Yantao 李彥韜	946:12	Daliang-Bian	V	JW 137:1835 TJ 285:9323	H	JW 88:1146	refused to visit imprisoned Jin emperor, accompanied him N 947:1 TJ 286:9332, JW 85:1126, LS 4:59
101	Gao Xingzhou	946:12	Shanzhou area	VR	TJ 285:9324		JW 123:1611	came to Liao camp; returned to governorship JW 123:1613
102	Fu Yanqing	946:12	Shanzhou area	VR	TJ 285:9324		SS 251:8837	came to Liao camp; returned to governorship SS 251:8838
103	civil and military officials	946:12	Dongjing	DR	TJ 285:9325			retained posts. Welcomed Liu Zhiyuan (Han), pardoned 947:6, TJ 287:9366
104	Wang Bo 王白	946:12?	Daliang-Bian	D	LS 108:1476	H	LS 108:1476	official in Board of astronomy when capital fell; given posts
105	Wei Lin 魏璘	946:12?	Daliang-Bian	D	LS 108:1476	?	LS 108:1476	known as a diviner, in capital when it fell; exiled to Wugu
106	Feng Dao 馮道	947:1	Dengzhou	VR	TJ 286:9330 LS 4:59	H	JW 126:1655	came to crt; hond for reputation, made <i>shou taifu</i> . R 947:9, TJ 287:9377 made <i>taifu</i> , N with Taizong 947:4, LS 4:60 made <i>taifu</i>
107	He Ning 和凝	947:1		DR	JW 137:1835 LS 4:59	H	JW 127:1671	made Hanlin scholar, N w Taizong 947:4, LS 4:60. R 947:9, TJ 287:9377 made chief minister
108	Zhao Ying 趙瑩	947:1		D	JW 137:1835 LS 4:59	H	JW 89:1169	made <i>taizi taibao</i> , accompanied Jin emperor N accompanied Jin emperor N

p. From Taiyuan.

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing	place	Type	Sources	Group	Biography	Notes
109	Liu Xu 劉洵	947:1			D	JW 85:1126			accompanied Jin emperor N
110	Feng Yu 馮玉	947:1			V	LS 4:59 LS 4:59	H H	JW 89:1171 JW 89:1173	made <i>shou taihao</i> , did not go N, died that year JW 89:1173 bribed Zhang Yanze for posts, made <i>taizi shaobao</i> , accompanied Jin emperor N. Son fled back 952, Yu died of fear JW 89:1174
111	Jin Shaoqi 晉少帝	947:1			N	TJ 286:9332 JW 85:1126 JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332 XW 10:100; 72:896	Sh Sh		accompanied Jin emperor N accompanied Jin emperor N transferred N
112	empress dowager Li 李	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332 XW 72:896	Sh	JW 86:1131	transferred
113	concubine dowager An 安	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332	? ?	JW 86:1133	transferred N
114	empress Feng 馮	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332	? ?	JW 86:1133	transferred N
115	Shi Chongrui 石重睿	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332	Sh	JW 87:1141	emperor's younger brother. Transferred N
116	Shi Yanxu	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332	Sh	see above	emperor's son. Transferred N
117	Shi Yanbao 石延寶	947:1			N	JW 85:1126 LS 4:59, TJ 286:9332	Sh	JW 87:1142	emperor's son. Transferred N
118	50 palace women, 3 eunuchs, 50 of <i>dongxi ban</i> , doctor, 4 falconers, 7 cooks, 3 wine and tea officials, 20 soldiers	947:1			N	JW 85:1126			transferred N
	50 palace women, 30 eunuchs, 50 of <i>dongxi ban</i> , doctor, 4 falconers, 7 cooks, 3 wine and tea officials, 20 soldiers				N	JW 85:1126			transferred N
	100+ palace attendants					LS 4:59			transferred N
119	prefectural generals	947:1			DR	TJ 286:9332			accepted Kitan orders, retained posts. Surrendered to Han 947:6, TJ 287:9366
120	Hou Yi 侯益	c.947:1	Qi		D(R)	JW 101:1344	H	SS 254:8879	accepted Kitan orders, retained post, uneasy when Han entered Luoyang, 948:2 asked Shu for help
121	Zhao Zan 趙贊	c.947:1	Pu		D(R)	JW 101:1344	H	JW 98:1313	Zhao Yanshou's son. Accepted Kitan orders, retained post, uneasy when Han entered Luoyang, 948:2 asked Shu for help
122	Ma Yinqing 馬胤卿	c.947:1?	Qingzhou		N	LS 105:1461	H	LS 105:1461	resolute defence, captured when city fell, family transferred to Yiwulshan



No. Name or description	Date	Crossing	place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
123 several thousand Jin civilian & military officials, several thousand functionaries & soldiers of armies,	947:3	Daliang-Bian	N(R) <sup>q</sup>	TJ 286:9350			several hundred palace women & eunuchs N with emp. cf. 947:2, TJ 286:9348
Jin offls, female court attendants, eunuchs, diviners, workmen	947:3	Xiangzhou	DXR	TJ 286:9351	?		sent to Shangjing, most R c.954, JW 85:1129
124 Liang Hui 梁暉+city	947:3	Xiangzhou	NC	TJ 286:9351			city attacked, asked to submit; pardoned, made <i>fangyushi</i> , resisted again
125 women	947:4	Xiangzhou		XW 72:899			city assaulted, all males slaughtered, women driven N
126 Li Huan 李濬	947:4	Hengzhou	N(R)	LS 4:60	?	see Ch. 6	all males slaughtered, women driven N
947:5				TJ 287:9364			N with Taizong
127 Xu Taifu 徐台符	947:4	Hengzhou	NR	LS 4:60	?		N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou.
947:5				TJ 287:9364			Information 952:6, JW 112:1482-3, TJ 290:9479; planned flight LS 6:70
128 harem, eunuchs, musicians	947:5	Hengzhou	N	TJ 287:9364			N with Taizong
129 1,090,118 households	947:4	Later Jin regime	NC	LS 4:60			N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou;
130 Li Congyi 李從益	947:5		D	JW 100:1331-2Sh		JW 51:696	disappeared TJ 287:9371-2; R 948:5, JW 101:1348; 948:4, TJ 288:9393
			(V)	TJ 287:9362-3			N with Taizong, rest of Jin officials and soldiers left at Hengzhou
131 Wang Shufei 王淑妃	947:5		D	XW 10:101			population of 76 districts acquired
132 Wang Song 王松	947:5		DR	TJ 287:9362-3 H?		XW 15:158	left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han; killed by Han emperor
133 Zhao Yuan 趙遠	947:5		DR	TJ 287:9362-3 H?		XW 57:660	left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han
134 Zhai Guangye 翟光鄴	947:5		DR	TJ 287:9362-3 H		SS 262:9065	left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han
135 Wang Jingchong 王景崇	947:5		VR	TJ 287:9362-3 H		JW 129:1698	left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han
						XW 53:603	left in charge of rump Liao S court by Xiao Han
136 Liu Zuo 劉祚	947:5		D	TJ 287:9362-3 ?			rump Liao S court; unhappy, offls looked to N, killed by Han XW 15:160
137 Du Chongwei +province	947:7	Guide	VXR	TJ 287:9369		see above	chief minister in rump Liao S court; pardoned by Han Gaozu XW 57:660
138 Du Hongsui 杜弘璚	947:7		V	TJ 287:9369	H	JW 109:1437	chf min in rump S court; urged Congyi to turn against Liao SS 262:9066-7
139 population	948:3	Dingzhou	NC	TJ 288:9389			<i>shumishi</i> in rump Liao S court; posts under Han JW 129:1698-9
140 Li Shouzheng	948:3		A	TJ 288:9391		see above	bribed Gao Mouhan for job under Liao occupation, <i>xuanhuishi</i> in rump Liao
141 Jin princess, singers	948:4		N	JW 85:1128			S court; fled with gold to welcome Hanzu, made general
Jin princess	948:4		N	TJ 288:9393			commander of palace guards in rump Liao S court
142 lady Zhao 趙氏	949		N	JW 85:1128	?		allegiance to Kitan, turned from China, rebd; killed 948:1, TJ 287:9384
							Chongwei's son. Sent as hostage to Mada with request for troops
							pillaged and driven N by Mada
							did not respect Han, contact with Kitan; killed 949:7, TJ 288:9411
							Jin Shaoqi's daughter. Taken by Liao Shizong, given to Kit noble Channu
							Jin Shaoqi's daughter. Taken by Liao Shizong, given to Kit noble Channu
							Jin Shaoqi's favoured concubine, taken by Shultu prince (Muzong)

q. This return is counted.

No. Name or description	Date	Crossing	place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
143 lady Nie 聶氏	949	N	JW 85:1128	?			Jin Shaodi's favoured concubine, taken by Shultu prince (Muzong)
144 very many prisoners	949:10	Beizhou Gaolaozhen, Yedu, Nangong, Tangyang, Shenzhou	NC	LS 5:65			generals sent to lead attacks
145 many people	950:10	Anping, Neiqiu, Shulu etc	NC	LS 5:65			emperor personally led raid
146 500 imperial troops +city	950:11	Neiqiu city	DM	JW 103:1375			small but secure, held out 5 days, attack critical, surrendered
147 Pan Yunian 潘聶然	951:1	Henghai	(V)	TJ 289:9443			held out 5 days; rebelled, led Kitān into city
148 Liu Chong 劉崇	951:1	Hedong	V	TJ 290:9455	?		abandoned governorship, went N w Shizong; made SW pacification commr
149 Yao Hanying 姚漢英	951:6		A	TJ 290:9455	Sh		asked for help against Zhou
150 Hua Zhaoyin 華昭胤	951:2	Zhou envoy	N	LS 5:66	H	LS 96:1402	attacked by Zhou, sent letter calling himself 'nephew,' asking for help
151 Murong Yanchao 慕容彥超	952:1		N	LS 5:66			carried letter treating Liao as equal; detained
152 sev hundred able-bodied	952:9	Zhou envoy	N	TJ 290:9460	?		carried letter treating Liao as equal; detained
153 Chinese population	952:10	Jibu	A	TJ 290:9473	Sh	JW 130:1716	did not want to be transferred, asked for help (also from S) against Zhou
154 Liu Hanzhang 劉漢章+city	953:9	Jizhou <sub>2</sub>	NC	JW 112:1484			taken when heard Zhou army coming; killed when showed support for Zhou
155 Zhou troops	954:3	Hebei	NC	TJ 291:9482			plundered from prefecture; killed when showed support for Zhou
156 Yang Gun 楊袞	954:5		VX	TJ 291:9496	?		50-60% of previously pillaged population returned as refugees from floods in Liao Ying, Mo, You; given relief
157 Zhou army prisoners	954:6	Qizhou	DM	TJ 291:9506			Kitān raided Leshou, Hanzhang planned to help; failed, executed
158 Northern Han population	954:7	Gaoping	V	TJ 292:9514	?		surrendered after defeat; Zhou got them back, killed them
(Chen Chuyao 陳處堯	956	Xinkou	NM	LS 6:72			opposed by a prefect, fled to allegiance; imprisoned for lack of merit
Zhao Anren 趙安仁	958:4?		NC	LS 6:72			presented to court by Talie
Northern Han envoy	963:int 12	S Tang envoy	(N)	TJ 293:9562, 6			mistakenly pillaged; returned on request
Northern Han envoy	963:int 12	Shenzhou Leshou	N(R)	LS 109:1481	H	LS 109:1481	worked for Kitān, died there)
4 sets of N Han envoys <sup>r</sup>	964:12	12 N Han court	NR	CB 4:114			captured as a child; eunuch
population	965:11	12 N Han court	NR	CB 4:114			bearing gift in thanks, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241
Bo Sheng 白昇	965	N Han court	NR	CB 5:140			restoring payments, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241
		Yizhou	NC(R?)	CB 6:160			w New Year, birthday, Duanwu jie greetings, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241
		N Han court	NR	CB 6:161	?		provoked Song counter raid to force exchange of captives
							requesting release of envoys, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241

r. The Southern Tang 南唐 were not directly involved in north China affairs, and Chuyao's case is an oddity.

s. Not listed separately.

No. Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group	Biography	Notes
168 Liu Jiwen 劉繼文	965	N Han court	NR	CB 6:161	Sh		further mission, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241
169 Li Guangmei 李光美 (Chen Da 陳達)	965 967:2	N Han court Shenzhou	NR (V)	CB 6:161 CB 8:190	H ?	TJ 290:9454	further mission, detained. R 970:1, CB 11:241 tried and exiled before he could cross)
170 sev hundred Song troops (Fu Tinghan 傅廷翰)	969:int 5 973:1	Taiyuan Dizhou	NMR (V)	CB 10:225-6 CB 14:297			force sent to recover those falling into Kitan hands planned to flee; discovered, executed)
171 Song army prisoners (Xin Zhongfu 辛仲甫)	977:3 977:5		NM (N)	LS 9:99 CB 18:405			captured while aiding Han; presented to court Liao emp considered detaining him; returned him for his uprightness)
172 Liu Jiwen	979:5	Hedong	D	LS 9:101	H	SS 266:9178 see above	fled N Han army after defeat. cf. CB 11:241: suspected by Song of contact with Kitan after return from Liao, examined, died of fear
173 Lu Jun 盧俊	979:5	Hedong	D	LS 9:101	?		fled from Northern Han army after defeat
174 Song army prisoners	979:7	Gaoliang	NM	LS 9:102			captured in battle, presented to court by Yelü Sha
175 Song army prisoners	979:8	Gaoliang?	NM	LS 9:102			captured in battle, presented to court by Yelü Sha and others
176 enemy people	980:10		NX	LS 9:103			captured; shot with devil arrows
177 70 Song border villages	983:2	Nanjing	VC	LS 10:109			came to allegiance; ordered to be treated kindly
178 1000+ hshlds bk fm Song	983:5		VC	LS 10:110			persuaded by Nanjing military commander Yelü Shanbu, comforted
179 Song spies	983:11	Yingzhou	N	LS 10:112			captured; information: Song building Wutai shan road, executed w helpers
180 prisoners	984:2	Hedong	NX	LS 10:113			captured in attack, presented by Han Dewei
181 military officials	986:3	Gu'an	N	LS 11:120			captured in battle where Song defeated by Yelü Pote, Xiuge
182 prisoners	986:4	Zhuozhou region?	NX	LS 11:122			captured during war; ordered generals to present prisoners
183 prisoners (Duoluo 多羅)	986:4	Gu'an cheng	NX	LS 11:122			captured in plunder after fall of city to assault
(Geng Shaozhong 耿紹忠)	986:4	Yuzhou, etc	(V)	CB 27:611	Kit?		Liao official. Having surrd to Song, planned return to Liao, discovered)
(captured Song people)	986:5	Yuzhou, etc	(V)	CB 27:611	H		Liao Ch offl. Having surrd to Song, planned return to Liao, discovered)
184 prisoners (surrendered soldiers)	986:5		(NC) NX	LS 11:122 LS 11:122			shot with devil arrows) captured; presented to court by Xiuge, Chouning, Pununing
185 240 Song	986:5		(DM)	LS 11:123			distributed to retinue)
186 Yang (Ji)ye 楊繼業	986:7	Shuozhou	VC	LS 11:123			came to allegiance; divided between ministers
187 prisoners (captured Song soldiers)	986:8 986:11		N NM	LS 11:124 CB 27:622	?		came off his horse, captured; died of hunger because of his wounds frontier experience CB 20:464. Capt'd in battle; loyalty, refused to eat, died presented to court by general Yelü Xiezhen
188 2 Song spies	986:11	frontier	(NM)	LS 11:125			shot with devil arrows)
189 9 Song vanguard soldiers	986:11	Wangdu	N	LS 11:126			captured; presented to court, given clothing, sent to Taizhou with a letter
190 army prisoners	986:12	Wangdu	NM	LS 11:126			captured by Shuangguli captured in battle; presented to court by Xiuge

No. Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
191 v many Song supply train	986:12	Wangdu	NM	LS 11:126		captured by Hezhu; food and fodder burnt
192 He Lingtu 賀令圖	986:12	Mozhou Leshou	N	LS 11:126 CB 27:625-6	H	SS 463:13540 Song general. Captured in battle fell for offer of allegiance, lost to the enemy
193 Yang Chongjin 楊重進	986:12	Mozhou Leshou	N	LS 11:126 CB 27:625-6	H	SS 463:13541 Song general. Captured in battle lost to the enemy; killed in battle <sup>t</sup>
194 messengers	986:12	Daizhou	N	CB 27:626		communicating on side-routes between Zhang Qixian and Pan Mei (Song)
195 defending general +city	986:12	Yangtuan cheng	DX	LS 11:126		assault on city, surrender; pillaging banned
196 prisoners	986:12	Fengmu zhen	NX	LS 11:127		allowed great pillaging
197 old and young	987:1	Wenan (Mozhou)	NC	LS 12:129		invitation to surrender refused; all able-bodied males killed
198 village women, children	987:1	N of Wei and Bo	NC	CB 28:631		where failed to take cities, pillaged surrounding rural areas
199 Song spies	988:9		N	LS 12:131		captured; presented to court by Xiuge's official Yideli
(surrendered troops	988:10		(DM)	LS 12:132		divided into 7 units, called the Guisheng army)
200 soldiers?	988:11	Changcheng kou	NM	LS 12:132		leadership <sup>u</sup> escaped city, rest rejected offer to surrender, assault, some captured; placed under Yan armies
201 soldiers' wives, children	988:11	Yizhou	NC	CB 29:658		left behind in the city, captured
202 commanders +civilians?	988:11	Mancheng	DC	LS 12:132		besieged, assault, soldiers <sup>v</sup> fled? letter to commanders, surrendered
203 20 soldiers	988:11	Mozhou	NM	LS 12:132		captured; presented to court, given clothes, belts, attached to Yanjing
204 200+ soldiers	988:11	western route	DM	LS 12:132		surrendered; those who were cold given fur clothes
205 Song spies	988:12		N	LS 12:132		captured by Xi official Yelu; presented to court by Xiuge
206 Guo Rong 郭榮+host	989:1	Jibi zhai	VM	LS 12:133	?	came to submit, ordered to camp at Nanjing
207 5 Song unit commanders	989:1	Suicheng	N	LS 12:133		captured in battle
208 800 people	989:1	Yizhou	NC	LS 12:133		Yizhou fell; escorted back to be attached to their original homes
209 17 Song <i>jinsli</i> +families	989:3		VC	LS 12:134		came to submit; tested, given minor posts at court and in counties
210 700 soldiers	989:5	Mancheng	DM	LS 12:135		called for their surrender; presented to court, attached to Dongjing
(Song prisoners	990:3		(NX)	LS 12:139		populated newly-walled Xingguo)

t. The CB says that Lingtu and Chongjin 'were lost to the enemy,' then notes in passing that Chongjin was killed in the battle. His biography says he 'died in the line of battle.' SS 463:13541.

u. The *shi* 士; this is unusual phrasing. It is not clear whether the *shi* are civil or military personages, or both, cf. #202. That those captured were attached to an army suggests that they were soldiers.

v. *Junshi* 軍士. Hence the *zhong* 眾 (host) in this case would comprise civilians rather than fitting the more common military usage.

No.	Name or description	Date	Crossing place	Type	Sources	Group Biography	Notes
211	(Song surrendered troops Song prisoners (500 surrd Song soldiers	990:5 990:9 991:1		(DM) NX (DM)	LS 12:139 LS 12:140 LS 12:141		divided and placed under various armies) presented to court by Li Jiqian  selected to form Xuanli army)
	(Song officials, functionaries, Confucian scholars, craft workers, good fighters	994:11		(NX)	LS 13:145		names to be reported)
	(Wei Desheng 衛德升 +5 people	994:11		(N)	LS 13:145	?	Song prisoners. Made officials)
212	Song population	995:3	near Wuqing xian	NCR	LS 13:146		taken by local Liao population; Liao punished plunderers, ordered those plundered to be returned
213	Kang Zhaoyi 康昭裔	999:10	Yingzhou	N	LS 14:154-5	?	Song general. Captured in battle
214	Song Shun 宋順	999:10	Yingzhou	N	LS 14:154-5	?	Song general. Captured in battle
215	Zhou Jing 周靖	1001	Heilukou	NR	CB 55:1211	?	captured; escaped back to Song, made assistant unit commander
216	Li Xu 李緒	1002:2	Daizhou	V	CB 51:1116	?	committed crime, fled; goods not confiscated, family not punished
217	prisoners	1002:4	S campaign	NX	LS 14:157		presented by generals
218	Wang Jizhong 王繼忠	1003:4	Wangdu Bocheng	N(R)	LS 14:158 CB 54:1190; 57:1268 SS 7:121	H see Ch. 7	captured in battle by Yelu Nugua and Xiao Talin fell into enemy hands; troops to rescue him, employed as official by Liao fell into enemy hands; troops to rescue him, asked to return SS 279:9472 shot with devil arrows)
	(captured spies	1004:int 9	Gu'an	(N)	LS 14:160		captured as a child; eunuch
219	Wang Jien 王繼恩	1004:int 9?	Dizhou	N	LS 109:1480	H	those surrendering were rewarded
220	troops	1004:10	Qizhou	DM	LS 14:160		official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya
221	Tian Fengji 田逢吉	1004:11	Song Wei fu	N	LS 14:160	?	official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya
222	Guo Shourong 郭守榮	1004:11	Song Wei fu	N	LS 14:160	?	official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya
223	Chang Xian 常顯	1004:11	Song Wei fu	N	LS 14:160	?	official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya
224	Liu Chuo 劉綽	1004:11	Song Wei fu	N	LS 14:160	?	official. Captured; presented as a gift by Xiao Paiya
225	population	1004:12	Tongli jun	NC	CB 58:1290		military official fled, town plundered of inhabitants
226	Wu Bo 武白	1004:12?	Tongli jun	N	LS 82:1294	?	captured en route to Xiangzhou post; served Liao

any one of which anything from one individual to over a million households may be recorded.

People are only accepted as crossers if their act of crossing is covered by the sources. There are some gaps in the sources where people are noted as holding prominent positions in Liao service, but where no indication is given of when they crossed to Liao. One such is the family of Geng Yanyi 耿延毅, who is known chiefly through three tomb inscriptions.<sup>3</sup> These people are not included here. Similarly, the LS records surrenders and the presentation of prisoners at court, and also contains several cases showing what happened to those who had crossed to Liao. The latter cases are recorded without giving any information about these people's arrival, and so to avoid the danger of counting the same group twice they are not included here.<sup>4</sup> Cases of deliberate deception are also omitted. The promise to cross if certain conditions were met was sometimes used to deceive the other side into placing themselves in a vulnerable position. Such 'dirty tricks' reflect the prevalence of crossing and its value to the other side, but do not contribute to a picture of actual crossings. Finally, the voluntary crossings by Li Jiqian 李繼遷 and his cousin Jipeng 李繼捧 are omitted because the conditions operating in what was then the far northwest were so different to those in the northeast which is our main concern here.<sup>5</sup>

Crossers who are named are counted as one incident each, even if several are named as crossing at the same time. If a crossing is recorded in different sources which suggest it should be categorised in two different ways (typically one source makes the crossing seem voluntary, another suggests duress) then this is noted in the table, but the likeliest category is chosen for use in the histograms. These decisions are arrived at by comparing what the different sources say in the light of what we know about them, but the process is inevitably somewhat subjective. This simply reflects the nature of our sources. It is also an appropriate method when what we are trying to examine is the issues surrounding the act of crossing, from the motivations of the crossers themselves to the manner of their recording. The histogram shows in graphical form what it was that the historiographers considered worth recording from the incomplete information they themselves would have

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3. Zhu Zifang, *Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi kaoshi*, *Liaoning di yi shifan xueyuan xuebao* 1978:3, pp.42-63, Luo Jizu, Du 'Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi kaoshi,' *Shenyang shifan xueyuan xuebao* 1979:1, 2, pp.91-2, Zhu Zifang, Dui 'Liaodai Geng shi san muzhi kaoshi' de yi dian buchong - jian da Luo Jizu tongzhi, *Shenyang shifan xueyuan xuebao* 1979:1, 2, pp.93-5, Zhu Zifang & Xu Ji, *Liao Geng shi muzhi kaolue*, *Kaogu xue jikan* 3 (1983), pp.196-204.

4. They are, however, included in the table, marked out by brackets. An example illustrating the possible danger of repetition is Table 1, #210 and the bracketed entry following #211. 700 soldiers surrendered and were presented to court in 989:5. Eight months later, in 991:1, 500 Song soldiers were selected to form a new army. These 500 could come from the 700 captured earlier, or from the pool of all Song troops captured to date, or be newly acquired. Hence we err on the side of caution.

5. Jiqian gave his submission in 986:2, 989:3, and perhaps c.997; Jipeng his in 991:10. See Chapter 1 for references. The situation in the northwest warrants the full study by Dunnell, Tanguts.

had. As such, this format is useful for showing tendencies, which will be discussed below, but the actual figures should not be taken literally.<sup>6</sup>

### Types of crossing

I have found well over two hundred instances of Chinese whose act of crossing to Liao is recorded. They include many groups of *laobaixing* or soldiers, but many more individuals, as more information was always recorded about those of higher rank. In addition to references found scattered through the annals, about sixty of these individuals have biographies in the histories of the Wudai, or in the SS, which have been referred to where appropriate. About a further twenty people have biographies in the LS. Every case was individual, and some of the better-recorded crossers are discussed more fully in the following chapters, but the purpose here is to provide a broad picture of trends and tendencies, and to relate that to the political events.

It needs hardly be said that those who crossed the frontier were always either in the frontier zone or the battle zone, wherever those areas happened to be at the time, with the exception of the crossings around the fall of the Later Jin to Liao in 946-7. Those who crossed the frontier did so in various ways. The main criterion used to categorise crossers is the degree of free choice which seems to be involved in their act of crossing. Clearly there are problems in defining something so nebulous, especially at such a distance, and with, in many cases, so little information. As with any history, a great deal depends on the manner of recording, and we can probably never know the full range of factors operating in any one situation. Nevertheless, it has been possible to categorise individual crossings on the basis of where the initiative for the crossing seems to have come from, regardless of the many unknown factors. Hence it seems possible to define three basic categories:

1. '*Voluntary*' crossings, where the people concerned are under no immediate external threat, and who, according to the impression given in our sources, simply decide to cross of their own free will. Such a decision was frequently made on the basis of political advantage, very often to gain support in a bid for greater autonomy against an erstwhile master, as we have seen in the previous chapter. The court officials who showed their willingness to join Liao were a particular case expressing an often similar motivation, as shown by the couple of instances where bribes were paid to try to secure re-employment (#110, 135.) Exceptions to this are Zhao Yanshou's 趙延壽 wife, who was allowed to go from Later Jin to join her husband in Liao (#64), and a group of leaderless civilian crossings towards the end of the century (#177, 178, 185, 209), which

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6. Although tendencies are noted, not every case fitted the perceived pattern. In addition, circumstances changed unevenly: there is no such thing as a 'steady progression.'

are discussed in more detail below. Meanwhile personal safety, more than advantage, was clearly behind Li Xu's 李緒 flight in 1002 (#216.)

2. *Crossings under duress*, where the crossers appear reluctant to come over, but are subject to a direct and immediate external threat, and where a prominent alternative to crossing is death. The typical example of such crossings is the surrender of commanders inside a besieged city, before the city falls to assault. This is usually done in preference to the risk of waiting for the arrival of a relieving force in time to prevent the said assault, which could be nothing but bloody. In these circumstances it is possible to see that there is some, albeit small, element of choice involved. In terms of the opposing concepts of loyalty and self-preservation, it is the most challenging of situations for a Chinese educated in traditional mores.<sup>7</sup> It is striking that in the flux of the Wudai period, it was most often self-preservation, which some might call commonsense, that won out. Clearly this is the most fluid of the categories, as often people are classified into it on the basis of a tiny amount of information, perhaps a line or less. (This is particularly the case with groups of surrendered soldiers.) At times it seems best to emphasise the small element of choice its members do have; at others to stress their lack of realistic alternative options. The other class of crosser found in this category is members of staff of prominent leaders where the subordinates' own motivation is unclear. Being in a position to take a more 'honourable' line of action if they so chose, and as occasionally happened, we must assume that there was at least some freedom of choice involved here.

3. *Involuntary crossings*, where there was not the slightest element of choice. This comprises chiefly the capture of defeated or fleeing troops, many of the crossings associated with the fall of Later Jin and the seizure of populations in raids or war. It also includes smaller numbers of those captured at the fall of their city, as well as the detention of envoys and capture of spies. It is probably the easiest category for which to identify members, with, as noted above, just a question mark over whether there is a difference between troops who 'surrendered' and those who were 'captured.' Although it is often assumed that these amount to the same thing, this study requires a recognition of the difference in vocabulary, simply because we lack the detail to do otherwise. It is hoped that the flexibility of the second category will allow some correction of any, inevitable, distortions.


There is, finally, a fourth group, of 'crossings' in the form of alliances with the Liao, or where crossings occurred as a result of those alliances. Hence Shi Jingtang (#48) and Liu Chong 劉崇 (#148) can both be seen to have 'crossed' in this sense, as can Du Chongwei's 杜重威 son Honghui 杜弘璣 (#138), sent to the Kitan noble Mada 麻答 as an envoy and detained as a hostage for Chongwei's continued loyalty to the Liao. Clearly

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7. See Chapter 8.



Figure 2: Frontier crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004



this type of crossing was only an option for those with at least a province under their control, and a crossing is treated as an alliance rather than a voluntary submission only if it appears that the crosser retained their autonomy and is not said to have ‘pledged their allegiance,’ or similar. They are typically marked by a request to Liao for troops to assist against a stronger power.


Figure 2 shows all those recorded as crossing the frontier. The peaks in the graph are mostly readily explained. The early fairly steady rate of crossings between 900 and 920 reflects the fluid frontier situation in Hebei at this time. The rise in the next column stems from the heating up of the Liao-Jin struggle for control of the Central Plains, in which the Liao were increasingly involved, leading up to a peak in the early 920’s, when Liao and Jin ambitions were being contested through the medium of Wang Yu’s 王郁 efforts to keep Yiwu 義武 an independent province. The generally increased crossing activity in the columns for 935-955 results firstly from the Liao-Jin alliance and crossings associated with Liao aid in the war against Later Tang. The most important event in this respect was the fall of Jin’an zhai 晉安寨 in 936:intercalary 11 (#49-58.) Secondly, most dramatically, these mid-century crossings result from the war and conquest of Jin by Liao in 946-7. Crossings continue at a high level during the early Zhou period, when the Liao were allied with the Northern Han, and drop off dramatically in the later period of the alliance, when the enemy was the Song, only rising briefly in the last phase of the war bringing about the fall of the Northern Han in 979. After this they recommence with a different emphasis, peaking during the 986-9 and the pre-Shanyuan campaigns.

We shall next look more closely at what lies behind this graph, and examine the breakdown into different types of crossings as defined above, as well as the significance of individual crossings, as against those of groups with or without leaders, civilian or military. To discuss the crossings in chronological sequence would simply be to reiterate what is set out in the table. Here it will be more informative to take a thematic approach, beginning with crossings which were hardly crossings at all, although they do reflect significantly on the attitudes of north China leaders in this period.

## Alliances

Whilst there are no dramatic peaks in Figure 3 (overleaf) the ‘clumping’ of the bars does reflect the level of competition for autonomy, with Liao alliances arising almost whenever there was a significant attempt by one leader to resist the authority of another. This gives some indication of the readiness of north China leaders of this period to look north for support, reinforcement and legitimation of their efforts to gain and retain a greater autonomy of governance than the major powers wished to allow. It is visible in the early

Figure 3: Alliances between north China leaders and Liao, 900-1004



alliances with Zhang Wenli 張文禮 and Wang Yu (#25, 27)<sup>8</sup> and continues into mid-century. The gaps in the pattern for the early part of the century correspond largely to an absence of this kind of challenge, coinciding and interacting with a variety of other factors. Between 900 and the end of 904 the Liao dynasty had not yet been established, and Abaoji 阿保機 was only just making his reputation. Between 910 and the end of 914 the challenger was Liu Shouguang 劉守光, whose father had regularly raided Liao, and who was perceived to be in an untenable position unworthy of assistance (following #15.) For most of the period between 925 and the end of 934, Later Tang power was at its height under Mingzong, who won provincial support (from already weakened provinces) partly by allowing some autonomy to the governors.<sup>9</sup> When Wang Du 王都 tried to resist Mingzong's control in 928 (#40), it was this support which deprived Du of friends in the Central Plains and weakened his position such that he could not just seek military help from the Kitan in the form of an alliance, but felt obliged to pledge the allegiance of his province in order to get what he wanted. Hence his crossing is counted as a voluntary submission, not an alliance. In the same way, although only Shi Jingtang's deal shows up on the graph for 935-9, both Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞 (#55, 56) and Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠 (following #64) had discussions with Liao along similar lines which just did not produce anything concrete. When Dejun entered Liao it was as an official of the defeated Later Tang, not as a leader in his own right, but Guangyuan was offered a second opportunity when relations broke down between the Liao and Jin in the early 940's (#71.)

After this the plethora of deals and cooperations gives way to a single alliance which ran for nearly thirty years. In the first half of 951 the rump government of the Later Han turned to the strongest alternative source of power in its quest to recover the control of the

8. Zhang Wenli gained Liao support for his occupation of Zhenzhou 鎮州, then seat of the independent province of Zhao 趙, in 921:7. His son continued the relationship until he was crushed by Liang forces. (LS 2:18 and biography at JW 62:829.) Wang Yu offered the Liao material incentives for an alliance in the winter of 921, at the behest of his father Wang Chuzhi 王處直, who feared for the integrity of his independent province of Yiwu once Zhao had been subdued. (LS 2:17; TJ 271:8870; JW 29:399-400.)


9. See Wang, pp.177-81.

Central Plains lost to the Zhou. The alliance was a close one, with a more or less continuous flow of envoys between the two states and with Liao forces regularly employed to help with Northern Han attacks on their southern enemy, or in the defence of Han territory against Zhou and Song expeditions. On the other hand, the closeness of the alliance and the increasing Han dependence on Liao resources as those of Hedong dried up, did not, apparently, prevent the Han from harbouring the desire to be rid of their Liao allies and quasi-suzerains. In 954:3 Liu Chong, believing his troops could be victorious at Gaoping 高平 without the help of their Liao allies, excitedly told his most senior officials that the Han might be able not only to destroy the Zhou, but also the Liao, in a single battle which would both recover the Central Plains and rid the Han of their reliance on another power.<sup>10</sup> It all went wrong for Liu, but certainly this was the last alliance between the Liao and a north China power. As the graph shows, the change is extremely marked. Although the Han alliance continued right to the end of that dynasty in 979, the imposition of Zhou and then Song authority in China, south as well as north, meant that no other north China powers remained to seek alternative help and legitimation after 952.<sup>11</sup> This changed situation contrasts with the period before the advent of the Zhou, when as we have seen there was continual recourse to the Liao for help from north China leaders.

### Voluntary crossings

Closely paralleling this contrast is the distribution of those who can be said to have crossed to Liao voluntarily, without the application of overt pressure. This is shown in Figure 4. It is no surprise that this reflects to a very large extent the movements of

Figure 4: Voluntary crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004



10. TJ 291:9504-5.

11. In 952:1 Murong Yanchao 慕容彦超 sought Liao help for his rebellion against the Zhou. (#151)

individual leaders. Our sources naturally pay more attention to the lives of those considered important, and the actions of these people could have serious political or territorial consequences. They also occupied social and economic positions from which it was possible to make choices about their own lives in a way that was largely unavailable to those lower down the scale. The graph shows that after 955 only two people of sufficient importance to be named crossed to Liao entirely of their own free will. These were a Song general who, unusually, chose active surrender over defeat and capture (#206), and a well-to-do fugitive from justice, Li Xu (#216.)

The interesting thing about this graph is the presence of what appear to be entirely voluntary submissions of groups of Song people, without any clear leadership, and where refugeeism is not stated to be the issue. These occur during the wars of the 980's. They include 70 border villages in 983:2, who appear to have placed themselves under the jurisdiction of Nanjing 南京 circuit, based at Youzhou 幽州 (#177.) This was followed, three months later, by the return of a thousand households from Song to Liao, this time apparently under the persuasion of a Nanjing official who was probably following up the coup of obtaining the 70 villages (#178.) The other two incidents are isolated, consisting of 240 Song people in 986 (#185), and 17 Song *jinshi* 進士 with their families in 989 (#209.) This would appear to imply that even in this period the Song population of the northern frontier might have been more flexible or pragmatic in its attitude towards the Liao than were the central authorities, but the fact that they are all found in the LS raises other issues which will be discussed below.

This group of crossings occurs in a period of Chinese history notably lacking in 'peasant uprisings,' when the common people appear to choose, en masse, to follow a charismatic leader. Peasant uprisings throughout history were rarely more than local and it was in the interests of bigger power-players to crush them swiftly; perhaps even more so during the Wudai. In this period it is also likely that there was simply too much else going on for brief, local disturbances to make it into our sources; the disruption of the period would mean a reduced likelihood of such things either coming to the attention of local officials, or of being considered worthy of reporting upwards. Yet difficulties of recording aside, it could be that there was no need for risings, at least among the frontier populations, when there was an alternative power to which submission could be made. Some support for this suggestion can be derived from the activities of the minor official Sun Fangjian 孫方簡 and the people of Langshan 狼山. Suffering from bandit attacks which the Jin court did nothing about, Fangjian organised the local people to resist the bandits themselves. When Jin and Liao severed relations, Fangjian turned to fighting off Liao raiders. At this time he pledged allegiance to the Jin court, but when repeated requests for help against the raiders were not met, Fangjian led his fortress to surrender

to the Liao (#84.)<sup>12</sup> This incident is the nearest we find to a peasant uprising in tenth-century north China.

The voluntary crossings by groups of the common people stand in contrast to the almost complete absence of voluntary individual crossings in the same period. This suggests that social and military status was a significant factor in choosing to cross. Hence in the early part of the century there were more crossings by people from the higher levels of society, who often took with them the populations they controlled; while in the latter part of the century there were very few individual crossings, which contributed greatly to a reduction in overall numbers of crossings. Both the general reduction in crossings and the marked change in behaviour at the higher levels of society make sense in the context of the increasingly close organisation of the state introduced by the Zhou and taken further by the first two Song emperors. Given that higher status conferred greater freedom of choice, the change in behaviour among the ruling classes also seems to reflect a shift in attitudes. As conventional strictures regarding the importance of loyalty were chiefly aimed at the official and educated classes, it may be that with the continuing survival of the Zhou-Song regime<sup>13</sup> and the evident energy of its first two rulers, it was possible for there to be a revival of the higher ideals of loyalty. As the dynasty progressed, the issue of loyalty was one which came to be emphasised more than ever, as we shall see in Chapters 8 and 9.

### Crossings under duress


Crossings under some kind of duress are shown in Figure 5 (overleaf), where we see the same major peaks as in the other categories. There was none of this kind of crossing before 915,<sup>14</sup> although there were plenty of others, implying that before 915 crossings were rather more clear-cut: the crosser was either clearly choosing to cross, or taken very definitely against their will. These findings appear to reflect the fluid situation of raiding and easy realignments characteristic of north China at the very end of Tang and through most of the Liang dynasty, when there were many contenders for power. In these circumstances, where every leader was searching for the decisive edge over their rivals, it would appear that nobody thought twice about heading north if that seemed to offer the greatest advantage at the time. In addition, the Liao were far less closely involved in north China politics than would later become the case, and this may have made it easier for frontier Chinese to turn to them. In this period Chinese leaders seem to have regarded the

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12. These details are given in TJ 285:9303-4.

13. Here I follow Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, pp.1-2, in seeing the Zhou as a part of the Song, although with regard to crossings and the fixing of the frontier, his rejection of 1004 (sic) as a cut-off date cannot hold.

14. Or probably 920. It is unclear how much pressure Liu Yin 劉殷 was under to cross (#22.)

**Figure 5: Crossings under duress from north China to Liao, 900-1004**

Liao as providers of extra cavalry if in alliance, and of alternative legitimate title to powerful regional positions if submission was offered. As it became apparent that the Liao were a potential threat to north China, enthusiasm for alliances and voluntary submissions by the powerful tailed off and disappeared, and it was thus more likely that situations would arise in which submission might come only under protest.

After a gap reflecting precisely the last alliance with the Northern Han, there is a special case from 979 of two Northern Han generals fleeing Han after their final defeat by the Zhou (#172, 173.) Taking account of this, it is really not until the renewal of war between Liao and Song in 986 that crossings under duress appear to recommence, but at a much lower level. All of these five crossings involve groups rather than individuals. Although the first two mention leaders, they are not named, and the presence of at least some civilians is implied (#195, 202.) The last three are of soldiers with no leaders mentioned (#204, 210, 220.)

In this we might see an indication of the real effects of the attempts by Song Taizu and Taizong to increase imperial control over the commanders of their armies. While the proportion of individuals submitting only under duress has fallen drastically from its level before 955, numbers of groups crossing under duress have remained at their previous level. Because the first two Song emperors succeeded in reducing the powers of

governors and then separating out their military and territorial jurisdictions,<sup>15</sup> the actions of individual military commanders were less likely to involve the transfer of territory. Given the reduced sphere of action of these commanders, they no longer benefitted from a decision to cross to Liao, and so they stopped doing it and thus stopped taking their troops with them.<sup>16</sup> It was, however, still possible for troops themselves to decide to hold out, and subsequently to surrender when their situation looked impossible, all without the intervention of a commander important enough to be mentioned. This maintenance of the level of leaderless crossings is a further reflection of the reduced importance of individual commanders. Troops had never, after all, necessarily needed commanders to encourage them to hold out against the enemy; indeed individual generals such as Du Chongwei are said to have made their armies surrender against their will (#88.)<sup>17</sup> As we have already noted the absence of alliances and the reduction in voluntary crossings for this period, so there is also here the suggestion of a growing inclination, at all levels in the Chinese army, to resist the Liao to the end, and this is supported by the next graph, since all the remaining crossers from this period were captured.

### Involuntary crossings

It is clear from Figure 6 (overleaf), showing occasions when crossers had no choice in the matter, that this was by far the largest single category of crossings. It also contains an important anomaly. The bars for 960-69 are almost entirely composed of Northern Han envoys detained by the Liao emperor Muzong 穆宗 in anger at what was considered to be an inadequate level of 'service' from the Han (#160-5, 167-9.)<sup>18</sup> These fall within our criteria for defining crossings, but they were very special cases. The two parties were close allies, and it was unprecedented for the Liao to treat allied envoys in such a manner.<sup>19</sup> These incidents had no bearing upon the current relationship between Liao and Song, and did not prevent the Liao from providing help for their allies. It is important that we do not allow these incidents to distort our view, because without them we would see an extremely low level of crossings maintained for a period of twenty years. This is significant, and will be discussed further below.

As to the rest of the graph, aside from the peak covering the conquest of 947, the next tallest bar is that covering 985-9, when the second Song-Liao war was raging. About half

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15. This also applied to the border generals, although they retained more freedom of action for longer than their counterparts in the central armies. Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, pp.165-198, esp. pp.190-5, 272-87.


16. With the exception of Guo Rong 郭榮 (#206.)

17. The reluctance of the army is emphasised by Sima Guang, TJ 285:9318-9.

18. CB 4:113-4.

19. It may be unprecedented in the tenth century, but much checking would be required to verify this. Muzong was notorious for his hot temper and irrationality. See LS j.6-7 for his reign, or Twitchett, *Liao*, pp.73-8.



**Figure 6: Involuntary crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004**


of these incidents come from 986, the same year that there were mass defections of Liao frontier officials pledging their administrations to Song allegiance.<sup>20</sup> The captives are those taken as a result of the Liao campaign to recover these lands, and although they reflect a failure to fulfil Song ambitions, they also contribute to a sense that there was a great deal of determination at all levels on the Song side. We can examine this issue more closely if we look specifically at the crossings which can be identified as being of a military nature.

### **Military crossings**

The capture or surrender of ordinary soldiers is not recorded in significantly greater detail than crossings by common civilians (68 military crossings as against 63 civilian.) However, military crossings are frequently quantified, if only in approximation.

Figure 7 (overleaf) shows proportionately high figures for military crossings without leadership from the Song period, and these reinforce the impression given by the involuntary crossings and those under duress, that individual military leaders were of less

20. LS 11:120-2; CB 27:608-10; SS 5:77-8.

**Figure 7: Military crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004**

importance than they had been.<sup>21</sup> In many earlier instances the soldiers cross as a result of the decision or capture of their commander, but notably in the period 930-954 there are a number of occasions when the troops themselves seem to come to a group decision to cross, under duress, without this being attributed to a leader (eg. #43, 44, 85, 95, 146.)<sup>22</sup> In the same period the number of recorded instances of such leaderless troops being taken prisoner, implying no decision to cross on their part, is relatively small: only three instances (#78, 80, 157.) During the later period of the Song war, 975-994 on the graph, the opposite is the case. Incidents where troops choose to cross, again under duress, are very few, whilst cases of soldiers taken prisoner are relatively huge. Troops are no longer being led across to Liao, and left to their own devices they show a greater tendency to fight on and risk capture rather than surrendering.

Changes in the style of warfare, involving more, smaller fortifications and a Song army closely controlled by the emperor himself,<sup>23</sup> may well have contributed to a preference to fight and be captured rather than make a pragmatic surrender. Some of the sources also hint at a period of great brutality towards prisoners, with an increase in mass

21. Although there was still a premium on their capture, as for example in the case of Wang Jizhong 王繼忠, #218 and Chapter 7.

22. In this period there are no cases of leaderless troops crossing entirely voluntarily.


23. The SS in particular makes far more mention of 'fortresses' and we know that there were major fortification programs conducted by Zhou Shizong and his Song successors. For imperial control of the Song armies, see Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, ch. 4.

executions,<sup>24</sup> which would naturally have encouraged armies to fight on and take their chances in the hope of victory rather than risk death as a result of surrender. Whilst leaders were generally less important in this later period, the actions of those few mentioned would seem to lend weight to the suggestions here, as although large numbers of them made a decision to cross in mid-century, during the Song war there are only two occasions when leaders bring troops over to Liao (#195, 206.) Setting the marked change in this pattern against the consistent absence of voluntary crossings by leaderless troops throughout the century,<sup>25</sup> we might further suggest that the mood of the common soldiery remained more stable with regard to crossing to Liao than did that of their commanders.

### Civilian crossings

To balance the military crossings we should examine what civilian crossings there are in the records. Unlike with the military, exact numbers are rarely found when dealing with the civilian population, but two striking figures, probably recorded because of their unusual size, are a claim by Abaoji to have taken 95,000 prisoners in a raid in 902:7 (#1),

Figure 8: Civilian crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004



24. In 986:5, orders were given that all the surviving Song troops taking refuge in Pingzhou 平州 were to be wiped out, LS 11:122; 986:11, Song people captured by patrols were executed, LS 11:125; 986:12, many Song prisoners killed, LS 11:126; 987:1, all the able-bodied in Wenan 文安 were killed because the city refused to surrender, LS 12:129. There were also attempts to control the amount of pillaging, suggesting that things got out of hand rather too often. For instance in 986:12 no pillage was allowed at Yangtuan cheng 楊團城, LS 11:126, and there were punishments for excessive pillaging in 988:12, LS 12:132. After early 989 the Liao armies seem to have been under closer control.

25. The single case is troops of Liu Shouguang, who evidently had good reason to flee (#11.)

and by Taizong to have brought 1,090,118 households under Liao control after the conquest of Later Jin (#129.) The latter was a very short-lived gain, although an unknown proportion of these households would almost certainly have been permanently relocated northwards into Liao territory. The other unusually large figure must also be considered within the context of Liao Taizu's subsequent seizure of power and drastic revision of the Kitan political power structure,<sup>26</sup> which would naturally be written up to Taizu's advantage in the surviving records. Nevertheless, when seen in the context of more frequent though less specific references to the populations of whole counties or prefectures, the 'exact' figures cited do not seem so extraordinary.

Figure 8 provides confirmation that very few indeed of the common civilian population had any say in their own crossings. Over half of the recorded incidents (36 out of 63) show that the populations involved, or occasionally their leaders,<sup>27</sup> had no choice at all in the matter of their crossings; in other words, most of them were captured, whether in raids or as a result of full-scale war. The peak, naturally, comes in 947, but this still leaves slightly less than half where some kind of decision was made. This was usually by groups where leadership is mentioned, but we lack any records of whether the population followed these leaders willingly or not. Certainly it is rare for a group of commoners to themselves make any kind of decision to cross, and where this happened, it is significant, as discussed above. In general, the graph shows a similar pattern to the previous one, for military crossings, so in the earlier period (c.920-954), crossings of the civilian population are made under the leadership of generals and officials, usually named, whilst during the Song war the smaller number of crossings shows the population acting largely without clear leadership.

It must be remarked that the vast majority of crossings recorded for the civilian population, regardless of method of crossing, are to be found in the LS. This latter is an indication of how important was the acquisition of population to the recorders of the dynasty and their masters and mistresses. We have not listed here a couple of instances from the texts which mention ransoming as a common feature of frontier life,<sup>28</sup> but it is clear that this is what was actually happening in #166 and #212. In the first case the loss of people in a raid moved the Song to launch a counter-raid to take prisoners of their own and thus force an exchange of captives; while in the second, the Liao punished some of their own people for raiding and ordered the return of those taken. These incidents are suggestive of a level of local cross-border raiding which is likely to have affected more

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26. See Twitchett, *Liao*, pp.29-35.

27. Only three of the leaders had no choice: #18, 24, 76.

28. TJ 281:9181; LS 11:120-1, 12:133.

communities for more of the time than did war.<sup>29</sup> The scale of this activity is hinted at by the explicit strictures against it to be found in the oath-letters confirming the treaty of Shanyuan.

### Notable features of the graphs

No matter how one chooses to calculate it, there was clearly an enormous influx of Chinese to Liao in 946-7, when the latter conquered all of north China. This is reflected in nearly all the graphs presented here. 947 is often seen as the turning point in the history of this period, both for the Chinese regimes and for Liao, and with good reason. Although in 936-7 there had been a small influx of élite individuals and a transfer of control over general populations, this was nothing to touch the upheaval brought by the 946-7 conquest. Some 80% (54 out of 66) of the crossings in the 945-9 column relate directly to the loss of the imperial armies and the occupation of the Central Plains in the period 946:11-947:5. About 40% of the incidents (26 out of 66) involve crossings where no choice was available, and all but a handful of these are a result of the occupation of the Jin capital Bianzhou and the stripping of all useful personnel from there to be taken north. Such an experience was most unusual, if not unprecedented, for the capital officials. Certainly many had gone through a change of regime in which they remained in their jobs while the ruling house was replaced, or at most were moved between cities in the Central Plains, but to be uprooted and transported north was another matter altogether.

Liao Taizong's intention was to remove the entire bureaucratic body to his capital at Shangjing, and several thousand officials began the journey in 947:3 (#123.) With the worsening of the Liao position in north China, combined with what was to be Taizong's terminal illness, most of the officials were left behind at Hengzhou 恆州-Zhenzhou 鎮州 a couple of months into the journey.<sup>30</sup> Most of them appear to have been present there in 947:9 when the Chinese garrison mutinied and drove out the Kitan noble Mada, before submitting to the Han court.<sup>31</sup> Although many of those who had begun the journey thus managed to get back to the south, they still had colleagues in the north who could not or did not want to return. This upheaval affected far more of the capital official classes than

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29. Cross-cultural comparisons suggest the ubiquity of this kind of activity in frontier regions, see later medieval examples from Wales (Rees Davies, *Frontier arrangements in fragmented societies: Ireland and Wales*, p.93), Ireland (Katherine Simms, *Bards and barons: the Anglo-Irish aristocracy and the native culture*, p.190) and the Castilian-Granada frontier (Manuel Jiménez, *Frontier and settlement in the kingdom of Castile (1085-1350)*, p.70; Angus MacKay, *Religion, culture and ideology on the late medieval Castilian-Granadan frontier*, pp.219-20; and esp. José López de Coca Castañer, *Institutions on the Castilian-Granadan frontier 1369-1482*, pp.137-9), all in *Medieval frontier societies* (1989), edd. Robert Bartlett & Angus MacKay.

30. Those who continued included Li Huan 李澣 and Xu Taifu 徐台符, as well as the palace women, eunuchs and musicians. (TJ 287:9364) From what we know of Chinese who are later found still in Liao service, there must have been a number of others too, but there is no way of knowing exactly how many.

31. Feng Dao 馮道, Li Song 李崧 and He Ning 和凝 were certainly there, TJ 287:9377.

had ever had direct contact with the Kitan before, and it may be that in these events we can see the origins of the increasingly anti-foreign attitudes of the subsequent north China regimes.<sup>32</sup> In addition to the highly important gains of administrative and palace personnel, Taizong claimed to have ‘obtained’ over a million households of the conquered population (#129.) We know not exactly what degree of coercion was involved in doing this, but judging from the surprisingly large number of submissions where there was at least some choice (see Fig. 2), the chances are that most of these households were gained through the chosen submission of those in charge of them. This would also explain how the figure given in the LS comes to be measured in households, and to be so precise: 1,090,118 households exactly. Taizong clearly had possession of registers for the 76 places he says have surrendered to him.<sup>33</sup>

We might further note that there were more submissions involving some level of choice than there were completely involuntary crossings, which contributes to an overall picture of most officials reacting to the Liao conquest as just another change of dynasty. In time of potential dynastic change, regional officials each made their own choices about when or if they would throw in their lot with the pretender. A decisive battle or surrender, such as that of Du Chongwei at Zhongdu qiao 中渡橋, would bring any remaining governors flocking to the banner of the person they now felt obliged to recognise as the new ruler. Diehard loyalty did occur, but it was rare, and hence all the more valued, often by the new ruler as well. When the new ruler reached the capital, a senior minister would lead the body of officials to greet him and make a formal show of submission, in the form of ‘confessing crimes’ or ‘requesting punishment.’ The new ruler’s role in this ritual was to absolve the officials of any fault, save for the odd handful of ministers regarded as truly responsible for the opposition shown the new ruler, and to reappoint them to their positions. There was no shame necessarily attached to any of this, though some individual ministers did feel it. This is precisely what happened in 946-7; if we were to change the names, then from the account in the annals, this could be any other dynastic change of the tenth and probably other centuries.<sup>34</sup>

Of course a certain amount of all such accounts may well have been written according to formulae for precisely such events, but given that even the LS recognises how hard it was for Taizong to impose his rule on the Central Plains, we might expect more intimations of illegitimacy about Taizong’s rule in the JW if there really was such strong feeling against the Kitan as we are led to believe. Taizong certainly does some things

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32. See Chapter 9.

33. Although these registers might well have been inaccurate (see above, p.62.)

34. Dynastic changes, with re-appointments and new appointments can be found at: Tang to Liang, JW 3:47-9; Liang to Later Tang, JW 29:403-4; Later Tang to Jin, JW 76:992-3; Jin to Han, JW 100:1332-3; Han to Zhou, JW 110:1457-70; Zhou to Song, SS 1:4-5.

which are not quite what a Chinese pretender would find normal, like leaving the capital to camp at Chigang 赤岡 on his first night as ruler,<sup>35</sup> but there is nothing in the behaviour of individual governors and ministers to suggest that Taizong does not enjoy the possession of the Mandate as made manifest in the will of the people, in other words, the ruling classes.

This is a situation inviting lengthy commentary for which there is not space here. Suffice it to say that the willingness of governors and ministers to accept Taizong on the same basis as they would accept any other new ruler (in the same way that capital officials had accepted An Lushan 安祿山, for instance) suggests that they did not find Kitan-Liao rule to be inherently unacceptable. The governors could have kept fighting. Although the imperial armies had all surrendered, to besiege one gubernatorial seat after another throughout the Central Plains would have been an impossible drain on even the best resourced of the tenth-century north China powers. The surrenders of the governors were not feints, but for real. In surrendering, they did not know that the Liao would withdraw only a few months after their entry into Bianzhou. They may have had it in mind to rebel as soon as they could, but they must have known that carried very many risks of its own; that they could not be assured of support, and without it they were unlikely to survive their attempt. The sources themselves suggest that it was the policies of the new government, not the government itself, which provoked Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 to raise his standard in revolt.<sup>36</sup>

Aside from the peak associated with the conquest of 947, the most striking feature of all the graphs shown here should be a gap between 955 and 975, in which there were virtually no crossings. We have already noted the distorting effect of Liao Muzong's detentions of Northern Han envoys, and if we discount these then there was only a maximum of three crossings in this twenty-year period (#159, 166, 170.)<sup>37</sup> This was the period in which the Northern Han, in close alliance with the Liao, fought for the control of the Central Plains and latterly for their survival against the Zhou and then the Song. Although the Liao recognised the Zhou dynasty which forced the establishment of Northern Han, under the new emperor Muzong they quickly came to the conclusion that their interests were best served by the continued support of the remnants of the Han dynasty. Clearly there were unlikely to be crossings from the territory of an ally, and the positioning of the Han (see Map 8) greatly reduced the length of the Liao frontier with Zhou and Song, so there were fewer opportunities for raids on non-allied territory. On

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35. TJ 286:9328.

36. TJ 286:9334-5, and see Chapter 1.

37. #159 is an estimated date for the crossing of Zhao Anren 趙安仁, whose native place of Leshou 樂壽 in Shenzhou 深州 may have been amongst those 'border prefectures' captured by the Liao general Xiao Siwen 蕭思溫 in 958:4. LS 6:75.

the positive side, there were also fewer opportunities for the Zhou or Song to strike at Liao. Any crossers from Zhou might be expected to go to Northern Han, perhaps out of cultural considerations, but also for the sound political reason that the Han were the other contenders for control of the Central Plains, and anybody choosing to change sides could thus find justification for so doing.<sup>38</sup>

Mere alliance was not the most significant factor though. When we consider the other period of Liao-north China alliance - the cooperation with Shi Jingtang and the Later Jin from 936 to the beginning of war in earnest in 944 - we find a marked contrast. Where there is an almost complete absence of crossings to Liao in the later period, under the Jin there was a steady flow, albeit a smaller one. This continued even when the Later Jin dynasty was established and the alliance was firm, as can be seen from the 940-44 segments of the histograms. Whereas the Liao-Jin alliance gave Liao direct access to the centre of power in north China, the Northern Han did not control the Central Plain; but the Han did act as the channel and mediator for Liao contact with north China. Hence it was the existence of Northern Han not as an ally, but as a buffer state, which was significant, providing, as it did, an alternative destination for potential crossers.

### **Outcomes of crossing**

We cannot consider the circumstances under which crossing occurred without looking at what happened to people after they arrived in Liao. In the case of voluntary crossings, and for individuals of the ruling classes, the likely outcome of going to Liao would have been a factor in the decision-making process, as we shall see. Naturally, larger groups and regional populations rarely had the same range of choices as individuals, and the majority of them found themselves relocated, often to cities and prefectures established especially for them.<sup>39</sup> There they seem to have been encouraged to farm, and artisans were sought out and given employment by the court, though it is unclear exactly what projects they worked on. Armies and smaller groups of soldiers were almost always redeployed as Liao troops, sometimes reorganised or split up under new commanders, sometimes kept largely intact under their former, surrendered, commanders.

For individuals though, the Liao regime could offer a deal which was similar to that available from the other north China regimes.<sup>40</sup> The vast majority of recorded individual crossers did reasonably well out of their change of allegiance. Their immediate fates, where known, are noted in the table of crossings. Generally, the very least they obtained was to be left in their post, with only the source of their orders changed. In some cases

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38. See Chapter 8. On a practical level, the Northern Han frontier with Zhou was very long.

39. The extent of relocation can be seen in the *LS dili zhi*, see n. 1.

40. Detailed accounts can be found in the case studies.



where the sincerity of the crosser was doubted a small Liao force, or an inspector of some kind, or both, might be left behind to keep an eye on the new subject, but this appears to be extremely rare.<sup>41</sup> In many cases the rewards of crossing came in material form, as gold and silks, and such like, which must have eased the transition between regimes and cultures considerably. It was not at all unusual for promotion to be part of the package as well. From the earliest tenth century and right through the conquest of Later Jin, it was quite common for senior generals to be given high honorific court posts and important regional positions at the level of *liushou* and *jiedushi*. After the conquest there are fewer individual crossings, and as the officials are less important they are recorded in less detail. For those few for whom there is information, we can see the same tendency continuing. Pan Yunian 潘聿然, Zhao Anren 趙安仁 and Wang Jizhong 王繼忠 attained high positions within Liao (#147, 159, 218), Guo Rong 郭榮 appears to have retained his post (#206), a half-a-dozen captive literati were given official positions (preceding #210), and Wu Bo 武白 and Wang Jien 王繼恩 both developed their careers while in Liao (#219, 226.) There is, as far as I have been able to see, only a single case where an individual crosser ended up worse off as a result of their crossing. This was Yang Gun 楊袞 of Daizhou 代州, who was imprisoned by Liao Muzong for his lack of merit (#156.) It may simply be that Gun had the misfortune to arrive in Liao during the reign of an emperor who was to become renowned for his arbitrary cruelty.<sup>42</sup>

On the down side, the number of deaths of crossers increases as the century wears on, but many of these were either not at Liao command, or entirely comprehensible in the circumstances. In the early period, up to the conquest of Jin, there are a couple of suicides, both of people clearly torn apart by the pressures they faced. The first was Li Jida 李繼達, who felt forced to turn to the Liao when he saw his father and brothers killed for plotting against the Later Tang, and the second was Huangfu Yu 皇甫遇 (#37, 98.) Yu was a general in Du Chongwei's command at the time of his surrender at Zhongdu qiao, and having declined a commission to serve in the Liao army against his former masters, refused to eat and soon after killed himself in despair. Unfortunately for Yu, he died just too soon to see the comeuppance of his fellow commander Zhang Yanze 張彥澤, who had embraced Liao allegiance and led his force to take the Jin capital of Bian on Liao Taizong's behalf. Once the city had surrendered, Yanze let his troops loose for two days of pillaging, and took the opportunity to settle some personal scores as well (for instance, killing Sang Weihuan 桑維翰.) For this Taizong had him executed, and let the populace feast on his body (#92.) During the Song war, there is an increased

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41. One case involves a guard of 300 cavalry sent with an inspector to 'oversee' Zhang Xichong 張希崇 when he replaced the Lulong *jiedushi* Lu Wenjin 盧文進, who had returned to the south (#12.)

42. Cf. the case of Li Huan, Chapter 6.

incidence of massacres of enemy prisoners, usually in a ritual manner apparently intended to increase the chances of victory,<sup>43</sup> but it is only an increase from no recorded incidents to four, concentrated within a short period of seven years (#176, preceding #184, following #187, #197.) After this, there are several cases showing good treatment of prisoners, such as giving them fur clothing (#204) and rewards (#220.) Before this, the only time we hear of a captive population being massacred is when several hundred able-bodied men of Jizhou 冀州 turned rebellious (#152.) Whilst this is undeniably a brutal response, it was nevertheless not done gratuitously. In addition, there are two further cases of spies being executed (#179, following #218), a fate which must have been accepted as one of the risks of the job.

### Returners

There is little doubt that for a sizeable proportion of those who crossed the frontier to Liao, the north China regimes were in fact the preferred locations, leading a significant proportion of people to head south again when they had the chance. These are almost always individuals; we only hear of a handful of groups returning. These are populations from Shucheng 束城, Luancheng 欒城 and Wuqing xian 武清縣 (#65, 85, 212), the prefectural and capital officials of what had been Later Jin (#119, 123), a group of 67 soldiers captured at Bozhou 博州 (#72) and several hundred Song troops rescued by their fellows (#170.) It is clear that more still would have liked to return, and several failed attempts are recorded (eg. #34, 41, 57, 98, 126, 159, 218)<sup>44</sup> but for our purposes here only those who actually made it back are counted. If we discount the anomalous cases of the Northern Han envoys, then 48 of our recorded crossers returned to north China service, comprising rather more than a fifth (22%) of the total recorded crossers. As yet there are no figures from other periods or places with which to compare this proportion, so it is not clear whether it should be considered high or low. However, as is clear from the black shading in Figure 2, all but a couple of the relevant, recorded returns fell in a sharply limited period, between c.912 and 947:7 (#14, 137.)<sup>45</sup> Between these years the proportion of returners to crossers in any one period fluctuated between 19% and 43%. The tiny number of three returns after 947 (discounting Northern Han envoys) does nothing to reduce the overall impression of a sharp cut-off in such incidents.

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43. WF p.268n.

44. Also see case studies.

45. A discussion of (#14) Han Yanhui's 韓延徽 likely date of return can be found in Chapter 3. There was one other return in the 965-9 period apart from the Northern Han envoys: the Song soldiers mentioned above, who were rescued by a special mission (#170.)

Judging from the proportion of those who did it, we can see that it was by no means impossible to return south, at least in the first half of the century. We might be tempted to assume that it would be the category of involuntary crossers: those taken to Liao entirely against their will, who would be most likely to return. In fact when we break down the figures further, we find this is not the case at all: rather the opposite is true, that it was far more likely for those who had had some kind of choice in their crossing to later choose to cross back again. Of all those returning, 71% had had some kind of say in their original crossing, moving either voluntarily or making a choice under duress. Surprisingly, slightly more returners had originally crossed without any pressure, although the difference in the figures for the two sub-groups is small: 53% simply reversed an earlier voluntary decision, while 47% had been reluctant to cross originally.

The surprisingly high proportion of returners whose original crossings had been voluntary suggests that the treatment of those Chinese arriving in Liao was affected by the manner of their crossing. It looks as if those who showed more willingness to come to Liao in the first place were given more freedom, and perhaps treated with more generosity, than those who had done their utmost to avoid entering Liao. That some of these people made use of their freedom to return to the Central Plains was perhaps a price the Liao were willing to pay for the sake of enhancing the likelihood of faithful service from those who had made their own decision to cross. If an individual stayed, the Liao stood to gain a servant made reliable through the exercise of their own free will, and if the individual chose to return, then the Liao rulers did not have to spend time worrying about whether or not that person would indeed prove to be reliable.

The freedom of movement apparently granted by the Liao was no different from that permitted by the other regimes who shared control of north China in this period. As we shall see in the earlier case studies, movement between regimes, whether Chinese or not, was tolerated, and to a certain extent, encouraged, by many rulers. Although in doing this a ruler stood to lose their own best people to better prospects, they were themselves trying to entice the best people from other regimes, and so were forced into a position where in order to acquire talent, they had to be prepared to risk losing it too. These pressures appear to have contributed to an improvement in the conditions of service, if not the remuneration, of those with services to offer, and to a necessity for wider consultation and rule-by-consensus, at least among the élite.

This is not the place to delve further into this fascinating issue, but Wang Gungwu provides numerous pointers to such a situation in his standard work on the Wudai period, which is primarily a study of the individual relationships on which power had to be based in the first half of the century. Perhaps the most striking example of what happened when such a consensus was lost was the end of the autonomous governor Liu Shouguang.

When he declared himself emperor in 911, Shouguang is said to have set up an executioner's block and axe in his courtyard, in an effort to terrorise his officials into subordination. Many of his troops are said to have fled north to Liao (#11), and it is quite possible that large segments of his population did so too. When the principedom of Jin attacked him in response to his expansionism, Shouguang's officials fled his regime, leaving him to the mercies of his enemies. This story has clearly been given emphases to make the point about the fate of wicked rulers. The historiographers are evidently outraged by Shouguang's violently coercive behaviour towards his officials and delight at his comeuppance.<sup>46</sup> In this they simply reflect the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between rulers and their officials. Having said that, the story is nevertheless an indication of the extent to which, in this unusual period, it was possible for officials to put into practice the principles upon which they claimed to serve, rather than merely paying lip service to them. For once, officials were in a position genuinely to wield some of the power for which they were always willing to argue, but which they rarely actually had.

The change of circumstances identified by both Wang Gungwu and Edmund Worthy, who date their studies of north China accordingly,<sup>47</sup> is also reflected dramatically in the numbers of returners. After 947 almost none are recorded. We will recall that from approximately the same date, the proportion of crossings involving some choice drops markedly, which thus correlates with what we have seen about the relationship between likelihood of returning and the element of choice in the original crossing. It also reinforces the suggestion that those crossing involuntarily were given less freedom of movement and thus fewer opportunities to return. That this latter category comprised mostly groups of soldiers without obvious leadership, while the former consisted largely of individuals important enough to be recorded by name, is surely not a coincidence. It would appear that social status had a definite bearing on the range of choices perceived to be available to different classes of people in similar situations. Most of the crossings involving choice were by individuals, and were before mid-century, with a significant proportion returning. By contrast, most of the later crossings were involuntary, by groups, and they did not return. Furthermore, from the detail available in some cases it is clear that in the early years of the dynasty at least, there were those who would actively choose Liao service as the best of their realistic options. The availability of this option seems to have diminished significantly after 936 and drastically after 947, when it may even have disappeared altogether. This change in the range of realistic choices is clearly

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46. We could, for instance, ask why, if Shouguang was so terrible, it took over two years for the Taiyuan Jin to overcome him? Clearly not all his generals and troops abandoned him, although this may simply reflect the individual stake that generals and officials had in the regimes they supported.


47. Wang, to 947; and Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, from 950.

related to the increased organisational control and centralisation of authority, giving a tighter focus for identity and loyalty to those considering themselves to be part of the Chinese world.

### Ethnic groups

As explained in the Introduction, the people considered here are understood to be 'Chinese' in cultural and geographical terms, regardless of genealogy. Even though the majority of them do appear to be 'Han,' the group can be broken down further. Ethnic identity (Han, Shatuo, etc) can be established for about a third (35%) of the crossers in Table 1, and Figures 9 and 10 plot crossings by identifiable Han Chinese and non-Han (mostly Shatuo) respectively. There were over three times as many Han crossers as non-Han (79 as against 24), reflecting the predominantly Chinese population.<sup>48</sup>

Figure 9: Han crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004




Han and non-Han people could be equally active in making the decision to cross: in both groups 33% of total crossings were voluntary. However, the non-Han distinguish themselves in a tendency to make alliances with the Liao. Only 7% of the Han crossers

48. See Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers: social forces in medieval China* (second edn. 1965), ch.6. At various times in Chinese history non-Han groups found it advantageous to fabricate Han descent (see, for instance, Pamela Crossley, *The Qianlong retrospect on the Chinese-martial (hanjun) banners, Late imperial China* 10:1 (1989), pp.63-107, for a particularly well-documented case.) It is not clear to what extent this was the case in the tenth century, so we can but take ethnic ascriptions at face value.



became Kitan allies, but a third of the non-Han group did so: nearly five times the Han proportion. This may be a result of a greater understanding amongst Shatuo people of steppe power structures based upon confederation rather than hierarchy. The alliance sought by the non-Han leader and the allegiance pledged by the Han official might have been functional equivalents framed within two different traditions. But whatever the reason, it appears that non-Han people were more likely to turn north for assistance than were Han.

**Figure 10: Non-Han crossings from north China to Liao, 900-1004**



The non-Han appear more decisive about crossing than the Han. Where only two of the non-Han crossings were under duress (8%), 22% of the Han crossings were in this category. The Han were also twice as likely to leave Liao for the Central Plains regimes, with 42% as against 21% returning south. Accordingly, the positive activity of non-Han people in crossing to the Liao was countered by an element of resistance to crossing amongst the Han, and a continuing attachment to the south, leading to returns.

These findings suggest that Han people, on average, were less comfortable than non-Han with the prospect of permanent residence in the north, so to this extent the Han exhibit an ethnic consciousness. However, this has to be seen in the context of a large total number of crossings, of whom the majority were probably Han. In addition, the maintenance of similar levels of voluntary crossing indicates that a considerable minority of Han Chinese found Liao service no more of a problem than did their non-Han colleagues. We shall return to people in this category in some of the case studies.

### **The recording of crossings**

A final point of interest concerns the recording of crossings and crossers. About 60% of the individuals listed in Table 1 have a biography in at least one of the major sources, and most of those with a biography in the JW also have one in the XW. As we have seen, a majority of those who crossed did not return, so we would expect fewer of these people

who stayed in Liao to have biographies in the two *Wudai shi* or the SS, simply through lack of information. Under the weight of accumulated assumptions, we might further expect those who remained in the Liao to be deliberately denied biographies in these sources as 'turncoats.' In fact, of those crossers who have biographies in the Central Plains sources, nearly two-fifths (37%) are of people who did not return. Furthermore, it is rare for the act of crossing not to be mentioned in the biography, whatever the source. Hence the writers of the sources appear to have seen nothing inherently wrong in giving biographies to people who went to Liao and did not come back.

Some historiographers, however, could be far more selective in their presentation of the annals for the period. Notable amongst these writers was Ouyang Xiu. His annals section in the XW was intended to give the 'official version' of what happened, and his heavy editorial hand is strikingly visible in his omission of all but the crossings it was either impossible to ignore or which made some point about the cruelty of the enemy<sup>49</sup> (eg. #125, when all the men in Xiangzhou 相州 were slaughtered and the women taken prisoner.) This is not explicable simply by the brevity of his annals section (12j.) because he takes care to include certain information less assiduously noted in the other sources.<sup>50</sup> In the annals he records only 16 of the more than 220 crossings found in the other annalistic sources. He is also uncompromising to those he does record, in several cases removing the detail which would allow us to see when elements of duress were involved. His favoured phrasing is that so-and-so 'rebelled and pledged allegiance' 叛附 or 'rebelled and submitted' 叛降. He applies this 'rebel' terminology to the two Jin army surrenders led by Yang Guangyuan at Jin'an in 936 (#49),<sup>51</sup> and Du Chongwei at Zhongdu qiao in 946 (#88.) He does not, however, mention that the Tang forces at Jin'an were running out of food, or that both armies had had their communications cut. In making such revisions, Ouyang is visibly applying his view that history should make clear moral judgments.<sup>52</sup> There is simply no space in Ouyang's account for mitigating circumstances, and thus he removes any ambiguity about the conduct of crossers, making it easy for his condemnation of such actions to be implied.<sup>53</sup>

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49. A tendency also found in the CB, discussed below.

50. He seems particularly concerned to record activities related to the dignity of the emperor's court, for instance, envoys received, hunting expeditions and rituals performed.

51. In this case he says that Yang Guangyuan surrendered to the Kitan, whereas in the JW he is said to surrender to the Jin.

52. See James T.C. Liu, *Ou-yang Hsiu: an eleventh-century neo-Confucianist* (1967), pp.100-11.

53. As we shall see in Chapter 8, his attitude towards side-changing was clearly set out in his biography of Feng Dao, although this piece leaves an ambiguity of its own regarding the difference between serving Central Plains regimes and foreign ones.

Curiously, whilst he quested for brevity and strict verdicts, Ouyang Xiu is the only one of our historiographers to record Liu Zhiyuan's apparently active consent to asking for Kitan help in 936 (#47.) This contrasts with Sima Guang's care to show Zhiyuan's objections to some of the specific terms of the offer made to the Liao.<sup>54</sup> Ouyang is careful to record the returning to allegiance of the Central Plains governors after Liu Zhiyuan established the Later Han dynasty, and notes Zhiyuan's banning of the making of Kitan clothing or items, but he is also not as rude as one might expect in his commentary at the end of the chapter.<sup>55</sup> This introduces a note of ambiguity about Zhiyuan's moral character, and about both his and Ouyang's attitude to the Kitan in general, which is only compounded by the brevity of the account.

The SS annals are also brief, and are even more reticent about crossings than Ouyang, managing to include only Wang Jizhong's capture. The reasons for this absence are less clear. Certainly the information was available, as many crossings are recorded in the LS for the same period, so this is another case which indicates the degree to which the LS and SS historiographers did not work together. What it also suggests, by extension, is that the Song sources for the SS did not themselves record such crossings. This was perhaps because such events did not reflect well on the regime, both for reasons to do with the attraction of people to the regime, described above, and because no regime likes to dwell upon defeat by recording its consequences in detail.

In contrast to the XW and SS, the CB does not suffer from excessive brevity, which makes the relative absence of crossings there all the more notable. Like the XW, the CB does not leave out anybody of any importance, but while only 21 crossings are recorded, 17 of them are not found in the other sources, and the CB makes the sole mention of another five attempted crossings which never came to anything. Nearly half (9) of the actual crossings it records are the detained Northern Han envoys, but of the rest, six are carefully described incidences of common people falling into Liao hands. So, for instance, in 987, the Liao are said to have retaliated for their failure to take cities by pillaging the rural areas surrounding them, carrying off the women and children (#198.) Sometimes the Song response is also set out, so in 965 the seizure of people from Yizhou 易州 provoked a Song counter raid for an equal number of Liao prisoners to be exchanged (#166.) The first incident shows to moral disadvantage the tactics used by the Liao; the second demonstrates the concern of the Song government for its people. If we thus suspect a definite purpose to the selection of these very minor incidents for recording, this thought is not discouraged by the other two cases found only in the CB. These are a minor commander who escaped back to Song, where he was rewarded with a

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54. TJ 280:9146, and see Chapter 9.

55. XW 10:100-2, 107-8.



promotion, and a fugitive from justice whose case provides the emperor with an opportunity to behave with generosity (#215, 216.) These cases stand together with those where a potential crossing comes to nothing. These include the thwarting of plans to flee Song for Liao, such as in the case of Fu Tinghan 傅廷翰, and the Liao general Geng Shaozhong 耿紹忠 (following #170, preceding #184), along with the return of a Song envoy whom Liao Jingzong 遼景宗 found to be too virtuous to detain (following #171.) It is therefore no surprise that we find no cases of the surrender or capture of Song troops save the incidents mentioned above where this is accompanied by Song efforts to get them back. Setting this beside its generally fuller record, the CB is shown to be even more reluctant than the SS to preserve the details associated with lack of success.

As to the rest of our sources, they reflect, with smaller numbers, the general pattern of crossings produced from combining the materials, with no striking differences in the proportions of different types of crossing. The only notable feature is that the JW records only one of the crossings associated with the war over Yiwu in the early 920's: that of Wang Yu himself, and also underreports the crossings at the time of the fall of Later Tang and establishment of Jin. In the case of the JW, compiled in haste at the beginning of the Song, before the regime, and literary production, had really settled down, these omissions are probably more to do with the problems of recording than with editorial policy. It is also the case that the annals for the Liang are the least well preserved, and although the Later Tang annals cover the Liang period as well, they do so from the viewpoint of the Taiyuan Jin, and hence according to a different set of criteria. The crossings which do make it into the JW for these two periods are all well-recorded elsewhere, and involve some of the most notable players in the events of the time. It is probably fair to say that even if there had been no written record to work from, then these are the people whose names and actions would have been remembered and put down anyway.

The general level of reporting of crossings to Liao reflects a lack of squeamishness on the subject which is only highlighted by the cases of deliberate editing. The fullness of the record suggests that there was little stigma attached to tenth-century crossings to the Liao, either at the time, or amongst those arbiters of official morality rewriting history through the first century or so of the Northern Song. A more detailed exploration of the issues surrounding crossing to the Liao follows in five case studies. In these a series of interrelated texts will be dissected and compared to see what light they throw on the changes wrought by successive historiographers on the image presented of some of the crossers recorded in the most sources, and for what these case studies can tell us about the shifting attitudes of tenth-century Chinese.

## PART TWO

### INDIVIDUAL FRONTIERS: CASE STUDIES

The case studies which follow take a comparative approach to the texts on each of the five individuals who have biographies of their own in both the LS and in at least one of the Central Plains sources, that is, the JW, XW, SS or QG. These biographical accounts are filled out by the passages on these individuals found in the TJ and CB, as well as other texts which appear to have been used in the compilation of the LS and SS, such as the *Long ping ji* (LPJ) and *Dongdu shi lue* (DDSL.) Where personal or other writings are available, these have also been used, but the materials for this period remain relatively scanty. The chapters are intended to be read with reference to the appended tables of parallel texts. Full references to the main sources are given in the tables, which are therefore omitted in the text. The theme of loyalty recurs throughout these case studies, and to save recurrent references to later chapters, it should be noted here that detailed discussions of this issue can be found in Chapters 8 and 9.

## Chapter Three

# Han Yanhui 韓延徽

Han Yanhui started his career at the beginning of the tenth century in the Youzhou 幽州 regime of Liu Shouguang 劉守光. He was sent as an envoy to the nascent Liao regime, where he was detained for refusing to show obeisance to the emperor, and was put to work pasturing horses until his worth was recognised and he obtained government employment. At one point he escaped from Liao, but then chose to return north, confident of a positive reception. He spent the rest of his life in service to the Liao and is credited with the establishment there of the basis for a Chinese-style administrative system.

Information on Han Yanhui is relatively scarce. He has short biographies in the LS and QG, and is mentioned a handful of times in the TJ, while in the XW, he appears only in a biographical, thumbnail sketch in one of the 'Appendices on the four types of barbarians 四夷附錄.'<sup>1</sup> Although we know from the TJ *kaoyi* 考異 that he had a biography in the *shilu* 實錄 (veritable records) of Han Gaozu, he is completely omitted from the JW. This absence may partly be due to his early arrival in Liao, before systematic record-keeping had been adopted,<sup>2</sup> but it is likely that the circumstances of his service in the Central Plains were more significant. Yanhui served the Youzhou regime of the Liu family, for which no independent records survive, and although he was briefly at the court of the pre-dynastic Later Tang, unless he had been involved in major events, there would have been little reason for their records to notice him. There are thus a good many problems in trying to assemble a picture of Han Yanhui, and a number of uncertainties remain.

As Han Yanhui does not appear in the JW, Ouyang Xiu, in the XW, must be given much of the credit for retrieving Han Yanhui from what otherwise is likely to have been total obscurity. Given that the non-imperial biographies in the JW are believed to be largely intact, and the absence of so much as a mention of Yanhui in the surviving annals of the same work, it is most likely that Ouyang Xiu obtained the information for his

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1. The extra materials gathered in the LSSY and LSJSBM are drawn only from the main sources already covered here. They do not add to our knowledge.

2. The first recorded order for a historical account was in 941:2, 27th March. (LS 4:49.) The first *shilu* were presented in 991. (LS 13:141.) Yanhui himself is credited with having 'set down the records,' which must have been at some time before his death in 959. (LS 74:1243.) The earlier years of the dynasty have left a thinner record in the LS annals than the later years.

description of Yanhui from other sources. Given Ouyang's moralistic motives in writing the XW, we can be fairly certain that he had a good reason for retrieving Yanhui.

Yanhui's LS biography is a much patchier work than that of say, Zhang Li 張礪, which clearly derives almost entirely from the QG.<sup>3</sup> For Yanhui the correlation is nothing like as close, although the QG was used in the compilation of the LS account. With a few notable exceptions, most of the incidents recorded in the QG are also found in the LS, but there is a good deal of rewriting and there are a number of passages which seem to derive more closely from the XW than from the QG.<sup>4</sup> There is also a lot of information found in the LS but not in the other three texts.

### Earliest employment

Yanhui's given name means 'extending excellence' (or 'honour.') We know from the note on his death in his LS biography that he was born in 882.<sup>5</sup> He was from Anci 安次 in Youzhou (Lulong 盧龍).<sup>6</sup> Hence Yanhui was born during the Huang Chao 黃巢 rebellions in a region with a long tradition of control by hereditary governors.<sup>7</sup> His father, Mengyin 夢殷, was a prefect, serving successively in Ji<sub>1</sub> 薊, Ru 儒 and Shun 順, which were later amongst the Sixteen prefectures (Table 2, §2.) The position of prefect in a frontier zone was an important one, and Mengyin's reappointment to three similar posts indicates that he was considered loyal, reliable and effective in the job. Although all three prefectures were technically under the jurisdiction of Tang Hebei *dao* 道 (circuit), in fact they were controlled by the autonomous Lulong *jiedushi*, who appointed his own prefects.<sup>8</sup> In 895, when Yanhui was 13, the patronage of Li Keyong 李克用 of the Taiyuan Jin placed Liu Rengong 劉仁恭 in charge of the province, and Yanhui's family must have been amongst those coming under his authority.<sup>9</sup>

Yanhui is said in the LS to have been 'talented,' and Rengong to have 'appreciated his worth,' summoning him to be a *wenxue* 文學 (instructor, 8:3) at the regional capital of You with a job as *lushi canjun* 錄事參軍 (administrative supervisor, 5b-8a) for Pingzhou 平州 (§3.) It is likely to have been later on that he worked with Feng Dao 馮道 in the *zhihou yuan* 祗候院 (court of ushers) which appears to have been some kind of court of

3. See Chapter 4.

4. Feng Jiasheng, *Liao shi yuanliu*, p.40, points out that the QG biography of Han Yanhui is phrased differently to those in the LS and XW.

5. He died in 959, at 78 *sui*.

6. Only the LS gives all this information; the others give only Youzhou. Anci is to the southeast of Youzhou.

7. Peterson, *Autonomy of the northeastern provinces*.

8. Wang, pp.9, 21.

9. TJ 260:8475.

reception, and probably after this that he became *guancha duzhishi* 觀察度支使 (surveillance and revenue commissioner, 7) for Youzhou.<sup>10</sup> It is important to note that Yanhui began his career owing his position to a regional magnate rather than the imperial court. This could be expected to have some influence on his attitudes to loyalty and where he felt his was due, which could only have been compounded by the great favour he received at Rengong's hands.

In 907:4, Rengong's son Shouguang 劉守光 usurped his father's position, and Yanhui was one of those who continued to serve, holding the post of *canjun* 參軍 (adjutant) under Shouguang (§4).<sup>11</sup> This mention of service to Rengong then Shouguang makes Yanhui, at an early stage in his career, someone who transfers his allegiance. The father-son succession lends a degree of legitimacy to Yanhui's actions, as it was considered quite in order to serve the son of one's original master. However, Yanhui's LS biography leaves to the annals any mention that Shouguang replaced his father by usurpation, and without that information, one would not think anything but good of Yanhui's action. Nevertheless, the issue of loyalty versus practical reality had come up for the first time for Yanhui when he was just 25. By this time, and in a regional administration, the question was an ambiguous one. It is not at all clear to what loyalty would have been owed; whether it was directed towards persons, institutions or places, but as we have seen in Part 1, people in Yanhui's situation were unlikely to set much store by any allegiance save one which could give them something concrete.<sup>12</sup>

Yanhui is not reported to have protested at Shouguang's usurpation, either on grounds of the breach of filial piety or of the overthrow of an imperial appointee. This is not surprising in itself, except that four years later, Yanhui is noted as one who speaks his mind regardless of the consequences. We might speculate inconclusively about the many possible reasons for this contrast of early silence with later outspokenness. He may have been too scared or uncertain to make a protest; he may have been too junior for any protest he did make to have an impact; he may have approved of Shouguang's actions. Whatever his unknown reasons at this point, by 911, when Shouguang declared himself emperor of Yan 燕, Yanhui was prepared to speak out against it, and it is attractive to suggest that after an early experience of voluntary or enforced silence in reaction to major breaches of propriety, he determined to speak up in future.

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10. The exact structure of offices in the Hebei gubernatorial administrations of this period is rather obscure, owing to the current confusion and rapid changes coming on top of 150 years of autonomy, but it seems reasonable to suggest Tang ranks for these offices.

11. QG, TJ, XW. It is not clear whether this is the different post called *canjun* or an abbreviation. The LS does not mention any transition of power, and thus leaves us to assume that Yanhui retained his posts, including that of *lushi canjun*.

12. Also see Wang, chs.2-5, *passim*.

The QG biography alone mentions Yanhui's part in the 911 events (§5), and the story seems intended to demonstrate Yanhui's courage in speaking out against improper behaviour. When Shouguang set himself up as emperor of Yan,<sup>13</sup> Yanhui protested against this. Shouguang decided to crack down hard on dissent and set up an executioner's axe and block in his court, warning that those who dared to remonstrate would be beheaded. One Sun He 孫鶴 was evidently prepared to risk a trial of the new emperor's resolve. He remonstrated strongly, and suffered the penalty. Yanhui escaped this punishment, according to the QG, because he was a longstanding member of Shouguang's retinue of aides and hitherto had been highly regarded. Although Sun He was also a senior minister, he did not enjoy the same privileged position as Yanhui. In 909-10 he had been one of the staunch supporters of Shouguang's brother Shouwen 劉守文 against the usurpation of their father.<sup>14</sup>

Although the QG is the only one of the four texts considered here to mention Yanhui in connection with it, the axe incident itself is recorded in the other three, and in the JW.<sup>15</sup> In these other works, Sun He is the only remonstrator mentioned and far more detail is given; we are told what he said to arouse Shouguang's wrath and there is a full account of the horrible punishment meted out to him. Ye Longli has cut all this in the QG and left only a brief mention of Sun He's misfortune to provide a pointed contrast to the courage and luck of his subject, Han Yanhui. In doing this, Ye was taking one aspect of the image of Yanhui given in the TJ and emphasising it, making Yanhui very definitely an official who did not fear to speak his mind to his master on points of principle, even if this placed him in personal danger.<sup>16</sup> It is striking that even though the LS is the only work giving us details of Yanhui's early career, this incident does not appear there at all.

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13. In 911:8. JW 27:376; 135:1805; TJ 268:8744; XW 39:426; LS 1:5.

14. JW 135:1803; XW 39:424-6, and see Chapter 1.

15. JW 135:1803, XW 39:424-5, TJ 268:8744-5. Although the TJ dates the incident with the axe to 911:8, the JW biography of Liu Shouguang appears to place it in 907:6 and the declaration as emperor to 907:8, but it must be that the couple of characters giving the year have been lost in transmission. A similar ambiguity arises in the XW biography, which gives no clear date to the axe incident so that it could appear to be in c.908. The JW and XW both place the incident before the declaration as emperor, as part of sections showing Shouguang's cruelty and growing hunger for power and position. The QG has followed the TJ in placing the axe incident immediately after Shouguang's adoption of the title of emperor and before his formal accession (TJ 268:8745.)

16. Ye Longli seems to find this an attractive trait; cf. his account of Zhang Li, QG 16:161-2. The LSJSBM 5:109 maintains the impression, saying that Yanhui 'remonstrated strenuously but was not heeded.' This phrase is quoted as if it were from the LS, but cannot be found there.

### Arrival in Liao

The date of Yanhui's mission to Liao is given no more precisely than the 'later years' of Liu Shouguang, when the TJ and QG say that he was 'weak and weary.'<sup>17</sup> Yanhui had an audience with the Liao emperor at which he refused to bow or to make obeisance as Taizu required. This angered Taizu, who detained Yanhui and sent him out to herd horses, evidently a shameful and probably a difficult job for a literary official (§6-7.) Later he was summoned to a further audience at which he impressed Taizu such that he was made a *mouzhu* 謀主 (planner.) In his new employment Yanhui oversaw the settlement of the newly acquired Chinese population and the establishment of a Chinese-style administration, and helped to pacify a number of tribes (§10-16.) But then he fled to the court of the prince of Jin, where he fell out with Wang Jian 王緘 and felt it safest to return to Liao, being rightly confident that he would be welcomed (§17-26.) All this must have happened before or only shortly after Wang Jian's death in 913:12.<sup>18</sup>

The sources all agree on this order of events, but the dating of Yanhui's arrival in Liao is a serious problem.<sup>19</sup> The TJ *kaoyi* discusses it when Yanhui's mission is mentioned in an entry under 916:12 covering his subsequent employment. Sima Guang quotes Yanhui's biography in Han Gaozu's *shilu*:

During Tianyou [904-7] the *lianshuai* 連帥 Liu Shouguang attacked Zhongshan 中山 and did not win; he wanted to join up with the northern barbarians [*beirong* 北戎] and sent Yanhui to convey this to the enemy.

As Shouguang did not take over from his father until 907, this must be the implied arrival date,<sup>20</sup> but Sima rejects this on the grounds that the longstanding Liu enmity towards the Kitan would have prohibited recourse to them in such times of strength. Sima eventually plumps for late 911 or early 912, and although he points out that this is based on no more reliable information than the weakness of Shouguang, it does make sense. Shouguang, having newly declared himself emperor, had turned on Wang Chuzhi's Yiwu 義武 (YiDing 易定) province in 911:11, leading Chuzhi to ask Li Cunxu 李存勗 of the Taiyuan Jin for help.<sup>21</sup> In 912:1 the Jin responded by attacking Youzhou, and with his

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17. QG 1:2 says 'at the end of the Tang,' LS 74:1231 has 'after Shouguang became *shuai* 帥 (leader - of Yan),' LS 71:1199-1200 says 'when the prince of Jin, Li Cunxu 李存勗, wanted to form an alliance.' XW 72:890 gives no time marker other than Liu Shouguang's rulership.

18. JW 60:806.

19. This is despite the apparent importance of Yanhui's mission to and detention in Liao, suggested by there being seven accounts of it in our four sources. The LS records it twice and the QG three times.

20. Sima Guang dismisses a further option of 900 because Rengong was still in charge of Youzhou at the time.

21. JW 27:376; TJ 268:8748.

capital so easily threatened, Shouguang asked the Liang emperor for assistance.<sup>22</sup> Given his later appeals to all and sundry,<sup>23</sup> there is reason to suggest that he might have sent an envoy to the Kitan too, although there is no mention of a specific mission at this time.<sup>24</sup>

However, this dating would give Yanhui a maximum of nearly two years before Wang Jian's death in which to pasture horses, settle Chinese households, help pacify tribes, organise the Liao administration, flee, quarrel with Wang Jian, and return to Liao. Whilst not totally impossible, it would have been an extraordinarily busy time for Yanhui, surely worthy of comment? On balance, it seems more likely that in this case Sima Guang has failed to take into account the rest of the story he is telling, and that the *shilu* dating of c.907 is, in fact, right.<sup>25</sup>

Unfortunately, the QG notes Yanhui's presence at the axe incident in 911, so according to this text he could not have left before then; yet the 907 dating is so compelling that we must reconsider the QG account. We saw that the axe incident itself is well-recorded by the other sources, without mention of any minister but Sun He, but hesitated there to suggest explicitly that Ye Longli had invented Yanhui's involvement. However, the QG is known to be unreliable, and it is quite possible that Ye Longli was willing to stretch the truth to do this on Han Yanhui's behalf, but it is more satisfying to go further than that, and to reconsider the dating of the axe incident. It is the TJ, Ye Longli's main source, which firmly dates the incident to 911:8, and it could well be the case that Ye, accepting the TJ datings, felt he could get away with the addition of Yanhui to the axe story without it being obviously impossible. However, as noted above,<sup>26</sup> the earlier sources are less certain of the timing of the axe incident, and even imply datings of 907 or 908, while Sima Guang's note in the *kaoyi* shows clearly that the TJ is uncertain about much to do with Liu Shouguang's regime. If the TJ got its dating of the axe incident wrong as well as the timing of Yanhui's arrival, and the QG followed these blindly, then c.907 could still be the most likely date for Yanhui's arrival in Liao.

In fact, what is interesting about this is not so much the actual date of Yanhui's arrival as the fact that Sima Guang's choice of dating turns Yanhui into some kind of prodigy,

22. JW 28:379; TJ 268:8751. The latter says that Shouguang first requested help. LS 1:5 makes an unsubstantiated claim that in 912:2 the Liao emperor went in person to attack Shouguang. The sentence has no subject and it seems likely that the compiler has mistaken Liao Taizu for Liang Taizu, who at the time stated did personally go to fight Shouguang (JW 28:379; TJ 268:9751-2.)

23. For instance, he was begging for relief from Zhou Dewei 周德威, the Jin general, in 912:10 (JW 28:381) and continued to do so repeatedly until his capture.

24. The earliest report actually to mention a mission to the Kitan is a TJ entry for 913:10. (TJ 268:8777.) The JW says that Shouguang sent for help in 913:3, without saying to whom, and four months later that he did so 'repeatedly.' (JW 28:381, 382.) These dates are much too late to be credible.

25. The TJ covers a large portion of Yanhui's life in this single account, with a minimum of dating.

26. See n.15.



achieving an enormous amount in an incredibly short time; for Sima had access to the JW, and he would therefore have known when Wang Jian died.

### **Initial employment and early service to the Liao**

The TJ version of Yanhui's early experiences in Liao is much more detailed than the XW account. The main addition to the TJ version, which is then carried over into the QG and LS, is the intervention of the Shulü empress 述律后 on Yanhui's behalf (§9.)

... the Shulü empress advised the ruler of the Kitan saying, 'Yanhui can stick to his principles without bending; in this he is one of the virtuous people of the present age, why do (you) dishonour (him) by employing him as a herder? You ought to employ him with propriety.'

The added contribution of the Shulü empress serves to emphasise Yanhui's qualities beyond the brief account of the XW. The comment in Ouyang's version that the emperor merely 'came to understand [Yanhui's] talents,' is now supplemented with a reminder of the courage and moral uprightness of one who refused to give what he considered to be unwarranted obeisance to another ruler.

From the Chinese point of view, it is perhaps curious that the empress, a woman, is credited with pointing out to Taizu the virtues he should be making use of, not insulting with menial labour. The empress's behaviour would not be so surprising to the Kitan, amongst whom women played a more active role than their counterparts in northern Chinese society.<sup>27</sup> Her involvement could be read both ways, either as a reflection on Taizu, as being ruled by a woman, or as an indication from Sima Guang that he knew that some in the Kitan state recognised upright principles when they saw them. Sima's idea of such principles was naturally that valued by the Chinese of his own day. It may also be significant that in the TJ the Shulü empress comments that Yanhui is 'one of the virtuous people *of the present age*' (my italics), which may indicate an understanding of the difficulties of sustaining a full-blooded Confucian approach to moral behaviour in such volatile times. The corollary to this is that the ability to make such a statement confirms that the Shulü empress, at least, knew what moral behaviour was supposed to consist of, in Chinese terms. The role of the emperor as selector of ministers is also emphasised by this story; in each version Taizu becomes impressed with Yanhui's capabilities and decides to employ him in an important post (§10.)

As it is related in the later texts, the whole affair is almost a parable of the 'civilising' of the Kitan rulers. Taizu's first reaction to Yanhui's refusal to bow can be read as that of an uncivilised autocrat who cannot recognise a principled stand when he sees one. Through the agency of some character with influence over him, in this case his wife, he is persuaded that there might be merit in somebody who can make such a stand. By the

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27. See WF pp.199-202.

time of the second interview a change has been wrought in the emperor such that he can see Yanhui's qualities and employ him in a position fitting his talents, thus demonstrating that he has learnt to recognise morality and has acquired the imperial virtue of choosing good ministers. Yanhui's example of sticking to his principles and not bowing, and then suffering for it, is the catalyst for learning, helped along by wise advice. Simultaneously, Taizu has moved from being an insecure despot who cannot cope with being crossed, to being a true emperor who can see the point of standing on principle, is willing to learn from his ministers, and who rewards merit. Ouyang Xiu was so firmly anti-Kitan that he might well have been disinclined to allow the Liao ruler any such learning process. The later writers, perhaps more resigned to having to accept the Kitan regime as a fact, may have been trying to ameliorate the situation by showing the Chinese servants of the Liao as civilisers of the barbarian, since they could not show the Central Plains emperors as their conquerors.

In a situation where a ruler's own authority depended at least partly on his ability to entice the followers of others into allegiance to him, preventing officials such as Yanhui from changing sides was a difficult and delicate task, requiring the incentives of security and a livelihood. Officials had a choice of master during the Wudai denied them in more stable times and some of them used that choice to their advantage. Yanhui's QG biography and the annals reiterate the TJ statement that Yanhui was made a planner because 'such of his conduct were sought after there [in Liao.]'<sup>28</sup> A valued minister could exploit his rarity to gain better treatment or promotion. Yanhui, as we shall see, was amongst those who benefitted from this situation.

All four accounts next describe incidents which are almost to continue the 'civilising' theme. The XW talks of the suppression of tribal dissent to the rule of Abaoji 阿保機, particularly the subjugation of the Dangxiang 党項 and Shiwei 室韋, planned by Yanhui (§11, 13.) It is not clear what dating should be attached to these events. There appear to be no Kitan attacks on the Dangxiang before 916:7 and none on the Shiwei between 909 and 965.<sup>29</sup> This means there is a slight possibility that Yanhui was involved in attacks on the Shiwei from later in 907, but this would require a very short period of pasturing horses. In any case, Yanhui is said to have planned the campaigns, and the 907 attacks come at the end of series, not the beginning. Subsequently, in 913:4, the Liao were actually co-operating with the Shiwei.

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28. This is not repeated in the LS versions, which do clearly derive from the TJ and/or QG. As in the QG, the story appears in the LS both in Yanhui's biography and in that of the Shulü empress, but in this text the compilations seem to have been done more independently of one another as the two biographies differ more, each making different changes from the sources. (LS 71:1199-1200; 74:1231.)

29. See LS 1:4-8 for absence of attacks 911-3, WF chronology, pp.574, 575, 581 for convenient summary of dates of known attacks.

The possible datings are so far from correlating with our other information that we are left with three unsatisfactory options. Firstly, we can assume that Yanhui planned minor, early campaigns that were not recorded; but the LS gives a detailed record of tribal conquest, and 'subjugation' would in all likelihood be recorded. Secondly, we might suggest that Yanhui was responsible for the plans which led to the later defeat of the Dangxiang in 916, 920, 924 and subsequently,<sup>30</sup> which would require us to assume that this part of the account is out of sequence in all the texts, and thus functions as an explanatory aside unrelated to chronological sequence. Unfortunately this does not work at all for the Shiwei, as according to the attacks recorded in the LS, Yanhui could never have planned even the later campaigns, as he died in 959 and the earliest of the later attacks was in 965. Thirdly, we can take note that the TJ, followed by the QG reference to Yanhui, mentions the subjugation of 'the various nations' in general, without naming any of them specifically, and thus suggest that the names Dangxiang and Shiwei bear little relation to the actual tribes and nations subdued. Whilst not denying that Yanhui was involved in tribal pacification, it is possible that the extent of his role has been exaggerated somewhat by an Ouyang Xiu aiming to make a moral point through his story.

The other service described in this section of the texts is Yanhui's contribution to the settlement of the displaced Chinese population recently acquired by Liao (§12.) This could refer to the people coming to Liao as a result of Shouguang's misrule,<sup>31</sup> but it could equally be those acquired before this as refugees, or through the usual methods of raid and warfare. The TJ and QG place this activity before the subjugation of the tribes. According to the TJ, he

{... was the first to urge the Kitan to establish a royal court and to set up government agencies,} he built city walls and delimited markets and residential areas in order to deal with the *hanren* 漢人, and caused each one to have a spouse, and brought abandoned fields under cultivation. Because of this, the *hanren* were each provided with a living, and those who fled were ever fewer.

These two texts have built upon a relatively minor mention in the XW to show Yanhui as a prime mover behind the supposed sinicisation of the Kitan and settlement of the Chinese subject population. He is seen as a civiliser of the barbarian and a bringer of stability to the people, providing for their welfare whilst at the same time reducing the

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30. See LS 1:11; 2:16, 19 and *passim*.

31. It is so taken by most Chinese writers on the subject, eg. Song Dejin, *Qidan hanhua lisu shulüe*, *Liao Jin shi lun ji* vol. 1 (1987), p.129; Yin Keming, *Qidan hanhua lüekao*, *Yugong banyuekan* 6:3-4 (repr. 1988), p.495.

numbers of refugees, which would in turn improve tax returns.<sup>32</sup> In short, he strikes the ideal Confucian balance of nurturing the people and strengthening the state.

The LS reiterates all these things in an edited form, placing the subjugation of Dangxiang and Shiwei first. It then goes further and on no less than three occasions mentions Yanhui's role as systematiser of national finances, as responsible for

the overall management of the capitals and cities, the establishment of the various palaces, the rectification of the (relationship between) ruler and ministers, the determination of position and status, the systematisation of the laws,

and as the one who 'established the customary ways and set down the records' (§14-16.) The WDHY had noted that when

Yanhui was *zaixiang* 宰相 [grand councillor], laws and regulations were made stern and fair, and the various tribes all respected and yielded to them<sup>33</sup>

but this emphasis in the LS over and above the accounts in the earlier texts suggests that it was in the interests of the Yuan, or their officials, to provide historical examples of Chinese who worked wholeheartedly and contributed to the administration of a non-Chinese state. Yanhui's manifest importance as the establisher of so much of the Liao administrative system, as set out in the later texts, emphasises the oddity of his not appearing at all in the JW.

The Liao were not ignorant of Chinese ways, having been in increasingly close contact with the north China regimes since the seventh century, in which time they accepted titles from the Chinese emperors and established a number of Chinese-style bureaucratic posts piecemeal. When Taizu established the empire he soon acquired a sedentary subject population which could not be treated in exactly the same way as conquered tribes. At this point the borrowing of names ceased to be adequate, which is why those such as Yanhui were so 'sought after.' The practical experience of people like Yanhui was invaluable in this early stage of the Liao, as the LS itself points out.<sup>34</sup>

Yanhui demonstrated a willingness to take on a vastly increased responsibility and to do what was required. He must have been a tremendously active initiator. If this was so then Taizu had clearly demonstrated his imperial virtue of selecting good ministers, as well as his ability to entrust his Chinese officials with important tasks. Furthermore, Yanhui's enthusiasm in his work for Taizu suggests a transfer of loyalty on Yanhui's part. From a purely practical point of view, this was a wise move. His previous master seemed unlikely to survive much longer, so even if Yanhui had returned to the south the

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32. Wittfogel and Feng translate the LS version of these events as even stronger praise for Yanhui's activities, claiming that Yanhui '*taught* (the submitted Chinese) cultivation' (*jiao ken yi* 教墾藝) (WF p.240, my italics); but a more likely meaning is that he 'encouraged (the Chinese) to open up new land for cultivation.'

33. WDHY 29:455, also found in CFYG 1000:11a-b, where it says the tribes 'all yielded from fear.'

34. LS 75:1243.

best he could reasonably have hoped for was to avoid execution in the aftermath of Shouguang's defeat and to find employment with the victor.<sup>35</sup> As he was almost certain to end up serving a new master anyway, it may have seemed most sensible to accept the situation he found himself in and be thankful to have escaped the fall of Shouguang. We should also remember that he was still only 30 and that to rise above the limited promotion and opportunities available within a provincial administration, he would either have had to move to an imperial court, or to have been lucky enough to serve a provincial leader who won the empire. In Liao he found himself in demand and, apparently, in the exciting position of being given free rein to design the institutional structures of a new state more or less from scratch, which he seems to have had the ambition to tackle. As a highly successful leader of tribal groups, Taizu clearly had qualities which made people follow him. Judging from his treatment of Zhang Li,<sup>36</sup> he cultivated this capacity in order to win over the many non-Kitan officials and generals who helped him to govern his empire. From what we know of Taizu's reaction to Yanhui at their second meeting, it seems likely that the emperor would have done his best to court his co-operation.

### Escape and return

Despite his achievements, his trusted position and any attachment to Taizu, something was missing, for after the subjugation of the tribes and the settlement of the Chinese population, Yanhui fled back south to the court of the prince of Jin, Li Cunxu, the future Tang Zhuangzong 唐莊宗.<sup>37</sup> Cunxu wanted to give Yanhui a senior post as a member of his staff. This apparently aroused the animosity of Wang Jian, and Yanhui, fearing what might happen, asked for leave to visit his family in Youzhou. He stayed for a while at the house of Wang Deming 王德明 (Zhang Wenli 張文禮), who asked him what he would do. Yanhui replied that he would return to Liao and did not fear to do so because he was so indispensable to the regime. He was proved right by the emperor's delight at his return, and received a number of senior posts (§17-26.)

It is unclear exactly when Yanhui fled to Jin, although it must have been after Li Keyong's death and Li Cunxu's succession in 908:2. He must have left again, in fear of Wang Jian, before the end of 913, because Jian's JW biography tells us that he was killed by looting troops in 913:12, as he was taking the news of the capture of Youzhou and Liu Shouguang back to Taiyuan-Jinyang 晉陽.<sup>38</sup> Yanhui's return to Liao may have

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35. Almost all of Shouguang's retinue fled him before the end.

36. See Chapter 4.

37. The LS anachronistically says that Yanhui fled to (Later) Tang and the XW uses Li Cunxu's temple name. Cunxu did not found the Later Tang until 923.

38. JW 60:806.

been almost immediate, or as late as 916. We know that Taizu declared himself emperor in 916:<sup>39</sup> and at this time gave Yanhui at least one post, so this is the latest he could have returned. We should distinguish between Yanhui's departure from Jinyang and his return to Liao, as he did not go directly from one to the other. Whilst Yanhui certainly left Jinyang before Wang Jian died, if his return to Liao is placed after Jian's death, that is, in around 914-5, then that puts a rather different cast on Yanhui's departure. If he decided to go back north after his enemy's death made it safe for him to stay in Jin, then this may suggest that Jian's animosity was simply a convenient excuse for Yanhui to return to a position of power and influence greater than he seemed likely to achieve under Cunxu, who was still only the ruler of a minor state. Yanhui had energetically fulfilled his responsibilities in Liao, and had left behind there a senior, if not the most senior, position amongst the Chinese bureaucrats in the fledgling Kitan state. Assuming that his role was as described in the later texts, he had the backing of Taizu to do whatever he believed necessary to settle the conquered Chinese population and set up Chinese-style administrative structures. Li Cunxu was still a good ten years away from founding his own dynasty and it may be that Yanhui saw more opportunities against less competition in the northern state.

There is also the question of Yanhui's own family. His son Deshu 韓德樞 was given military posts by Taizong (acceded 926) at the early age of 15 *sui* 歲 (14) which means he could have been born no earlier than 912.<sup>40</sup> Family members were often taken on later missions from Song to Liao, but it is generally assumed that all of these would have been sons or other male relatives,<sup>41</sup> making it unlikely that Yanhui took his wife and/or baby son with him on his mission to the Kitan. This may suggest that he married in Liao and began his family there. If this was the case, and perhaps especially if his son was born during his time away from Liao, Yanhui could have been concerned that his family would be used as hostages for his return. Another possibility is that Yanhui did not marry in Liao but brought a new, young family back there with him when he returned from the south. It could even be that he was married before he went north and that his son had been born during his sojourn in Liao. Certainly it is likely that any wife and children that Yanhui already had in the south would be living with Yanhui's mother, whom we are told he visited. Unfortunately our texts are not in the habit of mentioning the movements of their subjects' families.<sup>42</sup>

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39. LS 1:10; QG 1:2.

40. LS 74:1232. As Yanhui was born in 882, Deshu was born when Yanhui was already no less than 34.

41. Herbert Franke, Sung embassies: some general observations, Rossabi, *China among equals*, p.124.

42. An exception: Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽 left his wife behind him when he went over to the Liao and she was later allowed to join him there, but she was a princess. JW 77:1018; 98:1311; LS 76:1247.

More interesting is that the LS, having played up Yanhui's contribution to the Liao state, also places more stress on his flight, citing reasons for it where the other texts give none. The LS says that he 'sadly recalled his native place and composed poetry expressing his feelings, then fled.' The LS adds the mourning for native place which was by then conventionally expected of Chinese. By attributing Yanhui's departure to an emotional attachment considered entirely acceptable, the historiographers have removed any criticism of the Liao emperor which might be implied by the escape of such a senior minister: there is no suggestion of poor treatment. Since they too served a non-Chinese emperor, it may have been wise to avoid suggestions that it was inherently undesirable to work for a foreigner. Furthermore, towards the end of the biography, the LS recounts that when Yanhui fled,

Taizu dreamt that a white crane came out from inside his tent, and after flying around for a while, went back into the tent again. The next morning, he spoke with the officials in attendance on him, saying, 'Yanhui will come back.' Afterwards, it was exactly as he expected.

This dramatises the incident by the addition of a supernatural element. Accordingly, its significance is raised and the tensions at work are emphasised. Yanhui is depicted as a Chinese properly missing his homeland and his value to his Kitan lord is stressed.

The TJ, followed by the QG, seems more concerned to show how Yanhui was valued by other rulers. Both sources say that the prince of Jin 'wanted to appoint him *zhangshuji* 掌書記 (chief secretary) in his administration,' which also serves as an explanation for Wang Jian's dislike of Yanhui, variously given as false words against him,<sup>43</sup> detestation,<sup>44</sup> and a quarrel.<sup>45</sup> Wang Jian was currently Cunxu's chief secretary, and obviously did not want to be replaced by a newcomer.<sup>46</sup>

These two sources also emphasise Yanhui's relationship with his mother. The XW mentions that this is whom he asks for permission to visit, but the TJ and QG also say that Yanhui completed his visit, showing his request as not purely a pretext to get away, but as also containing some genuine filial regard. Later, when he has returned to Liao and the emperor asks him where he has been, he says that he missed his mother but feared he would not be given leave to visit her, and so left secretly. Whilst we may question the absolute truth of this claim, the TJ compilers evidently believed that Yanhui could have

43. XW 72:890.

44. TJ 269:8810; QG 1:2; 16:160-161.

45. LS 74:1231.

46. The punctuation in the Zhonghua shuju edition of the TJ is misplaced here, implying that Yanhui was placed in overall charge of the administration, and thus making it unclear why a relatively junior bureaucrat in the retinue would be so upset and so dangerous to Yanhui. TJ 269:8810.

felt such a claim was reasonable and that Taizu would accept it at least as a face-saving explanation.<sup>47</sup>

The LS makes the element of filial piety in the story rather more explicit. Yanhui asks for permission to visit his parents, not specifically his mother. On his return to Liao he explains his departure,

To forget your parents is not filial and to abandon one's master is not loyal. Although my body got up and ran away, my heart was with your Majesty; and this is what made me come back again.

The ancient tension between the demands of filial piety and those of loyalty to master is thus explored. Filial piety is satisfied, but the ultimate choice is for loyalty to Yanhui's master. It is no surprise that the LS compilers should emphasise such a decision. The parallels with their own time would be obvious, and it may have been especially relevant that the master in question was a foreigner and the servant a Chinese. The emphasis is further made by a substitution in the LS. In the XW, TJ and QG, the emperor greets the returned Yanhui with the exclamation that he has fallen from heaven. In the LS this is replaced with an account that Yanhui was given a Kitan name, Xialie 匣列, meaning 'come back.' The sheer delight of the earlier sources is thus tempered by a more matter-of-fact approach in the LS, almost as if Yanhui's return, though a reason for pleasure and reward, was nevertheless not unexpected, as indeed is later to be indicated by the account of Taizu's dream.<sup>48</sup>

As a final observation on this event, it is notable that of the potted biography which is almost the entire entry on Yanhui in the XW, over half concerns the escape and return. Ouyang Xiu, who wrote with such deliberate motives, clearly regarded this as the central event of Yanhui's life. The XW gives no details of Yanhui's career in Liao, observing only the posts he obtained upon Abaoji's elevation to emperor and his death in enemy lands, along with a curious incident at the Liao court in which Yanhui's situation is referred to but in which he takes no part himself.<sup>49</sup> The numerous accounts of escape, attempted escape, and return in the texts for this period appear to be an important medium for the articulation of the loyalty debate in the different periods when the various texts were compiled.

### Later service to the Liao

Following his return, Yanhui was given several posts, evidently part of the more generous treatment noted by the TJ and QG (§27.) In all the texts except the LS, they are

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47. It is an excuse also used by Li Huan 李澣. LS 103:1450.

48. Already mentioned above, but placed at the end of Yanhui's LS biography.

49. The 'hat incident,' see Chapters 4 and 5 for details and discussion.



placed after Taizu's claiming of the imperial title in 916:2. The details of exactly which posts were given vary from text to text, but all agree that he received the extremely senior post in the then Chinese administration, of *zhengshiling/zhongshuling* 政事令 / 中書令 (director of the department of administration/the imperial secretariat.)<sup>50</sup> The XW and LS also give him a literary post in the Chongwen hall 崇文館<sup>51</sup> whilst the three earlier texts make explicit statements that he became a grand councillor (*xiang* 相.) The granting of these posts would appear to be no more than the formalisation of Yanhui's apparent position before his flight. If he really laid most of the institutional groundwork for the Liao state before leaving for Jin, then to be made officially the head of it on his return was no more than fair reward. There is everything to suggest that he continued with his organisational work after receiving his new posts.

The TJ and QG next return to the theme of Yanhui missing home by describing a letter he is claimed to have sent back to Jin via envoys from there, explaining his reasons for flight (§28.) He had not felt the need so to do when he fled Liao; either he did not regard it as necessary or it was only after his return that he was struck by the need to explain his behaviour, having been required to do it once by Taizu. Or again, it may be that the TJ/QG wish to show Yanhui as more concerned with his breach of loyalty to the state which he would be serving were it not for his unfortunate quarrel. In any case, the letter covers everything:

It is not that I do not feel a continuing attachment to my eminent master, nor that I do not pine for my native place; the reason why I did not remain was just precisely because I feared the calumniations of Wang Jian. Therefore I used my aged mother as a pretext.

and adds, 'While Yanhui is here, the Kitan will certainly not govern in the south.' This last statement is backed up by the compiler's observation that it was indeed the case that through the Tongguang 同光 era (923-926) the Kitan did not penetrate deeply into the south, leaving Yanhui with all the credit for the territorial integrity of the south.<sup>52</sup>

We must not neglect the fact that Li Cunxu was not a 'Han' Chinese, but a Shatuo Turk, but judging from his supposed letter, the ethnicity of the Jin ruler was not an issue for Yanhui. What does seem important to Yanhui is his concern for the fortunes of what he calls 'the south,' an interest which extends to a promise to use his influence to prevent Liao encroachments into Jin/Later Tang territory. The issue of loyalty is clearly an important element in this incident. We should note that here it comes up alongside the

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50. These were two different names for the same post, used at different times. LS 47:774-5; WF p.485.

51. WF p.710 calls it a library.

52. An editorial note by the Yuan scholar Hu Sanxing 胡三省 (1230-1287) cites specific instances of Kitan aggression and gives the strength of the Jin (Later Tang) army, rather than Yanhui's energies, as the reason the Kitan were held back. TJ 269:8811.

question of ethnicity, but that there is no link between the ethnicity of the master and the loyalty considered owing to him.<sup>53</sup>

The whole passage concerning the letter and Yanhui's continued service to the southern regimes is omitted from the LS. In its place are a number of references to Yanhui's part in the subjugation of Bohai 渤海 in 925-6 (§30-34.) These are in Yanhui's biography, Kang Moji's 康默記 biography and the annals. They relate the first campaign of 925, on which Yanhui accompanied the emperor, and the Bohai prince, Da Yinzhuan 大諲譔, submitted. When Yinzhuan rebelled again, Yanhui was amongst the generals sent against him, and who destroyed his city. For this Yanhui was made left *puye* 僕射 (vice-director of the department of state affairs.) Then, in an attack dated in the annals to 926:3, 6th April, Yanhui and Kang Moji, another Chinese, took Changling fu 長嶺府 from the Bohai, after which the army returned north. These incidents support the image of Yanhui as the subjugator of tribal dissent and assistant in the task of consolidating the Liao state.

Another omission from the LS account is of an incident recorded in the TJ and QG involving an envoy from Later Tang, Yao Kun 姚坤 (§35.) He came to report the death of Zhuangzong and was questioned by Liao Taizu as to Li Siyuan's 李嗣源 reasons for setting himself up as Zhuangzong's successor, Taizu apparently being displeased at the transfer of power.<sup>54</sup> When Taizu offered to suspend raids in return for territory, Kun replied that this was beyond his brief. This angered Taizu, who imprisoned Kun for ten days before summoning him again with a more modest territorial demand and a requirement that Kun write to Siyuan (Tang Mingzong 唐明宗) to request his agreement to the proposal. When Kun refused, Taizu wanted to kill him, but the envoy's life was saved by the intervention of Yanhui, who remonstrated with the emperor, presumably reminding him that this was no way to treat an envoy. Kun was imprisoned again, and shortly afterwards released to convey the news of Taizu's own death back to Tang.<sup>55</sup>

This brief mention of Yanhui again shows him working on behalf of those from the south, both in terms of saving the life of an individual and apparently also preventing the pursuit of the territorial demands of the emperor. This is the second time that incidents showing Yanhui's attachment to the south have not been transmitted from the QG to the LS, which suggests that they could have been omitted quite deliberately by the Yuan compilers.

53. The distinction drawn between these two factors can also be seen in the accounts of Zhang Li's life.

54. The TJ dates the incident to 926:5, after 29th June, the QG to 926:7. The sincerity of Taizu's reactions to the news borne by Yao Kun is doubted in a close comparative study of the texts for this incident by Yao Congwu, *Abaoji yu Hou Tang shichen Yao Kun huijian tanhua jilu*, *Wenshi zhe xuebao* (1953, repr. 1988), pp.315-37.

55. TJ 275:8993.

### Service after the death of Taizu

After the Shulü empress dowager ensured Taizong's succession in 926, the new emperor made Yanhui director of the department of administration, which was effectively a reappointment to the same job he had held under Taizu, now re-named (§37.)<sup>56</sup> The LS, which appears to have standardised titles in this case, observes that he continued to be director. It had said earlier that Taizu had only given him the post provisionally. The LS adds that Yanhui also received the honorific noble title of Luguogong 魯國公 (duke) in this period. The catalogue continues with notes of his service as an envoy to the Later Jin (§38.) It is likely that this was during Shi Jingtang's 石敬瑭 war with Later Tang in 936, or possibly shortly afterwards, but the outcome of the mission was evidently of insufficient consequence to appear in the records. That Yanhui could be sent to the Later Jin indicates how trusted he was in Liao, and despite his apparent pining for home, he made no attempt to stay in the south. The changed relationship between the Liao and the Central Plains following the foundation of Later Jin would have fulfilled Yanhui's stated aim of keeping the Kitan out of the south. Although this was perhaps not on the terms envisaged in Li Cunxu's time, Yanhui seems to have been satisfied, and neither is there any record of objections by him to the planned conquest of Jin in 943.

As well as serving as an envoy Yanhui was also *sansishi* 三司使 (state fiscal commissioner), continuing a line of work begun when he served as commissioner for finances for Liu Rengong.<sup>57</sup> The *sansishi* was the senior official, responsible to the central ministry of revenue, for the control and collection of taxation in the administrative district of the Southern Capital, Nanjing 南京.<sup>58</sup> That Yanhui was employed here shows that later rulers were following Taizu's lead in making use of the experience that Yanhui already had as a financial official. The capital Nanjing was the richest of the administrative districts of Liao<sup>59</sup> and it would be surprising if Yanhui's own remuneration did not benefit from this appointment.

To complete the list of Yanhui's appointments under Taizong, the QG biography says that while the empress was at court in the Huitong 會同 era (938-947) Yanhui served concurrently as *shumishi* 樞密使 (commissioner of the military secretariat) and *tongpingzhangshi* 同平章事 (jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat and

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56. See n.50.

57. See above p.109. The LS biography develops a picture of Yanhui as a financial administrator to an extent which may have required early notice of his abilities or experience in that field, hence the mention of a financial appointment in his youth.

58. LS 48:803, WF p.311.

59. WF p.311.

chancellery),<sup>60</sup> amongst the highest positions in the developing bureaucracy (§40.) The Shulü empress had first recommended him to Taizu and there is no reason to suppose that her regard for him had waned. The likelihood is that she ensured Yanhui's appointment to these senior posts through her influence over her son.<sup>61</sup>

Although the LS and QG give what appears to be a comprehensive list of the posts Yanhui held, how much real power he wielded in them is unclear. Nevertheless, something of his importance and seniority, at least within the bureaucracy, is suggested by an odd incident related in the XW (§39.) In this Zhang Li says that when Feng Dao came to confer decrees of investiture on the northern court, which must refer to the Jin mission of 938, he had bestowed only two official hats. From the details in the story, these hats evidently indicated the highest of official ranks, though below that of a prince. One hat had gone to Zhang Li and the other to Han Yanhui, whom Zhang Li calls *zaixiang* 宰相 (grand councillor).<sup>62</sup> The TJ lends further support to Yanhui's senior position by observing, under an entry for 938:7, c.31st August, that Yanhui was one of only two named Chinese ministers said to receive regular gifts from the Jin, alongside other recipients who were all members of the imperial clans (§41.)

The three earlier texts give no details of Yanhui's activities between 938 and his death in 959, but the LS fills in the account with a continuing list of posts. Yanhui appears to have become some kind of elder statesman, taking little active part in major events but continuing to work at setting up a Chinese-style administration. Under Liao Shizong 遼世宗 (947-951) he was *nanfu zaixiang* 南府宰相 (grand councillor of the southern administration) and is said to have established the *zhengshisheng* 政事省 (department of administration) and to have devised 'means of maintaining righteousness and to praise officials who exerted their utmost' (§42.) This means that he played an important part in the reorganisation of the Liao administration which followed the capture of the Later Jin capital of Bian 汴 in 947.<sup>63</sup> In 951:6 he was commanded to devise a ceremonial for conferring investiture decrees on the Northern Han in Hedong, and produced a ritual following that used in an earlier, similar situation, when Taizong granted Shi Jingtang his title as emperor of Jin in 937 (§43.) Yanhui is not recorded to have objected to this kind

60. The administrator post became a chief ministerial position in the Liao. See discussion in Chapter 4, p.150.

61. It is curious that the texts continue to show an association between Liao empresses and Chinese ministers. Towards the end of the tenth century the career of the third generation Liao Chinese minister Han Derang 韓德讓 benefitted from his association with the then empress to the extent that some historiographers hinted at a romantic link. See LS 82:1296.

62. XW 72:898, see Chapter 4 for details.

63. The Liao bureaucracy is scantily described in our sources. It was divided into a northern and a southern region (*mian* 面) and according to some scholars, the northern region was further subdivided into a northern and southern division (*yuan* 院.) (WF pp.435ff.) This view is challenged by Yang Ruowei, Qidan wangchao zhengzhi junshi zhidu yanjiu (Ph.D. diss. 1991), pp.128ff, who says that these apparent distinctions were simply alternative names for an administration split only into northern and southern and not subdivided.

of subordination of north China powers, or to policies which aimed to remove the incumbent Central Plains dynasty in order to replace it with a Liao ally. His pledge to protect the south from Liao incursions had been made over 20 years before. Given the benefits which must have accrued to Yanhui as a result of his seniority in Liao it is hardly surprising that he should become forgetful of promises to the southern regimes.

In the meantime he had forged new links in Liao. It is possible that Yanhui's position was more directly connected to the Shulü empress than the texts make immediately apparent. The LS tells us that Yanhui retired during the Yingli 應曆 era (951-968) (§44.) It may be that this coincided with the death of his long-time patron, the Shulü empress, now known as the Yingtian empress dowager 應天太后, in 953. In 947 she had attempted to prevent the accession of her grandson to be Shizong in favour of her choice of her third son. After this she was sent into exile at Zuzhou 祖州, the settlement attached to Taizu's tomb.<sup>64</sup> Han Yanhui does not appear to have been involved at all in the succession dispute. At the time of Taizong's death he could have been with the emperor, in the south, although we would expect this to be mentioned in his biography if it was the case, or he could have been at Shangjing 上京 running the Southern administration. He does not appear to have been tainted with suspicions of disloyalty as a result of the attempts to prevent Shizong from acceding, but he might nevertheless have felt the death of his old patron provided a good moment for his own departure from positions of power.

Yanhui died in 959, aged 77 (§45-48.) His death is also noted in the XW and QG, but he was not considered important enough, or the information was not available, for his death to receive a notice in the TJ. He was given a posthumous title as *shangshuling* 尚書令 (director of the department of state affairs), and was buried not in his native place, even though that was accessible, but at Luguo 魯郭, also in You. Presumably in recognition of his services, his descendants were given the literary post of Chongwen *linggong* 崇文令公 (manager of the Institute for the veneration of literature) which Yanhui had himself held earlier. His son, Deshu, had already received special permission to go east to visit his parents each year, and he was to go on to a creditable career of his own.<sup>65</sup>

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64. LS 5:63-4.

65. XW 92:890; QG 16:161; LS 74:1232.

Yanhui's complete absence from the JW may speak as much for his relative lack of contemporary importance as for lack of information.<sup>66</sup> If Yanhui was really considered as important at the time as the LS would like us to believe, we might reasonably expect him to be at least mentioned in the JW. Although he seems to have done little of real note until after he was detained in Liao, nevertheless he took part in enough incidents involving the north China regimes for us to expect at least one of them to have appeared in the dynastic history. Zhang Li's position was not as significant as the one claimed for Yanhui from the TJ onwards, although they apparently served together, but there is far more information on Li. Perhaps Sima Guang and his collaborators needed to write up somebody as the bringer of light to the 'barbarian,' a theme which it is likely that Ye Longli would want to follow. By the time the LS was finally compiled, it would be in the interests of the Mongol state to show as many Chinese as possible working as closely as possible, and as early as possible, with the Kitan to whom they were compared, so a character such as Han Yanhui would provide the regime with historical examples of early and willing collaboration. Yanhui's place in the record would thus have been assured, though maybe for different reasons to those behind his recovery from the oblivion to which the JW would have consigned him.

The clearest evidence we have of the kind of manipulation suggested appears when we compare the accounts of Yanhui in the QG and the LS. Of the 28 items of information on Yanhui in the QG, 17 have been transmitted to the LS, all but one to the biography. Of the missing 11, three are extra details while the remainder relate to five distinct incidents (these are struck through for easy reference in the table of parallel texts.) The last two of these, describing Yanhui's letter to Jin and his defence of Yao Kun, show a definite attachment to the south, as discussed above. The second and third, in which the prince of Jin offers Yanhui a job and Yanhui says that he misses his mother, are still related to Yanhui's association with the south, though less directly. The first shows Yanhui disagreeing strongly with his lord (Liu Shouguang), as does also the Yao Kun incident. This trait is stressed in the QG account but is absent from the LS version except in the form of Yanhui's initial lack of obeisance to Taizu. Hence it appears that the LS has omitted a number of incidents which might throw doubt upon Yanhui's loyalty to the Liao emperors, whether by his continued concern for the interests of the south or through his disagreements with the rulers.

That the LS gives reasons for Yanhui's flight appears to stress the incident and thus contradict the conclusion that has just been drawn. However, an event so important that it fills half of the earliest surviving account of Yanhui could hardly be ignored, and as

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66. There is, of course, a small possibility that Han Yanhui's biography was in the original JW, amongst that 10-20% of the work which did not survive the loss of the original text. However, it is reasonably certain that we do have the whole of the non-imperial biographies.

discussed earlier, the apparent emphasis is stressing not the escape itself but that the emperor is in no way responsible for it.

That the changes discussed were not made until the Yuan also indicates that whilst these issues were evidently a concern to the Mongol emperors, *they had not been matters of concern before that point*. It therefore seems reasonable to suggest that in the tenth century a much more tolerant view was taken of the question of loyalty and the changing of masters than was possible in the fourteenth, when the official record was finally completed. As a final curiosity, that record produces an overall picture of a Yanhui who lived up to his name, 'extending excellence' in the Liao administration, while the emphasis of the earlier sources on Yanhui's virtue and attachment to the south shows him 'extending honour.' The ambiguities in the meaning of Yanhui's name are echoed in the different interpretations placed upon his life.

**Table 2 - Han Yanhui: parallel texts**


<b>References</b>	LS	2:22; 47:774, 777, 782; 59:926; 71:1199, 1200; 74:1230, 1231-2 (biography); 75:1243 (commentary).
	QG	1:2, 6; 2:11; 13:138; 16:160-1 (biography, commentary)
	TJ	269:8810, 8811; 275:8989, 8993; 281:9188
	XW	72:890, 898
	JW	60:805
	CFYG	1000:11 (WDHY 29:455)
	Fengtian tong zhi	(1934, 1982) 102:2330b; 138:3179b
	LDN	2, 3, 4
	LSH	shang:14a
	LSJSBM	5:109-118
	LSSY	20:385

**Notes**



The table shows what information is found in which texts. Information is given in note form, but variant wording is used in an attempt to give some indication of the differences between texts. Where there is more than one version of an incident in the same text, all are given. Texts from left to right are in reverse order of completion.

The first line(s) of each item (in smaller type) show the time marker or place, either as in the text (with mistakes struck out), or where possible, more exactly.





The last line of each item (in smaller type) gives the *juan* reference and page number in the modern editions used here.


	LS	QG	TJ	XW
1	Cangming Anci, Youzhou 74:1231 biog	Youzhou 16:160 biog	Youzhou 269:8810	Youzhou 72:890 Kitan
2	father Mengyin prefect: Ji, Ru, Shun 74:1231 biog			
3	Rengong (c.895-907) talented, made Youdu <i>wenxue</i> , Pingzhou <i>lushi</i> <i>canjun</i> , <i>zhihou yuan</i> with Feng Dao, Youzhou <i>guancha</i> <i>duzhishi</i> 74:1231 biog			
4		Shouguang (c.907-913) <i>canjun</i> 16:160 biog		Shouguang (c.907-913) <i>canjun</i> 72:890 Kitan



	LS	QG	TJ	XW
5		<del>911</del> 907? Shouguang emp remonstrated, axe and block, Sun He killed, Yanhui escaped 16:160 biog		
6	Shouguang <i>shuai</i> (c.907-913) mission, emp angered at no obeisance, detained 74:1231 biog  Shouguang (c.907-913) asked for Kitan help, no obeisance, Taizu angered, detained 71:1199 Shulü biog	? Shouguang's later years asked Kitan for help, emp angered at no obeisance, detained 16:160 biog  ? Shouguang's later years <i>canjun</i> Yanhui asked for Kitan help, emp angered at no obeisance, detained 13:138 Shulü biog  (bef 913:12 (JW)) Kitan gained Yanhui 1:2 annals	? Shouguang's later years <del>916-12</del> (c.911-2) <i>canjun</i> Yanhui asked for Kitan help, emp angered at no obeisance, (detained) 269:8810	sent with respects to Kitan, no obeisance, Abaoji angered, detained, would not release 72:890 Kitan
7	pasturing horses 71:1200 Shulü biog	pasturing horses in wilderness 13:138 Shulü biog; 16:160 biog	pasturing horses in wilderness 269:8810	pasturing sheep and horses 72:890 Kitan
8		intelligence and tact, writings 1:2 annals; 16:160 biog	intelligence and tact, writings 269:8810	
9	Shulü admonished, grasps principles, virtuous person, why harass and dishonour 74:1231 biog  empress said, sticks to principles, virtuous person, employ with propriety 71:1200 Shulü biog	empress advised, can stick to principles, virtuous one of present age, why dishonour as herder, employ with propriety 13:138 Shulü biog; 16:160 biog	Shulü advised, can stick to principles, virtuous one of present age, why dishonour as herder, employ with propriety 269:8810	after long time Abaoji came to understand talents, 72:890 Kitan

	LS	QG	TJ	XW
10	<p>summoned, talked, took a liking, <i>canjun shi</i> 74:1231 biog</p> <p>summoned, talked, greatly delighted, <i>mouzhu</i> 71:1200 Shulü biog</p>	<p>summoned, talked, delighted, <i>mouzhu</i>, conduct sought after 16:160 biog</p> <p>summoned, talked, delighted, <i>mouzhu</i>, later famous minister 13:138 Shulü biog</p> <p>talked, delighted, <i>mouzhu</i>, conduct sought after 1:2 annals</p>	<p>summoned, talked, delighted, <i>mouzhu</i>, conduct sought after 269:8810</p>	<p>summoned, talked, amazed, <i>mouzhu</i> 72:890 Kitan</p>
11	<p>Dangxiang &amp; Shiwei, tribes to obedience 74:1231 biog</p>	<p>see below</p>	<p>see below</p>	<p>Dangxiang &amp; Shiwei, tribes obedient, planned this 72:890 Kitan</p>
12	<p>city walls, division markets &amp; houses, settled submitted Chinese, spouses, 'taught' agriculture, absconders few 74:1231 biog</p>	<p>urged establishment court, govt agencies, city walls, division markets and houses, deal with Chinese, spouses, abandoned fields, those fleeing fewer 1:2 annals; 16:160 biog</p>	<p>urged establishment court, govt agencies, city walls, division markets and houses, deal with Chinese, spouses, abandoned fields, those fleeing fewer 269:8810</p>	
13	<p>see above</p>	<p>subjugating tribes 1:2 annals; 16:160 biog</p>	<p>subjugating tribes 269:8810</p>	<p>see above</p>
14	<p>systematised national finances 59:926 zhi</p>			
15	<p>all things in early stages, responsible for organisation, establishment, codification 74:1232 biog</p>			
16	<p>estd customary regulations, set down records 75:1243 comm</p>			

	LS	QG	TJ	XW
17	after long time sad, missed home, poetry, fled to Tang 74:1231 biog	shortly afterwards (bef 913:12 (JW)) fled to prince of Jin 16:160 biog  shortly afterwards fled to Jin 1:2 annals	shortly afterwards bef <del>916:2</del> (913:12 (JW)) fled to Jinyang 269:8810	afterwards fled home, served Zhuangzong 72:890 Kitan
18	when fled Taizu dreamt of white crane & tent 74:1232 biog			
19		aft 908:2 prince of Jin wanted him in central post 1:2 annals; 16:160 biog	aft 908:2 prince of Jin wanted him in central post 269:8810	
20	Wang Jian quarrel, feared trouble, visited parents, Youzhou 74:1231 biog	<i>zhangshuji</i> Wang Jian detested him, uneasy, asked to visit mother 1:2 annals; 16:160-1 biog	<i>zhangshuji</i> Wang Jian detested him, uneasy, asked to visit mother 269:8810	Wang Jian spoke falsely against him, scared, asked to visit mother 72:890 Kitan
21	hid with Wang Deming, will return, not possible, smiled, like L & R hands 74:1231 biog	Zhending stopped with Wang Deming, must return, choose death? like hands & eyes 16:161 biog	Zhending stopped with Wang Deming, must return, choose death? like hands & eyes 269:8811	Changshan hid with Wang Deming, want to return, not possible, like eyes or hand & foot 72:890 Kitan
22		completed visit 16:161 biog	completed visit 269:8811	
23	returned unfilial, disloyal, heart remained 74:1231 biog	(bef 916:2) returned 1:2 annals; 16:161 biog	(bef 916:2) returned 269:8811	returned 72:890 Kitan
24	emp pleased Xialie meaning "come back" 74:1231 biog	emp pleased, come from heaven 16:161 biog	emp pleased, come from heaven 269:8811	emp pleased, come from heaven 72:890 Kitan
25		missed mother, emp slapped back 16:161 biog	missed mother, emp slapped back 269:8811	
26		(c.916) more generous treatment 1:2 annals; 16:161 biog	(c.916) more generous treatment 269:8811	

	LS	QG	TJ	XW
27	<p><i>shou zhengshiling</i>, Chongwen <i>guanda xueshi</i>, deciding all matters 74:1231 biog</p> <p>Taizu (c.916-926) <i>zhengshiling</i> 47:774 zhi</p> <p>Taizu (c.916-926) Chongwen <i>guanda xueshi</i> 47:782 zhi</p>	<p>Taizu emp (aft 916:2) chief minister, <i>zhongshuling</i> 16:161 biog</p> <p><i>xiang, zhongshuling, pingzhangshi</i> 1:2 annals</p> <p>later famous minister 13:138 Shulü biog</p>	<p>Taizu emp (aft 916:2) <i>xiang, zhongshuling</i> 269:8811</p>	<p>Abaoji usurped <i>xiang</i>, title of <i>zhengshiling</i>, Chongwen <i>linggong</i> 72:890 Kitan</p>
28		<p>letter via Taiyuan envoys, attachment, missing home, dreaded Wang Jian, mother pretext, Kitan will not govern South 16:161 biog</p>	<p>letter via Taiyuan envoys, attachment, missing home, dreaded Wang Jian, mother pretext, Kitan will not govern South 269:8811</p>	
29		<p>Tongguang 923-926 Kitan not deep into South due to Yanhui 16:161 biog</p>	<p>Tongguang 923-926 Kitan made no deep raids into South due to Yanhui 269:8811</p>	
30	<p>925 with emp v Bohai, Da Yinzhuang submitted 74:1231 biog</p>			
31	<p>Yinzhuang rebelled again with generals destroyed city 74:1231 biog</p> <p>all gens ordered v. Yinzhuang 74:1230 Kang Moji biog</p>			
32	<p>for merit made left <i>puye</i> 74:1231 biog</p>			

	LS	QG	TJ	XW
33	<p>926:3, 16 April with <i>yilibi</i> Kang Moji attacked Changling fu 2:22 annals</p> <p>with Kang Moji took Changling fu 74:1231 biog</p> <p>with Kang Moji subduing Changling fu 74:1230 Kang Moji biog</p>			
34	<p>return of army 74:1231 biog</p>			
35		<p>926:7 Kun reporting Zhuangzong's death, angers Taizu, Yanhui remonstrance saves him 1:6 annals</p>	<p>926:5, after 29 June Kun reporting Zhuangzong's death, angers Taizu, Yanhui remonstrance saves him 275:8989</p>	
36	<p>(926) death of Taizu 74:1231 biog</p>	<p>death of Taizu at Fuyu Shulü ensured Taizong's accession 2:11 annals</p>	<p>death Taizu 926:9, after 17 Oct Shulü ensured Taizong's accession 275:8993</p>	
37	<p>Taizong (c.926-947) Luguo gong, still <i>zhengshiling</i> 74:1231 biog</p>	<p>Taizong (c.926-947) made <i>zhengshiling</i> 2:11 annals</p>	<p>Taizong (c.926-947) made <i>zhengshiling</i> 275:8993</p>	
38	<p>Taizong (c.926-947) envoy to (Shi) Jin, <i>sansishi</i> 74:1231 biog</p>	<p>Taizong (c.936) Taizong assisted Shi Jin, obtained You and Yan 16:161 biog</p>		
39				<p>Taizong (c.937-947) Zhang Li and Yanshou's hat, Yanhui <i>zaixiang</i> and hat-wearer 72:898 Kitan</p>
40		<p>empress regency (c.938- 947) conc <i>shumishi</i> and <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 16:161 biog</p>		

	LS	QG	TJ	XW
41			938:7, c.31 Aug received regular Jin gifts 281:9188	
42	Shizong (c.947-951) <i>nanfu zaixiang</i> , estd <i>zhengshisheng</i> and righteousness 74:1231 biog			
43	951:6 ceremony for Hedong at emp's command 74:1231-2 biog			
44	(st.951-(959)) retired, Deshu had permission to go east each year 74:1232 biog			
45	959 died at 78 <i>sui</i> 74:1232 biog	after a few years died in Kitan 16:161 biog		later died in enemy lands 72:890 Kitan
46	959 emp grieved, posthumous <i>shangshuling</i> 74:1232 biog			
47	959 buried Lugu, Youzhou 74:1232 biog			
48	descendants Chongwen <i>linggong</i> 74:1232 biog			

## Chapter Four

### Zhang Li 張礪

Zhang Li held literary posts at the Later Tang court from the early 920's, serving as a secretary on the 925 Shu 蜀 campaign, and becoming a Hanlin academician 翰林學士. In 936 he was on the campaign against Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 and his Liao allies, and entered Liao as part of the defeated Tang army. The Liao employed him again as a Hanlin academician, but he tried to escape. After his recapture he served in increasingly senior court positions, and went on campaign against Later Jin in the 940's. When Liao Taizong died in 947, a Kitan nobleman with a grudge against Li threatened to kill him, and Li died the same evening.

The sources for the life of Zhang Li are particularly abundant, as Li has full biographies in three of the main sources used here: the LS, QG and JW, and receives fairly generous mention in the TJ. (See Table 3.) In fact, we almost have four biographies, because two different versions survive of the JW account. The first, and shorter, version is pieced together from passages in the YLDD and CFYG.<sup>1</sup> Although the Qing re-compilers of the JW believed that the YLDD contained the full version of the biography, in the palace edition they appended a second, slightly fuller, version to the first.<sup>2</sup> This fuller version (referred to here as the JW appendix) contains the sole JW account of much important information about Li, including his escape attempt and the confrontation preceding his death, but no sources are given for this extra material, save for a single section regarding Li's recommendation of titles for Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽.<sup>3</sup>

#### Early life in Liang and Taiyuan Jin

Zhang Li's given name means 'whetstone,' but his *zi* of Mengchen 夢臣 means 'dreaming of ministerial position.' We do not know when he was born, but he was from Fuyang 滎陽 in Cizhou 磁州 (Table 3, §1.) Although a good deal further south than Han Yanhui's 韓延徽 place of origin, by 907 frontier changes meant that although Cizhou was part of Later Liang, it was within 110 km of the border with Zhao 趙 and only 50km from the Taiyuan Jin border: Cizhou was still in a frontier region where much fighting took place. Li's family was well placed to take advantage of both central and provincial

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1. YLDD j.10,798 and 13,913; CFYG j.796.

2. JW 98:1319, n.7.

3. From the JW *kaoyi*.

opportunities, but the JW appendix says that Li's ancestors were farmers (§2), and gives no posts for either Li's father, Bao 張寶, or grandfather, Qing 張慶. Given that Li is a future official, it is said that when he was young he loved to study. The formula is personalised with a note that Li 'had poetic language' (§3.) The JW appendix also gives more specific information about the young Li, namely his early interest in legal matters, which led him to report to the local official residence on disputes he observed amongst the people (§4.) This probably made him known amongst the clerks, if not to the officials themselves, and may be how he got his break into the bureaucratic world.

The chance to start on the path of learning and an official career must have come when Zhang Li, presumably while hanging around the local *yamen*, met Li Yu 李愚. Li Yu was of a family of scholars and his biographies emphasise his talents and Confucian virtues.<sup>4</sup> According to Li Yu's JW biography, the 'provincial graduate (*juzi* 舉子) ...., Zhang Li, was sponsored by him' (§5.) As a farmer's son, to find such a sponsor was Li's only real hope of social advancement, and it must be assumed that it was chiefly Li Yu who funded Li's education. The association with Li Yu must already have lasted several years because of the time needed to study for the official examinations, and by the time we learn of the relationship it must be 913 or 914, 'when [Li Yu] was in his first court position' under Liang Modi. According to the strictures of Confucian morality, Li's bond to Li Yu should have been a strong, respectful and highly personal one. Not only does this appear to have been the case, but Li seems to have taken the sense of his obligations to his first sponsor into all his subsequent relationships with other patrons, of whom there were many. Li's sponsor was himself a person of upright character, providing a moral exemplar for his charge, and perhaps Zhang Li, as a new and enthusiastic arrival in the world of Confucian learning, was exhibiting the passion of the convert. Whatever the reason it is certainly for his principled living by Confucian standards that he is remembered in the texts.

It is therefore rather strange that the next reported action of Zhang Li is that during Zhenming 貞明 (915-921) he left Liang, and his sponsor, in order to pledge allegiance to the Shatuo Turk Li Cunxu 李存勖, the future Tang Zhuangzong 唐莊宗, currently ruler of the Taiyuan Jin and the implacable enemy of the Liang. It appears that Zhang Li made a conscious decision to change sides, and to a regime regarded as rebellious by the Liang. As he immediately received a post in the Taiyuan administration, such a move could well have seemed a sound career move for a young and ambitious provincial graduate. But this is not what the text is trying to tell us. The point of the notice of Zhang Li in somebody else's biography is to elevate the subject of that biography. In this case Zhang

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4. JW 67:890-4; XW 54:620-2. Zhang Li does not appear in the XW biography.



Li is an essential player because it is implied in the JW that it was largely due to his efforts that Li Yu was given a court post under Zhuangzong after 923 and the foundation of Later Tang. Li Yu's biographer tells us just exactly what we need to know about Zhang Li in order to make sense of events. Li has apparently abandoned, and possibly shamed, his erstwhile sponsor, who remained in Liang. But once Li was in Zhuangzong's service and clearly before the establishment of the Later Tang, Li 'circulated amongst the high and mighty, praising Yu's probity' and telling the 'northerners' (*beiren* 北人 - in this case it must mean the Later Tang court)<sup>5</sup> about Li Yu's writings, three of which are named (§6-7.)<sup>6</sup> In the meantime, Li Yu was exiled from the Liang court for speaking against Modi's 梁末帝 brother and was made *panguan* 判官 (administrative assistant) of Deng 鄧.<sup>7</sup> When Zhuangzong took the throne, Li Yu came to the new Tang court, probably with the other officials of Deng, and was restored to his old posts, including that of Hanlin academician.<sup>8</sup> It is questionable how much difference the intercession of a minor official like Zhang Li would have made to Li Yu's reemployment prospects under the new regime, which was likely to have taken him on anyway, but the point of the biography is that Li Yu was such a virtuous person that those he had helped were willing to speak up for him. As a by-product, the story also shows Zhang Li's personal loyalty to Li Yu. It is quite possible that Zhang Li's efforts were intended to secure an invitation from the Taiyuan regime to bring Li Yu over to them before the establishment of the Later Tang.

Despite his initiative in hobnobbing with the powerful, Zhang Li must still have been a young man of little consequence, for it was only in around 923 that he became a *jinshi* 進士 (§8.) Soon afterwards, and probably as a consequence of his graduation, he received a minor literati post as left *shiyi* 拾遺 (reminder, 8b1) with an additional posting to the History institute (*shi guan* 史館) (§9.) The reminders were responsible for searching out what the emperor forgot, with the intention of improving the records and thus benefitting the state. Whilst it was desirable that they should be wise, they were very junior, and so were under the direction of appropriate historiographers.<sup>9</sup> The History institute was, under the Tang, the office where information on events and the activity of the emperor was collected, mostly via reports from the various administrative bureaux, to

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5. This usage of the term reflects a fluidity in perceptions of ethnicity in this period which was not to last. See Chapter 9 for further discussion.

6. *Zhongni yu* 仲尼遇, *Yan Hui shou* 顏回壽, *Yi Qi fei e' ren* 夷齊非餓人. JW 67:892.

7. XW 54:621.

8. JW 67:892; XW 54:621.

9. Des Rotours, *Fonctionnaires*, pp.151-2 & n.

provide material for the compilation of each reign's *shilu* 實錄.<sup>10</sup> In both postings Li was working ultimately for the History institute, which could be a base for a high-flying career.<sup>11</sup> As it turned out, Li's promise was to be fulfilled in the Liao more than in the Wudai regimes.

### Service under the Later Tang

Nevertheless, Li's talent was quickly recognised. In the 925 Tang campaign against Shu, led by the prince Jiji 李繼岌, Zhang Li served with his old sponsor: Li Yu was *dutong panguan* 都統判官 (administrative assistant to the campaign commander)<sup>12</sup> and Li was *zhangshuji* 掌書記 (chief secretary) (§10), both senior bureaucratic positions on the army's staff. However, in Zhang Li's own JW biography the connection with Li Yu is not made<sup>13</sup> and Li is instead associated with Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜, the senior bureaucrat on the campaign. The JW biography says it was Chongtao's request that Li be given the chief secretaryship<sup>14</sup> in the army (perhaps at the recommendation of Li Yu, returning Li's favour), suggesting that Li had caught the eye of senior officials. Certainly by the time it came to writing the record of his life, it was in the interests of Li's image to posterity that he be connected with the most senior figure possible. The QG in some senses takes this to its logical extreme. In Zhang Li's biography, it is simply stated that 'when the Tang prince Jiji subjugated Shu, at this time (Li) was chief secretary.'<sup>15</sup>

The point of the JW biography mentioning Guo Chongtao in connection with Zhang Li is to show Li's virtue. After the successful campaign against Shu, Jiji, albeit reluctantly, agreed to the demands of the empress dowager to have Chongtao killed, on 926:1, 21st February.<sup>16</sup> Chongtao's retainers were afraid and fled, but Zhang Li went alone to Jiji's residence (where the killing had taken place) and wept outside for Chongtao (§11.) His point was doubtless to upbraid and embarrass Jiji for acceding to the murder of a senior official in this manner. Worse, Jiji had argued with his officials that he had no imperial warrant for the killing, but they had persuaded him that he should do it anyway and had then forged an imperial document to assuage the expected wrath of Mingzong 唐明宗. The JW comments that 'the people of that time {all} respected his

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10. Des Rotours, *Fonctionnaires*, p.199n. He includes a listing of several methods for conveying information to the *shi guan*.

11. Wang, *Chiu Wu-tai shih*, pp.19-20.

12. JW 67:892.

13. Li Yu's biographies also do not mention Zhang Li's presence in the staff.

14. Here called by the alternative name of *zhangjunshu* 掌軍書.

15. This is the first incident recorded in Zhang Li's QG biography.

16. JW 43:468, which says the incident took place at Xichuan 西川; TJ 274:8955.

[Zhang Li's] great righteousness.'<sup>17</sup> Li was fulfilling one of the functions of a good Confucian official: that of remonstrance with his lord over moral transgressions, regardless of personal danger. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, it was Guo Chongtao who had recommended Li's appointment to the army, so Li's relationship to Chongtao was similar to the one he had with Li Yu, and once again he was putting himself out to return favours received. In this regard we should note an error at this point in the QG,<sup>18</sup> which states that Zhang Li was under Jiji, and that it was Jiji who died and for whom Li mourned; Guo Chongtao is not even mentioned. It looks as though Ye Longli, who was trying to be as concise as possible, eliminated a key personality from a story he wished to retain, and thus distorted the factual accuracy of his work. Although the error is worthy of correction, the mistake in the object of Li's grief does nothing to diminish the point being made in the biography. In one sense, it does not much matter exactly who died, as in each case it is made clear that Li properly mourns the death of the person stated to be his master and potentially risks his life on a matter of principle.

The next incident is found in the JW appendix and is thus unsubstantiated by the YLDD or CFYG, although as a version also appears in the TJ we can be fairly certain that the ultimate source is reliable (§12-14.) It picks up the story after Chongtao's death, when Jiji was withdrawing his troops from Shu. Chongtao had been replaced by his deputy, the *fu zhaotaoshi* 副招討使 (deputy punitive commissioner) Ren Huan 任圜. Although Zhang Li had protested at Chongtao's murder he was nevertheless willing to accept a position under his successor, with whom we now find him returning east. When they reached Lizhou 利州, Kang Yanxiao 康延孝 rebelled in their rear. He was clearly to be taken seriously because the army under Ren Huan turned back to occupy Hanzhou 漢州, where they seem to have remained until receiving orders from Jiji to suppress the rebellion. It is Zhang Li who suggests setting an ambush of crack troops to the rear, baited by the rest of the army, to which Ren Huan agrees. The outcome of the story is couched in terms of hubris and virtue and strikes a blow for the military competence of literary types. We are told that Yanxiao was a good general and Ren Huan a Confucian scholar, and that when Yanxiao heard Huan had arrived and saw his own army achieving success, he advanced 'without inhibition,' only to be defeated by the righteous army with its Confucian commanders. Yanxiao was captured and appears to have travelled with the army as it resumed its homeward journey. They reached Fengxiang 鳳翔 on 19th May. The person in charge of Fengxiang, the *neiguan* 內官 (centrally-appointed official) Xiang

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17. This point is brought out explicitly by the Yuan editor Hu Sanxing. He observes Zhang Li's position as *zhangshuji* to Chongtao, thus making the connection that Li and Chongtao are in a master-servant relationship, and then says that history notes how dedicated Zhang Li was to his lord. TJ 274:8955.

18. This has not been picked up by the editors of the 1985 edition.

Yansi 向延嗣, took his orders from Zhuangzong, who ordered the execution of the rebel Yanxiao. However, one of the local generals, the *jianjun* 監軍 (army supervisor) Li Yanxi 李延襲, had heard news of the rebellion which was to bring the accession of Tang Mingzong, and detained Yanxiao in what appears to be protective custody. On closer inspection this seems to be interpreted as an attempt by Yanxi to steal the credit for Yanxiao's capture; the hint is the comment in the JW that 'it was also his intention to damage Ren Huan's merit.' Huan evidently could not decide what to do about Yanxi's action and it is Zhang Li's remonstrance which makes his mind up. Li argues,

This rebel stirred up disorder and so has caused a delay in the triumphant return of the army; now my lord has fought a bloody battle and captured the rebel, why go against orders and foster calamity? This destroying of the cage and releasing of the tiger will leave behind trouble for yourself. If you do not make a decision, I will personally kill this rebel.

And the text comments that Ren Huan 'had no choice but to execute Yanxiao.' In these circumstances Zhang Li's actions are seen to be completely justified in the interests of maintaining order in the state. The tale stands in contrast to that preceding, where he mourns the unjust execution of a good minister, and shows another side of Li's morality. He is still the fearless advisor of his superiors, but this time he is depicted as a necessarily ruthless suppressor of rebellion.

Essentially the same story is related by the TJ, which dates the events to 926:2, sometime after 12th April. However, the rebel is named as Li Shaochen 李紹琛.<sup>19</sup> The plan of action proposed by Zhang Li is identical in both accounts, as is the attitude of the rebel to the scholars leading the opposing army. After this, the TJ makes no more mention of Li until we find him on Zhao Yanshou's staff before Tuanboyu 團柏谷 and Li's arrival in Liao, discussed below.

In around 926, Mingzong, hearing of Li's reputation, made him a Hanlin academician (§15.) During early Tiancheng 天成, perhaps between 926 and 928, it is reported in the JW biography of Li Yi 李懌 that Zhang Li and Dou Mengzheng 竇夢徵<sup>20</sup> each composed a standard *fu* 賦 and *shi* 詩 to provide models for the candidates taking the *jinshi* exam (§16.) The *zhongshu* 中書 (imperial secretariat) had reported that they were lacking a number of *jinshi* and had requested the Hanlin academy to supply the standard poems required by the ministry of rites (*libu* 禮部.) Along with Mengzheng, Zhang Li evidently thought his skill at poetry was up to the mark, but the chief ministers of the secretariat thought otherwise. They 'did not consider them to be appropriate,' and so requested that Li Yi, another Hanlin academician, produce the exemplars. Li Yi, however, refused, on

19. This could not be confused with Kang Yanxiao through misreading, although transcription from a different part of the text is possible.

20. And possibly others: XW 55:638 says 'Dou Mengzheng, Zhang Li and others.'

the grounds that he had passed the *jinshi* only due to the kindness of others, and that his abilities were insufficient to set standards for the talents he expected to follow him. His statement shows honest recognition of his limitations, in contrast to the pretences of Li and Mengzheng, and thereby suggests the depths to which standards had fallen in preceding years. All these people were Hanlin academicians; they were supposed to be amongst the leading literati of the regime. Hence it is clear that Zhang Li's *jinshi* degree is not necessarily indicative of his actual abilities, but is rather a reflection of the desperate shortage of people wanting to take the examinations in the early 920's. The XW version of this story specifies in what way the efforts of Li and Mengzheng were inappropriate. They were 'unskilful,'<sup>21</sup> a change which only further emphasises the point of the story: that standards were low.

Not long after this Li's career was interrupted by the death of his parents (§17), mourning for which must have kept him out of active service for the next three years; he is being written up as too much of a Confucian to avoid this requirement of morality. The period of mourning must have expired around 931, at which time Li was restored to his position in the Hanlin, in conjunction with appointments as *libu* and *bingbu yuanwailang* 禮部兵部員外郎 (bureau vice-director in the ministry of rites and the ministry of war, probably 6b) whilst acting as *zhizhigao* 知制誥 (participant in the drafting of proclamations) (§19.)<sup>22</sup> Shortly after that, Li's father's concubine died, giving another opportunity for Li's Confucian virtues to be demonstrated (§20.) Li had evidently been very close to the concubine, to the extent that his children called her 'grandmother,' and he clearly felt for her as if she were one of his parents, but he was unsure of his position in terms of Confucian morality. Consultation with his colleagues brought no response, so Li returned to Fuyang on a pretext and, although he did not practise official mourning, lived a life of retirement for three years. This was apparently approved of by those who knew him. This extreme filial behaviour contributes to the JW's portrait of Zhang Li as a highly moral individual, but it is not carried over into the later texts: it was too tangential to the main action to warrant inclusion in either the XW or the TJ, which effectively removed it from consideration for the QG and probably the LS. During Qingtai 清泰 (934-936) Li was again restored to his Hanlin academician position, along with his drafting appointment, and was promoted to *shangshu bibu langzhong* 尚書比部郎中 (director of the bureau of review in the ministry of justice in the department of state affairs, 5b) (§21.)

21. Cf. the comment on Li's 'poetic language' in the JW biography, noted above, p.136.

22. The functions of the latter post gave the holder greater access to high-level affairs than the concurrent rank might suggest. From the annals (§18) we have a precise date for the appointment: 931:11, 25th December, which adds the function of *qiju lang* 起居郎 (imperial diarist) but omits the ministry of rites appointment.

It may be significant for the historiography of the reconstructed JW text that from this point most of the story is also found in one or more of the other three main sources. This is largely because the LS and QG understandably show little interest in Li's Wudai career. However, it should be noted that after the account of Li's conduct of mourning, the two versions of the JW biography diverge completely, (§21ff.) and it is the information in the appendix which is picked up by the later texts. The final section in the first version, taken from the CFYG, is known to contain mistakes,<sup>23</sup> and is somewhat anomalous. The text notes baldly that Li became Hanlin academician to the 'ruler of the barbarians (*rongwang*) 戎王' (§26), which we know happened around 937, and then jumps ten years. Li is said to have lived with the Kitan 'within the Nansong pass 南松門' (§32), that is, on the Kitan side, and appears to have been deeply involved in official affairs there:

there were several interwoven strands to his official duties; in many cases he lit one candle after another during discussions [i.e. worked long into the night], without giving any appearance of being tired.

There follows a description of the things abandoned at the roadside when the Liao left Bian for the north, with a note that the junior officials were also left behind, but this appears to have no bearing upon Li at all. The final sentence brings us back to Li with the observation that on the day he died his personal effects amounted to no more than household goods, bringing him praise from those who knew him (§54.)

### Arrival in Liao

Where the first version of the JW biography simply observes that 'Li became Hanlin academician to the ruler of the barbarians,' the second version gives the background to this change of master (§22-26.)

When Gaozu [Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭, founder of Later Jin] arose (in rebellion) at Jinyang 晉陽, Tang Modi 唐末帝 ordered Zhao Yanshou to advance and suppress (him), and also ordered the Hanlin academician He Ning 和凝 to go along together with Yanshou. Li had always regarded Ning lightly, considering that he could not achieve anything, and for this reason he requested that he personally go along; Tang Modi was ill and allowed him to go. When the Tang army was defeated at Tuanboyu, he fell into the hands of the Kitan along with Yanshou; the Kitan put him in harness in his old appointment....

Shi Jingtang rebelled against Tang Modi in 936. With Kitan assistance, Jingtang defeated the Later Tang punitive army under Zhang Jingda 張敬達, and laid siege to him and his forces in Jin'an zhai 晉安寨, just to the south of Taiyuan-Jinyang. Zhao Yanshou was sent to reinforce the relieving army under Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞, and Zhang Li was the administrative assistant on Yanshou's staff.

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23. Editorial note, JW 98:1314.

Zhang Li's disparaging attitude to He Ning seems on the surface to show Li's confidence in his own abilities and willingness to take on the responsibilities that his judgement of others demanded. However, given He Ning's reputation for scholarship,<sup>24</sup> Li's objection to Ning is a further example of Li's elevated opinion of himself. The exact reasons why Li was allowed to go on the expedition are obscured by ambiguous wording. Although *wei* 慰 is translated as 'ill' above, following the prince Chongmei's 李重美 reference to Modi's 'eye illness,'<sup>25</sup> *wei* could also mean 'depressed,' which would fit with the account of Modi's state of mind shortly after the appointment of Yanshou (and presumably his staff) on 12th October, when he is said to have retreated into drink and singing laments.<sup>26</sup> Either way it seems there was a lack of enthusiasm for Zhang Li's appointment. In contrast, the XW account says that Li was sent to 'oversee' Yanshou's taking his army to Tuanbo. This makes sense as a reflection of the suspicions at court over the intentions of the Zhaos,<sup>27</sup> and is a reminder that whilst Zhang Li's pretensions to scholarship might have inclined him to arrogance, he had nevertheless demonstrated his capacity for various kinds of loyal behaviour, and could perhaps therefore be entrusted with keeping an eye on a potential rebel. It is also possible that Tang Modi had thought about what might happen to his 'plant' if Yanshou did turn treacherous, and considered that it would be preferable to lose Li rather than He Ning. On the other hand, although Li's post of administrative assistant was the most senior bureaucrat on a governor's staff, and although in this case Li had technically been appointed by the emperor, in practice his ability to operate according to court rather than Zhao orders would have been severely limited, as we can see from Dejun's lack of response to repeated edicts, direct from court, urging him to advance.<sup>28</sup>

In any case, Zhang Li's appointment meant he would have been present when the Zhaos met up at Xitang 西湯<sup>29</sup> on 22nd November. Their combined forces encamped at Tuanboyu and did not move for over a month, until Jin'an fell and the Zhaos surrendered along with their armies. One has to wonder why the virtuous Zhang Li did not give any 'correct' moral advice (as viewed with hindsight) in this case. Shi Jingtang was clearly rebelling against the recognised central authority in north China, namely Tang Modi, and furthermore had enlisted the aid of a foreign power in his quest for the throne. Surely an

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24. As seen in his biographies: JW 127:1671-4; XW 56:639-40. The pictures given here can be tested against his surviving writings in eg. QWDSB 11:191-9.

25. TJ 280:9150.

26. TJ 280:9152, which also supplies the date. Various other meanings of *wei* could also fit the context, but two ambiguities are sufficient to make the point.

27. Discussed further in Chapter 5.

28. TJ 280:9153.

29. Ibid; the JW gives Xitang dian 西唐店.

upright official should have been urging Yanshou and Dejun to advance upon the rebels as quickly as possible? And if Zhang Li really had been appointed to ‘oversee’ Yanshou, surely he would have even greater obligations to argue with Yanshou for the proper course of action? The situation was, however, confused by the contact between Zhao Dejun and the Liao emperor, from whom Dejun was hoping to gain the position of emperor of the Central Plains soon to be held by Shi Jingtang. This effectively made Dejun almost as much of a rebel as Jingtang; the only difference was that Dejun pursued his ambitions in a less obvious manner. However discreet Dejun was, Zhang Li’s official position made it unlikely that he would not have noticed Dejun’s contacts with the Liao camp. Although Dejun might have been able to send the odd messenger secretly, at one point it is said that Yanshou himself went as an envoy, bearing generous gifts, and this would have been hard to conceal.<sup>30</sup> It may be that Li did give sound Confucian advice and that no notice was taken of it, although advice approved of by the historiographers but not followed at the time is often placed in biographies to show just the qualities which Zhang Li is said to have had. If Li really was the good Confucian he is depicted as being, he must have been in a terrible dilemma over what it was morally right for him to do. His ultimate loyalty should have lain with Tang Modi, but his immediate master was probably of more significance to him. We should also not forget that he had already transferred his own allegiance once, from Liang Modi to Tang Zhuangzong, so a move of this kind was not unprecedented. Being with the army led by the Zhaos, Zhang Li was in the spot where everything was happening in 936. Perhaps he saw advantages to his own career of a change of master at this point. If he did, he was right, for he rose fast under the Liao.

The phrase used by the JW biography for his arrival in Liao is *xian yu* 陷于, which means either ‘fell into the hands of’ or ‘was beguiled into.’ It is one of the phrases commonly associated with the arrival of the Zhaos in Liao. If Yanshou ‘fell into the hands of’ the Kitan, then any officials with him in his entourage might be expected to pass over in the same way. There seems to be a difference between this and ‘captured,’ *huo* 獲, *qin* 擒, etc), and it is this which confirms our classification of Zhang Li as crossing under duress (see Table 1, #57.) The TJ observes simply that Li ‘entered (*ru* 入)’ Liao together with Yanshou and was restored to his position of Hanlin academician, while the QG says that Zhang Li ‘followed (*sui* 隨)’ Zhao Dejun in coming over to the Kitan. The LS, however, does not mention here that Li came over in company with one of the Zhaos, and it also uses as a time marker not their surrender, or the defeat of their army, but the defeat of Zhang Jingda four days beforehand. Given the clarity of the connection between Zhang Li and the Zhaos in the other sources, it could be that the LS

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30. TJ 280:9155.



compiler has made a choice here. Either the compiler felt that Jingda's surrender was better known, and therefore more effective as a marker, or he was keeping the Zhaos out of this, perhaps in order to protect Li from association with them.

Given that Li had shown on other occasions his willingness to hold out for principle, we might think it more likely that he would be amongst those Chinese literati who crossed to Liao but then refused to serve them.<sup>31</sup> In fact, the Kitan 'put [Li] in harness in his old appointment and he served in successive posts....' Evidently he was not unwilling to serve, and this may be the key, for we have yet to see Zhang Li turning down a job. His move from Liang to Taiyuan, and his acceptance of a post under a replacement after the murder of Chongtao, both give some indication that whatever personal risks he might be driven to take, his desire for employment held primacy, perhaps as part of a struggle to escape his farming origins; his *zi*, after all, meant 'dreaming of ministerial position.' Hence, whilst his crossing to Liao clearly happened under severe limitations to choice, at some point Zhang Li must have made the pragmatic decision to take the job he was offered.

In terms of his bureaucratic career, this would almost certainly have been to his immediate advantage. As illustrated in the case of Han Yanhui, it seems that the Kitan suffered from a shortage of officials to run their Chinese administration, and that those who joined them were almost guaranteed at least their old position and the possibility of swift promotion. This could have made service under the Liao more attractive for an official like Zhang Li. Such a phenomenon would also fit into a wider pattern of shortage of officials suffered by many regimes during the Wudai, as seen in the story of the model poems discussed above. As that incident stresses the low standards of the time, it is perhaps a backhanded compliment when the XW, reporting Li's arrival in Liao in the Kitan section, says that 'Deguang regarded his learning,' and kept him on as a Hanlin academician.<sup>32</sup> Sources after the XW omit the stories which could cast doubt on Li's abilities, and both the LS and the QG biographies observe at this point Zhang Li's straightforwardness and willingness to speak his mind, and say that he was employed by the Liao emperor because of them. The qualities which Taizong is said to have observed in Li are conventional Confucian virtues of the format often to be found at the beginning of biographies. Placing the note about them here gives Taizong the credit for noticing and employing them, and thus shows him practising the conventional imperial virtue of recognising and making use of talent.

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31. Meng Guangyao, *Shilun Liaodai Hanzu rushi de 'huayi zhi bian' guannian*, *Beifang wenwu* 1990:4, p.63; citing tomb inscriptions: QLW j.9, 11, for Wang Ze 王澤, Meng Youfu 孟有孚, Shi Xunzhi 史洵直.

32. It also implies a low standard of learning at the Liao court.

### The escape attempt

Shortly after Zhang Li's arrival in Liao he attempted to escape back to the south (§27-28.) The incident appears in all the sources, and is the only incident which survives into the gazetteers, the *Shengjing tongzhi* 盛京通志 and *Fengtian tongzhi* 奉天通志.<sup>33</sup> The story appears at the end of the JW account:

When he first fell into the hands of the Kitan he had turned his back on the Kitan and returned south, but he was apprehended by pursuing cavalymen. The ruler of the Kitan was angry and said, 'Why did you abandon me and leave?' Li said, 'Li is a *hanren* 漢人 and (Chinese) clothes and food and drink are different to those here; living like this I might as well be dead and I request that (I) may swiftly feel the edge of the knife.' The ruler of the Kitan looked round at the interpreter Gao Tangying 高唐英 and said, 'I have often cautioned all of you to treat this person exceptionally well; that if he was caused to flee the fault would lie with all of you.' As a result he had Tangying given a beating of a hundred strokes: this was how the ruler of the Kitan treated people exceptionally well.

The main point of the story is to further illustrate Li's value to the emperor, hence it is at this point that the TJ adds, and the QG annals reiterate, their observations of Li's straightforwardness and outspokenness. Li's value to Taizong is emphasised because rather than punishing Li, the emperor turns on the interpreter (*tongshi* 通事) Gao Tangying<sup>34</sup> and blames him for allowing Li's flight to happen. Taizong makes it clear that Gao had been responsible for the good treatment of Li and it is now therefore his fault that Li has been unhappy enough to attempt escape. Gao's punishment is a beating; Li is pardoned.<sup>35</sup>

There is another element to this story, focussing around Li's explanation for his flight and the changes it undergoes in successive texts. The JW version:

'Li is a *hanren*, and (Chinese) clothes and food and drink are different to those here; living like this I might as well be dead and I request that (I) may swiftly feel the edge of the knife.'

is repeated in the TJ and twice more in the QG.<sup>36</sup> The XW version is condensed, as we might expect, but retains the essentials of Li's complaint:

'I am originally a *hanren*, and (Chinese) clothes, food and drink, and language are different to those here; now I think of my homeland but cannot get (there), living like this I might as well be dead.'

33. *Fengtian tongzhi* 221:7b (p.4702b), which says the *Shengjing tongzhi* (90:7b), is the same.

34. The TJ and LS give Yanying 彦英, and the QG editors have corrected from Tangying to Yanying; hence I call him Gao.

35. This half of the story raises another set of issues. There were clearly already Chinese in Liao who were in a position to act as interpreters. In the TJ, the Yuan editorial note attached to this story explains that the interpreter was a position created to improve communications between the peoples. They were not simply fluent in the appropriate languages, they also seem to have acted as cultural intermediaries. In terms of this latter function, Gao (and his staff) had failed badly in their duty and perhaps in their understanding.

36. There is slight rewording and some detail is omitted.

All these accounts convey essentially the same point: that Zhang Li, complaining about the food, was suffering desperately from culture shock. If he had made it to the south, Li would have had to serve the Later Jin, who now ruled the Central Plains, but it is implied that he would have been happier to do this than to stay in Liao. In the LS, however, Li's reply is,

'I am not used to the local customs of the north, to the food and drink or to the living accommodation, so my thoughts are often pent-up with unhappiness, and it is simply for this reason that I fled.'

This version is as close to its predecessors as they are to each other, except that, 407 years after the events took place, the record of what Li is supposed to have said, a record of apparently spoken words, has been completely rewritten. The clear statement of ethnic self-identity of the earlier texts is omitted, even though what comes before and after the speech is effectively untouched.

We cannot reject the possibility that this was entirely deliberate. Although the final compilation of the LS was done in a great hurry, this change was still made to a biography which otherwise follows its immediate source very closely. The difference in the recording of the incident is the precise omission of that, and only that, which could have offended the Mongol emperors, who might take exception to any suggestion that the value placed upon a Chinese official by his non-Chinese lord should not be positively reciprocated. Hence it may suggest that the LS compilers did not want service to a non-Chinese master to be regarded as anything out of the ordinary. That the change is made emphasises that the official historiographers from the early Northern Song and right through both Song dynasties, were conscious of an ethnic identity amongst the Chinese, which was specifically linked with cultural differences related to the obvious variations in food and drink as well as to the differences in dress observed in the classics.<sup>37</sup> That consciousness must surely have remained during the Mongol regime, or otherwise there would have been no need to change the reference to it. Whatever the case for the Yuan, it is clear that Li identified himself as a Chinese, yet as we shall see, this did not prevent him from giving ten years of faithful service to his new, non-Chinese masters. The significance of this will be suggested in Chapter 9.

### At the Liao court in Bianzhou 汴州, 947

Probably within a year after this incident Li was restored to the position of Hanlin academician, this time with the position of *chengzhi* 承旨 (recipient of edicts), which

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37. For instance, in the story of Guan Zhong 管仲 (*Lunyu* 14:16-17), who is praised for saving the Chinese from having to fasten their clothing on the left; a practice said to characterise the 'barbarians.' The LS replaces the reference to clothing with one to housing (or everyday life), perhaps reflecting Mongol sensitivities to this ancient distinguishing mark.

gave him a supervisory role over other academicians. In his JW biography it says that Li was then successively promoted up to up to *libu shangshu* 吏部尚書 (minister of the ministry of personnel, 3a) (§29.)<sup>38</sup> This unremarkable progress is matched by Li's complete disappearance from all the sources for the next ten years.

He resurfaces in 946 because he was in the imperial campaign retinue at the end of the Liao-Jin war, when he offered the emperor some advice quoted in the TJ (§32):

Today Great Liao has gained the *tianxia*, and as for the military and civil posts of the Middle Kingdom, it is proper to employ people of the Middle Kingdom in them, it is not proper to employ northerners [*beiren*] and the intimates and favourites of the emperor. If government orders are contradicted or neglected, then the hearts of the people will not be obedient and even though (you) have obtained (control over) them (now), you could still lose them in future.<sup>39</sup>

Despite Li's value to Taizong being made much of earlier in the TJ, the emperor on this occasion ignores Li's advice. Given that the TJ tends to emphasise Li's virtues, it is no surprise when his prediction comes true, and Taizong, having appointed the Kitan Xiao Han 蕭翰 as his vicegerent (*liushou* 留守), does indeed lose the hearts of the people, and is forced to withdraw north less than six months after the triumphant entry into Bian. The TJ version of the story is simply another case of a virtuous official being disregarded by his ruler, then vindicated by events, but it was not allowed to remain so unexceptional in the sources which drew upon it.

In the TJ Zhang Li's advice is placed shortly after the surrender of the last Jin armies under Du Chongwei 杜重威, and shortly before the surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze 張彥澤 is sent with an advance party to take Bian for the Liao. The TJ goes on to relate that after he had taken the city with scarcely a blow being struck, Yanze allowed his troops two days of savage plunder.<sup>40</sup> However, the biographies of Zhang Li in the LS and QG both describe plundering by Kitan generals, and this incident is placed before Li's advice (§31):

When Taizong entered Daliang 大梁 [Bian], there was one time when some of the foreign [*fan* 番] generals let loose their perverse cruelty, indulging (themselves) in killing and slaughter, and (people) such as Xiao Han, Mada 麻答,<sup>41</sup> Yelü Langwu 耶律郎五 and their like allowed their soldiers to kill and plunder to an even worse extent. [Zhang] Li advised Taizong saying, ....

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38. According to the LS and QG, he received both his old academician position and the personnel posting in 938. As Zhang Li held these same positions when we next hear of him nearly ten years later in 946, the LS and QG give the impression of a prolonged spell in the same jobs. If this were the case it would indicate a lack of promotion speaking for a very serious lack of ability on Li's part. As this is not the overall impression given in either text, it is probable that Ye Longli made a mistake, which was then transmitted into the LS.

39. There is an abbreviated version in the original JW biography: '(Since) these barbarians (*hu* 胡) use this kind of military strategy and tactics, how can they control the capital for long?'

40. TJ 285:9322. Yanze was subsequently executed for this by Liao Taizong (§33.)

41. Han was a member of the Liao imperial consort clan, Mada was a cousin of Taizu and was also known as Yelü Balide 耶律拔里得.

This changed order of events thus implies that it was the plundering - by Kitan nobles - which provoked Li to offer his advice on the undesirability of having northerners govern the newly conquered lands. The linkage has the effect of showing a Zhang Li concerned for his homeland and trying to defend it against the ravages of foreigners, and contributes to the QG portrayal of his great virtue which is then carried forward into the LS.

A few days later, on 2nd February, Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou are noted in the JW and TJ as promoting the career of Li Song 李崧 by recommending him for his talent (§36-37.) They had apparently already praised this to Taizong to the extent that the emperor was delighted to meet Song, and immediately gave him the post of *taizi taishi* 太子太師 (grand preceptor of the heir apparent, usually 1b) acting as *shumishi* 樞密使 (commissioner of the military secretariat, 1b.)<sup>42</sup> According to Li Song's biography, Taizong comments to his officials that in his conquest of the southern court, Li Song is his only gain. Zhang Li had served together with Li Song for many years. On the Shu campaign of 925-6, whilst Li was administrative assistant to Guo Chongtao, Song held the same position under the prince Jiji. Zhang Li was a Hanlin academician from around 926, and Song joined him in the academy in around 933-4. It appears likely that Song's sponsor was Fan Yanguang 范延光, because in the period when Yanguang was one of the commissioners of the military secretariat in Later Tang, Song was appointed to a clutch of literary positions. Yanguang's co-commissioner for much of the time was Zhao Yanshou, which probably explains the latter's interest in Song's career. This incident reads as another example of Zhang Li's virtue in working on behalf of those with whom he has past associations. Given Li Song's many literary appointments under Later Tang, it is likely that he had the talent that Zhang Li probably lacked. Thus it is rather odd - or exceptionally virtuous - for Li to petition for Song's promotion over Li's head. On the other hand, there is the possibility that Li and Yanshou were recruiting Song for a particular purpose, as seen in the following story.

With Li Song now very senior in the administration as commissioner of the military secretariat, he was in a position to return the favour which had brought his appointment, and he found himself requesting the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom for Zhao Yanshou (discussed in Chapter 5) (§39.) Evidently it was considered most efficacious that Li Song should make the request on Yanshou's behalf, but after the failure of this attempt, it was Zhang Li who proposed that Yanshou be given a series of four posts, one can only assume as consolation for not getting the imperial title he desired. The emperor clearly thought that this was too much, for 'he read the proposal, took tight hold of his brush and crossed out, refusing to accept them' the last two of the posts Li had

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42. According to JW 137:1835, he was made *xi ting shumishi* 西廳樞密使, a variant name for the post.

suggested. However, Taizong did give Yanshou's son, Kuangzan 趙匡贊, the senior regional post of Hezhong 河中 *jiedushi*. It is clear that by this time, ten years after his arrival, Li holds whatever position he has in his own right, and no longer needs the sponsorship of a senior figure such as Zhao Yanshou. Yet in making the proposal he did, Zhang Li seems to be demonstrating a degree of loyalty to his old master Yanshou. Indeed, the story virtually reiterates the loyalty to his immediate master that Li had shown in working to obtain an appointment under the Later Tang for Li Yu. In both cases we might have cause to reflect upon Zhang Li's evident persuasiveness and his considerable ability in working situations not only to his own advantage but also to that of others, on which we shall shortly comment further.

Although individual sources each provide a clear sequence of what happened around the Liao entry into Bian, once one compares texts the exact dating and order of events becomes unclear. It was around this time that Zhang Li received a number of posts about which the sources also do not agree, but which seem to have included a chief ministerial position. There are two sets of dates (§35, 40.) In the Kitan section of the JW and in the LS annals, it says that Li was made *zaixiang* 宰相 (grand councillor) (JW) or *pingzhangshi* 平章事 (manager of affairs) (LS) on 31st January, while his own JW biography and the remaining sources describe his promotion to be right *puye* 僕射 (vice-director of the department of state affairs), and concurrently *menxia shilang* 門下侍郎 (vice-director of the imperial chancellery, 3a) and manager of affairs.<sup>43</sup> The TJ dates this set of appointments to about 22nd March.

The position of manager of affairs was originally given in the Tang, to provide the emperor with chosen advisors who nevertheless did not hold any of the top posts in the *shangshu* 尚書 (department of state affairs), *zhongshu* 中書 (imperial secretariat) or *menxia* 門下 (imperial chancellery), as these were often kept vacant to guard against ministers acquiring too much power.<sup>44</sup> The Liao adopted the post from the Wudai regimes, and it appears that it came to carry the responsibilities of a grand councillor.<sup>45</sup> Accordingly, it seems reasonable to suppose that the grand councillorship mentioned by the JW was in fact this same post of manager of affairs. As to the discrepancy in dates, the Kitan section in the JW notes that on 31st January, 947, Taizong came to live in the palace in Bian and assigned posts to both old and new officials in the newly conquered

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43. The JW omits vice-director of the imperial chancellery, and makes him *da xueshi* 大學士 (grand academician) of the Jixian dian 集賢殿 (Academy of scholarly worthies) instead.

44. Des Rotours, *Fonctionnaires*, p.916.

45. Yang, *Qidan zhengzhi zhidu*, pp.150-2. She cites only the eleventh-century travelogue of Yu Jing 余靖 as her evidence for the functions of the manager of affairs, so it is possible that in the tenth century the post was not yet in its mature form.

lands.<sup>46</sup> Amongst the appointments were grand councillorships not only for Zhang Li, but perhaps ironically, also for the person Li had not trusted to manage the relief of Jin'an: He Ning. These appointments are followed, over three weeks later, by a further court ceremony for receiving the congratulations of all the officials, at which Zhang Li must also have been present, and it would seem that Liao Taizong held court in Bian regularly until his departure for the north on 10th April. The compilers clearly condensed records of court sessions which stretched across both dates, and their decisions have led to the confusion between 31st January and 22nd March as the date of Zhang Li's promotion. The only thing which really matters is that his appointments were made at the Liao court of occupation in the Central Plains.

A further incident at court illustrates the strong position of Zhang Li, and of his ally Zhao Yanshou (§34.) The story is found in the Kitan section of the XW, and is related retrospectively as part of the thumbnail biography of Zhang Li which follows the notice of his promotion.

(When) Deguang 德光 was about to hold court [in 947], the [ritual] officials gave Yanshou a hat with the marten tail and cicada wing ornaments of an imperial prince or one of the three dukes, (and gave) Li the robes and hat of the third grade; Yanshou and Li were both unwilling to wear them. Yanshou instead had made a king's hat in order to distinguish himself. Li said, 'When I was in the upper kingdom, the Jin sent Feng Dao 馮道 to confer decrees of investiture on the northern court [938], (and) Dao bestowed two of these marten tail and cicada wing hats: one for the grand councillor Han Yanhui to wear, and one ordered to be worn by me. Am I now going to wear something of lesser rank!' and in the end, he wore the marten tail and cicada wing hat to attend court.<sup>47</sup>

When Li says that he shares the privilege of wearing this kind of hat only with Han Yanhui, Li implies that he also shared Yanhui's leading position in the bureaucracy, and had done so since 938; a claim which is not borne out anywhere else, including in the rest of the XW itself. More importantly, the positioning of the account is by way of expansion upon Li's promotion, and shows that there had been an earlier attempt to devalue Li and Zhao Yanzhou. This provoked their sartorial defiance, and it is implied that this protest was what led Taizong to promote Li. The story thus gives an extraordinary picture of Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou being able to manipulate the emperor and go against his wishes with impunity, even as he was apparently trying to control them. This invites further exploration of the relationship Taizong had with his Chinese ministers, but this cannot be tackled here.

It is worth observing that this Kitan section in the JW refers to Li as 'the Hanlin academician recipient of edicts who had come north' (*bei lai Hanlin xueshi chengzhi*

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46. JW 137:1835.

47. Abridged in LSJSBM 5:116, where the account is followed not by anything explaining the incident, but by several long passages detailing the dress to be worn on different occasions by emperor and officials. Version from *Hong jian lu* 宏簡錄 (also found in DDSL) quoted in LSJSBM 12:289.

北來翰林學士承旨。)<sup>48</sup> The effect of this is to identify him as somebody who had originally served one of the north China regimes and then entered service with the Liao. As it is not clear why it should be desirable to point this out, it is possible that the phrase *bei lai Hanlin xueshi chengzhi* was some kind of tag used to refer to Zhang Li at the time, perhaps analogous to the Kitan name given to Han Yanhui after his return to Liao.

### On the Liao retreat north, 947

The XW and TJ record that the emperor Taizong, on his homeward journey and accompanied by several tribal and Chinese ministers including Li, saw for himself the cities laid waste by the recent war (§42.) He says,

‘Bringing the Middle Kingdom to this state of affairs is all the fault of the prince of Yan 燕王 [Zhao Yanshou.]’ He turned to Zhang Li saying, ‘You also were instrumental in this.’

Taizong argues that it is partly Li’s fault simply because he had gone south with Yanshou. The implication is that Li, as a Confucian present in the military command, should have prevented as much damage as he could. This is particularly telling when set against the report earlier in the TJ (though not in the XW) of Li’s advice to use Chinese to govern the Middle Kingdom, on the grounds that they stood less chance of losing the hearts of the people. Now Taizong, withdrawing north as the Middle Kingdom was rising against him, turns Li’s argument against him by blaming Yanshou and Li - Chinese both - for the war. In the XW this incident ties in with the negative appraisal implied in the story of Li’s ‘unskilful’ poetry, but in the TJ it comes from an account which tends to stress Li’s usefulness to his Liao master. Considering the even more positive pictures of Li found in the LS and QG, it is perhaps no surprise that this event does not appear in those texts.

The record of Liao Taizong’s death found in the LS annals may well be more significant to Zhang Li than appears at first sight, because this is the only source to make it clear that Li was with the emperor when the emperor died (§43-45.) So according to the LS, this means firstly that Li is amongst those who could have received Taizong’s last will and testament, and secondly that he is dissociated from Zhao Yanshou and his claim to the throne.<sup>49</sup> We know from the other sources that the new Liao emperor Shizong 世宗 blames nobody but Yanshou for the insurrection, and pardons all those in Yanshou’s retinue (save in the XW, where Li is chief amongst those removed from office) (§46-47.) Li’s most important part, however, is as the main person to whom Shizong addresses his remarks on these events (§46, 48.) In the XW, TJ and QG, though not in the LS, it is Li to whom Shizong initially explains himself, and again Li to

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48. So does Zhao Yanshou’s JW biography. JW 98:1312.

49. See Chapter 5.



whom Shizong speaks the following day (24th May), when he holds the ceremony confirming his new status as emperor. On this occasion,

laughing, he spoke to Zhang Li and the others saying, 'If the prince of Yan had really performed this ceremony here, I would have used armoured cavalry to surround him and not a soul would have escaped.'

In both cases Shizong seems to be making the point to Li that Yanshou's venture was doomed from the start, giving the impression that Li was involved. Indeed, although it is not made explicit anywhere, it does seem likely that Li was, if not Yanshou's right-hand man, then at least his eyes and ears at court. This would make sense of many incidents, starting with this most recent treatment of Li, and the XW note that Li was sacked. It would also fit with the recent cooperation between Yanshou and Li at the Liao court in Bian, and the blaming of those two for the despoliation of the Middle Kingdom. Consequently, it may well be the case that Li, arriving in Liao on the staff of Zhao Yanshou, remained more closely connected with him than the sources are willing to say directly, and that he might have been the person who drew up the various ill-fated plans for the fulfilment of Yanshou's ambitions, discussed in the next chapter. Given that the LS presents a generally positive picture of Li, such an association with the usurping Yanshou could be another reason why that source is careful to distance Li from the connection by telling us that he is with the emperor when the emperor dies, and therefore less likely to be plotting a coup with Yanshou. The further omission of the events around Shizong's accession, even though these are in the QG annals, only contributes to the sense of a cover-up by the LS.

### Confrontation with Xiao Han 蕭翰

Once Taizong was dead, and Yanshou disgraced, Li discovered that his outspokenness, so approved of by the compilers, had made him enemies. It appears that when Shizong headed north after his accession at Zhenzhou 鎮州, Li stayed behind, for he was there when Xiao Han, whom we last met as a pillaging general in the LS and QG, surrounded his residence with troops (§50-53.)<sup>50</sup> According to the JW,

At this time Li was ill and was just then prostrated on a pillow, Han saw Li and berated him, saying, 'You advised the late emperor and told him that he should not appoint tribesmen as *jiedushi*, and that if he did then the country would not last long; then when the late emperor came he ordered me to settle things in the palace of Bianzhou, and you advised that this was not permissible; again when I became *jiedushi* at Bianzhou and you were in the imperial secretariat, for what reason did you send in memorials about me?' Li raised his voice in defence and replied with words indignant and unyielding, Han then chained up Li and left. The *jiedushi* of Zhenzhou, Mada, shortly afterwards released his chains but that night he died of his illness.

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50. The LS and QG place Mada with Xiao Han, but this is to make him more aggressive towards Li than the older sources would have to be the case.

This gives an impression that Li constantly proffered advice. If we combine it with what we know and conjecture of his relationship with Yanshou, we might see an official forever wheeling and dealing on behalf of his friends and to keep his enemies out of office. As one of the direct targets of Li's memorialisation, Han is understandably upset about it, even though it did not prevent his appointment. But the subsequent sources do not leave it at that. The account in the XW is very brief, but the TJ adds yet more details of Li's activities, for Han also complains that,

'Furthermore, you slandered me and Jieli 解里 to the late emperor, saying that Jieli loved to plunder other people's property<sup>51</sup> and that I loved to take away other men's women and children by force. {Now} I will surely kill you!'

In addition, when Xiao Han ordered Li to be chained,

Li raised his voice in defence, saying, 'This is the moral standard of the entire country: I spoke truly about it. (If you) want to kill me then kill me. How will chaining me up do that?'

and when Li dies, it is no longer of his illness, but 'of rage and indignation.' Hence to the anger conveyed in the JW version has been added a contrast between Li's high principles, for which he is evidently prepared to die, and the uncivilised behaviour of the Kitan, along with an implication that they are responsible for his death.<sup>52</sup> This emphasis is carried over from the TJ into the two later texts.

According to the JW biography Li had enough family with him in Liao for somebody to cremate his bones and return the ashes for burial at his home town of Fuyang (§55), and there is a final note on his essential character:

Li was honest and upright and had a limitless love of wine. ....<sup>53</sup> Throughout his life, Li embraced righteousness and had sympathy for the talented, he was quick to commend the outstanding and when he heard of the excellence of some person, he would be sure to leap to act on their behalf, whilst when he saw the impoverishment of some person he would also empty his chest to assist them, and it was for this reason that on the day he died, the officials of the central court all sighed with regret over him.

Clearly this is what a biographer would be pleased to find in the life of a person perceived to be of Confucian virtue, and given the extent of human frailty, when the historiographers found somebody who really did fit the model of the ideal Confucian *junzi* 君子, they would doubtless have pounced upon them as the much-sought good exemplar. Yet we have seen that when examined closely, Li's life does not completely fit this stereotype. Nevertheless, as we have been suggesting throughout this chapter, such a

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51. According to his LS biography, Jieli had tried to *prevent* Zhang Yanze's plunder of Bian. LS 76:1245.

52. Ironically, Xiao Han later rebelled against Shizong and was executed in 949:1. LS 5:65.

53. This gap is filled with an account of the escape attempt.

disjunction of ideal and reality did not prevent successive editors from 'improving' upon what they had.

In the texts we can see a number of approaches to the problem of changing master. Only the JW observes Li's change of master from the Later Liang to the future Later Tang emperor, and then with neither praise nor blame. Whilst we must remember that probably only the Later Tang viewpoint survived, the event is conveyed as if such a change of allegiance were a normal occurrence. It is also implied, by accounts of the escape attempt, that it would have been perfectly respectable for Li to transfer his allegiance again from Later Tang to Later Jin. Hence at the time it seems to have been considered normal and permissible for an official to serve more than one regime. Not only that, but in Li's case, even as he changed masters he was also praised for his loyalty, particularly in the QG. This praise is bestowed on a loyalty to personality: to Guo Chongtao, Zhao Yanshou, perhaps even Liao Taizong. This kind of loyalty is independent of the regime, race, language, culture or lifestyle of either master or servant.

Yet the ethnic element was clearly there. When Zhang Li entered Liao service he found himself in a strange world where he could not cope with the food, and in our earliest text was moved to identify himself as a Chinese in order to explain his attempted escape. Taizong understood, to the extent that he had already tried to make provision for Li's needs. Taizong's concern seems to be to win his Chinese ministers to him personally so that they will apply their talents in his state. To do this he seems willing to accommodate continuing cultural differences, and to distinguish these from any judgements upon loyalty. The evident necessity to remove Li's statement of ethnicity under the Yuan suggests that by this time the question of loyalty had become inextricably bound up with ethnic identity, and that as in the case of Han Yanhui, these matters which were of concern in the fourteenth century had not been of such significance in the tenth.

Table 3 - Zhang Li: parallel texts

References	LS	4:59, 60; 76:1251-2 (biography)
	QG	2:20; 3:37; 4:42, 43; 16:161 (biography), 165-6 (commentary)
	TJ	274:8955, 8964; 280:9153, 9161; 281:9170; 285:9319, 9320; 286:9330, 9339, 9346, 9352; 287:9358, 9365
	XW	55:638; 72:897, 898, 899; 73:901, 902
	JW	42:583; 67:892; 92:1224; 98:1312, 1313-6 (biography), 1317 (commentary); 100:1332; 108:1421; 137:1835
	Fengtian tong zhi 221:4702b	
	LSJSBM	5:115-8
	LSSY	20:389-90
	LSSYB	5:115-6
	LWK	shang:26a
	QLW	70
	Shengjing tong zhi	90:7b
	Dengke ji kao	25:10b

Notes see Table 2 - Han Yanhui: parallel texts

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
1	place of origin Cizhou 76:1251 biog	place of origin Fuyang, Cizhou 16:161 biog				place of origin Fuyang, Cizhou 98:1314 biog
2						ancestors farmers 98:1314 biog
3					studious, poetic language 98:1313 biog	studious, poetic language 98:1313 biog

LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
4					reporting disputes 98:1314 biog
5				Yu 1st at crt c.913 exam candidate, sponsored at Liang court by Li Yu 67:892 Li Yu biog	
6				st.915-921 to Later Tang, praised Li Yu 67:892 Li Yu biog	
7				c.923:12 (c.925:3?) got Li Yu a job 67:892 Li Yu biog	
8				bg Tongguang c.923 <i>jinsi</i> 98:1313 biog	bg Tongguang c.923 <i>jinsi</i> 98:1314 biog
9				bg Tongguang c.923 left <i>shiyi</i> , <i>zhi shi guan</i> 98:1314 biog	bg Tongguang c.923 left <i>shiyi</i> , <i>zhi shi guan</i> 98:1314 biog
10	L Tang c.923-936 <i>zhangshuji</i> 76:1251 biog	bef 926:1, 21 Feb <i>zhangshuji</i> under Chongtao 274:8955, 8964	Jiji subjd Shu 925-6 <i>zhangshuji</i> 16:161 biog	Chongtao subjd Shu 925:9, c.1 Oct? <i>zhangjunshu</i> at Chongtao's request 98:1314 biog	Chongtao subjd Shu 925:9, c.1 Oct? <i>zhangjunshu</i> at Chongtao's request 98:1314 biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
11		Jiji (sic) d. 926 wept for Jiji (mistake) 16:161 biog	926:1, after 21 Feb wept for Chongtao, dedication noted 274:8955		aft Shu pacfd 926:1 wept for Chongtao (death 34:468) 98:1314 biog	aft Shu pacfd 926:1 wept for Chongtao (death 34:468) 98:1314 biog
12			926:2, aft 12 April <i>zhangshuji</i> under Ren Huan 274:8964			withdrawal c.926:2 followed Ren Huan east 98:1314 biog
13			926:2, aft 12 April Li Shaochen rebn & ambush 274:8964		926:3 (2:14 April) capt of Kang Yanxiao at Hanzhou reported 34:474 annals	to Lizhou 926:3 Kang Yanxiao rebn & ambush 98:1314-15 biog
14			926:2, aft 12 April Shaochen shut himself in Hanzhou 274:8964			926:4, 19 May advice to kill Yanxiao 98:1315 biog
15	L Tang c.923-936 Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> 76:1251 biog	Luwang c.934-936 Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> 16:161 biog		Mingzong's time Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> 55:897 Kitan	bg Tiancheng c.926 Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> by Mingzong 98:1314 biog	bg Tiancheng c.926 Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> by Mingzong 98:1315 biog
16				c.926-30 shortage of <i>jinshi</i> , composed standard poems, unskillful 55:638 Li Yi biog	c.926 composed standard poems, not considered appropriate 92:1224 Li Yi biog	
17					c.928? mourning parents 98:1314 biog	c.928? mourning parents 98:1315 biog

LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
18				bef 931:11, 25 Dec <i>qiju lang</i> 42:583 annals	
19				931:11, 25 Dec <i>bingbu yuanwailang</i> , acting <i>zhizhigao</i> 42:583 annals end mourning restored as <i>xueshi, libu</i> , <i>bingbu yuanwailang</i> , <i>zhizhigao</i> 98:1315 biog	end mourning restored as <i>xueshi, libu</i> , <i>bingbu yuanwailang</i> , <i>zhizhigao</i> 98:1315 biog
20				c.931? mourning concubine 98:1314 biog	c.931? mourning concubine 98:1315 biog
21		936:11, bef 21 Nov Hanlin <i>xueshi</i> 280:9153			Qingtai c.934-936 <i>shangshu bibu langzhong</i> , <i>zhizhigao</i> , <i>xueshi</i> 98:1315 biog
22	Jingtang action 936 <i>zhaotao panguan</i> w Dejun to relieve Jingda in Hedong 76:1251 biog	936:11, bef 21 Nov <i>panguan</i> to Yanshou in Hedong 280:9153	Jin Gaozu rebn 936 sent by Feidi to oversee Yanshou going to Tuanboyu 72:897 Kitan		Gaozu->Jinyang 936 asked to go w Yanshou bcs low opinion of He Ning 98:1315 biog
23		936:11, 22 Nov met Dejun at Xitang 280:9153			

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
24	Jingda defeat 936 entered Kitan 76:1251 biog	936 followed Dejun into Kitan 16:161 biog	936:int 11? entered Kitan w Yanshou 280:9161	Yanshou chained Li transferred w Yanshou to Kitan 72:897 Kitan		Tuanbo defeat 936 fell into Kitan hands w Yanshou 98:1314 biog
25	after this 936 Taizong saw was tough, honest, had learning 76:1252 biog					
26	therefore 936 <i>xueshi</i> under Taizong, speaking up valued 76:1252 biog	936 <i>xueshi</i> under Taizong, speaking up valued 16:162 biog	936:int 11? <i>xueshi</i> as before 280:9161	transferred N Deguang regarded his learning, kept on as Hanlin 72:897 Kitan	<i>xueshi</i> to barbs 98:1314 biog	entered Liao 936 put in harness in old job 98:1315 biog
27	not long after c.937 escape & punishment of Gao Yanying 76:1252 biog	937:2 escape & punishment of Gao Yanying 2:20 annals, 16:162 biog	937:2, aft 30 Mar escape & punishment of Gao Yanying 281:9170	thought of returning escape & punishment of Gao Tangying, Li as bef, loved 72:897-8 Kitan		1st in Kitan c.937 escape & punishment of Gao Tangying 98:1316 biog
28		937:2 speaking up valued 2:20 annals	937:2, aft 30 Mar speaking up valued, importance of Confucians 281:9170			
29	beg Huitong c.938 Hanlin <i>chengzhi</i> , conc <i>libu shangshu</i> 76:1252 biog	938 Hanlin <i>chengzhi</i> , conc <i>libu shangshu</i> 16:162 biog	in 946:12, c. 6 Jan Hanlin <i>xueshi chengzhi</i> , conc <i>libu shangshu</i> 285:9319-20 annals			c.937? successively to <i>libu shangshu</i> 98:1315 biog



	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
30	c.946 w Taizong v Jin 76:1252 biog					
31	entered Bian c.946-7 Kitan plundering 76:1252 biog	c.946-7 Kitan debauchery 16:162 biog				
32	entered Bian c.946-7 rule Chinese w Chinese 76:1252 biog	c.946-7 rule Chinese w Chinese 16:162 biog	946:12, aft 6 Jan rule Chinese w Chinese 285:9319-20	c.947 lived within Nansong men, critical advice 98:1314 biog		
33	947:1, 27 Jan Zhang Yanze execd for plundering Bian 4:59 annals	947:1 Zhang Yanze execd for killing Gao Xun's family 3:35 annals	947:1, 27 Jan Zhang Yanze, Fu Zhuer execd for crimes 286:9328-9		947:1, 27 Jan Zhang Yanze executed for plundering Bian 85:1126 annals	
34				Deguang about to hold court, (947:2?) hat incident 72:898 Kitan		!
35	947:1, 31 Jan <i>pingzhangshi</i> 4:59 annals (cf. below)	see below	see below	see below	947:1, 31 Jan <i>xueshi chengzhi</i> who had come N, md gd cllr 137:1835 Kitan	see below

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW	JW appendix
36			947:1, 2 Feb recommended Li Song's talent 286:9330		entered Bian 947 praised Li Song's talent 108:1421 Li Song biog	
37	947:1, 31 Jan Li Song md <i>shumishi</i> 4:59 annals		947, shortly after Li Song <i>taizi taishi</i> , <i>shumishi</i> 286:9330		entered Bian 947 Li Song <i>taizi taishi</i> , acting <i>shumishi</i> 108:1421 Li Song biog	
38			947:1, 24 Feb as <i>chengzhi</i> 286:9339		947 as <i>xueshi chengzhi</i> who had come north 98:1313 Yanshou biog	
39	Bian taken Li Song's & Li's requests, Yanshou's posts 76:1248 Yanshou biog	947:2 Li's request & Yanshou's posts 3:37 annals	947:1, 24 Feb Li Song's & Li's requests, Yanshou's posts 286:9339	aft Jin conqd, c.947 Li Song's & Li's requests, Yanshou's posts 72:897 Kitan	947 Li Song's & Li's requests, Yanshou's posts 98:1313 Yanshou biog	
40	right <i>puye</i> , conc <i>menxia</i> <i>shilang</i> , <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 76:1252 biog (cf. above)	c.946-947 right <i>puye</i> , conc <i>menxia</i> <i>shilang</i> , <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 16:162 biog	947:2, c. 22 Mar md right <i>puye</i> , conc <i>menxia</i> <i>shilang</i> , <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 286:9346	c.947 md right <i>puye</i> , conc <i>menxia</i> <i>shilang</i> , <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 72:897 Kitan	see above entered Bian c.946-7 right <i>puye</i> , <i>pingzhangshi</i> , Jixian palace <i>da xueshi</i> 98:1315 biog	
41	947:4, 24 April to Chigang w emp 4:60  shortly aft md <i>puye</i> emp returned N 76:1252 biog				after c.947 w emp to Zhenzhou 98:1315 biog	

JW appendix

JW

XW

TJ

QG

LS

42				947:4, aft 1 May blamed for wasted cities 286:9352	returning N, c.947 blamed for wasted cities 72:899 Kitan		
43	947:4, 3 May w emp crossed the Liyang, emp on 3 mistakes 4:60 annals			947:4, 9 May emp sighed over 3 mistakes 286:9354-5			
44	947:4, 6 May w emp stopped at Gaoyi, not at ease 4:60 annals						
45	947:4, 15 May w emp? who died at Luancheng, age 46 4:60 annals, 76:1252 biog	947:4 emp died at Shahulin, Luancheng, of illness 3:39 annals	947:4, 14 May emp died at Shahulin 286:9356	947:4 Deguang died at Luancheng 10:101 annals	947:4, 14 May Deguang died at Luancheng in Zhen 99:1329 annals		
46		947:5 summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will 4:42-43 annals	947:5, 23 May summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will 287:9358	947:5, 23 May summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will 73:901-2 Kitan			
47				removed from office 73:902 Kitan			
48		947:5 congrats ceremony & Wuyu's comment 4:42-43 annals	947:5, 24 May congrats ceremony & Wuyu's comment 287:9358				

JW appendix

JW

XW

TJ

QG

LS

49	947, aft 15 May at Hengzhou 76:1252 biog	947, aft 5th month went to live at Hengzhou 16:162 biog	947:6, 21 June at Hengzhou 287:9365				emp N c. 947:4-5 at Zhenzhou 98:1317 biog
50	947, aft 15 May confrontation w Xiao Han & Mada 76:1252 biog	947, aft 5th month confrontation w Xiao Han 16:162 biog	947:6, 21 June confrontation w Xiao Han 287:9365	Xiao Han heading N confrontation w Xiao Han 73:902 Kitan	precis of confrontation 98:1317 biog		Yongkang N 947:5 confrontation w Xiao Han 98:1315-6 biog
51	947, aft 15 May moral stds, chains won't kill 76:1252 biog	947, aft 5th month moral stds, chains won't kill 16:162 biog	947:6, 21 June moral stds, chains won't kill 287:9365	at Zhenzhou unyielding reply 73:902 Kitan			Yongkang N 947:5 indignant reply 98:1316 biog
52	947, aft 15 May released 76:1252 biog	947, aft 5th month released 16:162 biog	947:6, 21 June released 287:9365				Yongkang N 947:5 Mada released him 98:1316 biog
53	that evening died of rage and indignation 76:1252 biog	that evening died of rage and indignation 16:162 biog	947:6, 21 June eve died of rage and indignation 287:9365	that evening died 73:902 Kitan	947:6, 22 June death at Zhenzhou as right <i>puye</i> , conc <i>zhongshu</i> <i>shilang</i> , <i>pingzhangshi</i> 100:1332 annals	that night died of illness 98:1316 biog	
54					household goods only 98:1314 biog	helped talent, sighed for 98:1316 biog	
55						family burned bones, buried at Fuyang 98:1316 biog	

## Chapter Five

### Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽

Zhao Yanshou is the most famous of the five individuals considered comparatively here. He was adopted by Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞 when very young, and by the time he held his first office was living under his fourth different regime. He married a daughter of Tang Mingzong 唐明宗 and achieved the highest office in the Later Tang. In 936 he went along with his father's plans to gain imperial status and upon the failure of this plan was taken to Liao. There he once again filled the highest offices open to a Chinese and participated in the campaigns against Jin on the promise of the imperial title sought by his father. After the fall of the Jin capital he attempted to usurp the Liao throne from its Kitan heirs and it is likely that he died in prison.

Yanshou was involved at a high level in the most important events of his day: the Tang-Jin transition of 936 and the Liao-Jin war of 943-7. Study of these events, and accordingly of Yanshou, benefits from the relatively large amount of surviving material from both sides. Yanshou has a biography in each of the main composite works, yet despite his prominence is still omitted from the XW biographies. However, even Ouyang Xiu could not ignore him altogether without omitting large and significant chunks of the history of the period, and he appears extensively in the Kitan section and in the biographies of others. Given that he held high office it is no surprise that he is also extensively mentioned in the TJ and in the various annals. With such a wealth of material there should be much of interest in a comparative analysis, but the quantity is such that Yanshou cannot be dealt with in quite the same detail as has so far been the case. It should also be remembered that where there is more information there is also more room for contradictions, mistakes, biased interpretation and quite possibly invention.

#### Earliest frontier crossings

Yanshou's given name means 'prolonged life.' His real father was surnamed Liu 劉, but his given name suffers from miscopying early on, changing from Yuan 郾 to Kang 康 in the journey from the JW/XW to the TJ. Liu was from Changshan 常山/Hengshan 恆山 (§1-2.) These were the mountains to the north of Zhenzhou 鎮州, on the border with Ding 定, in the territory which changed hands probably more often than anywhere else in

this period.<sup>1</sup> When we hear about him, Liu is in charge of Tiao 蓆, a county of Dezhou 德州, just south of the frontline prefectures of Ying 瀛 and Mo 莫. Yanshou was thus in every sense a child of the frontier zone, as confirmed by his earliest recorded experience.

In 898 Liu Rengong 劉仁恭 took control of Dezhou, along with Cang 滄 and Jing 景, and installed his son Shouwen 劉守文 as Yichang 義昌 *jiedushi*.<sup>2</sup> Zhao Yanshou's father would thus have been under the jurisdiction of Shouwen, and ultimately of Rengong. In 907 Shouwen's brother Shouguang 劉守光 imprisoned their father. Shouwen resisted this usurpation, but despite having Kitan help he was captured in battle in 909.<sup>3</sup> Shouwen's commanders held out in Cangzhou until it fell to Shouguang in 910, and it appears that Yanshou's father was amongst those keeping faith. Zhao Dejun, a junior general under Shouwen, evidently was not so loyal, because he seems to have joined Shouguang's party and been sent as part of the mopping-up operation ensuring that all localities acknowledged the new governor. Tiao was evidently on his list, because there Dejun captured Yanshou along with his mother, the lady Chong 种 (§3.) This suggests that Yanshou's father died in the taking of Tiao and that Yanshou was at most a very small child at this time. For reasons which are unknown Dejun adopted the boy, and although no mention is made of what happened to his mother at this point, we know she survived because she features in events towards the end of Yanshou's career. These details of the story so far come from the JW, XW, and the LS. The latter abridges the earlier accounts, leaving the reader uncertain as to exactly who is working for whom, for there is no indication that Dejun's employer was ever Liu Shouwen. The confusion in the lives of these individuals is a direct reflection of the volatility of the political situation as expressed in shifts in the lines of frontiers.

Dejun had joined the victorious Liu Shouguang, but in 911 Shouguang declared himself emperor of Yan 燕, and Li Cunxu 李存勗 of the Taiyuan Jin moved to crush him. By the end of 912 it was evident to Dejun that Shouguang could not hold out even with Liang assistance, so Dejun fled to join the Jin, where Li Cunxu gave him the honorific name of Li Shaobin 李紹斌 (§5.) Dejun took his family with him, making it the second change of regime for Yanshou, who would have been still a boy.

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1. The QG says Yanshou was from Xiangzhou 相州. Xiangzhou was the place of origin of Yanshou's adoptive father Zhao Dejun, and Ye Longli omits to mention the adoption. Xiangzhou is not quite so directly on a frontier as Changshan, but it lay midway between Zhaozhou 趙州 and Bianzhou 汴州, and so was in an area much fought over.

2. TJ 261:8515.

3. See Chapter 1, p.22ff and notes for context and references.

Although Dejun himself is not noted for learning but for his horsemanship and archery,<sup>4</sup> he appears to have provided a cultured environment for his charge, who is said to have liked writing history and poetry (§4.) The formulae make no mention of Yanshou's interest being from an early age, suggesting that his literary talents were not exceptional, but he nevertheless seems more the courtly, scholarly type of person than the active frontier character, with military and political inclinations, that Dejun was. According to a curious reference in the XW, when the Kitan prince Yelü Bei 耶律倍 crossed to Later Tang with several thousand volumes of his library, Yanshou 'often borrowed his heterodox books and medical classics, none of which existed in the Middle Kingdom' (§15.) And despite Dejun's own martial inclinations, he demonstrated his pride in learning when in 929, he asked that his highly talented grandson, Yanshou's son, should be allowed to take the official examinations at the age of 4 (§12.)<sup>5</sup>

By this time Yanshou was well-established, but his first appointment had been as a *sima* 司馬 (adjutant) at Bianzhou 汴州, the former Liang capital (§6.) By the time he received this post the Jin under Li Cunxu had overthrown the Liang and established the Tang restoration (923-936), with control over most of north China, and the capital returned to Luoyang 洛陽. This earliest position, though minor, placed Yanshou far from the frontier, close to the court. It was perhaps around then that a prediction about him, recorded in the CFYG, was made. This said that he would be

certain to have armoured troops and great power, and will be renowned amongst those in the highest positions.<sup>6</sup>

At this point the family seems to have been part of the retinue of Cunxu's adopted son Li Siyuan 李嗣源, but Dejun and Yanshou had yet to make their reputations. The turning point in their careers was the accession of Siyuan as Tang Mingzong in 926.

Mingzong's regard for the family was shown immediately upon his accession (§7.) Dejun's original name was restored at his request, and at about the same time Yanshou married the emperor's daughter, the Xingping princess 興平公主. Although Mingzong had a lot of daughters - this was apparently his thirteenth<sup>7</sup> - the marriage was undoubtedly an honour bringing tremendous advantages; and not just for Yanshou. It also brought Dejun much closer to the centre of power, and he is variously said to have been 'entrusted with' or 'favoured for' employment. There was to continue to be a strong link between the two men at crucial points in their subsequent careers.

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4. JW 98:1308.

5. Mingzong admired the boy's talent and waived the examination, simply adding him to that year's list of graduates. Cf. concern over the quality of graduates, Chapter 4, pp.140-1.

6. Quoted in LSJSBM 12:283. It continues with a reference to Yanshou's delicate good looks: 'Some others (said), "This person is as pretty and tender as a girl, how can this be?" In the end it all came true.'

7. JW 49:678 editorial note, quoting the WDHY.

Upon Yanshou's marriage he became *fangyushi* 防禦使 (defence commissioner) of Ruzhou 汝州, neighbouring Luoyang, and then *jiedushi* of Heyang 河陽, the capital province. In 928 he was given the honorific title of *fuma duwei* 駙馬都尉 (imperial son-in-law) along with Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭, who had married Mingzong's eldest daughter. The following year he was moved to govern Songzhou 宋州, east of Luoyang (§8-11, 13.) While Yanshou's orbit remained in the vicinity of the capital, Dejun's was the northern frontier. He had been made Youzhou 幽州-Lulong 盧龍 *jiedushi* in 925 and gave good service there for ten years, improving the defences and the lives of the common people.<sup>8</sup>

### At the Later Tang court

On 20th February, 931:2, Yanshou was transferred from the regions to court, receiving the prestige position of *zuo wuwei shang jiangjun* 左五衛上將軍 (generalissimo of the left guard, 2b) and a senior appointment as *xuanhui beiyuan shi* 宣徽北院使 (commissioner of the northern court of palace attendants.) A couple of months later he was made *libu shangshu* 禮部尚書 (minister of the ministry of rites, 3a) with an appointment to serve as one of the two *shumishi* 樞密使 (commissioners of the military secretariat, 1b) (§16-17.)<sup>9</sup> He thus reached the highest bureaucratic position at the Later Tang court, but also opened an unhappy chapter in his life. The story so far has come largely from the JW,<sup>10</sup> but at this point the TJ begins to take notice of Yanshou's career in its own right, and takes over as the text providing the most detail about him.

The post of military secretary had had immense powers brought to it by previous incumbents, notably Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜,<sup>11</sup> and An Chonghui 安重誨, Yanshou's immediate predecessor. Appointed by Li Siyuan shortly after his accession in 926:4, An Chonghui had acquired what Wang Gungwu calls 'overriding powers,' but clashed with the last remnants of eunuch power in the shape of Meng Hanqiong 孟漢瓊, who engineered his dismissal in 931:1.<sup>12</sup> Zhao Yanshou replaced Chonghui, but Meng

8. JW 32:445, 43:592, 98:1308-9; TJ 273:8930, 278:9076. In 929 he was made *bei mian xingying zhaotaoshi* 北面行營招討使 (expeditionary punitive commissioner for the northern region) (JW 40:550, 98:1309) but Dejun might also have used non-military means of handling the frontier situation. Two LS entries for 932 talk of Dejun receiving rewards, and presenting 'the fruits of the season.' LS 3:33, 34.

9. Hereafter 'military secretary.' This translation is the standard one, but does not reflect the unspecified, and potentially wide, powers of the *shumishi* under the Wudai. Limitation of authority was a development under the Song. See Wang, *passim*, (describing the acquisition of powers); Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, ch.5, pp.212ff.

10. The later texts for this period of Yanshou's life all appear to derive ultimately from the JW. The only exception is the XW story of Yanshou borrowing writings from Yelü Bei.

11. Given control of military affairs under Tang Zhuangzong 唐莊宗 (Li Cunxu, r.923-926.) Murdered in 926:1 as part of a eunuch attempt to recover powers lost to the emperor's retainers. Wang, pp.109-11, 150. Mourned by Zhang Li 張礪.

12. JW 41:561-42:579; TJ 277:9040-63; Wang, p.155.



Hanqiong took over Yanshou's former post of commissioner of the court of palace attendants.<sup>13</sup> Although Yanshou's post was theoretically the more senior, and one to which great powers had accrued, nevertheless it is clear that the real holders of power were Hanqiong and the concubine Wang 王淑妃, who 'stood alone in the centre and managed things' (§18.) Yanshou served alongside Fan Yanguang 范延光, who had been appointed to the *shumiyuan* 樞密院 (military secretariat) with An Chonghui in 930:9, and continued in his post after Chonghui was dismissed.<sup>14</sup> Neither Yanguang nor Yanshou dared to comment upon governmental matters because of the power of Hanqiong and the concubine, which 'everybody feared.' Hence, senior though the post of military secretary was, it did not automatically bring power; that depended upon the character of the holders. It is evident that although Yanshou, as a son-in-law of the emperor, was extremely well-connected, he did not have the personal capability to withstand opposition.

Another contender for control of the court was Mingzong's son Li Congrong 李從榮, prince of Qin 秦王. Yanshou had got on the wrong side of him, apparently through association, however distant, with the fall of An Chonghui. Although Yanshou had not helped to plot this, he had replaced Chonghui as military secretary and had not prevented his execution.<sup>15</sup> Congrong had apparently been full of respect for Chonghui, but perhaps more to the point, Chonghui's position at court had ensured that Congrong's ambitions were catered for. Now he could not be so certain of getting what he wanted, and is said to have been contemptuous of Yanguang and Yanshou (§19.) Congrong had been given the important post of *pan liujun zhuwei shi* 判六軍諸衛事 (controller of the six armies and the guards)<sup>16</sup> in 929:4, and in 932:10 Shi Jingtang joined him as *fushi* 附使 (vice-controller), to give Congrong the benefit of his experience, and perhaps also to keep him under control.<sup>17</sup> Jingtang, because of the mutual antipathy between himself and Congrong, did not want this posting and sought a transfer to a provincial (non-court)

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13. On 10th June, 931:5. TJ 277:9059. Wang, p.153, does not know the date for this. Post known hereafter as 'commissioner of palace attendants.'

14. Yanguang had been appointed to the same post in 928:3 but was almost immediately sent out on a provincial posting. After his reappointment in 930 he seems not to have done anything in the post until Chonghui left to fight Shu 蜀 in 930:12. Wang, p.153n.

15. Fan Yanguang had at least spoken up on Chonghui's behalf. TJ 277:9045-6.

16. Controlling the only imperial army not under the emperor's personal command. Wang, pp.158-9.

17. Shi Jingtang had previously helped Congrong's younger brother Conghou 李從厚 (controller of the six armies, 926-8) as vice-controller. The 932 appointment could have a similar intention, but the fear of Congrong detailed in the TJ suggests that there may have been an ulterior motive. Jingtang was married to Congrong's half-sister, who did not get on with her ambitious sibling. TJ 277:9078-79; Wang, p.159.

appointment to get away from the prince. Yanshou and Yanguang were also trying to leave court, but their requests were denied.<sup>18</sup>

Then, in response to a feared Kitan invasion, Mingzong ordered the selection of a governor for Hedong (§20-22.) The two military secretaries said that only Shi Jingtang or Kang Yicheng 康義誠 could go. The emperor chose Jingtang but when Jingtang found he had not been relieved of his six armies post, he declined to go. Kang Yicheng was called to the palace,<sup>19</sup> but no appointment was made and shortly afterwards, on 7th December, Kitan encroachments provoked an order for a swift decision. Yanshou and Yanguang now wanted to appoint Kang Yicheng, with Yanguang arguing that formerly the emperor had not wanted to send Jingtang. Jingtang, though, still wanted the job. He was supported by Li Song 李崧, then a *quan shumi zhi xueshi* 權樞密直學士 (provisional auxiliary academician in the secretariat of military affairs),<sup>20</sup> who persuaded the committee to go along with him, and Jingtang was appointed on 9th December.<sup>21</sup> Thus, Yanshou and Yanguang, holders of the highest posts in the land, could not maintain their will against the suggestion of a lowly bureaucrat of their own commission. Two days later Yanshou received the additional advisory position of *tongpingzhangshi* 同平章事 (jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat and chancellery), but it is not clear whether this timing is significant.

There is a story about Yanshou hidden away in the JW biography of the minister Liu Xu 劉煦 (§23):

[In 933]<sup>22</sup> (Xu) was appointed .... manager of affairs. At the time that Xu came to court to give his thanks (for his appointments), it happened that there was a great sacrifice, (and) Mingzong was not holding court in the Zhongxing palace 中興殿. The memorial reception staff [*gemen* 閤門] explained, 'Under the old rite, chief ministers who are giving thanks for benevolence must communicate this in the appropriate palace, please wait a day or two.' The military secretary Zhao Yanshou said, 'The decision on notifying (new) grand councillors [*zaixiang* 宰相] has already been out for three days, (when) coming to give thanks it is improper to miss the appropriate time.' Because he immediately memorialised about this, (Xu) therefore gave thanks at the Duanming palace 端明殿.

This is not an especially significant story in itself, save that it reinforces the suggestion that Yanshou had a Confucian education, because this was evidently what influenced him here. The curious thing is that Yanshou's willingness to speak up for ritual correctness is not conveyed into the later sources, nor indeed into the JW biography, and thus a positive

18. They obviously want to get away from the court, but it is not clear whether this is out of fear of the other palace commissioners, or due to the antagonism between Congrong and Shi Jingtang.

19. Yicheng was replaced in his provincial appointment by Zhu Hongzhao 朱弘昭. TJ 278:9079.

20. Amongst several other posts. JW 108:1420.

21. The dating gives an indication of just how urgent the discussions were.

22. This date comes from the version of the story by Song Bo 宋白, quoted in TJ 275:8986.

aspect to Yanshou's character remains relatively obscure. We shall see that this may not be entirely coincidental.

Meanwhile, Congrong continued to be a worry and when, in 933:6, an exiled official recommended that Congrong be made heir apparent (*taizi* 太子), the emperor interpreted this as a request for his own abdication,<sup>23</sup> and consulted with his most senior officials (§24-25.) No result is reported, but three months later Congrong came to reassure Mingzong that he had no designs upon the throne, and received the enigmatic reply, 'It is what the ministers want.' Congrong, believing he was about to lose his military command, complained to Yanguang and Yanshou such that they, fearing his intentions, 'explained' to the emperor. One must assume that this means they told Mingzong that because the prince controlled a large body of troops based in the capital, he had to be pacified, but that this should be done in such a way as to remove the danger without depriving him of military command. These must have been amongst the considerations which led, three or four days later, to Congrong being given a title revived especially, the high-sounding *tianxia bingma da yuanshuai* 天下兵馬大元帥 (grand commander-in-chief of the empire.) A week later Yanguang and Yanshou were each given the extra position of *shizhong* 侍中 (director of the imperial chancellery, 2a), presumably as a reward for their advice. They had again shown themselves talented not at the energetic exercise of their powers, but at taking the line of least resistance commensurate with protecting the immediate interests of the emperor, the state and themselves. Whilst we might be unimpressed at the relative passivity of Yanguang and Yanshou, we might also consider that the attempt to do much assumes a control over the course of events which is rarely justified and is thus mined with tremendous risks, the more so in unstable times. Yanshou has so far demonstrated no abilities beyond the ordinary; it may have been wisest to do only the minimum necessary.

Unfortunately this meant that the problem of Congrong remained, for he was not pacified. He began bringing armed troops with him to court, and told his intimates that he would destroy the south. Yanguang and Yanshou were terrified and renewed their requests to be relieved of their posts or transferred away from court (§26, 28-29.)<sup>24</sup> They were not the only ones, and the emperor began to accuse his ministers of deserting him because he was ill, implying that they were ungrateful as well as cowardly, and that if they wanted to go, they should just go without having to ask for an imperial letter to give

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23. Hu Sanxing helpfully comments that this resembles Tang Xuanzong's 唐宣宗 words, 'If we set up an heir apparent, then we become a retired person.' TJ 278:9087.

24. The JW and XW say the former, the TJ the latter. The earlier texts do not record the previous transfer request, and whereas they now express Yanshou's fear - he wants out at any cost - the TJ could be implying that Yanshou was calculating to retain some kind of official position.

them permission.<sup>25</sup> Yanshou changed his tactics, exploiting his familial relationship by sending his wife, the emperor's daughter, to work on the emperor in his private quarters, explaining that Yanshou really was ill and could not stand 'these cunning affairs.' After almost a week of this, Yanguang and Yanshou presented a revised request for transfer, and after nearly a year of trying, Yanshou was finally posted away from court as Xuanwu 宣武 *jiedushi*, with his seat back at Bianzhou where his career had started.<sup>26</sup> The XW does not record this appointment, but only his dismissal as military secretary. A couple of months later Congrong rebelled.<sup>27</sup>

### As a regional magnate

In the Wudai a provincial posting was the prerequisite to insurrection and usurpation, because the regional appointment giving freedom from direct court control could not be obtained in the first place without the consent of the emperor. This made the court-provincial structure of power one of delicate negotiation, good judgement and personal relationships, which had to be renegotiated whenever any party to it was replaced. A new emperor inheriting existing governors had to balance the possibilities and hope that the benefits offered would be enough to retain the loyalty of the official, but he was always taking a chance. The tense and uncertain relationships which could result are typified in the new attitude to Zhao Yanshou as a regional magnate under successive emperors.

Congrong's rebellion was crushed but Mingzong died a few days later in 933:12. His son Li Conghou 李從厚 had reigned for about six months (temple name: Tang Mindi 唐閔帝) before Li Congke 李從珂, Mingzong's adopted son, usurped power for himself (temple name: Feidi 唐廢帝) in 934:4. Yanshou evidently transferred his allegiance smoothly from each emperor to the next because he was honoured as *jianjiao taishi* 檢校太師 (acting grand preceptor) under Mindi,<sup>28</sup> and duke of Luguo 魯國公 by Feidi (§30-31).<sup>29</sup> However, not everybody trusted the provincial governors of the former regime. When the Hedong *jiedushi* Shi Jingtang went to court upon the accession of Feidi, one of the emperor's retainers advised Jingtang's detention. Two other advisors counselled against this, and Jingtang was allowed to return to his seat at Taiyuan. In the XW the argument used is that Jingtang and Yanshou could not be detained because they

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25. Mingzong was making a trenchant point: those who changed their master were not noted for asking permission first.

26. His posts of military secretary and manager of affairs were given to Zhu Hongzhao, then a *jiedushi*. Hongzhao also feared Congrong's wrath as he had helped to bring down An Chonghui, and therefore declined the appointment.

27. JW 44:609-10; TJ 278:9091ff.

28. 934:1, 11th February.

29. 934:5, 21st June.

are married to Tang princesses (§32.) In the TJ the counsellors say Jingtang should not be detained 'because Zhao Yanshou is at Bian.' In other words, Yanshou might react badly to such an expression of suspicion. This could be difficult as not only did Yanshou have the forces of Bian at his disposal dangerously close to the capital, his father Dejun also controlled a strong army at Youzhou, ideally placed for an alliance with Shi Jingtang.<sup>30</sup> Between the three of them, they controlled about half of the Central Plains north of the Yellow River and had a foothold close to the capital.<sup>31</sup> Now Yanshou has become one of those against whom the emperor's interests have to be protected.

Ten months later, in 935:3, Yanshou was moved south to be Zhongwu 忠武 *jiedushi* and at the same time brought back to court as military secretary (§33-34.) Thus he combined technically one of the highest court positions with another of the regional commands neighbouring the capital. In fact, Yanshou's position was being undermined. Zhongwu was strategically less important than Xuanwu, lacking the waterway communications with the capital that Bian had, and the military secretary appointment proved simply to be a means of getting him back to court where an eye could be kept on him, for although his old worries Congrong and Meng Hanqiong were both dead, Yanshou was still ineffective in the job. Meanwhile, increasing powers were accruing to the commissioners of palace attendants. Liu Yanlang 劉延朗 held both northern and southern offices successively, whilst remaining *shumi fushi* 樞密副使 (vice-commissioner of the military secretariat) under Yanshou and his fellow commissioner Fang Hao 房勗. Hao had a habit of sleeping through meetings and going along with whatever those with power or influence suggested. Liu Yanlang thus had significant influence in the military secretariat and at the same time control over many minor officials who performed important functions, such as carrying messages and serving as envoys.<sup>32</sup> He was effectively in charge at court and also a notorious bribe-taker. Yanshou did little to prevent this corruption or the loss of the military secretaries' powers, even though the emperor's visits to Yanshou's private residence appear to speak for a close relationship.<sup>33</sup> It is possible that Yanshou was simply not interested in court power, for when we next meet him he is again trying to be relieved of the military secretaryship.

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30. Cf. Wang, appendix: The alliance of Ho-tung and Ho-pei in Wu-tai history, pp.208-15.

31. The following month Dejun was made prince of Beiping 北平王. JW 46:636. This did not give him any extra territorial or military power, but it nevertheless served as a reward and encouragement to continue in his allegiance to the new regime.

32. Wang, p.154.

33. This aspect of court life would repay further study, which cannot be undertaken here.

### The war against Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭

By 936:9, Feidi was four months into a struggle with Shi Jingtang for the empire. Jingtang had turned to the Liao for help and their army had defeated the Tang expeditionary force under Zhang Jingda 張敬達. This had been besieging Jingtang's base of Taiyuan-Jinyang 晉陽, but was now itself placed under siege in its camp just to the south at Jin'an 晉安. A relief force had to be sent and Lu Wenji 盧文紀 recommended that a 'close minister' be placed in charge of it (§39.) He was backed by Zhang Yanlang 張延朗, one of the few power-holders close to Yanshou. Yanlang, along with He Ning 和凝, proposed that Yanshou be the 'close minister' to be sent, as he would then be able to join up with the Youzhou army of his father, Dejun, already heading for Jin'an. Despite the obvious fears which such a familial concentration of forces might have aroused, 'none dared to say anything different,' and on 12th October Yanshou was given the temporary expeditionary post of *dubushu* 都部署 (chief administrator of the imperial quarters), and ordered to Luzhou 潞州 with 20,000 troops (§40-41.) Just over a month later, between 17th and 20th November, Yanshou was appointed *nan mian xingying zhaotaoshi* 南面行營招討使 (expeditionary punitive commissioner for the southern region)<sup>34</sup> of Hedong *dao* 道 (circuit), with Zhang Li 張礪 as his *panguan* 判官 (administrative assistant.) On 21st November Fan Yanguang was given the punitive commissionership for southeastern Hedong, whilst Zhao Dejun was placed in overall charge as *zhu dao xingying dutong* 諸道行營都統 (overall expeditionary campaign commander.) The following day, the increasingly powerful commissioner of palace attendants and vice-commissioner of the military secretariat, Liu Yanlang, was made *nan mian xingying zhaotao fushi* 南面行營招討副使 (deputy expeditionary punitive commissioner for the southern region.) This placed him under Yanshou's command, but would also have had the effect of enabling the power-holders to breath down Yanshou's neck. Although his initial expeditionary appointment bespeaks a victory for the court party which had adopted him, the present mistrust of Yanshou was entirely in keeping with the attitude towards him expressed by those advising over the detention of Shi Jingtang at court in 934. Both past counsel and present actions reflected different approaches to the same concern: that Shi Jingtang and Zhao Yanshou, as provincial magnates, were potentially dangerous. Whatever strategy was employed in relations with them was driven by that essential fear.

Nevertheless, Yanshou was under orders to join up with Dejun, orders which had the approval of at least some of the ruling group. He accomplished the link-up at Xitang

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34. Northern Hedong was in Jingtang's hands.

西湯<sup>35</sup> on 22nd November (§43), and from this point until Dejun's death, Yanshou is almost constantly at his father's side. Whilst Yanshou is never mentioned as contributing to the decision making, he at least went along willingly with Dejun's plans. Dejun had been trying to increase his forces over the last couple of months,<sup>36</sup> but was reluctant to carry out his appointed task of relieving Jin'an (§44-46.) This hesitation sharpened the concern of the court, which harassed Dejun to advance with successive edicts. It was not until Dejun received his appointment as overall campaign commander - on the same day that he met up with Yanshou - that Dejun showed willing by leading his forces north to camp at Tuanboyu 團柏谷, 100 *li* south of Jinyang. There he remained, however, for over a month, doing nothing to relieve the siege of Jin'an. At the same time he repeatedly asked for Yanshou to be made Chengde 成德 *jiedushi*, ostensibly to look after Dejun's affairs in Youzhou while he was away on campaign. Chengde was essentially the old territory of Zhao 趙, neighbouring Youzhou, and the appointment would have given the Zhaos an extremely solid base in the north, with legitimately held titles. Feidi already seems to have had his doubts about Dejun, which must have been confirmed by these requests. In an angry outburst the emperor makes it clear that he suspects a plot with the Kitan and predicts a disastrous end for it.<sup>37</sup>

It is not clear just when Dejun did start communicating with the Kitan, as the texts suggest different timings, and all tend to inform their record with a strong sense of what was to come (§47, cf. §37.) Yanshou maintains a low profile in this except in the TJ, where he is named as the otherwise anonymous envoy on the decisive mission sent by Dejun to the Kitan. According to the TJ's especially detailed account, Yanshou went to the Kitan imperial camp sometime between 17th and 24th December, and offered there everything that the Tang ruler had bestowed upon Dejun, along with first a false letter and then a secret one containing Dejun's real suggestions, accompanied by further gifts of gold and silk. Dejun requested Kitan sponsorship for the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom, in return for the conquest of Luoyang and the south, and fraternal relations with the new emperor - himself. In generous mood, he allows that Shi Jingtang could be left with a permanent seat in Hedong. In making this suggestion at this point Dejun seems to be about a month behind in his understanding of events. Shi Jingtang was already the invested emperor of Later Jin and he had a brotherly agreement with the Kitan, supported by the promise of a significant parcel of land, the Sixteen prefectures. Dejun's offer seems badly timed and did not match the deal already struck with Shi Jingtang, but

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35. Or Xitang dian 西唐店.

36. Liu Zaiming 劉在明 and Hua/Dong Wenqi 華 / 董溫琪 joined him in 936:10; he tried to get Fan Yanguang to join him the following month. JW 48:666, 98:1309, 106:1396; TJ 280:9152-3.

37. He refers to a story from the *Zhanguo ce* 戰國策, in which the swiftest dog in the world chased the most cunning hare in the world until they both dropped dead. TJ 280:9155.

Jingtang feared a change of plan and sent Sang Weihan 桑維翰 to defend the original agreement (§48.)

Where the JW and XW take this as sufficient explanation, the TJ goes on to explain that the Liao were indeed tempted by Dejun's offer, and quotes the debate between Weihan and Liao Taizong. Weihan argues that the Zhaos are giving poor service to the Tang; that they are incapable of loyalty and covetous to the last, thus negating any service they may have rendered to their lord. Conversely, he says, the Jin will make generous payments to the Kitan, implying that the Zhaos have little to offer in comparison.

Your great nation has raised a righteous army to help the unaided in danger, (and) in one battle the Tang troops have fallen apart and withdrawn to defend a palisade, where their food is used up and their strength exhausted. Zhao Beiping 北平 father and son are disloyal and untrustworthy, [*Hu Sanxing note*: ....What is meant is that they are disloyal to the Tang and cannot be trusted by the Kitan.] they fear the strength of your great nation but always harbour their own ambitions, keeping back their troops and watching how the situation develops. They are not ones who would serve their country to the death; they are not worth fearing and you should not believe their lying, cheating words. They are greedy for the tiniest profit, and have thrown away the merit they have gained (in the past)! However (if you) let the Jin gain the *tianxia* they will devote the wealth of the Middle Kingdom to the service of the great nation; how can this be likened to that small profit!

The argument is a complex one. Great emphasis is placed on the disloyalty of the Zhaos. Sima and his colleagues detested disloyalty in officials and were unlikely to miss such opportunities for comment as were provided by their sources.<sup>38</sup> For Weihan, though, it is a curious card to play, considering that his lord Shi Jingtang was himself a former servant of the Tang, and had rebelled against them openly.<sup>39</sup> Weihan is obviously not going to regard Jingtang's behaviour as disloyal, because he believes (and the historiographers know) that Jingtang has the will of heaven on his side. In contrast, the unfaithfulness of the Zhaos is stressed by Weihan, and can be stressed by the historiographers, because it is believed by the one, and known by the others, that they did not have the Mandate. On another level, Weihan is implying that the Zhaos are generally unreliable, and thus likely to be no more trustworthy with the Liao than they were with the Tang. That the Liao emperor subscribed to some such thinking is suggested by numerous instances in which he shows respect for those who loyally held out against him, and criticised or punished those who changed sides.<sup>40</sup> The second part

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38. As pointed out by Chan, *T'ung-chien*, pp.17-18.

39. Weihan was a *jinshi*, and had been part of Jingtang's regional staff since around 931. (JW 75:981, 89:1162; Wang, pp.157-8, 176.) As such, Weihan had in some sense transferred his loyalty from the Tang to Jingtang himself.

40. The most immediate examples are Taizong's respect for the firm loyalty of the Tang commander in Jin'an, Zhang Jingda, and his criticism of those who murdered Jingda in order to surrender to the Liao; and subsequently Taizong's execution of the Kitan guards who had years before taken service with Zhao Dejun. TJ 280:9157-8, 9160; JW 137:1833, 98:1310; QG 2:17, 16:163; LS 3:39. The QG and LS retain the praise of Zhang Jingda without the criticism of his murderers; the LS does not mention the killing of the Kitan guards.



of Weiha's argument makes clear just how central were immediate, material benefits to inter-state relations in this period. Clearly Jingtang and his advisors believed that the Kitan would respond to the offer of 'the wealth of the Middle Kingdom,' but in fact this does not work. Taizong apologises that although he has never reneged on an agreement, he cannot ignore the advice of his military experts, who say there is no alternative but to accept Dejun's offer. In the end though, Weiha does persuade Taizong to maintain the original agreement.<sup>41</sup>

It must have been only days after Yanshou returned from the Liao camp that events climaxed. On 25th December, inside the besieged Jin'an, Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠 cut off the head of the stubbornly loyal Zhang Jingda and surrendered the fortress to the Kitan. Taizong buried Jingda with full rites, then made the delayed push south, with the army now swelled by the surrendered Tang troops from Jin'an. On 28th December they fought with the Tang army based at Tuanboyu, and led by Zhao Dejun (§49-50.) The Zhaos, father and son, fled before anybody else, and were then followed by others of the high command, including Liu Yanlang,<sup>42</sup> leaving their troops to be slaughtered to the number of 10,000.<sup>43</sup> The defeat of the 'northern army' had the desired effect in Luoyang of creating panic and a mass flight from the city, while Dejun and Yanshou led the Tang army's flight south to Luzhou. Gao Xingzhou 高行周, a Tang general who had tried to prevent the murder of Zhang Jingda in Jin'an, was now Zhaoyi 昭義 *jiedushi* under the allies,<sup>44</sup> and Luzhou was his seat. Arriving there, he spoke to Dejun and Yanshou, up on the defending wall, as a fellow Youzhou person. He offered his 'honest advice' that as there was no food in the city, the Zhaos would do best to surrender swiftly to Shi Jingtang, 'the emperor.'<sup>45</sup>

When Jingtang (Jin Gaozu) and Taizong reached Luzhou on 4th January, the Zhaos surrendered (§51, 53.) Each account slants the information according to its own agenda. In the JW, the Tang annals say that Gaozu was accompanied by the 'foreign king' (*rongwang* 戎王) and thus emphasise the non-Chinese alliance. The Jin annals make no mention of a Kitan presence at the surrender, while the biographies of Dejun and Yanshou, and the Kitan section, all declare that the surrender was to the Kitan.<sup>46</sup> Hence,

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41. The *Luozhong ji yi lu* 洛中紀異錄, quoted in LSJSBM 12:286-7, contains a different ending to the story. In this, Yanshou presents a counter-argument to Jingtang's objections, which results in Taizong burning Jingtang's letter and appointing Yanshou to govern Youzhou.

42. At this point it seems that none of the leaders submitted to the enemy; we know that the Zhaos did not because we are told later of their surrender.

43. This could simply be a nominal figure, meaning 'very many,' but it makes the point.

44. TJ 280:9157-58. Once Jin'an fell, Xingzhou had himself changed sides.

45. There may be an edge to Xingzhou's advice in that it had been Dejun who had sponsored Xingzhou's early career in Tang, recommending him to the youthful Li Siyuan (Mingzong.) JW 123:1612.

46. Dejun's biography adds that Gaozu arrived later.

however much the southern annals might stress the role of Gaozu in the surrender, to the biographers of the Zhaos, their later departure to the northern court outweighed any Chinese involvement. The TJ relates the complete submission of the Zhaos, who do not wait for the two emperors to arrive, but go out to meet them at Gaohe 高河. As in the JW biography, the TJ has them meeting Gaozu 'at the head of his horse;' in other words, they bow to him before he even has time to dismount, a formula used to indicate great respect and submission. The LS, now evidently drawing on independent information, tells a quite different story, saying that Dejun and Yanshou were still in flight, and surrendered when the Kitan caught up with them. This removes the gentlemanly feel of the surrender conveyed by the other sources, and does not allow for Gao Xingzhou's advice. It also greatly reduces the element of volition in the Zhaos' crossing, so that, according to the categories defined in Chapter 2, what had been a voluntary crossing becomes one under so much duress that it could almost be classified as involuntary.<sup>47</sup>

Dejun's JW biography relates that, although greeted respectfully, Gaozu treated Dejun without any courtesy, while Taizong had Dejun's Kitan guard killed.<sup>48</sup> The TJ makes more of the meeting. Taizong is said to have given the Zhaos a 'consolatory edict' and this generosity contrasts with Gaozu's reaction to them during their audience, provoked by their behaviour:

going into an audience, they said, 'After we part will there be good fortune or bad?' The emperor did not turn his head and also did not speak to them. [*Hu Sanxing note*: Because they wanted to compete (with him) to be emperor, he resented them.]

It is not clear exactly to what this refers, but it may be a request by the Zhaos to know their fate. Gaozu's reaction indicates that they are unlikely to find favour under him, and this is evidently why Dejun and Yanshou are taken into service by the Liao instead. All sources except the LS<sup>49</sup> say that they were chained before they were taken away, which is odd as one would expect such treatment to be more likely for those surrendering on the battlefield than for those submitting more freely, but it could be that this was a reflection of Gaozu's mistrust, transmitted to his Liao ally.

### As a servant of the Liao

Dejun died the year after arriving in Liao,<sup>50</sup> which would be in early 938. Yanshou then

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47. The problems created by the case of the Zhaos are reflected in the different phrasings found in the sources, and even in different versions of the story in the same source, which between them place the Zhaos in all the categories distinguished in Chapter 2. See Table 1, #55, 56.

48. A reflection of the Kitan attitude to taking service against one's original master.

49. This instead provides a unique note that Taizong inspected the camp of the surrendered army as he began his journey back to the north.

50. It is implied he dies from shame, as a result of an interview with the Shulü empress dowager 述律太后 in which he offers her his lands in Youzhou. She points out that the Liao already hold these at the gift of Shi Jingtang, and therefore Dejun is presumptuous indeed to present them again to their owner. JW 98:1310; XW

succeeded to Dejun's old position of Youzhou *jiedushi*, and was made prince of Yan 燕王 (§54, 56.) In 938:11 Taizong declared the Huitong 會同 reign era and made many administrative changes, including the promotion of Youzhou to be Nanjing, making a third capital. People from the Middle Kingdom were given employment alongside Kitan, and Yanshou was among them. He became military secretary, and was thus restored to his Later Tang post, at least nominally. The job of military secretary under the Liao, whilst important, could not have quite the significance that had been possible under the Wudai regimes, because in Liao the office was still only a bureaucratic position subordinate to a ruling group comprised largely of imperial clan members.<sup>51</sup> According to the LS, Yanshou was not made military secretary for some years yet (§102), and in 938 became instead *liushou* 留守 (vicegerent) of the new capital Nanjing as well as being put 'in charge of all affairs south of the mountains' (*zong shannan shi* 總山南事.)

Whatever the posts he held, there are several indications that Yanshou was highly placed and highly regarded by the Liao. The envoys from Jin always brought rich presents for

the Yingtian empress dowager 應天太后, the *yuanshuai* 元帥 [marshal]-heir apparent, the prince of Wei 偉王, the two princes of the north and south 南北二王, Han Yanhui 韓延徽, Zhao Yanshou and all the other great ministers (§57.)

The envoys were chastised if the presents were not rich enough. Han Yanhui and Zhao Yanshou are the only Chinese mentioned by name in this list. The people who precede them are all senior members of the Kitan power structure and imperial clan. Yanshou must have been one of the most prominent Chinese servants of the Liao at this time. As a mark of the regard in which he was held, we may note that a little while after his appointment, an envoy was sent to Luoyang<sup>52</sup> to collect Yanshou's wife, who had been left behind when Yanshou was sent north (§58.) Whilst the JW annals record a gift of horses given by Yanshou in thanks for this, the LS says that he repaid the gesture by giving his all in the service of Liao Taizong, suggesting he had been done a great favour. Presumably the recovery of Yanshou's wife, though probably a formality between allies, was nevertheless eased by imperial intervention.<sup>53</sup>

It was also doubtless a mark of seniority that, in the LS for 940, Taizong not only paid a visit to Yanshou's residence, but also held court there (§60.) Here, amongst other

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72:894; TJ 280:9160-1; QG 2:18, 16:163. From Dejun's JW biography and the QG annals it appears that Yanshou was present at this interview, but Dejun received all the blame.

51. There is insufficient information to be entirely sure how even the mature Liao administrative structure worked, let alone to explain its development. In this period it seems that there was only a single *shumiyuan*, although there do appear to have been two *shumishi* in charge of it. Yang, Qidan zhengzhi zhidu, p.134.

52. No longer the capital, which was moved to Bianzhou.

53. The need for imperial intervention may speak for the extra control which could be exercised over a frontier between allies, see Chapters 1 and 9.

activities, he made Yanshou *zhengshiling* 政事令 (director of the department of administration), reverting to an older name for the function and position of *zhongshuling* 中書令 (director of the imperial secretariat).<sup>54</sup> This official was the other leading bureaucrat in the Liao regime, alongside the military secretary.<sup>55</sup> According to the other sources Yanshou was granted this position concurrently with his military secretaryship and *jiedushi* posting, making him effectively in charge of southern affairs. As the LS has already noted that Yanshou was placed ‘in charge of all affairs south of the mountains’ in 938, it is possible that granting the title of director of the department of administration was simply an adjustment of terminology to match Central Plains usage more closely, and involved no change in responsibilities.<sup>56</sup>

### Yanshou and the Liao-Jin war

Yanshou did nothing remarkable for the next four years. Then, after the death of Jingtang and the succession of his son (temple name: Chudi 晉出帝) in 942:6, relations between Jin and Liao rapidly deteriorated as Chudi repudiated the subordinate relationship his father had had with Liao Taizong, thus provoking the wrath of the Kitan.<sup>57</sup> This story cannot be found in the JW annals, but comes chiefly from the biography of the main power at court at the time, Jing Yanguang 景延廣.<sup>58</sup> It is ignored by the XW, but picked up by the TJ, which is also the first to record that in 942:12, Yanshou advised an attack on the south, because he ‘wanted to replace the Jin as emperor of the Middle Kingdom’ (§62.) On hearing that the Kitan were about to invade, Chudi prepared his defences whilst continuing to talk and the situation remained static for nearly a year. Then, in 943:9, the Qiao Rong 喬榮 incident (§63) provoked Taizong beyond patience and, by the by, gave Yanshou the opportunity it is claimed he was waiting for.

Qiao Rong was a Liao trading official. According to Jing Yanguang’s JW biography, when the Liao protested that Chudi did not call himself their subject, Yanguang sent a message via Rong saying that as Chudi, unlike Gaozu, had not been set up by the Liao, there was no reason for him to subordinate himself. He also added an explicit military challenge, saying,

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54. The post was called *zhengshiling* before 926, then *zhongshuling* until Yanshou’s appointment. According to LS 47:774-5, this was in 942, not 940. Also WF p.485.

55. Yang, *Qidan zhengzhi zhidu*, pp.143ff.

56. The post of director of the imperial secretariat under the Liao appears to have involved certain ritual duties which were not part of the job in the Central Plains. (Yang, *Qidan zhengzhi zhidu*, p.144.) This is the only obvious potential change to Yanshou’s responsibilities.

57. TJ 283:9242-3; LS 4:52; JW 88:1144.

58. JW 88:1044. The annals give the impression that the war was a result of Yang Guangyuan’s rebellion and a Kitan invasion. JW 81:1068-82:1085.

If the grandfather [Liao Taizong] gets angry, then let him come and fight; his grandson [Jin Chudi] has 100,000 naked swords: enough to receive him.

The TJ makes a great deal more of the story, describing how Yanguang had previously advised the imprisonment of Rong and the killing of the Liao merchants in Jin, and it turns the report of the message into a full-scale interview between Yanguang and Rong. This adds to the JW account, including the following,

The emperor of the northern court should not believe Zhao Yanshou's deceptions and beguilements and insult the Middle Kingdom. The soldiers and horses of the Middle Kingdom, you have seen with your own eyes.

This specific attack on Yanshou shows that Yanguang, at least, perceived Yanshou to be powerful in the Liao regime, and a traitor. The TJ has told us that Rong had come over to Liao with Yanshou, so Yanguang is insulting Rong's old master, but it seems odd that Yanshou's name should be mentioned at all. Yanshou is not of direct relevance at this point, and it is unlikely that Yanguang could have known that Yanshou was pressing for an attack on Jin, even if it was true. It is, we recall, the TJ which tells us this. Aside from contributing to the TJ's negative picture of Yanshou, the mention of his name places in the same passage the single minister on each side who is said to have pressed hardest for war. Left to himself, it is possible that Chudi would not have acted so provocatively, and it does seem that Taizong was not as enthusiastic as he might have been. Hence the responsibility for the 943-7 wars is shifted subtly from the emperors to their servants.<sup>59</sup>

Where the LS merely says that Taizong went to Nanjing to discuss punishing the Jin - leaving us to work out that he was probably consulting Yanshou<sup>60</sup> - in the TJ Yanshou is said to 'urge' an attack (§64-65.) He was placed in charge of the armies and the planning for the campaign, and was offered the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom if he succeeded in its conquest (§66.) As a result of this, in the Central Plains sources though not the LS, Yanshou is said to have become extremely diligent in his service of the Liao. As far as Yanshou was concerned he was only claiming what had been promised to his father, and was thus rightfully his. He does not seem concerned about turning to a 'barbarian' ruler for his ultimate sanction and legitimation. Since the failure of Dejun's bid for empire in 937, the Zhao family had not had the independent control of armies sufficient to set itself up again at the top level of territorial politics. But now Yanshou was the legitimately appointed official of the most powerful regime of his day, conducting what was considered from the north as a punitive invasion of a quasi-rebellious

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59. The TJ makes it clear that Chudi acted under the influence of Yanguang. If Taizong was keen to fight he would surely have pressed ahead his attack at the beginning of 943 and not continued to negotiate through the autumn. Blaming the ministers may reflect the line that Sima and his kind were obliged to tread at the Song court, where criticism of the emperor was not always easy and powerful ministers directed policy and were thus the legitimate objects of criticism. See Chan, *Official historiography*, pp.19-25.

60. Vicegerent of Nanjing.

subordinate power. Yanshou was in charge of a large army again. Any gains for himself were underwritten by the backing of the Liao emperor<sup>61</sup> which placed him in a strong position vis-à-vis any potential rivals for control of the Central Plains, including the Jin house itself. As the Wudai period showed time and again, sustaining autonomous operation required the utmost in skill, military power and ability, pragmatism, imagination, talent and luck. Yanshou's earlier career shows that he was lacking in at least some of these areas and in any case, the situation was, relatively speaking, a lot more stable than it had been even five years before. Greater stability meant fewer opportunities for autonomous powers to arise, and the Liao military system did not provide the same potential as the Central Plains regimes for establishing regional power bases. Tenth-century dynastic founders all began as servants of the previous regime; in persevering in gaining imperial backing for his desires, Yanshou was following old patterns.

The campaign began well with a drive deep into Jin territory which captured Beizhou 貝州 without a pitched battle (§67-71.) As Liao supporting attacks hit all across the north of Jin,<sup>62</sup> the vanguard camped at Yuancheng 元城 in Weizhou 魏州 in 944:1, preparing to cross the Yellow River. There Yanshou was made WeiBo 魏博 *jiedushi* and prince of Wei 魏王, recognising the achievements so far. The LS biography reinforces these by telling of a Jin defeat by Yanshou, who captured the general Sai Xiangyu 塞項羽,<sup>63</sup> and continuing,

.... the Jin generals Li Shouzhen 李守貞 and Gao Xingzhou led their troops to come and give battle, (and) they were destroyed (by Yanshou.)

Or at least, that is what it appears to say. In fact, every other source, including the LS annals, makes it quite clear that it was Shouzhen who defeated the Liao (at Majiakou 麻家口), and that the Liao commander on this occasion was not Yanshou, but the Kitan general Mada 麻荅. The sentence in the LS biography is written with just sufficient ambiguity that, following on from the previous mention of the capture of Sai Xiangyu, it converts defeat into victory and changes the identity of a general. Such skilled construction suggests that the ambiguity was deliberate.<sup>64</sup> We might expect Yanshou's

61. As had been those of Shi Jingtang.

62. JW 82:1085; TJ 283:9261-2; XW 9:93; the LS (4:53) puts events in a more logical order, placing some of the northern attacks before the advance to Beizhou.

63. It seems probable that the incident described in the LS biography refers to the pre-battle skirmish on the Yellow River at Majiadu 馬家渡 recorded in the JW and TJ, in which a Jin general named as Cai Xingyu 蔡行遇 was captured (Table 1, #74.) From the circumstantial and phonetic similarities it is possible that he and Sai Xiangyu might be the same person. There is little chance of confusing the characters for the two names, and clearly pronunciation has changed since the tenth century, but if the two generals were to be identified as one, this could suggest some element of oral transmission at some stage in the historiographical process.

64. A further example of this is the implication in the LS annals for 946:9 that Yanshou defeated Zhang Yanze 張彥澤 at Dingzhou, when the other sources all report a Kitan defeat with no mention of Yanshou.

LS biography to be friendly towards him, but that it was felt necessary to make such a drastic change to events rather than simply ignoring them suggests a biographer scratching about for positive material.

After about five weeks in camp, Taizong tried to lead the Jin into an ambush, but the Jin were stopped by heavy rain, leaving the ambushing force in place for ten days with hunger and fatigue sapping their morale. It is apparently in response to this situation that Yanshou suggests taking the bridge at Shanzhou 澶州<sup>65</sup> in order to pacify the *tianxia* (§73-74.) Yanshou's grasp of strategy was sound: the capture of Shanzhou would provide a bridgehead across the River into the heart of the Central Plains, and expose the capital, Bian, but in the battle at Qicheng 戚城 which followed on about 27th March, Gao Xingzhou led an unexpectedly strong Jin defence. The Central Plains sources describe a Kitan withdrawal, while the LS, in both annals and Yanshou's biography, claim a Jin defeat. Whatever really happened, this battle ended serious campaigning for the season,<sup>66</sup> and the Liao lost the foothold they had gained at Beizhou.

Nine months later in 944:intercalary 12, Yanshou led another major attack on Jin, but it was only brief. Sources from the XW onwards add to the unexceptional account of military advance in the JW with notes of pillage; a small point, but one implicating Yanshou in the destruction of his homeland (§77.) A battle between scouting forces near Xiangzhou 相州 at Yulin dian 榆林店 led Taizong to withdraw northwards, while the defenders pulled back from Xiangzhou to Liyang 黎陽, leaving Fu Yanlun 符彥倫 with 500 troops to defend the bridge over the Anyang 安陽水. Rather than trying to hold the bridge, he fortified Xiangzhou itself, and confronted a force of Kitan cavalry with a show of good morale on the city walls (§78.) The Liao then prepared for battle, so Yanlun lined up his 500 troops against them, at which the Liao moved off as he had predicted. The JW says there were 'over 10,000' Kitan cavalry, but the TJ claims 'several tens of thousands,' and that they were led by Yanshou.<sup>67</sup> The increased enemy numbers emphasise the courage of the defenders, whilst the involvement of Yanshou is another reminder that he is a traitor to the Middle Kingdom.

The Jin now took the offensive.<sup>68</sup> Yanshou led the Liao army north via Hengzhou 恆州, and reached Qizhou 祁州 in late March or early April 945 (§80.) The prefect (*cishi* 刺使), Shen Yun 沈贇, attacked them, only to lose the gates of his city to the élite Kitan cavalry. Yanshou knew Yun and tried to persuade him to surrender:

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65. Shanyuan 澶淵; Shanzhou is not on the River. Place-names are frequently used rather loosely in the texts.

66. Skirmishes continued. JW 82:1088-83:1098; TJ 283:9268-284:9279; LS 4:54-5.

67. It also adds that Yanshou first bypassed Xiangzhou, then turned back there for fear of being caught in the rear by a Jin army under Zhang Yanze. TJ 284:9282.

68. JW 83:1100-1; TJ 284:9283-4.

Shen Shijun 使君 [serving his lord] is from the same hometown as me. If you can choose your misfortune, it is better to choose the lighter; if you bring your city to surrender sooner (rather than later), you will bring no disgrace to yourself.

But Yun responded by berating Yanshou from the top of the city wall:

[You and your father] miscalculated and fell into the hands of the Kitan, you have mercilessly brought the hosts of the sheep-reeking tents to destroy the homeland of your father and mother, and you do not feel ashamed of yourself; on the contrary you have the appearance of somebody pleased with their virtuous behaviour. Shen Yun would rather die for country and family, and certainly will not imitate what you have done.

Yun does indeed die for his defiant loyalty (by his own hand), but this passage encapsulates the dilemma faced by Wudai officials by presenting the two main viewpoints and options in a single exchange. Who is the better off: the loyal suicide, going to his grave with an easy conscience and confident that he will be remembered as an adherent to the virtuous path; or the living frontier-crosser, ambition yet unsatisfied, who, even if his own conscience is clear or non-existent, may well be remembered to posterity as a wicked man? The exchange appears in all the texts except the LS,<sup>69</sup> so Shen Yun's viewpoint is not simply a neo-Confucian emphasis. Nevertheless, the TJ editors could not have hoped for a better contrast to Yanshou's approach.

In 945:3 the Jin counter-attack drove into Liao territory and heavily defeated the Liao army at Botuanwei cun 白團衛村, near Dingzhou (§82-84.) Taizong ordered all his chieftains to be beaten in punishment for the defeat, sparing only Yanshou, perhaps because he had been promised the emperorship. A couple of months later the LS annals have him reporting that one of his generals drove off a Jin attack on Gaoyang 高陽. It seems that just before Botuanwei cun, the Jin had written to Yanshou inviting him to return to Jin allegiance, and as Yanshou appeared interested, the invitation was repeated on subsequent occasions.<sup>70</sup> In 946:7, after another year of inconclusive fighting,<sup>71</sup> Yanshou was approached again (§85-90.) He said that he 'would like to come home to the Middle Kingdom,'<sup>72</sup> and would do so if an army was sent to meet him, and this was eagerly arranged. Thus, according to the LS, Yanshou was able to trick the Jin out of their strongholds as a large army was sent out under Du Chongwei 杜重威 and Li Shouzheng. After some skirmishes, Chongwei fought his way to possession of Zhongdu 中渡, but the Liao cut his supply lines and began to starve him out.<sup>73</sup> The LS, unlike the other sources, is careful to note Yanshou's active involvement in the fighting (§86.)

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69. In the JW and XW it is in Shen Yun's biography, not the annals.

70. The sources are not clear as to the exact sequence or dating of the letters. See esp. JW 84:1118.

71. JW 84:1110-16; TJ 284:9293-285:9306; LS 4:56-7.

72. The LS gives a sentence in which the meaning of *ning* 寧 is ambiguous: 'I fell into captivity a long time ago, how could I [or: I prefer to] forget the country of my parents.' The effect on the Jin is the same in each case.

73. JW 85:1121-3; TJ 285:9312-18; LS 4:57-8, 76:1248.



Chongwei surrendered on 4th January, 947, having sounded out the Liao in advance (§91-92.) Taizong gave encouragement by offering him the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom in place of Yanshou. According to the TJ, Taizong said this was because Yanshou's

prestige up to the present has been slight, (so) I fear he is not able to be emperor over the Middle Kingdom.

In fact, there was no intention whatsoever of giving Chongwei the emperorship, but neither does it seem that Taizong was willing to give it to Yanshou. Both contenders were given red robes in which to go to the Jin camp, and Taizong handed the defeated army over to Yanshou, saying, 'They're all yours;'<sup>74</sup> but it was Taizong, not Yanshou, who entered Bian 'in all things as an emperor,' who received the surrenders of the Jin court officials, and who held court.<sup>75</sup>

During this court session Yanshou, with Zhang Li, was involved in the 'hat incident,' and in recommending the former Jin minister Li Song for office (§94-95.) These were discussed in the previous chapter, where it was suggested that self-interest was an important factor in the recommendation. However, there are also stories from this period showing Yanshou in a more altruistic light. The first is a tiny mention in the JW biography of Feng Dao 馮道 (§93), who led the Jin officials to surrender to the Liao. At court in Bian, Feng Dao advised Taizong that only the emperor could help his people.

After that the officials did not come to any harm, and this was all achieved through the protection and patronage of them by Dao and Zhao Yanshou.

Another story comes from the DDSL:

Liu Wensou 劉溫叟 served the Jin as a Hanlin scholar. When the Kitan took the capital, Wensou was afraid to follow the Kitan and move north. Along with the *chengzhi* 承旨 [recipient of edicts] Zhang Yun 張允 he begged to be relieved of his post. The Kitan ruler was angry, and wanted to demote them to be county magistrates. Zhao Yanshou said, 'The scholars are not competent in their posts and are begging to be relieved of their difficulties, it is appropriate to remove them from their positions.' He managed to get them off being demoted.<sup>76</sup>

However, the most famous incident is Yanshou's rescue of the Jin army from massacre (§97.)

Du Chongwei's troops had not wanted to surrender, but had wept and ground their teeth.<sup>77</sup> Taizong was so worried that they would rebel that he wanted to exterminate them

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74. This is the TJ version; the JW biography says, 'The Chinese troops are all in your possession, you had better go in person to sort them out.' There is no such comment in the other sources. The LS annals say that the surrendered army was split between Yanshou and Chongwei.

75. JW 85:1126, 137:1835; TJ 286:9327-30; LS 4:58-9.

76. Quoted in the LSSY 20:387-8.

77. TJ 285:9318-9; also Du Chongwei's JW biography, 109:1435.

and be rid of the problem. The sources record a long conversation in which Yanshou is cast in the role of wise minister advising the emperor. He says,

'I have seen that before today the emperor has been in many battles and on many campaigns and only now has taken the state of Jin; (but) I don't know if the emperor wants to govern it (Jin) himself, or (if he conquered it) in order that others may take it?' The (emperor) coloured in anger and said, '.... You had better tell Us quickly what you are trying to say!'

Yanshou then points out the danger from the states of Wu 吳 and Shu 蜀 in the south, and the need for defences. He offers to organise these and suggests that the troops at Chenqiao 陳橋 are ideal for the purpose. The emperor raises an objection, but Yanshou has a ready solution, prompting the emperor to exclaim, 'Excellent! Only a great prince could have managed it like this!'<sup>78</sup> All the elements of the formula appear in this passage: the minister says something enigmatic which provokes the emperor's anger but also his curiosity, and the minister then explains some clever course of action which resolves the emperor's problem in an imaginative way and is an improvement, morally, on the original plan. Although the TJ has so far been somewhat negative towards Yanshou it does not detract from his behaviour on this occasion,<sup>79</sup> and the commentary to Yanshou's biography in the QG goes so far as to say that it shows his loyal and honest disposition.

However, later in the same month (947:1) the TJ records that Yanshou's request for supplies for his Liao troops was refused with the explanation that the Kitan did not have this custom, after which the Liao indulged in a period of pillaging called 'smashing the pasture and grain' (§99.)<sup>80</sup> It is unfortunate for Yanshou that he is thus associated with an act which seems designed to demonstrate the barbarity of the invaders, and this is followed up when during the TJ account of the Liao withdrawal north even Taizong turns on Yanshou to blame him for the destruction caused by the war.<sup>81</sup> It was also the TJ which first mentioned Yanshou's enthusiasm for the war.

### Imperial ambitions

Yanshou had not forgotten that Taizong had promised him the emperorship, and with nothing forthcoming, finally in 947:2 he got Li Song to make enquiries on his behalf (§101.) It was suggested in Chapter 4 that Song had been in some sense set up for this purpose, and the JW and TJ reinforce this by saying that Song 'could not but' do as

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78. The previous passage is quoted from the JW biography, but this sentence is from the TJ, as the rewrite found there is clearer in meaning. The TJ has heavily edited this whole passage for style, but the emphasis does not appear to have been changed.

79. In contrast, Hu Sanxing's note states that Yanshou acts not for any laudable reason, but simply in order to sound out Taizong's intentions regarding his promise to make Yanshou emperor in the Central Plains. TJ 286:9331. To sustain this interpretation takes too much effort for it to be credible.

80. The Kitan troops foraged for themselves and did not rely upon supplies provided centrally. WF p.560n. See Zhao Guangyuan, *Da caoyu*.

81. Zhang Li was also implicated, see Chapter 4.

Yanshou wished, which was to ask that he be made heir apparent. When this is rebuffed, Zhang Li proposes that Yanshou be given four more posts: vicegerent of Zhongjing 中京, *dachengxiang* 大丞相 (grand counsellor), *lu shangshu shi* 錄尚書事 (overseer of the department of state affairs) and *dudu zhongwai zhu junshi* 都督中外諸軍事 (supreme commander-in-chief of the affairs of all the armies), and that he should remain military secretary and prince of Yan as before (§102.) Although Taizong appears to have seen value in mollifying Yanshou with the prestige title of grand counsellor, he was not about to surrender all military control to him, and accordingly he denied Yanshou the last two posts on Zhang Li's list.

Nevertheless Yanshou's position remained very powerful, and one crude index of this is the story of his second marriage as related in the JW biography (§103.)

While Yanshou was at Bianzhou, he married another of Mingzong's younger daughters, as his previous wife had died. Before this the Yanzhou 延州 *jiedushi* Zhou Mi 周密 had (arranged for) her to marry his son, Guang 周廣; the presentation of betrothal gifts had already been completed and the date of the wedding had been set, and at this point Yanshou wrested (her) away.

It is curious that the later sources make no mention of this thieving abuse of position, but record the same incident with reference to Taizong's treatment of the bride's mother-surrogate, the concubine (dowager) Wang.<sup>82</sup>

Powerful position and generous reward were still not the emperorship, but when Taizong died near Zhenzhou-Hengzhou, Yanshou took the opportunity and claimed provisional control of the south until he was imprisoned by the successful claimant to the throne, Taizong's son Wuyu 兀欲 (temple name: Shizong 世宗) (§106-111.) The TJ makes a great deal more of this story. According to Sima, once Taizong was well on his way home Yanshou became disenchanted, declaring that he would not go back to the north. There was not time for the immediate intentions behind this remark to become clear before Taizong died, at which Yanshou marched on Zhenzhou, ignorant that the Kitan generals had already decided to serve Wuyu. While Yanshou claimed the emperor's dying instructions as his mandate, Wuyu had also reached Zhenzhou and was able to deny Yanshou the keys of the city. As Wuyu's position rapidly became unassailable, it was only the remonstrations of Li Song which prevented Yanshou from trying to hold a ceremony of receiving congratulations as emperor.<sup>83</sup> The simple imprisonment noted in the JW is turned by the TJ into a piece of theatricality which creates a tense atmosphere for Yanshou's arrest and provides Wuyu with opportunities to make pointed remarks to

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82. She had been Tang Mingzong's concubine and had brought up the princess. Because Mingzong was older than Liao Taizong, Taizong treated the concubine as the wife of his older brother. According to the XW, he 'joked with her that (according to the Kitan practice of levirate) this meant she was now *his* wife.

83. The JW annals record official appointments apparently made by Yanshou.

Zhang Li.<sup>84</sup> The TJ once again shows Yanshou eager for power but incompetent to achieve it. According to this version, Yanshou was out of his depth, and to an extent that strongly suggests that despite all his titles to power, he still remained excluded from the real political decision-making and intrigue at the Liao court. As Yanshou seems definitely the most important Chinese in Liao service at this time, we might extrapolate that this shows the distance at which the Chinese were still kept from positions of actual control.<sup>85</sup> Tellingly, the LS omits any reference to Yanshou's bid for the throne,<sup>86</sup> and even declares that Shizong made him military secretary for his 'merit in assisting and supporting the emperor' (§112.)

This was the end of Yanshou's career, and according to the LS annals he died about eighteen months later in 948:10 (§117.) Earlier in that year (948:1), Yanshou's son Kuangzan 趙匡贊 crossed from Liao to Liu Zhiyuan's 劉知遠 Later Han, advised by an old servant of Yanshou's called Li Shu 李恕 (§116.) Arguing in favour of allegiance to Han, Shu says, 'As to the prince of Yan entering (the foreign) court, how could this be something that he wanted!' In other words, he believes that the compulsion practised upon Yanshou will excuse his service to the Liao in the mind of the Han ruler, and thus improve Kuangzan's chances of acceptance. Liu Zhiyuan does indeed accept the submission, but is cautious enough to order that an eye be kept on Kuangzan.

The fleeting impression given by Li Shu of a Yanshou reluctant to serve the Liao cannot overturn the evidence to the contrary. Yanshou might complain that he has not received the rewards he expected and might work to help save Chinese lives, but he never expresses any regret at taking employment with the Liao, nor any but a false desire to return to the south. This is true even in the only surviving work by Yanshou's own hand, a poem recorded in the *Taiping guangji*. For hundreds of years poetry had been the ultimate outlet for unhappiness or protest,<sup>87</sup> but this one expresses none of that:

Yellow sand is gathered in curls by the wind and abandoned in mid-air.  
 Clouds are layered over Yinshan 陰山 and snow fills the outskirts of the city.  
 People return from their search for water and, moving their tents, head off.  
 He shoots at a hawk, the arrow falls and, carrying his bow, he goes to retrieve it.  
 A bird comes across frosted fruit and in its hunger pecks at it.  
 A horse crossing a frozen river, feeling thirsty, paws the ice with its hoof.  
 Occupying the plentiful grasslands of the high plain.

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84. See Chapter 4, pp.152-3.

85. This contrasts with the genuine power of later generations, notably Han Derang 韓德讓. LS 82:1289

86. Although it does mention the challenge from Wuyu's uncle, Lihu 李胡, LS 5:63

87. See, for instance, Laurence Schneider, *The madman of Ch'u: the Chinese myth of loyalty and dissent* (1980), passim.

In the deep night we break forest twigs to light a fire.<sup>88</sup>

If anything, it give the impression of a calm, if wistful, contentment.

It is perhaps Yanshou's lack of remorse, even when his dreams are in tatters, which fuelled the Chinese response to him.<sup>89</sup> It has been observed throughout this chapter how the TJ not only adds information not found in the JW, but also structures it in such a way as to indicate overall disapproval of Yanshou. He also appears to have been a convenient target for antipathy in the contemporary Central Plains. There is a story in Shi Hongzhao's 史弘肇 biographies (§96)<sup>90</sup> that under the Han, a disgruntled servant accused his master He Fuyin 何福殷 of once having carried a token of sincerity from Yanshou to the Wu regime in Huainan 淮南. No such incident is recorded anywhere else, and the point of thus taking Yanshou's name in vain is seemingly to compound the sense of He Fuyin's treacherous behaviour by association with a minister whose record suggests he would turn anywhere for profit.

It is left to the LS to redress this balance, which it does with a generally upbeat account, perpetrating reverses of military fortune, and backed up in the Yuan commentary with talk of Yanshou's 'great achievements.' This account omits the attempted usurpation altogether, although the commentary finds the request to be heir apparent embarrassing enough to need justification, excusing it by saying,

If this then becomes a fatal flaw which detracts from his great achievements, .... how ridiculous that would be!

The efforts to which the LS feels obliged to go in defence of Yanshou's reputation are suggestive of just how negative a picture of him had formed in China by the fourteenth century.

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88. *Taiping guangji* 200:1508; QWDSB 9:155; QLW 4:69. The QWDSB gives the poem a title, 'On the frontier;' Chen Shu's QLW calls it 'Disgrace,' but says that it sings of the Kitan landscape.

89. Chinese secondary works continue to regard Yanshou as nothing more than a traitor, when they mention him at all.

90. JW 107:1404; XW 30:331.

**Table 4 - Zhao Yanshou: parallel texts**

<b>References</b>	LS	3:38-40; 4:47, 53-59; 5:64; 47:774, 775, 781; 48:804; 76:1246, 1247-1248 (biography), 1249, 1253 (commentary); 86:1322
	QG	2:18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26; 3: 28, 29, 32, 35, 36, 37; 4:42; 16:163-165 (biography) (commentary)
	TJ	275:8986, 8992; 277:9058, 9059; 278:9078, 9079, 9080, 9087, 9088, 9089; 279:9119, 9120, 9128, 9133; 280:9151, 9153, 9155, 9159, 9160, 9161; 281:9185, 9188, 9190; 283:9243, 9253, 9256, 9260, 9263; 284:9267, (9268), (9272), 9280, 9282, 9283, 9284, 9288, 9290; 285:9306, 9311, 9318, 9319; 286:9330, 9331, 9332, 9333, 9334, 9339, 9346, 9352, 9356, 9357; 287:9358, 9368, 9369, 9382, 9383; 288:9388
	XW	6:63, 65; 7:73; 8:78, 79; 9:93; 15:160, 164; 27:290, 292; 30:331; 33:361, 362; 47:532; 49:557; 51:577, 578; 52:595; 57:654; 72:893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899; 73:901, 902
	JW	38:527; 39:538, 542; 40:549; 41:569; 42:575, 577; 43:596; 44:606, 607; 45:616; 46:635; 47:644, 653; 48:657, 665, 666, 667; 49:678, 679; 66:877; 75:985; 76:992; 77:1018; 80:1058; 82:1084, 1085, 1088; 83:1099, 1102; 84:1117, 1118; 85:1123, 1127; 88:1144; 89:1170, 1172; 94:1242; 95:1267; 96:1277; 97:1286; 98:1308, 1309, 1310, 1311-1313 (biography), 1315 (commentary); 99:1329; 100:1331, 1332, 1334; 107:1405; 108:1420, 1421, 1430; 109:1441; 124:1636; 126:1660; 127:1668; 129:1704; 137:1833, 1834, 1835
	CFYG	980:28 (JW 77:1018); 997:4 (XW 73:901); 998:12 (JW 84:1118)
	LDN	3, 4
	LFN	14a
	LSJ	4:9a
	LSJSBM	12:283-290
	LWK	shang:6a
	QLW	69
	QWDS	9:202-3 (QWDSbu 9:154-5)
	Taiping guang ji	200:1508

**Notes** See Table 2 - Han Yanhui: parallel texts

LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
place of origin Hengshan 76:1247 biog	place of origin Xiangzhou 16:163 biog		place of origin Changshan 72:893 Kitan	place of origin Changshan 98:1311 biog
father Liu Kang, in chg of Tiao 76:1247 biog	father Dejun, Tang Lulong <i>jiedushi</i> 16:163 biog	father Liu Kang, in chg of Tiao 275:8992	father Liu Yuan, in chg of Tiao 72:893 Kitan	father Liu Yuan of Changshan, in chg of Tiao 98:1311 biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
3	early Kaiping, c.910 Tiao taken, Dejun adopted Yanshou 76:1247 biog			Shouwen tk Tiao Dejun obtained Yanshou & mother Chong, took them in 72:893 Kitan	early Kaiping, c.910 Shouwen took Tiao, Dejun capt'd Yanshou & mother Chong, adopted Y 98:1311 biog
4	character good-looking, loved writing history 76:1247 biog			character handsome, gentle, liked to write history 72:893 Kitan	character handsome, gentle, liked to write history, receive guests, could write poetry 98:1311 biog
5					912:11, 3 Jan (913) Dejun fled Yan for Jin 28:381 annals  Jin crushed Youzhou Dejun certain of defeat, fled to Zhuangzong 98:1308 Dejun biog
6					bef 926:4 Bianzhou <i>sima</i> 98:1311 biog
7	bef Mingzong acceded Mingzong m a daughter to him 76:1247 biog		926:9, 28 Oct Dejun's name restored, Y m Xingping princess, Dejun favoured for jobs 275:8992	Tang Mingzong m Xingping princess to him, Dejun trusted 72:893 Kitan	Y of age m Xingping princess 98:1311 biog  Mingzong accession c.926:4 m Xingping princess, Dejun entrusted w imp jobs 98:1308 Dejun biog
8					Mingzong accession c.926:4 Ruzhou prefect 98:1311 biog
9					927:9, 15 Oct Ruzhou <i>fangyushi</i> ; md Heyang <i>jiedushi</i> 38:527 annals  md Heyang <i>jiedushi</i> 98:1311 biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
10	Mingzong accession c.926:4 md <i>fuma duwei</i> 76:1247 biog				928:5, 24 May md <i>fuma duwei</i> w Jingtang 39:538 annals
11					928:9, 10 Nov md <i>jianjiao situ</i> 39:542 annals
12					929:1, 13 Feb Dejun memo on gson Zan 40:547 annals
13					929:4, 24 May md Songzhou <i>jiedushi</i> 40:549 annals  md Songzhou <i>jiedushi</i> 98:1311 biog
14					930:10, 28 Oct emp ordered sending of apptmt of Xingping gongzhu to Y's private residence 41:569 annals
15				Tuyu arrived 930:11 borrowed writings Mid Kdm didn't have 73:901 Kitan	
16					931:2, 20 Feb md <i>zuo wuwei shang</i> <i>jiangjun</i> , conc <i>xuanhui beiyuan shi</i> 42:575 annals  entered crt as <i>shang</i> <i>jiangjun</i> , serving as <i>xuanhuishi</i> 98:1311 biog



	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
17	Mingzong accession e.926-4 md <i>shumishi</i> 76:1247 biog		931:4, 6 May <i>xuanhui beiyuan shi</i> ; md <i>shumishi</i> 277:9058	931:4, 6 May <i>xuanhui beiyuan shi</i> , <i>zuo wuwei shang</i> <i>jiangjun</i> ; md <i>shumishi</i> 6:63 annals  Mingzong c.926-33 was <i>shumishi</i> 72:893 Kitan	931:4, 6 May md <i>jianjiao taifu</i> , managing <i>libu</i> <i>shangshu</i> , serving as <i>shumishi</i> 42:577 annals
18			931:5, 10 June w Fan Yanguang, feared Meng Hanqiong & concubine Wang 277:9058-9		
19			932:10, aft 24 Nov Congrong contempt for <i>shumishi</i> , Y sought transfer 278:9079		
20			932:10, aft 24 Nov Kitan invasion threatened, w Yanguang advised only Shi Jingtang, Kang Yicheng cd go 278:9079		
21			932:11, 7 Dec discussion of gens, w Yanguang wanted Kang Yicheng, Li Song suggn adopted 278:9079	tribal invasion, 932 Jingtang finally apptd 8:78 annals  Changxing 930-4 w Yanguang wanted Kang Yicheng, Li Song suggn adopted 57:654 Li Song biog	932: winter empd demanded decision on gens, w Yanguang wanted Kang Yicheng, Li Song suggn adopted 108:1420 Li Song biog
22			932:11, 11 Dec md <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 278:9080		932:11, 11 Dec md <i>tongpingzhangshi</i> 43:596 annals
23			933 on giving thanks for office 275:8986 (Song Bo)		st. 930-934 on Liu Xu giving thanks for office 89:1172 Liu Xu biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
24			933:8, c.27 Aug-19 Sept request for Congrong to be heir app, his complaint via Yanguang, Y 278:9087	933... request for Congrong to be heir app, his complaint to Yanguang, Y 15:164 Congrong biog	
25			933:9, 26 Sept w Yanguang md conc <i>shizhong</i> 278:9087		933:9, 26 Sept w Yanguang prom <i>shizhong</i> , contd in crt offs 44:606 annals
26			933:9, aft 8 Oct Congrong danger, w Yanguang requested postings from court, emp angry, princess intervened 278:9088	933 w Yanguang begged to stand down 15:164 Congrong biog  Congrong trouble, w Yanguang begged to leave, emp angry, Y sent wife to speak for him 27:290 Zhu Hongzhao biog  begged for removal 51:578 Fan Yanguang biog	933 Congrong rumours, w Yanguang begged to leave, emp angry, Y sent wife to speak for him 66:877 Zhu Hongzhao biog
27					933:9, 10 Oct? lady Zhao md Qiguo gongzhu 44:607 annals
28			933:9, 14 Oct Yanguang, Y compromise accepted 278:9088-9		
29	Congrong defiance asked for prov posting to escape, md Xuanwu jun <i>jiedushi</i> 76:1247 biog		933:9, 16 Oct md Xuanwu <i>jiedushi</i> 278:9089	933:9, 16 Oct removed from post 6:65 annals  dismissed as <i>shumi</i> 72:893 Kitan	933:9, 16 Oct md Bianzhou <i>jiedushi</i> 44:607 annals  933 to gov Bianzhou 66:877 Zhu Hongzhao biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
30					934:1, 11 Feb prom <i>jianjiao taishi</i> 45:616 annals
31	c.934 prom Luguogong 76:1247 biog				934:5, 21 June md Luguogong 46:635 annals
32			934:5, aft 21 June Jingtang at crt, fear of him, Y, Dejun 279:9119-20	w Jingtang cdn't be detained bcs m to princesses 27:292-3 Liu Yanlang biog	
33	c.934 again <i>shumishi</i> , govd Xuzhou 76:1247 biog		935:3, 12 April md Zhongwu <i>jiedushi</i> conc <i>shumishi</i> 279:9128	935:3, 12 April Zhongyi jun <i>jiedushi</i> ; md <i>shumishi</i> 7:73 annals  under Feidi <i>shumishi</i> 72:893 Kitan	935:3, 12 April md Xuzhou <i>jiedushi</i> conc <i>shumishi</i> 47:644 annals  trans to <i>shumishi</i> conc govd Xuzhou 98:1311 biog  Modi acceded c.934:4 joint <i>shumishi</i> w Fang Gao 96:1277 Fang Gao biog
34			935:9, 17 Oct Fang Gao, Y w little real power 279:9133		
35					935:10, 11 Nov emp to Y's, Zhang Yanlang's residences 47:653 annals
36					936:1, 10 Feb Lantern Festival emp held feast at Y's residence 48:657 annals
37	936:7, c.18 Aug Dejun sent envoy to Liao court 3:38 annals, cf below				

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
38	Jingtang rebn Dejun to relieve Jingda in Hedong 76:1251 Zhang Li biog	Jingtang rebn Dejun to atk Kitan rear 16:163 biog  Jingtang rebelled Dejun md <i>xingying</i> <i>zhaotao</i> 16:161 Zhang Li biog	936:9, 6 Oct relief of Jin'an inc Dejun to cut off Kitan rear 280:9149-50  bef 936:10 Dejun plans, asked to relieve Jin'an & take 3000 Kitan gds 280:9152	Gaozu rebn Dejun suspected, sent to atk Kitan rear, went S 72:893 Kitan	936:9, 6 Oct relief of Jingda inc Dejun to enemy rear 48:665 annals  936:9 Dejun to atk enemy rear, Dejun took 3000 Kitan gds 98:1309 Dejun biog
39			936:9, 11 Oct advice that Y should join up w Dejun 280:9150-1		936:8 memorial, Y ordered N 127:1668 Lu Wenji biog
40	Jin'an siege, 936:9 +20,000 at Tuanboyu, Fan Yanguang +20,000 at Liaozhou 3:38 annals  Jin'an siege Zhaos to relieve 76:1247 biog		936:9, 12 Oct as <i>sui jia zhu jun</i> <i>dubushu</i> w 20,000 to Luzhou 280:9151  bef 936:10, 4 Nov Fan Yanguang w 20,000 to Liaozhou 280:9152	Jingda besieged & Fan Yanguang to help 33:360 Zhang Jingda biog  Fan Yanguang w 20,000 to Liaozhou, w Y defeated enemy 51:578 Fan Yanguang biog  sent v Jingtang 72:893 Kitan	936:9, 12 Oct ahead to Luzhou 48:665 annals  936:9, 13 Oct to put 20,000 under Dejun, Fan Yanguang w 20,000 to Liaozhou 75:985 annals  936:9 <i>shumishi</i> w army to Shangdang 98:1309 Dejun biog  Gaozu rebelled Fan Yanguang w 20,000 to Liaozhou, w Y defeated enemy, joined forces 97:1286 Fan Yanguang biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
41	Jin'an siege, 936:9 Dejun +10,000 from Shangdang to join Y 3:38 annals		936:10, st 25 Oct-3 Nov Dejun said needed more trps, hurried to Luzhou 280:9152		936:10, 4 Nov Dejun +2000 cav & Dong Wenqi, hurried to Luzhou 48:665 annals  936:10 Dejun +10,000 to join Y at Tuanyukou 75:985 annals  936:9 Dejun w Hua Wenqi hastened to Zhaoyi to meet Y at Xitang dian 98:1309 Dejun biog
42			936:11, 19 Nov? md Hedong <i>daonan</i> <i>mian xingying</i> <i>zhaotaoshi</i> under Dejun as c-in-c 280:9153	md Taiyuan <i>nan</i> <i>mian zhaotaoshi</i> under Dejun as c-in-c 72:894 Kitan	936:11, 19 Nov md Hedong <i>daonan</i> <i>mian xingying</i> <i>zhaotaoshi</i> under Dejun as c-in-c 48:666 annals  936:11 md Taiyuan <i>nan</i> <i>mian zhaotaoshi</i> under Dejun as c-in-c 98:1309 Dejun biog
43			936:11, 22 Nov met Dejun at Xitang, placed trps under Dejun 280:9153	met Dejun at Xitang, placed trps under Dejun 72:894 Kitan	936 met Dejun at Xitang dian 98:1309 Dejun biog
44					936:11, 1 Dec Dejun repd army to Tuanboyu, killed 500 enemy cav 48:666 annals  w Dejun from Luzhou to Tuanboyu 98:1309 Dejun biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
45			936:11 Dejun wanted Kitan to take Mid Kdm, stayed at Tuanbo over a month, 100 <i>li</i> from Jin'an, no comms 280:9155	didn't intend to help Jingda 33:360 Zhang Jingda biog  w Dejun wdn't relieve Jingda 72:893 Kitan	936:11, 3 Dec Dejun repd army left valley, enemy retreating 48:666 annals  936:10 w Dejun etc, at Tuanyukou 100 <i>li</i> from Jingda for 1 month, comms cut 75:985 annals
46			936:11 Dejun asking for Y to be Chengde <i>jiedushi</i> , reasons given, emp's response 280:9155	Dejun asked for Zhenzhou govship for Y, emp's response 72:894 Kitan	936:11, c.3 Dec Dejun asking for Y to be Zhenzhou <i>jiedushi</i> , emp's response 48:666 annals  936 Dejun asking for Y to be Zhenzhou <i>jiedu</i> , emp's response 98:1309 Dejun biog
47	936:7, aft 18 Aug? Dejun envoy to Kitan 3:38 annals, cf above	bef 936:int 11 Dejun secret envoy to Kitan asking to be emp 2:18 annals  Dejun secret agreement w Kitan, asked to be emp, Kitan tempted 16:163 biog	936:int 11, st 17-24 Dec Y sent as envoy to Kitan, w gifts, asking for Dejun to be emp, Kitan tempted 280:9155-6	envoys urged advance, respects to Kitan asking to be emp 72:894 Kitan	936 edicts urged advance, Dejun sent envoy to Kitan presenting gold, asking to be emp 98:1309-10 biog  at Tuanboyu, 936 Dejun envoy asking Kitan to mk him emp 137:1833 Kitan  Jingtang rebn, 936 Dejun envoy w respects to Kitan 89:1162 Sang Weiha biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
48	936:7, c.18 Aug? Hedong sent Sang Weihaan urgently 3:38 annals, cf above	(936) Gaozu urgently sent Weihaan to Taizong, Taizong stuck to deal 16:163 biog  bef 936:int 11 Taizong stuck to deal 2:18 annals	936:int 11, st 1-24 Dec Jingtang urgently sent Weihaan, said Zhaos disloyal, dishonest, etc, Taizong stuck to deal 280:9156	.. Taizong stuck to deal 72:894 Kitan	Jingtang rebn, 936 Gaozu feared chg of plan, sent Weihaan to expln pros & cons, Jingtang-Kitan agmt confirmed 89:1162 Sang Weihaan biog  936 Kitan didn't agree to Dejun's proposals 98:1310 Dejun biog  at Tuanboyu, 936 Taizong stuck to deal 137:1833 Kitan
49	w Dejun heard Jin'an fell, to Tuanboyu 76:1247 biog  936:int 11, 31 Dec Dejun etc escaping, pursued, 10,000+ surrendered 3:39 annals	936:11 Jin'an fallen, Gao Mohan reached Tuanbo, fought Tang, army scattered, 10,000 dead 2:17-18 annals	936:int 11, 28 Dec- c.2 Jan Jin'an fallen, Gao Mohan reached Tuanbo, fought Tang; w Dejun, gens fled, soldiers scattered, 10,000 dead, w Dejun S to Luzhou, army straggled after 280:9159		936:int 11, 28 Dec Jin'an fallen, w Dejun, gens fled S from Tuanboyu, trps crowded into defile 48:667 annals  Jin'an surrender, 936 Zhaos, S bk to Luzhou, 10,000 died, survivors gathered at Luzhou 98:1310 Dejun biog
50			936:int 11, aft 2 Jan (937) Gao Xingzhou to Luzhou, advised surr 280:9160		Gao Xingzhou to Luzhou wall, advised surr, offering terms 98:1310 Dejun biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
51	936:int 11, c.1 Jan (937) Kitan army caught Zhaos; led trps to surr 3:39 annals  at Tuanboyu Taizong caught Zhaos; surrd 76:1247 biog	936:11 at Luzhou, Zhaos surrd, chained, sent away 2:18 annals  Taizong reached Luzhou, Zhaos to meet him at Gaohe, chained, sent to Liao 16:163 biog	936:int 11, 4 Jan (937) Jin emp, Kitan ruler reached Luzhou, Zhaos met them at Gaohe, Kitan ruler kind, Zhaos asked for reward, Jingtang resented persistence, Zhaos chained, sent to Liao 280:9160	936:int 11, 4 Jan (937) Zhaos rebd v Tang, came to surr, taken N 8:78-9 annals  Y surrd, only Fan Yanguang didn't 51:578 Fan Yanguang biog  Deguang chained Zhaos, took them N w him 72:893-4 Kitan	936:int 11, 4 Jan (937) Jin Gaozu, foreign king reached Luzhou 48:668 annals  936:int 11, 4 Jan (937) Jingtang to Zhaoyi, tk surr of Zhaos 76:992 annals  Zhaos came to surr to Kit, welcomed Gaozu, G not polite, Zhaos chained, taken to foreign parts 98:1310 Dejun biog  Gaozu to Luzhou, 936 Zhaos capt'd by northern court 98:1311 biog  Zhaos came out of Luzhou to surr to Kitan, chained, ordered to follow in retinue 137:1833 Kitan
52		936:11? emp dow interview 2:18 annals  in Liao? emp dow interview 16:163 biog	936:int 11, c.4 Jan (937) emp dow interview 280:9160-1	emp dow interview 72:894 Kitan	mother of the nation interview 98:1310 Dejun biog
53	936:12, 22 Jan (937) overnight at Xihe, examined Zhaos & surrendered army 3:40 annals				
54	after Dejun's death md Youzhou <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Yan 76:1247 biog	after Dejun's death released, given job 2:18 annals  after Dejun's death released, given job 16:164 biog		Dejun's death md Youzhou <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Yan 72:894 Kitan	after arrival md Youzhou <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Yan 98:1311 biog



	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
55	alt 937 md Liu Jing Youdu adminwenxue 86:1322 Liu Jing biog				
56	c.938 Youzhou chgd to Nanjing, Y bec <i>liushou</i> , md <i>zong</i> <i>shannan shi</i> 76:1247 biog	c.938:1 Mid Kdm people employed, Y md <i>shumishi</i> 2:20 annals  Huitong c.938 employment for foreigners & Ch, Y md <i>shumishi</i> 16:164 biog	937 Mid Kdm people employed, Y md <i>shumishi</i> 281:9185		then md <i>shumishi</i> <del>eene</del> <del>shengshiling</del> 98:1311 biog, cf. below  938:11 new reign era, Y md <i>shumishi</i> , Youzhou md Nanjing, Zhao Siwen md Nanjing <i>liushou</i> 137:1833 Kitan
57		938:8 Jin gifts for imp fam 2:21 annals	938:8, c.31 Aug Jin presents for imp fam, Han Yanhui, Y 281:9188-9		
58	st. 936:2-938:11 Y's wife fetched from Jin 76:1247 biog	c.937:1 Liao envoy to <i>Luoyang</i> to collect Y's wife 2:20 annals  Liao envoy to collect Y's wife 16:164 biog	938:9, st.4-13 Oct Kitan envoy to <i>Luoyang</i> to collect Y's wife 281:9190		938:9, 17 Oct Kitan envoy to <i>Luojing</i> to collect lady Zhao 77:1018 annals
59	st. 936:2-938:11 passionate to repay generosity 76:1247 biog				938:9, 23 Oct gave horses in thanks 77:1018 annals

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
60	<p>940:4, 19 May-4June emp to Y's residence, held crt 4:47 annals</p> <p>c.940 emp md formal visit to Y's residence, md him <i>zhengshiling</i> 76:1247 biog</p> <p>942 <i>zhengshiling</i> appointed instead of <i>zhongshuling</i>: Y 47:774-5 zhi</p>	<p>c.937:1 md conc <i>zhengshiling</i> 2:20 annals</p> <p>Huitong c.938 md conc <i>zhengshiling</i> 16:164 biog</p>	<p>aft 937:12, 2 Feb (938) md conc <i>zhengshiling</i> 281:9185</p>		<p>then md conc <i>zhengshiling</i> 98:1311 biog, cf. above</p>
61					<p>942:3, 31 Mar empress wept for d of sister, Y's wife 80:1058 annals</p>
62		<p>942:6 Lulong <i>jiedushi</i>, advised atk on Jin 2:22 annals</p> <p>c.942 advising atk on Jin 16:164 biog</p> <p><del>943 (942) md Lulong <i>jiedushi</i> 16:164 biog, cf. above</del></p>	<p>942:12, Jan (943) Lulong <i>jiedushi</i>, advising atk on Jin 283:9243</p>		
63	<p><del>942:7</del> Qiao Rong &amp; Jing Yanguang's speech 4:52 annals</p>	<p>943:9 Y's man Qiao Rong &amp; Jing Yanguang's speech 2:23 annals</p>	<p>943:9, c.14 Oct Y's man Qiao Rong &amp; Jing Yanguang's speech 283:9253</p>		<p>c.Shaodi accession Jing Yanguang's memo to Qiao Rong 88:1144 Jing Yanguang biog</p>
64	<p>943:12, 1 Jan (944) emp to Nanjing to discuss punishing Jin 4:53 annals</p>				
65		<p>943:12 Yang Guangyuan info for attack, Y urged this 2:23-4 annals</p>	<p>943:12, c.8 Jan (944) Yang Guangyuan info for attack, Y urged this 283:9256</p>		

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
66	943:12, c.1 Jan (944) Y etc formed great army, advanced 4:53 annals  943: winter formed vanguard 76:1247 biog	943:12 led 50,000 Liao trps, planned conq on promise of empship, served w all might 2:24 annals  led 50,000 trps, planned conq on promise of empship, told Jin Y their master, Y served w all might 16:164 biog	943:12, c.8 Jan (944) led 50,000 Mid Kdm trps, planned conq on promise of empship, told Jin Y their master, Y served w all might 283:9256	--	c.944 sent to manage S affairs on promise of empshp, led frontier expansion campns 98:1311 biog
67	944:1, 28 Jan w Zhao Yanzhao led vanguard to Renqiu 4:53 annals	944:1 w Zhao Yanzhao heading for Beizhou 2:24 annals  <del>945 (944)</del> w <del>younger brother</del> Yanzhao led 50,000 to take Beizhou 16:164 biog	944:1, 29 Jan frontier posts repd Y, Yanzhao +50,000 heading for Beizhou 283:9260		944:1, 29 Jan 4 prefs repd Y, Yanzhao +50,000 cav coming to Ganling to help Yang Guangyuan 82:1084-5 annals
68	944:1, 2 Feb surdd Beizhou, Shao Ke let Liao in, Wu Luan drowned self 4:53 annals  aft 943: winter took Beizhou 76:1247 biog	c.944:1 Shao Ke let Liao into Beizhou, Wu Luan drowned self, 10,000 killed 2:24 annals  <del>945 (944)</del> Wu Luan died, 10,000 killed 16:164 biog	944:1, 2 Feb Shao Ke let Liao into Beizhou, Wu Luan drowned self, 10,000 killed, Kitan advanced 283:9261	w Deguang took Beizhou 72:895 Kitan	944:1, 2 Feb Kitan tk Beizhou, Wu Luan killed self, Kitan advanced 82:1084-5 annals
69				Y acquired Tang Jingsi when Beizhou atkd 49:557 Tang Jingsi biog	Tang Jingsi capt'd when Beizhou fell, Y knew name, took him on 124:1635 Tang Jingsi biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
70	944:1, 12 Feb emp at Yuancheng, Y md WeiBo etc <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Wei, camp at Nanle 4:53 annals  943: winter md WeiBo etc <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Wei 76:1248 biog	c.944:1 Liao emp camped at Yuancheng 2:24 annals  945 (944) Taizong at Yuancheng, Y at Nanle, md WeiBo <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Yan 16:164 biog	944:1, c.11 Feb Kitan ruler at Yuancheng, Y at Nanle, md WeiBo <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Wei, 283:9263	944:1, 14 Feb Kitan at Yuancheng, Y raided Nanle 9:93 annals	944:1, 14 Feb 30-40,000 Kitan cav at Yuancheng; Y md WeiBo <i>jiedushi</i> , prince of Wei; daily displayed banners 82:1085 annals
71	943: winter defd Jin at Nanle, captd Sai Xiangyu 76:1248 biog		944:1, c.24 Feb Cai Xingyu captured in battle 283:9264		944:2, c.27 Feb Cai Xingyu sent v Kitan, ambushed, captd at Majiadu 82:1086 annals
72	944:2, aft 27 Feb Li Shouzhen etc defd Kitan Mada's army at Majiakou 4:54 annals  camped at Yuancheng Li Shouzhen, Gao Xingzhou fought, Kitan defd them 76:1248 biog	944:2 Li Shouzhen defd Liao (Mada) 2:24 annals	944:2, 2 Mar Li Shouzhen defd Kitan (Mada) at Majiakou, didn't dare come E 284:9266		944:2, 2 Mar Kitan at Majiadu destd by Li Shouzhen 82:1087 annals
73	944:3, 27 Mar plan 4:54 annals  Liao army at Dunqiu rainstorm, about to wdraw, Y plan 76:1248 biog	944:3 Liao feigned abandonment of Yuancheng, ambush at Dunqiu, rain stopped them, morale low, Y plan 2:24-5 annals	944:2, c.18 March Kitan feigned abandonment of Yuancheng, ambush at Dunqiu, rain stopped them, morale low, Y plan 284:9267-8		944:2, c.18 Mar Kitan falsely abandoned Yuancheng, cav ambush at Dunqiu, morale low, Y plan followed 82:1088 annals
74	944:3, c.27 Mar w emp heavily defd Gao Xingzhou at Qicheng 4:54 annals  led light inf v Gao Xingzhou, enemy scattered 76:1248 biog	944:3 Liao emp fought Gao Xingzhou, Kitan wdrew 2:25 annals	944:3, 27 Mar Kitan ruler fought Gao Xingzhou S of Qicheng, Kitan wdrew 30 <i>li</i> 284:9268		944:3, 27 Mar w emp fought Gao Xingzhou S of Qicheng, Kitan wdrew 30 <i>li</i> 82:1088 annals

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
75	944:3, 5 April Zhao Yanzhao left to defend Beizhou 4:54 annals  army returned ¥ left to patrol Bei, Ji, Shen 76:1248 biog		944:3, c.29 Mar Zhao Yanzhao left at Beizhou 284:9268  (944:5, 13 June fled 284:9272)	--	944:3, 7 Apr Kitan emp left Zhao Yanzhao to defend Beizhou 82:1089 annals  (944:5, 13 June fled 82:1090 annals)
76	944:3 w Mohan discussed helping Qianning jun, good omen 76:1249 Mohan biog				
77	944:int 12, 27 Jan (945)-945:1, 17 Feb Liao surrounded Hengzhou, took its 9 counties, pillaged 4:55 annals	944:int 12-945:1 Liao again in force to atk, Y led vangd ahead to Xingzhou, Liao burned crops 2:26, 3:28 annals	944:int 12, c.14?-17 Feb (945) Liao again in force to atk, Y led vangd ahead, to Xingzhou, Kit pillaged 284:9280	<del>945</del> Kitan invdd, Y's vangdsurdd Zhenzhou, pillaged, tk counties, S to Xingzhou 47:532 Huangfu Yu biog	944:int 12 w Deguang, whole army invaded, surdd Hengzhou, tk counties, vangd to Xingzhou 83:1098-9 annals
78			945:1, 1-3 Mar Fu Yanlun +500 Jin outfaced Y's huge retreating army returning to Xiangzhou 284:9281-3		945:1, 1-2 Mar Fu Yanlun +500 Jin outfaced large Kit retreating army at Xiangzhou 83:1100 annals
79					945:2 letter inviting Y, false response 84:1118 annals
80	945:3, 16 April tk Qizhou, killed Shen Yun 4:55 annals	945:2 at Qizhou, Shen Yun accused Zhaos of treachery 3:28 annals	945:2, st 28 Mar-3 Apr at Qizhou, Shen Yun accused Zhaos of treachery, Qizhou fell, Yun suicide 284:9284	944 at Qizhou, Shen Yun accused Zhaos of treachery, Qizhou fell, Yun suicide, family captured 33:362-3 Shen Yun biog	<del>944</del> (945):winter at Qizhou, Shen Yun accused Zhaos of treachery, Qizhou fell, Yun hanged himself, family captured 95:1266-7 Shen Yun biog  945:3, 16 April Kitan took Qizhou, Shen Yun died 83:1101 annals

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
81		945:4 Jin tk Suicheng, surrd Y trps scared Du Wei, retreat to Yangcheng 3:29 annals	945:3, 3-4 May Jin tk Suicheng, surrd Y trps scared Du Wei, retreat to Taizhou 284:9288		945:3, 3-5 May Du Wei retk Suicheng, to Taizhou bcs of surrd Y trps info 83:1102 annals
82	945:3, 6 May (30 April?)-11 May led vanguard to Taicheng, battle of Botuanwei cun, Kit wdrew 4:55-6 annals	945:4 Liao arrived in force, battle of Botuanwei cun, Kit heavily defd 3:29 annals	945:3, 6-11 May Kitan vangd arrived, battle of Botuanwei cun, Kit wdrew 284:9288-9		945:3, 6-11 May Kitan vangd arrived, battle of Botuanwei cun, Kit wdrew 83:1102-3
83	945:4, 1 June Liao who hadn't fought well beaten 4:56 annals	945:4 Liao chieftains beaten bcs of defeat 3:29 annals	945:3, c.11 May Kitan chieftains beaten bcs defeat, only Y spared 284:9290	945:1 Deguang beat chieftains, only Y escaped 72:895 Kitan	945:3 Deguang beat offls, only Y escaped 137:1834 Kitan
84	945:6, 3 Aug repd gen drove off Jin attk on Gaoyang 4:56 annals				
85	945 besieging Zhen Jin sent Y's relative Zhao Xingshi w invitation, Y tricked Jin from strongholds by saying wd come home if they sent an army 76:1248 biog		946:7 Youzhou peop said Y wanted to come home, believed, Y asked for army to meet him, Xingshi to fix time 285:9306	letters enticing Y, Jin to send army to meet him 72:896 Kitan  letter enticing Y, offered to surr if Jin brought army 52:595 Li Shouzhen biog	946:3-7 Du Wei & Zhao Xingshi letters enticing Y, Y asked to be met w army, crt gladly believed, Xingshi to fix meeting place 84:1118 annals
86	946:9 defd Zhang Yanze at Dingzhou 4:57 annals	946:8 Zhang Yanze defd Liao N of Dingzhou 3:30 annals	946:9, 4 Oct Zhang Yanze repd defd Kit N of Dingzhou, Taizhou 285:9310		946:9, 9 Oct Zhang Yanze repd destd for bandits at Dingzhou border 84:1117 annals
87			946:9, c.26 Oct Feng Yu, Li Song wanted to send army to welcome Y, Liu Yanzuo 285:9311	Li Song believed Y 57:654 Li Song biog	c.946-7 Li Song, Feng Yu discussed sending army to meet Y 89:1170 Zhao Ying biog

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
88	945 Du Chongwei sent w army to meet Y 76:1248 biog	946:10 Du Wei etc led army v Liao 3:30 annals	946:10, 10 Nov Du Wei etc md campn cdrs 285:9312		946:10, 10 Nov Du Wei etc md campn gens 85:1121 annals
89	946:11, 27 Nov Liao emp surrdd Zhenzhou 4:57 annals				
90	946:11, c.5 Dec Du Chongwei etc defending Zhongdu fortress v Y etc blockade 4:57-8 annals  945 tk Zhongdu qiao, killed Wang Qing, held bridge 76:1248 biog	946:12 blockade to prevent Jin joining w Hengzhou forces, Jin comms cut 3:30-1 annals	946:11, 23-30 Dec Kitan holding Zhongdu qiao, Yanze attkd, Kitan burned bridge, retreated, blockade to prevent Jin joining w Hengzhou forces, Jin comms cut 285:9315-7		
91	946:12, 4 Jan (947) Du Chongwei etc w 200,000 to surr 4:58 annals  945 Du Chongwei surrd 76:1248 biog	946:12 Du Wei etc planned surr, emp offered empship, Wei surrd 3:31-2 annals	946:12, 2-4 Jan (947) Jin cut off, Du Wei etc planned surr, emp said Y no gd, offered empship, Wei surrd 285:9318-9	<del>e-946:7</del> Jin cut off, Du Wei etc surrd 72:896 Kitan	946:12, 10th (4 Jan, 947) Du Wei, Li Shouzheng led armies to surr to Kitan 85:1123 annals
92	945 emp gave Y red robe to deal w army, greeted at camp 76:1248 biog  946:12 (947) shared surrd trps w Du Chongwei 4:58 annals	946:12 in red robe to camp to deal w army, Wei's red robe a sham 3:32 annals	946:12, 4 Jan (947) in red robe to camp to deal w army, his affair, greeted, Wei's red robe a sham 285:9319	<del>e-946:7</del> Y given Ch & red gown to deal w army, Wei given gown 72:896 Kitan	Jin surr at Zhongdu to deal w army, given gown, troops are yours etc, greeted 98:1311 biog
93					entered Bian 947 w Feng Dao protected officials 126:1660 Feng Dao biog
94				Deguang about to hold court, (947:2?) hat incident 72:898 Kitan	

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
95			947:1, 2 Feb recommended Li Song's talent 286:9330	entered Bian 947 had praised Li Song 57:654 Li Song biog	entered Bian 947 praised Li Song's talent 108:1421 Li Song biog
96				jade pillow said to have been sent to Wu 30:331 Shi Hongzhao biog	entered Bian 947 said to have sent He Fuyin w jade pillow to show sincerity to Huainan 107:1404 Shi Hongzhao biog
97		947:1 urged using Jin army on frontier, they avoided execn 3:35-6 annals  948 (947) argued for lives of Jin army at Chenqiao, use on frontier, avoided repeated massacre 16:164-5 biog (shows loyal, honest disposn 16:165 comm)	947:1, c.2 Feb argued for lives of Jin army at Chenqiao, avoided execn 286:9331		entered Bian 947 argued for lives of surrd trps at Chenqiao, use on frontier, avoiding repeated massacre 98:1312 biog
98			947:1, c.14 Feb son Kuangzan md Huguo <i>jiedushi</i> 286:9333		
99		947:1 was denied food supps for trps, Kitan plundering 3:36 annals	947:1, c.16 Feb was denied food supps for trps, Kitan plundering 286:9334		947:1 Y's mother brought food to Jin emp 85:1127 annals
100					947:1, 25th (18 Feb) gave Zhao Siguan +units to son Zan 109:1441 Zhao Siguan biog
101	Bian conquered 947 got Li Song to ask for Y to be heir app, Y promoted 76:1248 biog	947:2 felt Kitan ruler reneged, requests to be heir app, promoted 3:36 annals	947:2, c.24 Feb felt Kitan ruler reneged, Li Song requested Y to be heir app, promoted 286:9339	Bian conquered 947 got Li Song to ask for Y to be heir app, transferred 72:897 Kitan	at Bian long time Li Song requested Y to be heir app, increased favour 98:1312 biog



	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
102	<p>Bian conquered 947 Zhang Li request for 4 new posts, given 2 76:1248 biog</p> <p>947:2, 1st day md <i>da chengxiang</i> conc <i>zhengshiling</i>, <i>shumishi</i>, Zhongjing <i>liushou</i>, giver of titles 4:59 annals</p> <p>947 <i>da chengxiang</i> appointed: Y. md Zhongjing <i>liushou</i> at Zhenzhou 47:775, 48:804 zhi</p>	<p>947:2 Zhang Li request for 4 new posts, given 2 3:37 annals</p> <p>947:2, 1st day Liao emp wanted single overseer 3:37 annals</p>	<p>947:2, c.24 Feb Zhang Li request for 4 new posts, given 2 286:9339</p>	<p>aft Jin conqd, c.947 Zhang Li request for 4 new posts, given 2 72:897 Kitan</p>	<p>Zhang Li request for 4 posts, given 2, Kuangzan Hezhong <i>jiedushi</i> 98:1312-3 biog</p> <p>947:2, 1st day md <i>da chengxiang</i>, conc <i>zhengshiling</i> appointed <i>shumishi</i> conc Zhongjing <i>liushou</i> 137:1835 Kitan</p>
103			<p>947:2, c.22 Mar m Mingzong's daughter, treatment of concubine Wang 286:9346</p>	<p>Kitan in capital 947 wife died, given a sister, concubine Wang at marriage 15:160 Wang biog</p>	<p>while at Bianzhou stole another daughter of Mingzong as wife 98:1313 biog</p>
104					<p>emp at Xingzhou prom above Kitan L&amp;R chief mins 98:1313 biog</p>
105			<p>947:4, aft 1 May w Zhang Li blamed for wasted cities 286:9352</p>	<p>returning N, c.947 w Zhang Li blamed for wasted cities 72:899 Kitan</p>	
106		<p>947 resented broken promise, said wdn't go to Longsha again 16:165 biog</p>	<p>947:4, c.14 May resented broken promise, said wdn't go to Longsha again 286:9356</p>		
107		<p>947:4, day emp died resented broken promise, trps to Hengzhou, didn't know Wuyu accepted 4:42 annals</p>	<p>947:4, c.14 May trps to Hengzhou, acknowledged Wuyu, hadn't known Wuyu accepted 286:9356</p>		

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
108		947:4 claimed chg of S, told circuits, treated Wuyu as a gen, Wuyu had keys, Y advised to plan for trouble 4:42 annals  Taizong died (947:4) falsely claimed chg of S 16:165 biog	947:4, c.14-15 May claimed chg of S, told circuits, treated Wuyu as a gen, asked for keys, didn't know of preps, Y advised to plan for trouble 286:9356-7	Deguāng died 947:4 claimed chg of state, asked for keys, Y advised to plan for trouble 73:901 Kitan	947:4, c.14 May at Zhenzhou, declared self in chg of state affairs 99:1329 annals  death of emp 947:4 told circuits was in chg of S 98:1313 biog
109					947:4, 19 May making appointments 99:1329 annals
110		947:4 Li Song argued against receiving congrats 4:42 annals	947:4, 21 May Li Song argued against receiving congrats 286:9357		
111	merit manifest, mistaken to covet throne 76:1253 comm	947:5 summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will 4:42-43 annals  c.947:4 Wuyu locked Y up 16:165 biog	947:5, 23 May summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will, pardoned Y's party 287:9358	947:5, 23 May summoned by Wuyu, arrest, no will, Y interrogated, property confiscated 73:901-2 Kitan	947:5, c.23 May imprisoned by Wuyu, forged will 100:1331 annals  947:6, 1st day (2 July) locked up by Wuyu, property divided 98:1313 biog
112	Shizong acceded 947:5 md <i>shumishi</i> for merit 76:1248 biog		947:5, 8 June envoy to tell Kuangzan his father in prison 287:9362		
113					947:6, 22 June Kuangzan restored as Hezhong <i>jiedushi</i> 100:1332 annals

	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
114			947:7, c.31 July rumoured dead, advised trans Huguo <i>jiedushi</i> Kuangzan, md Jinchang <i>jiedushi</i> 287:9368		947:7 (Kuang)zan md Jinchang <i>jiedushi</i> 100:1334 annals
115			947:7, c.31 July Du Chongwei hoped to use 2000 Y trps in rebn, failed 287:9369		
116			948:1, c.17 Feb old Y servant advised Kuangzan not to join Shu, submit to Han, saying Y didn't choose to join Kitan 287:9382		
117	948:10, 8 Nov died as Nanjing <i>liushou</i> , prince of Wei 5:64 annals  948 died 76:1248 biog	2 yrs after 947:5, 949 died amongst Kitan 16:165 biog	2 yrs after 947:7, 949 died 287:9368		died amongst Kitan 98:1313 biog
118					Kuangzan served Han and Zhou 98:1313 biog

## Chapter Six

### Li Huan 李澣

Although Li Huan is not one of the earliest arrivals in Liao, information on him is scattered and confused, as can be seen in Table 5. We can only be reasonably certain of a small amount of information. He served the Later Tang and was on the staff of prince Congrong 李從榮 when he rebelled. Huan was of a literary persuasion and held several scholarly posts, several of them as a member of the Hanlin, both before its abolition by Jin Gaozu and after its re-establishment. He must have been in Bian 汴 when it fell to the Liao in 947, and was one of a group of Jin officials who, when most of their colleagues were left behind at Zhenzhou 鎮州, were taken north to Liao. There he received employment, and seems to have acted as some kind of spy and fifth columnist for the southern regime of Zhou, where his older brother was an official. Probably as a result of this, he tried to escape to the south. He died in Liao in 962.

None of the accounts discussed here are clearly derived from any single one of the others, with the exception of the sole, scant mention in the QG, which, as usual, follows its parallel passage in the TJ with a few insignificant changes. It is clear that some of the later sources have made use of some of the earlier ones in compiling their own versions of Li Huan's life, but this usage is inconsistent. Information is taken in a haphazard way, seemingly from a number of different sources, and then recombined with a great deal of rewriting and apparent alteration. The close borrowings amount to only a few sentences at most, in contrast to the lives of earlier, and perhaps more important, figures. This means that differences between texts are more likely to be the result of differing source material than of editorial input. Whereas the filiation of the LS from earlier major works has allowed us to draw inferences from the adjustments made to successive texts, it is less possible to do this for the SS.

Li Huan is the earliest of the case studies to have a biography in the SS. This was compiled separately from the LS,<sup>1</sup> and its independence means that for the first time we have a control for the story provided in the LS. The material in the SS on Li Huan is likely to have come into the archives via Huan's older brother Tao 李濤, who always served southern regimes. Probably Tao's family records provided the information for the more detailed picture of Huan's early life given in the SS, and Tao's continuing links

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1. See Introduction.

with his brother are the likely source of the information for the SS version of Huan's espionage activities.

Materials additional to those found in the standard histories are unusually plentiful for Huan. They are also especially important, as much was not transmitted from these to the official works, leaving a number of incidents which do not appear in the standard histories. Most of these materials are collected in the LSJSBM, but the LSSY and LSSYB, upon which the LSJSBM drew, contain rather fuller versions of some incidents, which the LSJSBM has edited down. These extra incidents are not included in Table 5, but they are discussed in the text here. Unfortunately although Huan's own writings were collected into the *Dingnianji* 丁年集 after his death, we cannot compare these with the official record as the *Dingnianji* does not survive. On the other hand, we do apparently have the text of three of the letters sent by Huan in his role as a spy. These are preserved in the CFYG and have since been collected into the QTW, the QLW, and other works. There is also one poem written at the Jin court, preserved in the *Yuhu qinghua* 玉壺清話,<sup>2</sup> and now found in other collections. Finally, the *Siku tiyao* and the QTS claim that this Li Huan was the author of the *Meng qiu* 蒙求, a children's primer. However, Song writers credited the work to a Li Huan who lived under the Tang, and this attribution has been proved by the discovery of a Japanese copy of the *Meng qiu* with Tang colophons, and another work with the same colophons at Dunhuang 敦煌.<sup>3</sup>

### Early career and reputation

Huan's name means 'to wash,' or 'purify.' His *zi*, Rixin 日新, means 'daily renewal' or 'constant progress.' From the TJ (Table 5, §1) we learn that he was the great-grandson of Li Hui 李回, a *zaixiang* 宰相 (grand councillor) under Tang Wuzong 唐武宗 (840-846).<sup>4</sup> Hui was a distant descendant of one of the cadet branches of the Li house which founded the Tang, so Huan had in his veins some tiny proportion of imperial - and probably of Shatuo - blood.<sup>5</sup>

From here the SS takes over to provide the fullest account of Huan's early life (§2-7.) Being of a literary bent he is conventionally described as being a bright youth. The formula is sustained by his having been said to have imitated Wang 王, Yang 楊, Lu 盧 and Luo 駱 in his essays. This refers to the *Chu Tang sijie* 初唐四傑 or Four Worthies of early Tang: Wang Bo 王勃, Yang Jiong 楊炯, Lu Zhaolin 盧照鄰 and Luo Binwang

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2. Full references are given in the relevant discussions below.

3. Bi Suojuan, *Shi shuo jinjian de Liaoban shuji* - 'Meng qiu,' *Wenwu* 1982:6, pp.20-8.

4. Hu Sanxing's note tells us who Li Hui was; he has a biography in JTS 173:4501, but none in the XTS.

5. See Chapter 9, n.10.

駱賓王, whose *pianwen* 駢文 style was the standard for court documents.<sup>6</sup> According to the early Song writer Su Yijian 蘇易簡,

Huan used ornate language which was especially beautiful, he was foremost in superior talent<sup>7</sup>

and this view is echoed in several of the additional sources. Huan's emulation of famous writers in the court style suggests not only his talent, but that he had court ambitions.

He was evidently already in the capital, and his talent already recognised at a senior level, by about 932. In that year the king of the southern state of Wuyue 吳越, Qian Liu 錢鏐, died,<sup>8</sup> and the *bingbu shilang* 兵部侍郎 (vice-minister of the ministry of war) Yang Ningshi 楊凝式 was ordered to write the memorial tablet for the spirit road (§3.) According to the JW, Ningshi was in fact *zuo sanqi changshi* 左散騎常侍 (left policy advisor) at this time, a chancellery post with responsibilities including constant availability to answer the emperor's questions.<sup>9</sup> It was perhaps his workload which prompted him to order Li Huan to draft the memorial tablet for him. This ran to over 10,000 characters and 'was elegant and vigorous and much praised by the capable people of that time.' How Ningshi came to know of Huan and his talent is unknown. It is also unclear whether it was right for Ningshi to delegate in this way, and whether it was Ningshi or Huan who took the credit for the tablet. That Ningshi's behaviour was not quite proper is suggested by the version of the story in the *Wudai shi bu*.

Yang Ningshi once received an edict to write a memorial tablet for Qian Liu. He considered that his own writing was not up to that of Huan and so he bought a lot of excellent wine and summoned Huan to drink. As soon as he got drunk (Ningshi) made (Huan) write (the tablet) for him, and in the course of the night it was completed. Altogether it was 15,000 characters long, and at no point were the phrases not reasoned or the allusions not plentiful. Ningshi praised and admired it for long time.<sup>10</sup>

This account does not reflect so well on Ningshi, whilst linking appreciation of Huan's talent with his reputation as a great drinker, of which we will hear more.

### Vicissitudes in official service

It could have been Yang Ningshi's sponsorship which swiftly brought Huan what appears to be his first official posting, to the staff of Tang Mingzong's son, the prince of Qin 秦王, Congrong. A passage in the SS biography of Zhao Shangjiao 趙上交 tells us

6. See William Nienhauser, 'Prose,' *Companion to traditional Chinese literature*, ed. Nienhauser, esp. pp.105-8.

7. Su Yijian (958-996), *Xu Hanlin zhi* 續翰林志, quoted in LSSYB 5:123; LSJSBM 18:346.

8. Probably 932:7, 5th August. JW 43:592. TJ 277:9065-6 gives the date of his death as 932:3, 6th May.

9. Ningshi received this post on 931:intercalary 5, 8th July (JW 42:579) and was promoted to *gongbu shilang* 工部侍郎 (vice-minister of the ministry of works) in 932:11. At this time he is said to have been right policy advisor, probably a mistake (JW 43:596.) Details of the post in des Rotours, *Fonctionnaires*, pp.141-2 &n.

10. WDSB 3:6a-b.

that Huan, along with Zhang Hang 張沆 and Yu Chongyuan 魚崇遠, was a new *jinshi* (*boyi* 白衣)<sup>11</sup> in Congrong's administration, and that these people were friends with Shangjiao. Shangjiao himself fell foul of Congrong and so was posted away from the capital. The name he thus made for himself seems to have saved him when the prince made his coup attempt in 933:11, for Shangjiao was spared the trial and exile which faced most of his colleagues. Huan was evidently included in this punishment as his own biography notes he was forced to return to his place of origin. It is clear from Zhao Yanshou's 趙延壽 pleadings in the previous chapter how dangerous it had been considered to be in the vicinity of Congrong and his activities, let alone to serve under him. Yanshou had the leverage to be able, eventually, to get away from court, but a provincial posting was no haven for lesser officials: the TJ tells us that at the time of his banishment<sup>12</sup> Huan was *xunguan* 巡官 (inspector) of Henan 河南 (§5.) It also tells us that he was one of a total of six thus banished, and it is tempting to think that these might have included Huan's colleagues Zhang Hang and Yu Chongyuan.

The SS resumes that after 'a long time' Huan was made *jiaoshulang* 校書郎 (editor in the palace library, 9a1) and Jixian *jiaoli* 集賢校理 (sub-editor in the Academy of scholarly worthies, unranked.) The latter post was a Tang creation revived under the Later Tang restoration by Mingzong's successor Mindi 唐閔帝 (933:12-934:4),<sup>13</sup> implying that Huan was another beneficiary of the favour distributed by new emperors immediately upon taking the throne. It has already been noted that Zhao Yanshou added to his titles in this transition,<sup>14</sup> but for Huan his new appointments would have meant much more: they brought him out of disgrace and back to the imperial court. Without the transfer of power, there is no telling how long he might have remained in provincial obscurity. There is no mention of Huan under Tang Feidi 唐廢帝, but he was evidently re-employed by Jin Gaozu, as during the Tianfu 天福 era (936-944) he was made *you shiyi* 右拾遺 (right reminder, 8b), responsible for amending the omissions in the emperor's conduct, and shortly after that became a Hanlin academician 翰林學士. The Hanlin appointment is the first information provided about Huan in the JW, which dates it to 937:11, 26th December (§8.) Like Mindi, Jin Gaozu made a mass of appointments and reorganised the bureaucracy in order to help consolidate his position on the throne,<sup>15</sup> and Huan's career was again the beneficiary of the prevailing situation. He must have

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11. *Boyi* was an unofficial reference to new *jinshi* of especial promise.

12. Dated to 933:11, 14th December.

13. WDHY 18:305-6.

14. He was given the honorific position of *jianjiao taishi* 檢校太師 (acting grand preceptor.)

15. There are pages of appointments: JW 76:993-1000.

come to the attention of the emperor, because only a few months after his Hanlin appointment, on 14th March, 938:2, the JW observes that Huan 'was granted scarlet robes and a fish tally' (§9.) The fish tally was the badge of rank worn at the waist by officials of the fifth grade and above, but it appears that the tally and dress accorded to this rank could be bestowed extraordinarily by the emperor.<sup>16</sup>

Then, on 17th October, 940:9, the JW, XW and TJ (§10-11) record that Jin Gaozu abolished the Hanlin academicians and transferred their duties to the *zhongshu sheren* 中書舍人 (secretariat drafters.) According to the JW, the next day Gaozu gave new posts to several former members of the Hanlin, including Li Huan. Huan had been *zuoyou buque* 左右補闕 (rectifier of omissions, 7b1)<sup>17</sup> and was now made a *libu yuanwailang* 吏部員外郎 (bureau vice-director in the ministry of personnel, usually 6b), a post in the six ministries. The XW adds that not only were the academicians of the Hanlin abolished; those in the Duanming palace 端明殿 and the military secretariat (*shumi yuan* 樞密院) also disappeared. This is not the place to try to explain the real motive behind the abolition,<sup>18</sup> but in the XW and TJ a somewhat dubious reason is implied.

Both the XW and TJ immediately precede their brief notices of the abolition with remarks that Li Huan was fond of drink and that Jin Gaozu disapproved of this. Ouyang says that Huan

often drank to excess, and Gaozu considered him frivolous. In [940]:9, he ordered the abolition....;

the TJ that Huan

was irreverent and flippant, and often did things under the influence of strong drink; the emperor detested him, (and) on 17th October discontinued the office....

The proximity of these comments to the abolition implies a causal relationship, although there is nothing in the Chinese to make this explicit.<sup>19</sup> A further suggestion that aspects of Huan's behaviour might have been unacceptable comes from Chen Jiru's 陳繼儒 *Gujin shi hua* 古今詩話, quoted in the LSSY.<sup>20</sup>

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16. A similar case of a Hanlin academician given this honour (for his sincerity) is noted from the Tang by Han Yu 韓愈, in his *Dong gong xingzhuang* 董公行狀, quoted in the *Hanyu da cidian* 漢語大詞典, vol.9, p.888.

17. Huan seemingly held both left and right posts, the left under the *menxia* 門下 (imperial chancellery), the right under the *zhongshu* 中書 (imperial secretariat.)

18. Although Wang discusses the bureaucrat-retainer power struggle at the Later Tang and Jin courts (ch.6, *passim*), he does not consider this abolition or its significance. See next note for a Yuan view.

19. The Yuan commentator Hu Sanxing assumes that Huan's drunkenness did indeed have a causative effect regarding the abolition. Hu notes that as the academicians of the chancellery had already been discontinued, only the Hanlin academicians remained as Confucians (*rusheng* 儒生) close to the emperor. By further contrasting the correctness of stopping Huan's drunken actions with the incorrectness of abolishing all the academicians because of the intemperance of one, Sanxing implies that Huan's drinking was just an excuse for Gaozu to remove the last representatives of the 'Confucian' interest from his close circle.

20. Chen Jiru 陳繼儒 (1558-1639.) LSSY 21:399, also an abridged version in LSJSBM 18:346.



When Huan graduated as a *jinshi*, he was examined by He Ning 和凝. Later he served with the official in charge of the examinations [He Ning], both as (Hanlin) academicians. When Ning was made a grand councillor, Huan became a *chengzhi* [recipient of edicts], with responsibility for commenting on edicts. The next day in (He's) private residence, (Huan) opened up grand councillor He's cupboards without permission, took all the books and objets d'art and went off with them, and left a poem on the bed which said,

The official in charge of the examinations has risen in his employment and ended up in the phoenix palace,

(But) your disciple who is commenting upon edicts was the top graduate.

In the cupboards of your private residence there are many precious objects;

These can be gifts in gratitude for my literary efforts, can't they?

People all laughed at his presumptuousness.

As this passage comes from the Ming 明 it must be treated with greater than usual caution, but we can probably date the incident to He Ning's appointment as *zhongshu shilang pingzhangshi* 中書侍郎平章事 (manager of affairs and vice-director of the imperial secretariat) in 940,<sup>21</sup> and accordingly it is tempting to see an intemperance in Huan's behaviour that matched his intemperance in drink, contributing further to turn Gaozu off him.

Gaozu's successor Chudi 晉出帝 re-established the military secretariat and the Hanlin academicians during the Liao-Jin war,<sup>22</sup> but apparently the people who got the posts were all his 'intimates and long-standing officials.' This group seems to have included Li Huan as according to the JW and TJ he was amongst a number of officials appointed or restored as Hanlin academicians four days after the re-establishment, on 20th July (§13.) The JW says that at the time he was a *libu langzhong* 禮部郎中 (bureau director in the ministry of rites, 5a) and was now also made *zhizhigao* 知制誥 (participant in the drafting of proclamations.) Exactly one year later, on 20th July, 945:6, he was made a secretariat drafter.

### Arrival in Liao

This is where the LS begins its account (§16-19.) The first entry in Li Huan's biography states that earlier he had served the Jin as secretariat drafter and that he 'pledged allegiance' (*gui* 歸) to the Liao when Jin fell. As the SS says that Li Huan 'fell into the hands of the enemy' (*xian* 陷) along with Xu Taifu 徐台符 at the fall of Bian, it is evident that Huan, serving in his posts as a court literatus, was amongst the Jin officials in the capital who surrendered en masse to the Liao emperor. He and Taifu were then taken 'north of the border' (*saipei* 塞北) with the LS annals noting that they were in a party including Feng Dao 馮道, Li Song 李崧, He Ning, and Zhang Li 張礪, which

21. JW 127:1672.

22. In 944:6, 28th June and 16th July respectively.

accompanied Liao Taizong as he began his return from Bianzhou to the north on 24th April. Zhang Li had been in Liao for ten years by this time, but Dao, Song and Ning were all senior bureaucrats who had survived the conquest. The critical factor in this group, however, seems to be not so much their seniority in Jin as their established administrative or literary talent,<sup>23</sup> and it is presumably for this that the relatively junior Taifu and Huan were picked out.

This group of officials were with the emperor up to his death near Zhenzhou on 15th May, and remained there during the short period of confusion as Zhao Yanshou and Taizong's son Wuyu 兀欲 converged on Zhenzhou to claim the throne. Feng Dao, Li Song and He Ning are named amongst the officials summoned to the drinking party at which Wuyu had Zhao Yanshou arrested,<sup>24</sup> but when the new emperor (Shizong 世宗) departed north, he left behind these ministers, who returned their allegiance to the south.<sup>25</sup> Shizong did, however, take Xu Taifu and Li Huan north with him, along with Jin Chudi's harem, his eunuchs and the college of musicians.<sup>26</sup> According to the WDSB, at this point Huan was 'specially detained because of his talent,'<sup>27</sup> but given the company he was keeping we might wonder whether this refers to his talent for writing, or for drinking. The imperial entourage headed first to Nanjing 南京 (Youzhou 幽州) and then on to Shangjing 上京, a route reiterated in Li Huan's LS biography. There we also learn that Gao Xun 高勳 was in the same party, which will turn out to be important later on. The biography continues that once in Shangjing, Huan was once more made a Hanlin academician, and the *baiguanzhi* 百官志 notes a move to the Xuanzheng palace 宣政殿 after the accession of Liao Muzong 遼穆宗 in 951:9. The SS dates the Xuanzheng appointment to Shizong's accession, apparently confusing emperors (§21.)

Muzong also gave Huan the post of *gongbu shilang* 工部侍郎 (vice-minister of the ministry of works, 4a.) This turned out to be the culmination of successive promotions, making him second-in-command of one of the six ministries<sup>28</sup> and raising him above the directorship of a sub-bureau which he held in the Jin. However, promotion at this

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23. As noted in biographies, and evidenced in surviving works: Feng Dao, JW 126:1655-66; XW 54:612-5; QWDSB 9:150-1; Li Song, 108:1419-21; XW 57:653-5; He Ning, JW 127:1671-4; XW 56:639-40; QWDSB 11:191-9.

24. Only the TJ mentions He Ning. TJ 287:9358; QG 4:42, cf. JW 100:1331.

25. In 947:9, TJ 287:9377. Shizong left behind almost all the people whom Taizong had been taking north.

26. This is the only event recorded by the QG about Li Huan. It is not clear what Shizong's rationale was in choosing this particular set of people to take north, because Taizong had complained about the idleness of the lesser Jin officials (LS 4:60), and had previously followed advice to take those in the most senior positions first (TJ 286:9348-9.) Shizong's choices seem even more extraordinary given that the Liao could now pick and choose from almost the entire Jin official body.

27. WDSB 3:6b.

28. LS 47:779. This follows the Tang system.

unexceptional rate was not enough to win Huan over, for the remainder of the accounts in both biographies are concerned with Huan's spying and subversive activities.

### Espionage

Given that we would expect spying to be top secret, we have a remarkable amount of information on these matters. This runs to seven accounts in various sources.<sup>29</sup> All the main texts we have been using here give abridged versions of the story, explaining only part of what happened and creating great confusion when the texts are compared. This is despite the fact that the CFYG (as quoted in the LSJSBM)<sup>30</sup> gives a coherent account of the story, including, apparently, the texts of all three of the letters mentioned.<sup>31</sup> The inaccessibility of the CFYG was enough to deter even Sima Guang from using it, leaving it to the SS biography to provide the next fullest account, presumably from information held by Huan's brother Li Tao and within the Li family's close circle.<sup>32</sup> The TJ account remains scanty, while the concentration of the LS on the events following the discovery of the conspiracy suggests that its full extent may never have been known to the Liao.

The following chart expands upon entries §23-29 of Table 5 with the addition of the CFYG account.

**Table 5a - Li Huan's espionage activities**

	SS	LS	TJ	CFYG (LSJSBM 18:346)	JW
(23) a	d Wuyu 951 on good terms w Xiao Haizhen 262:9063 biog		bef 952:6, 12 July good rels w Haizhen, spy w letter 290:9479	Youzhou <i>jiedushi</i> Xiao Haizhen got on well w Huan	
(23) b	d Wuyu 951 taking opportunities, persuaded Haizhen to give allegiance to S 262:9063 biog	bef 952:6, 2 July w Xiao Meigude (Haizhen) planned to flee S 6:70 annals (cf. §k)	bef 952:6, 12 July persuaded Haizhen to come to allegiance 290:9479	talked about Mid Kdm, Haizhen admired it/desired (to go)	

29. There are two different versions in the LS, accounts in the JW, TJ and SS, and in the CFYG and TJ *gangmu* 綱目. The last two are quoted in LSJSBM 18:345-6.

30. The inaccessibility of the CFYG, the lack of references in the Chinese works which quote it, and time pressures have precluded a search for the original story. In this case, the LSJSBM version is more than sufficient to provide a framework for accounts in the main texts with which we are concerned here. It is hoped that in future, use can be made of Hiraoka Takeo's chronological arrangement of the CFYG at Kyôto University.

31. Collected in Miao Quansun, *Liao wen cun*, 3:4b, 7b-8a, 5:10a, and in QLW 4:72.

32. Biographies were usually based heavily upon the *vita* written after the subject's death by a family member or close associate. See Twitchett, *Writing of history*, pp.66-70.

	SS	LS	TJ	CFYG	JW
(23) c	952 secret report of Kitan weakness via Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou 262:9063 biog			Ding spy Tian Chongba arrived, involved in secret plans, Huan letter to Ding leader (Sun Fangjian)	
(24) d	952 praised by Zhou Taizu 262:9063 biog			Zhou Taizu heard of this matter	
(25) e	952 Zhouzu sent spy w rescript, asked for more information 262:9063 biog			Taizu ordered Chongba to present a rescript	
(26) f		Tao a Hanlin scholar in Bian, sent secret invitation to Huan 103:1450 biog		Taizu ordered Tao to send secret family greetings to Huan	
(27) g				Huan sent letter of thanks <u>Letter 1</u>	
(27) h			bef 952:6, 12 July sent Ding spy Tian Chongba w report 290:9479	Huan also reported on secret matters <u>Letter 2</u>	952:6, bef 12 July report on classified matters, Haizhen to come to allegiance 112:1482 annals
(27) i	report urging invasion 262:9063 biog		bef 952:6, 12 July letter to Tao urging invasion 290:9479	Huan also wrote to Tao urging action <u>Letter 3</u>	
(28) j	952 Mid Kdm too busy 262:9063 biog		952:6, 12 July spy reached Daliang, Mid Kdm too busy 290:9479		952:6, 12 July report arrived, congratulations 112:1482 annals
k		(bef 952:6, 2 July w Xiao Meigude (Haizhen) planned to flee S 6:70 annals (cf. §b)			

	SS	LS	TJ	CFYG	JW
(29) I	once fled 262:9063 biog	excuse of needing treatment in Nanjing, escaped 103:1450 biog  952:6, 2 July plan discovered, edict 6:70 annals			

The basic story is that Huan convinced the Kitan Xiao Haizhen 蕭海貞 that he should cross to the Central Plains, and that in connection with this there was secret communication between Huan and the south. What each recorder brings to the story, and what each text does with it, varies far more than has been the case with our earlier *subjects*. *There is less overlap in the knowledge shared by every text*, reflecting the wider range of original sources for the texts which are left to us. It may also give some indication of just how secret clandestine operations could be.

The JW account, found in the annals, is short and to the point:

(On) 12th July, the former Hanlin academician Li Huan sent up a report from within Kitan setting out a memorial on urgent and secret matters, and also saying that the false Youzhou *jiedushi* Xiao Haizhen wanted to plan to come to allegiance; the emperor deeply commended him [Huan.]

This notice is greatly expanded in the CFYG, which gives details of the covert discussions and communications which led up to the overt event recorded in the annals (Table 5a, §a-h.) This account relates how Xiao Haizhen got on well with Huan, and how in the course of conversation Haizhen expressed his admiration of the Middle Kingdom, and perhaps his desire to go there.<sup>33</sup> It appears that it was only when the spy Tian Chongba 田重霸 arrived from Ding 定, apparently quite by chance, that these conversations were turned into ‘secret plans.’ Huan wrote to Chongba’s master in Ding, who evidently informed the Zhou emperor, and thereafter Huan’s communications, whilst still sent via Chongba, went straight to the southern court. Zhou Taizu encouraged Huan by sending him a rescript and instructing Huan’s older brother Tao, a Zhou minister, to send ‘family greetings.’ Huan’s three letters in reply are quoted in the CFYG (§g-i): a simple letter of thanks for the emperor’s generosity, a ‘Report to the throne on secret matters’ detailing the manoeuvring that had been necessary to negotiate Haizhen’s crossing, and a reply to Huan’s brother urging swift action to secure the best outcome for the Middle Kingdom:

33. *Mu* 慕 can mean ‘desire’ as well as ‘admire.’

The present emperor is proud and foolish, he loves nothing but playing polo; he is addicted to his wives and concubines, and he certainly does not have an overall ambition. Looking at the general course of events, it is not like it was before; his intimates and senior ministers also harbour rebellious intentions, (and) accordingly (one can) recognise (his) [the emperor's] weakness. .... You (should) take advantage of this time when they are in disorder and weakness to plan for peace. If it is decided to come with a punitive expedition, just be quick; if it is rather decided to make peace, then also just be quick. In the future it will certainly not be possible to help Hedong (so) much (as now.)<sup>34</sup>

The background to these events was the rivalry between the Zhou and Northern Han, and the Liao support for a failed Han attack on Zhou in 951:9.<sup>35</sup> Xiao Haizhen was a member of the consort clan, and the brother-in-law of the former emperor Liao Shizong, who had married Haizhen's older sister. The brief records of this incident are all we know of Haizhen,<sup>36</sup> so we cannot speculate far upon his motivation. It is unlikely to have been related to the political situation in Liao, as according to the SS, it was the current emperor Muzong who appointed Haizhen to the Youzhou governorship. This suggests that Haizhen was in favour, not danger. The CFYG says that he 'admired' the Middle Kingdom, but this seems an inadequate reason for such a highly placed Kitan nobleman to change allegiances; even the sinophile Yelü Bei 耶律倍 had not fled until his life was threatened.<sup>37</sup> Like Bei, though, Haizhen's province of Youzhou was on the border, neighbouring Dingzhou, which was under the control of Sun Fangjian 孫方簡. Fangjian was originally a petty leader whose choice of Liao suzerainty had brought him the governorship, which he then retained upon his return to Central Plains allegiance.<sup>38</sup>

From the CFYG, it appears to have been Fangjian's sending of the spy Tian Chongba which prompted Huan to move on a stage from talking about the Middle Kingdom, to start communicating with the south. Fangjian, in his frontier location, was acting independently from the court as frontier governors had been doing for years, and as he had himself done several times within the last six years in order to attain his current position. However, it is clear that he was not now as autonomous in fact as his predecessors, or he himself, had only recently been, for he very quickly referred the matter of Xiao Haizhen upwards to the court. Although he was able to act on his own initiative, he did this not on his own account, but as a representative of the Zhou emperor.

As for Huan, he shows every sign that he is maintaining a loyalty to the southern court. His letter to his brother shows Huan's evident desire for the Middle Kingdom to

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34. Yu xiong Tao shu 與兄濤書, quoted in *Liao wen cun* 5:10a, and QLW 4:72. Also found in QTW 861:13a.

35. See Chapter 1, p.46.

36. Also known as Meigude 眉古得.

37. See Chapter 1, p.31.

38. See Chapter 1 and Table 1, #84.

recover the northern prefectures, and his enthusiastic embrace of 'secret plans' to subvert Haizhen is just one practical way of trying to realise this desire. Huan's 'Report to the throne on secret matters' is not easy to follow in detail, but does convey the depth of Huan's involvement. It suggests that Haizhen was not prepared simply to hand himself over to the Zhou, but wanted first to be sure of the terms under which he would be received. Haizhen says he has

decided to send somebody to take a silk (secret) letter up to the emperor of the southern court to ask him to mobilise troops to come here,

and that he has the reports of the detained Zhou envoy Yao Hanying 姚漢英,<sup>39</sup> implying he could hand these over as evidence of his good faith. But he seems hesitant to actually send his letter, apparently because he lacks any response from the Zhou court. It is Huan's action at this point which encourages Haizhen to continue with his plan.

It seems that Huan had been expecting a Zhou imperial rescript for Haizhen. When the spy Chongba arrived bearing only Li Tao's 'family greetings,' and without any rescript for Haizhen, he (Chongba?)

did not dare to make this known (to Haizhen), and [Huan] was on the point of sending Tian Chongba back again.

Huan recognises that without written acknowledgement from the Zhou, Haizhen might change his mind. Meanwhile, the messenger carrying Haizhen's draft invitation (to show Huan) was terrified about the situation, so Huan offered reassurance by showing him, apparently, an imperial rescript. It is not clear what this document is or why seeing it would have eased the messenger's mind, but when Haizhen heard about this he was delighted, and summoned Chongba for a series of talks. Haizhen still wanted written acknowledgement of Zhou good faith, but despite the earlier fears, was in fact willing to discuss detailed terms with Chongba first. The 'Report' demonstrates that Huan was working hard to bring about Haizhen's crossing, in order to serve what he believed were the interests of the Zhou.

The account in the TJ condenses the story (§b, h-i.) Rather than detailing intrigue, the TJ notes only that Huan 'persuaded Haizhen to come to allegiance.' It says that Huan sent a report via Tian Chongba and a letter to his brother, but quotes only the latter. It does, however, tell us one outcome, which is that

(On) 12th July, Chongba reached Daliang 大梁, but it so happened that the Middle Kingdom had many concerns and was not able to proceed in this matter.

As the LS annals record that on the very same day the Zhou launched an attack on Northern Han,<sup>40</sup> it is hardly surprising that the Zhou were distracted. In fact, this

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39. Table 1, #149.

40. LS 6:70.

particular attack is not confirmed by the other sources, and it is likely that the distractions were more to do with the rebellion of Murong Yanchao 慕容彦超 and Han attacks on Zhou, rather than the other way round.<sup>41</sup> This is not to say that Zhou Taizu would not have been pleased if Haizhen had brought Youzhou over on his own account, but to send an army to help him would have meant fighting on another front, and the Zhou were too busy struggling to establish themselves to indulge in such risks unnecessarily.

This result is picked up by the SS (§i), which also, like the CFYG, gives details of the events between Haizhen's decision to cross and Huan's recommendation of swift action. The SS version emphasises how proactive Huan was in this matter (§b-c.) He

seized the opportunity to sweet-talk Haizhen with a plan to return to the south, and Haizhen accepted it. In 952, Huan, by means of Sun Fangjian of Dingzhou, secretly reported on the weakened state of the Kitan ....

Where the CFYG has been taken to imply that Huan did not turn conversation into action until the arrival of Sun Fangjian's spy, the SS biography gives the impression that Huan, having already primed his target to switch allegiances, was casting around for ways to bring the Zhou in on the scheme.

In return for his situation report, Huan received a rescript of 'comfort' carried by Tian Chongba, who also brought a request for Huan to continue providing information (§d-e.) It is this request which produces Huan's report on the self-indulgence of the Kitan ruler, and the rebelliousness of his ministers, along with the recommendation that a swift attack will bring peace. However, as was noted in the TJ, 'the Central Plains had many concerns and could not make use of his information.' As a final point, the SS mentions that,

(w)hen Huan was in Kitan, he once fled back home and was captured by them, (so) he was guarded with total watchfulness (at all times.)

It is this aspect upon which the LS alone expands (see Table 5, §30-36), in two versions of the story which give different details.

It is not at all clear how the two versions fit with each other, or with the events in the other sources. Huan's LS biography observes that at some point after Muzong's accession, Huan's brother Li Tao sent him a secret invitation or summons: a communication which we can equate with the 'family greetings' mentioned in the CFYG. The biography says that 'when Huan received the letter,' he tried to escape, and then details his consequent actions, to which we shall return.

Meanwhile, the annals relate that on 2nd July, 952:6, Huan, along with the *zhengshiling* 政事令 (director of the department of administration) Xiao Meigude 蕭眉古得 (Haizhen's Kitan name) and others, 'planned to flee south.' There is no doubt

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41. Murong Yanchao rebelled in 951:12. TJ 290:9469ff; JW112:1479ff.



here that what Haizhen and Huan had planned was an escape. This is in contrast to the suggestion in the southern sources that the plan was for a transfer of territory or internal support for a southern attack. Both of these latter had the most serious political connotations at the highest level, whereas a plan 'to flee south' merely involved a few individuals. The disparity in what was seen to be at stake could suggest a damage-limitation exercise at some point in the compilation of the LS, in which the seriousness of the incident was scaled down. A more intriguing possibility is that although 'the matter was discovered,' the Liao may simply have been unaware of the full extent of the plot. If Huan and Haizhen were expecting a positive response to their offerings it would not make sense for them to flee, because they would be waiting for a Zhou army to march north. This suggests that fleeing south was the conspirators' Plan B, undertaken as a result of the Zhou inability to launch such an attack (see Table 5a, §k.) It is also logical to suppose that it was Huan's failed attempt to escape, recorded in his biography, which led to the discovery of Haizhen's involvement in what appeared to the Liao to be a high-level escape plan, as recorded in the annals. The possibilities are endless, but it is not the plot to which the LS biography pays most attention, but the aftermath of the escape which it produced.

Huan's attempt to flee was well-planned.

When Huan received the letter [from Tao], he used a pretext to request medical treatment in Nanjing, changed his clothes and slipped out at night, wanting to escape back to Bian.

Judging from his appointments as academician and vice-minister in one of the six ministries, he was probably based in Shangjing. By contriving an excuse to get to Nanjing, he shortened the distance to the frontier without arousing suspicion. It was still about 150km, and Huan only got halfway, to Zhuo 涿, before he was captured by a frontier patrol. This raises questions about the consistency of border surveillance, for although it indicates that there were established patrols, we have to set that against the movements of the spy Tian Chongba, who crossed the frontier at least three times in pursuit of his mission, apparently without let or hindrance, and travelled at least as far as Nanjing, if not to Shangjing itself, all without detection.<sup>42</sup>

Having captured the fugitive, the patrol escorted Li Huan back to Nanjing, where he was demoted to the minor ranks. Then,

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42. There is also a problem regarding the location of the action. Huan's posts and the LS imply that everything happened in Shangjing, but Haizhen's appointment and the mention of 'official quarters' in Huan's 'Report' suggest Nanjing, and the shorter distance from the frontier would have made this easier for Chongba. This possibility is supported by the presence of an official establishment at Nanjing for running the Chinese part of the empire, but it is not clear whether Huan's positions would have allowed him long-term residence there. It is perhaps most likely that the action was split between these two capitals, a possibility reinforced by the peripatetic nature of the Liao court.

Huan watched until his jailers were sound asleep, then used his belt to hang himself. However, he did not die and he was guarded even more closely. He was fettered to go to Shangjing, and threw himself into the middle of the stream of the river Huang 潢河, but a cable restrained him and again he did not die.

Although two out of three subjects of the preceding case studies also made escape bids, the relative ease of their return to Liao stands in contrast to Huan's repeated attempts at suicide. The immediate spur for these was evidently his failure to escape, but there is nothing to tell us why he felt that his last remaining option was to kill himself. He could have regarded it as the honourable course of action now that he was unable to return to the south, but on a less rational level, he could simply have feared the wrath of the emperor and seen suicide as his only way out. Once Huan had faced the emperor, he did not try again, so it is the latter explanation which makes most sense of his actions.

In fact, the emperor wanted to execute Huan, but he was saved by another Liao Chinese acquired in 947, Gao Xun. Xun had been a *gemen shi* 閤門使 (commissioner of memorial reception staff) serving in Du Chongwei's armies 杜重威,<sup>43</sup> and not directly a colleague of Huan's, but since the LS notes earlier that Xun and Huan were together in the party of selected officials sent north by Liao Shizong, it is implied that they got to know each other then. Xun rose fast under the Liao and was now commissioner of the military secretariat (*shumishi* 樞密使.) In repeated representations to the emperor, Xun argued,

Huan is not essentially ungrateful for the generosity he has received, but because his mother is eighty years old, his worry about visiting her has brought him to his misdeeds. Moreover, Huan is rich in his capacity for literature, and at present there are few who could compare with him, and if he were kept to supervise the wording of edicts, he could glorify the national prestige.

The emperor lifted the death sentence on Huan, and we can date this to 952:8 because it is at this point that the annals account slots back in (§36.) According to this, in 952:7, four Kitan ministers who had 'planned disorder' were arrested, and the month after that were executed, along with Xiao Haizhen. At the same time Li Huan was merely beaten and released, apparently the only conspirator to survive. That Huan was also the only Chinese named as being involved might have said something about the general treatment of Chinese officials at this point in the Liao dynasty, but from the biography it is evidently more of a reflection on the continuing need for sponsorship amongst the Chinese bureaucracy, whichever regime they were in. It has already been shown how sponsorship, given and received, affected the careers of all three of the preceding case study subjects.

On the face of it, the LS version of this incident is a curiously equivocal account. It does not mention any espionage or subversive activities, whilst Huan's reluctance to

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43. Table 1, #91. Biography at LS 85:1317.

serve Liao is given far more stress than in the other texts, amongst which only the SS mentions the escape attempt at all. As already noted, this could be mostly a matter of what was known to the respective recorders, but even if this were the case, it still seems strange that so much emphasis should be given to a story reflecting so badly upon the Liao emperor. In fact, though, Liao Muzong is treated without sympathy in the LS, which, detailing his excesses, prompts the Yuan compilers to comment that the rebellion against him 'was indeed proper!'<sup>44</sup> Huan's suicide attempts, made out of fear, contribute to this negative image of Muzong, but on the other hand, the mercy and openness to reason elicited from him by Gao Xun suggests both a more human side and the good influence of Chinese ministers upon non-Chinese rulers.

This version of the story also shows most clearly a Li Huan subject to the demands of filial piety. First he responds to a 'summons' to return south from his older brother, to whom, according to the Five relationships, he owes obedience.<sup>45</sup> Later Gao Xun argues under the same rubric to save Huan's life, playing on the filial attachment of son to mother, and an aged mother at that, to excuse Huan's behaviour. This is set against Muzong's interpretation of Huan's actions as ungratefulness - tantamount to disloyalty - and so reworks the theme of the tension between loyalty to family and loyalty to ruler.

Although Huan survived the wrath of Muzong, he was confined at the Fengguo temple 奉國寺,<sup>46</sup> surrounded by mountains, suffering 'all forms of privations and hardships.' Six years later it was again Gao Xun who came to his rescue, recommending that nobody else was capable of writing the planned commemorative tablet for Liao Taizong. Huan was freed and made *libu shangshu* 禮部尚書 (minister of the ministry of rites, 3a) and academician of the Xuanzheng palace 宣政殿學士. He died shortly afterwards; according to the SS, in 962:6 (§39.)

The SS tells us that Huan's brother Li Tao gathered his writings into the *Ding nian ji*, a work named with reference to the Han 漢 official Su Wu 蘇武 (c.143-60 B.C.), who had received his first commission in the year he came of age (*dingnian* 丁年.) Su Wu was sent as an envoy to the Xiongnu 匈奴 and was held for nineteen years without submitting to them, thereby becoming a watchword for continuing loyalty to the south. The *Dingnian ji* must have been incomplete; it is most unlikely that Tao could have had access to Huan's works produced in Liao, which would have included the commemorative tablet to Liao Taizong.

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44. LS 6:77-7:87.

45. He maintains this despite Tao's improper behaviour with Huan's new wife. WDSB 5:8a; abridged in LSSY 21:399; LSJSBM 18:346.

46. This temple survives, although much of it was rebuilt during the Jin 金, at Yixian 義縣 in Liaoning 遼寧.

It is a shame that this does not survive, as Huan's draft for it was probably the most important piece he ever wrote: according to the LS it was not until the emperor had approved the text that Huan was released. Hence it is seen to be Huan's own talent which ultimately brought him freedom, although he needed a sponsor in order to get the chance to exercise his skill. This is the only mention of Huan's literary abilities in the LS, as that work chiefly concerns itself with his reaction to recapture, but the effect of the remark is to reinforce the importance of learning, a skill appreciated in every regime. This comes at the end of an account which otherwise, in contrast to the southern sources, does not mention Huan's talents. There are shades here of the Confucian idea that *wen* 文 could civilise the barbarian, but these are perhaps more a reflection of the subconscious minds of the various historiographers than the conscious decisions of the actors themselves. In recommending Li Huan's literary talent it seems unlikely that Gao Xun thought much beyond the desire to give Huan a chance to redeem himself: the edification of the Kitan would surely come a very poor second to the practical concerns of individuals.

It seems characteristic of Huan that he was unlucky in being frequently in the wrong place at the wrong time. His life seems mostly one of uncertainty, misfortune and hardship, and his greatest achievement was probably to survive at all. His career perhaps shows something of the less successful end of official service in tenth-century north China, and given the praise he received for his compositional abilities, we might wonder what he would have achieved if he had been born in the more stable times which followed his death. More importantly for our purposes here, though, Huan's experience reflects at an individual level the changing circumstances brought by the political developments of the first half of the century. There was no longer such a shortage of Chinese bureaucrats in the Liao regime, and the work of establishing a bureaucratic administrative apparatus for which the earliest arrivals were enlisted had been more or less completed by 947, with such success that an ineffective and unpopular emperor could hold the throne for 18 years without the state collapsing. This (and Muzong's temperament) meant that escapers could no longer be certain of generous treatment. Meanwhile in the south, the trauma of the Liao conquest added impetus to the recovery of central power by helping to start the polarisation of the Central Plains and Liao into two clear groups demanding an unequivocal choice. Huan's extremely active expression of a continuing loyalty to the Central Plains contrasts markedly with the behaviour of our earlier subjects, but even so, he accepted the opportunity for rehabilitation offered him by Gao Xun, and returned to Liao employment. In turning down the chance to refuse office and thereby display his continuing loyalty to the south, Huan ultimately rejected black-and-white morality in favour of a practical shade of grey.

Table 5 - Li Huan: parallel texts

References	SS	208:5349; 262:9062-63 (biography) (commentary), 9066
	LS	4:60; 6:70; 47:779,782; 103:1450 (biography)
	QG	4:43
	TJ	278:9095; 282:9218; 284:9273; 287:9364; 290:9479; 294:9601
	XW	29:320; 73:902
	JW	51:694; 76:1009; 77:1013; 79:1043; 82:1091; 84:1108; 112:1482, 1483; 119:1586 (wife lady Dou 119:1586)
	LSH	shang 15b
	LSJ	4:9b
	LSSY	21:399-400
	LSSYB	5:123
	LWC	1:3a (29)
	LWK	shang:30a
	QLW	72
	QTS	11:770:8748
	QTW	861:12a
	QWDS	12:265
	QWDSB	11:203
	SSXB	72:5a

**Notes** See Table 2: Han Yanhui. There are two references in the CB (up to 1005) to a Li Han 李瀚. Han 瀚 can be used as an alternative to the character usually given for Huan 澣, and the QTS mistakenly gives Han for Huan, but the CB references are to 977 and 979. Huan died in 962.

SS	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
			Tang Wuzong 841-6 ggrandfather Li Hui <i>zaixiang</i> 278:9095		

	SS	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
2	youth bright, essays 262:9062 biog					
3	c.930 draft for Yang Ningshi 262:9062 biog					
4	on Congrong's staff 262:9062 biog <i>boyi</i> under Congrong 262:9066 Zhao Shangjiao biog					
5	Congrong defeated, c.933 forced back to countryside 262:9062 biog			933:11, 14 Dec Henan <i>xinguan</i> , w 5 others forced back to countryside 278:9094		
6	after long time md <i>jiaoshulang</i> , Jixian <i>jiaoli</i> 262:9062 biog					
7	c.936-44 md right <i>shiyi</i> 262:9062 biog					
8	shortly after md Hanlin scholar 262:9062 biog					937:11, 26 Dec right <i>shiyi</i> ; md Hanlin scholar 76:1009 annals

SS LS QG TJ XW JW

9						938:2, 14 March given scarlet robe, fish tally 77:1013 annals
10			940:9, bef 17 Oct irreverent, drunk, emp detested him 282:9218		drank, emp considered him frivolous 29:320 Sang Weihai biog	
11			940:9, 17 Oct Hanlin scholars abolished, duties to <i>zhongshu sheren</i> 282:9218		940:9 Hanlin (+Duanming palace, <i>shunmiyuan</i> ) scholars abolished, duties to <i>zhongshu sheren</i> 29:320 Sang Weihai biog	940:8(9), 17 Oct abolished Hanlin scholar yuan, duties to <i>zhongshu</i> <i>sheren</i> 79:1043 annals
12						940:8(9), 18 Oct Hanlin scholar, L&R <i>bique</i> ; md <i>libu yuanyailang</i> 79:1043 annals
13			944:6, 16 July Hanlin scholars reestablished 284:9273		<i>shunishi</i> Weihai memo for establishing scholars, used intimates and old officials 29:320 Sang Weihai biog	944:6, 16 July Hanlin scholars reestablished 82:1091 annals
14			944:6, 20 July <i>libu langzhong</i> ; md Hanlin scholar 284:9273			944:6, 20 July <i>libu langzhong</i> ; md <i>zhizhigao</i> , Hanlin scholar 82:1091 annals

	SS	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
15		Jin c.936-47 <i>zhongshu sheren</i> 103:1450 biog				945:6, 20 July md <i>zhongshu sheren</i> 84:1108 annals
16	Bian fell 947:1 fell into enemy hands w Xu Taifu 262:9063 biog	Jin fell c.947:1 allegiance to Liao 103:1450 biog				
17		947:4, 24 April from Bianzhou w Zhang Li, Feng Dao etc 4:60 annals				
18		947:4, 15 May emp d at Luancheng 4:60 annals				
19		d Taizong, tumult, 947 w Gao Xun +10 to Nanjing 103:1450 biog	d Taizong Jin offls remained except Xu Taifu, Huan, harem, eunuchs, musicians 4:43 annals	947:5, after 11 June Jin offls remained except Xu Taifu, Huan, harem, eunuchs, musicians 287:9364	accession Wuyu Jin gens & mins left behind, Wuyu tk Xu Taifu, Huan w him to N 73:902 Kitan	
20		later to Shangjing, md Hanlin scholar 103:1450 biog				



	SS	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
21	succession Wuyu md scholar of Xuanzheng palace 262:9063 biog	after 951:9 Muzong md him scholar of Xuanzheng palace 47:782 zhi  (952:6 was scholar of Xuanzheng palace 6:70 annals)		md Qinzhen palace scholar 290:9479		
22		Muzong c.951-69 succ trans to <i>gongbu shilang</i> 47:779 zhi, 103:1450 biog				
23	d Wuyu 951 persuaded Xiao Haizhen to give allegiance to S, report of Kitan weakness 262:9063 biog	952:6, 2 July w Xiao Meigude planned to flee S 6:70 annals		952:6, after 9 July persuaded Haizhen to come to allegiance 290:9479		
24	952 praised by Zhou Taizu 262:9063 biog					
25	952 Zhouzu sent spy w rescript 262:9063 biog					
26		Tao a Hanlin scholar in Bian, sent secret invitation to Huan 103:1450 biog				

	SS	LS	QG	TJ	XW	JW
27	report urging invasion 262:9063 biog			952:6, after 9 July report to Zhou, letter to Tao urging invasion 290:9479		
28	952 Mid Kdm too busy 262:9063 biog			952:6, 12 July spy reached Daliang, Mid Kdm too busy 290:9479		952:6, 12 July report on urgent matters, Haizhen, congratulations 112:1482 annals
29	once fled 262:9063 biog	excuse of needing treatment in Nanjing, escaped 103:1450 biog  952:6, bef 5 July plan discovered, edict 6:70 annals				
30		to Zhuo captured by frontier patrol 103:1450 biog				
31		escorted to Nanjing demotion to minor ranks 103:1450 biog				
32		jailers asleep hanged himself, survived 103:1450 biog				
33	thereafter guarded 262:9063 biog	more closely guarded 103:1450 biog				

JW

XW

TJ

QG

LS

SS

34		fettered to Shangjing threw self into Huang, survived 103:1450 biog					
35		in Shangjing emp wanted execution, Gao Xun <i>shumishi</i> , saved him: mother 80, excellent writer 103:1450 biog					
36		952:8, 28 Aug Meigude et al executed, Huan beaten, released 6:70 annals cf. 103:1450 biog  confined at Fengguo si, 6 yrs hardship 103:1450 biog					
37		estg Taizong tablet Gao Xun recommended Huan, draft, emp pleased, Huan released 103:1450 biog cf. 6:70 annals					
38		<i>mdlibu shangshu</i> , scholar of Xuanzheng palace 103:1450 biog					

JW

XW

TJ

QG

LS

SS

39	962:6 died 262:9063 biog	died 103:1450 biog				
40	Tao collected writings for <i>Ding nian ji</i> 262:9063 biog					

### Wang Jizhong 王繼忠

Wang Jizhong is best-known as a negotiator of the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵. He was a military man who served Song Zhenzong 宋真宗, man and boy. He took his first substantive office in Zhenzong's heir apparent establishment, and then at the imperial court served in the palace armies and in northern regional posts. He was captured in battle fighting the Liao in 1003, accepted employment under Liao Shengzong 遼聖宗, and became so trusted that he was able to push for peace. After the conclusion of the treaty Jizhong was treated generously. He continued to serve Liao in senior regional posts and as a campaign general against Koryo 高麗. He retired in 1022 and died the same year, after 19 years of service to Liao Shengzong.

Although Jizhong fits the criteria of having biographies in both the LS and the southern sources, his case is anomalous. His crossing took place over half a century after the others examined in these case studies, and in a world much changed. By 1003 the Song had ruled in the south for more than forty years, so Jizhong knew no other regime and had experienced none of the transitions of power common to our earlier cases. Instead of seeing a number of powers, of various origins, competing for control of the Central Plains, Jizhong grew up in a period when the Song had become the undisputed masters of both north and south China, and the Liao were the only other serious power in the region. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, in this changed environment cases such as Jizhong's were very unusual, and indeed his was one of the last before the treaty of Shanyuan effectively prevented any further crossings. He was also the first to feel the concrete effects of this treaty, as his request to be recalled south was denied. As a figure thus straddling the transition from one 'world order' to the next his case illustrates how far and in what aspects the definition of the frontier had changed, for he stands at the end of the process we saw beginning with Li Huan 李瀚. Accordingly, our discussion of Jizhong here will not attempt to cover the whole of his life in detail, and in particular will not dwell upon the sequence of events leading to Shanyuan,<sup>1</sup> but will focus instead upon how his story resembles and differs from those of his predecessors.

The texts for Wang Jizhong suffer from the same problems of scattered filiation as do those for Li Huan.<sup>2</sup> Jizhong has a biography in each of the LS and SS, which show no

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1. Jizhong's role in the negotiations which resulted in the treaty of Shanyuan is given detailed analysis by Christian Schwarz-Schilling in his *Friede von Shan-Yüan* (hereafter Schwarz-Schilling), esp. pp.40-50. It would be superfluous to duplicate his work here.

2. See Chapter 6.

sign of consultation between the compilers. The QG is not a source for the LS in this case, as Jizhong does not warrant a QG biography of his own, being mentioned only in the annals and in the biographies of others. As for the SS, although it is said that the DDSL and LPJ are not major sources,<sup>3</sup> in this case the parallel passages are closely derived from the earlier works to the later, with the DDSL being so close to the LPJ as to warrant them being treated here as a single work. The SHY gives extensive coverage to the communications which preceded Shanyuan, but as these are not of direct concern here, the SHY has not been used.<sup>4</sup>

### Career in the Song

As already hinted, Jizhong's early life differed markedly in some respects from our other subjects, and especially from those of the first three case studies. To begin with, his origins lie a good deal further south. Han Yanhui 韓延徽, Zhang Li 張礪 and Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽 all hailed from the northern frontier region, but according to the southern sources, Jizhong was from Kaifeng 開封, where the court was based (§1.)<sup>5</sup> He also acquired his first post in a rather different manner. Whereas the sources are clear that Yanhui, Li and Huan were all given their first appointments on their own merits, Jizhong received his initial posting by virtue of his father (§2-3.) From the SS we learn that Wang Chong 王琬 was a commander of cavalry (*wuqi zhihuishi* 武騎指揮使) stationed at the strategic pass of Waqiaoguan 瓦橋關, and died there, leaving Jizhong an orphan. According to the DDSL/LPJ, it was in recognition of this that Jizhong, at the age of 5, was given a sinecure appointment in the palace as a minor attendant.<sup>6</sup> The position of his father now placed Jizhong within a circle of official privilege, based upon the imperial court, that had not been available to our earlier subjects. It is clear from cases such as that of Zhang Li, the farmer's son, that patronage flourished at every one of the regional courts of the first half of the century, but by the end of the century the erosion of regional power left the emperor as the only source of favour.

A feature remaining from earlier decades is the importance of the pre-accession household of the ruler-to-be.<sup>7</sup> Jizhong's first real recorded posting was as a *jishi zuoyou*

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3. J. Haeger in Hervouet, *Sung bibliography*, p.90.

4. Schwarz-Schilling naturally makes full use of the SHY material.

5. The LS says that Jizhong's place of origin is unknown. Li Huan was also based at court, but acquires a link (admittedly a tenuous one) with the frontier region through his distant association with the Tang royal house, which came from the north.

6. The DDSL/LPJ call him simply a *dianzhi{shi}* 殿直 (侍) (palace attendant), the SS gives his title as *dongxiban dianshi* 東西班殿侍 (palace attendant in the companies of the east and west.) In the SS the causal relationship between his father's death and this appointment is not made explicit.

7. See Wang, *passim*, on the prominence of former gubernatorial retinue officials at the courts of their governor-turned-emperor.

給事左右 (executive assistant-attendant) in the heir apparent establishment of the future Song Zhenzong. According to the SS Jizhong's prudence and virtue won him the personal confidence of the prince, and when Zhenzong came to the throne in 998, Jizhong accompanied him to Kaifeng with the position of *neidian chongban* 內殿崇班 (imperial palace warder) (§4-6.) Just as Li Siyuan 李嗣源 brought his retinue officials Zhao Yanshou and Dejun 趙德鈞 to court with him when he became Tang Mingzong, so Jizhong was given court positions when his lord acceded. The difference was that Yanshou and Dejun could have had no idea that they were serving a future emperor, because Siyuan was not in line for the throne, whereas there was more certainty that the Song heir apparent would indeed become emperor in his turn. Neither was Jizhong faced with serving an heir apparent who was regarded as a danger to his predecessor, as Li Congrong 李從榮 had been, so he had no need to escape his posting or suffer the consequences as Zhao Yanshou and Li Huan had done.

Jizhong's career showed rapid promotion on an overtly military track. The CB tells us that by 1001 at the latest he held the regional post of Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> 雲州 *guanchashi* 觀察使 (surveillance commissioner), but it seems unlikely that he spent much time there because he always held concurrent positions in the imperial armies, with expeditionary duties which took precedence over everyday administration. The sources do not agree exactly on which posts he held when, but the CB, SS and LS all give him the rank of *dianqian duyuhou* 殿前都虞候 (inspector-in-chief of the palace armies.) The CB, followed by the SS biography, gives him the expeditionary position of *fu dubushu* 副都部署 (vice-administrator of the imperial quarters) of first Gaoyangguan 高陽關 and then of Dingzhou 定州, but these are his most senior appointments, coming at the end of about three years of transfers between various northern and expeditionary posts, listed in Table 6, §7-10. By this time it was unusual for a Central Plains emperor to go on campaign in person, and with the increasing separation of civilian and military responsibilities, it was also unusual for senior court officials to do any fighting.<sup>8</sup> This contrasts with the situation in which Zhao Yanshou, as military secretary, led an expeditionary force against Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭. Hence the people commanding the armies of the frontier region were no longer a mixture of military-minded frontier officials and bureaucratic staff, but were now largely military types, like Jizhong. It was a great deal harder for bureaucratic figures such as Han Yanhui or Zhang Li to find themselves in a situation where they could be faced with the option of crossing the frontier, and this is one factor behind the great reduction in individual crossings noted in Chapter 2 for the period after 947.

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8. Trends started by Song Taizu 宋太祖; see Worthy, *Founding of Sung*, pp.66-7, 195ff, 238ff.

## Arrival in Liao

Jizhong's arrival in Liao is detailed in two completely different views of the same event (§11-16.) The northern source, the LS, gives a simple, downplayed description of his capture.

In 1003 the Song sent Jizhong to camp with his troops at Wangdu 望都 in Ding. With his light horse he went scouting against our [Liao] army and met the *nanfu zaixiang* 南府宰相 [grand councillor of the southern administration] Yeli Nugua 耶律奴瓜 and others, who captured him.

The southern sources forswear such a dispassionate account. Having stressed that the Liao 'invaded' the northern borders of Song, they move on to Jizhong's part in the defence, which becomes more dramatic with each retelling.

The DDSL/LPJ imply great praise for Jizhong's courage. Whereas we know that Jizhong was part of an army led by Wang Chao 王超, Sang Zan 桑贊 and Zhou Ying 周瑩, these two sources do not mention the presence of either the main Song defending force or its senior generals. According to them, Jizhong, apparently alone, led the local military to fight the Liao.

At the end of Xianping 咸平 [c.1003] the Kitan invaded. Jizhong led the military of Ding out to fight to the north of Wangdu. Because of the generosity of the favour he had received, he fought hard in his efforts to repay this, but his dress was a little unusual, (so) the Kitan, recognising him, fought with him in one place after another for several days. The relieving force did not arrive and so he fell into the hands of the Kitan. The court assumed he was dead and gave him the posthumous title of Datong 大同 *jiedushi*.

The CB account is more detailed again, and the QG copies it word for word, with two alterations (the QG version shown within [] brackets), and extensive cutting (shown in {} brackets):<sup>9</sup>

[On] 20 May the Kitan invaded. The Dingzhou administrator of the expeditionary imperial quarters Wang Chao {sent an envoy to summon} Sang Zan of Zhenzhou 鎮州 and Zhou Ying of Gaoyangguan {each to bring the troops under their command to assist. Chao sent 1500 infantry ahead to} oppose (the Liao) at Wangdu xian 縣; the next day, arriving 6 *li* south of the town, {they met the enemy, and many were killed.} The vice-administrator of the imperial quarters, {inspector-in-chief of the palace armies and Yunzhou surveillance commissioner} Wang Jizhong, {because he had often met with great generosity, longed to exert himself and was willing to give his all; he fought with the enemy at Kangcun 康村 from sunset until the second division of the night, and the enemy force retreated a little. At daybreak they fought again; the whole enemy host attacked the east flank, they went out behind (the Song) lines and fired the supply route, cutting it off. Jizhong} led the troops under his personal command to {gallop there at full speed} [fight to their last breath], {he} generally displayed himself in ritual clothing (so) the enemy recognised him and surrounded him several tens deep. {His soldiers were all badly wounded, (but) fought to their last breath}, alternately fighting and pulling back; close to Xishan 西山 they (turned) north; when they reached Baicheng 白城, they {fell into the hands of the enemy. [were captured by the Kitan.] Chao and the others accordingly led his troops back to Dingzhou, and sent envoys to report to the court.}

9. English grammar cannot always be preserved when showing the alteration of the text.



The CB has no stake in emphasising Jizhong's role: it makes clear that he was only one member of a much larger force, and makes no explicit suggestion that reinforcements might have been expected. On the other hand, the details given of the battle show that Jizhong faced overwhelming odds, and thus bring out his courage and imply his loyalty. The abridged QG account again clearly places Jizhong as a less senior member of a larger force, but the first phase of the battle is dropped, leaving the more dramatic second phase as ample demonstration of Jizhong's courage.

The SS biography quotes sections of the CB version word-for-word, but also embellishes. It introduces the incident with the vision of a huge Liao invading army, and makes Jizhong the first Song leader to meet the Liao force.

In 1003 several tens of thousands of Kitan cavalry invaded south, they reached Wangdu [in Ding], and Jizhong and the great general Wang Chao, along with Sang Zan and others, led troops to assist it. Jizhong reached Kangcun and fought with the Kitan....

After the Liao cut the Song supply line,

Chao and Zan were both frightened and pulled back their troops, and did not, in the end,<sup>10</sup> go to assist. Jizhong alone, with the troops under his personal command, galloped there at full speed....

The cowardice of the other generals in simply abandoning Jizhong to his fate makes his heroism as he 'galloped there at full speed' that much the greater. The heroic picture is maintained by the suppression here of the information found in the CB (a direct source) and the SS annals that the Song emperor 'sent an edict dispatching 15,000 troops (from) Hedong .... to relieve (Jizhong)' (§15.)<sup>11</sup>

This increasingly admiring view of Jizhong contrasts with the measured Liao account in which he was simply captured while on reconnaissance. There is no suggestion in the LS that Jizhong fell into enemy hands only after a hard-fought *melée*, or of any serious resistance on his part. It could even be suggested that he had no opportunity for resistance. If the LS has minimised the amount of conflict depicted before Jizhong was captured, this is only to be expected, as it was clearly in Liao interests to show crossing to be as painless as possible. Equally, it is in Song interests to make the most of Jizhong's brave resistance, and the southern sources leave us with a picture of Jizhong as a great hero, fighting to the death but being overwhelmed by the enemy. That they do this means that Jizhong stands completely apart from our previous case studies, all of whom are said to have crossed in non-violent circumstances. To be sure, the situations in which they crossed generally resulted from war, but none showed the least sign of individual,

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10. *Jing* 竟 here contains an element of surprise at the outcome.

11. Compiling a dynastic history was a balancing act. Wang Chao's and Sang Zan's biographers were unlikely to accuse them of cowardice, and Wang Chao's biography is careful to record the investigation into accusations of withdrawal. This laid all the blame on two of the deputy-level expeditionary commanders, thus leaving Wang Chao and Sang Zan with official reputations unscathed. SS 278:9464.

active resistance, whether this meant taking up arms, as Zhang Li and Zhao Yanshou could have done, or non-cooperation, as all four could have done. Even Li Huan did not refuse his services when he was offered rehabilitation. As a general, Jizhong clearly had more opportunity to resist by force of arms than did a bureaucrat, but the changed circumstances must also have been a factor. Whereas the general Zhao Yanshou had seen service to the north as an opportunity, Jizhong found it less attractive than the fulfilment of his duty to the Song, even at the risk of death.

### Interpretations of Jizhong's crossing

The contemporary appreciation of such behaviour is demonstrated by the Song court's reaction. Believing that Jizhong had died in the battle,<sup>12</sup> the emperor posthumously gave him the position of Datong *jiedushi*, while his sons were given official posts in a manner echoing Jizhong's first appointment (§16.) What is curious is that by the fourteenth century, the commentators in both dynastic histories regard Jizhong with considerable ambiguity (§17.) The SS is clear that he 'was willing to serve to the death,' but because Jizhong took service with the Liao, the commentator concludes that 'his moral integrity was most certainly compromised.' Such a verdict sits uneasily beside the enhanced heroism found in the biography itself. Moreover, the LS declares,

Since Jizhong was unable to die for his country, even though he concluded peace between the south and the north and was a mirror for knowing people('s character), how could he be worthy of esteem?

Hence his fault in allowing himself to be captured, rather than fighting to the death or committing suicide, is felt to outweigh any positive service. It is quite possible that the main compiler of the three histories project, Ouyang Xuan, wrote both commentaries,<sup>13</sup> which would account for the similarity of views. Whoever the author, there is no mistaking that there is little to be said for Jizhong's behaviour from the official historiographical standpoint of the late Yuan, so it appears that by this time the ideal of loyal behaviour was much more rigid than it had been possible to practise in the tenth century. The earlier cases treated here, where they are commented on at all, are generally appraised positively, in line with their biographies. Jizhong, however, suffered from being the last crosser of serious note before the frontier, and attitudes, solidified. There is an impression that the neo-Confucian commentators would have liked Jizhong to have been a precursor of the 'new world order' which their movement represented, and were disappointed that he had failed them.

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12. Incidentally, this shows the extent of non-communication between the two sides.

13. Chan, *Official historiography*, p.86; Chai Degeng, *Shi ji juyao*, pp.123-4.

Even before the compilation of the dynastic histories, Jizhong became a reference point for those discussing the morality of crossing to the north, and how to deal with it when it arose. The early eleventh-century Song official Jia Changchao 賈昌朝 advanced a pragmatic view in defence of one Liu Ping 劉平, who was captured by Li Yuanhao 李元昊 of the Tangut Xi Xia 西夏.<sup>14</sup> The minor frontier officials accused Ping of submitting to the enemy, and wanted to execute his whole family in punishment. Changchao responded,

The [Former] Han 漢 wiped out Li Ling's 李陵 family [c.99 B.C.]; Ling did not return, and the Han hated him. The former emperor [Zhenzong] treated Wang Jizhong's family generously, and in the end got service from Jizhong. We cannot know what Ping did; if we wipe out his family, then even if Ping is alive, we will not get him to return.

Such an open-minded approach was a practical one, focussed upon the importance of retaining or recovering even single officials from across the borders. Changchao was a court literatus, but the frontier attitude towards Jizhong was even more favourable, as quoted in the LSSY.<sup>15</sup>

Some of the common people and literati of those lands [Hejian 河間] praised him saying, 'The ancients considered that to be entirely loyal, one could only be loyal to a single lord. Now that the Hejian wang 河間王 [Jizhong] has concluded such a happy peace between the north and south, we can say that he is entirely loyal to the rulers of two states.'

Evidently a contemporary view from shortly after 1005, this probably reflects the gratitude of those in the frontier region for the stability brought by the peace. It is immediately qualified by the author, who says:

However, Jizhong himself fell into the hands of a strange state, and could not die accordingly; he brought no benefit to his master and, as one who (continued to) live (even) at the expense of honour, betrayed (that master.)

The uncompromising 'correction' of the contemporary view echoes the dissonance between the SS biography and its commentary.

Such disagreement reflects an ambivalence in the approach to Jizhong which can first be seen amongst contemporaries in the Song. The SS biography of Zhao Anren 趙安仁<sup>16</sup> records that after Jizhong's crossing, a Song official called Yao Dongzhi 姚東之 'repeatedly praised [Jizhong's] talents.' But Anren said,

'Jizhong formerly served in the establishment of the heir apparent, (I've) heard that he is a little cautious, (but) I do not know anything else (about him).'

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14. Jia Changchao's biography, SS 285:9614.

15. LSSY 20:392, quoting *Wang Wenzheng gong bilu* 王文正公筆錄.

16. Not the same person as the Anren who crossed to Liao and became a eunuch. (Table 1, #159.)

Anren's unwillingness to commit himself on the subject of Jizhong's talent, let alone his virtue, constitutes damnation with faint praise, especially when Anren is then himself commended for his ability to cut straight through to the heart of matters.

A more complex ambivalence is presented in the *Yuhu qing hua*,<sup>17</sup> which records the prediction of a fortune-teller about Jizhong:

'This person will surprise you; for half his life he will eat Chinese rice, for half his life he will eat foreign rice.'

Here fate is introduced as a factor in Jizhong's behaviour, and by thus reducing or removing his scope for the exercise of free will, diminishes his responsibility for what happened to him. Because he was not in control of events, he cannot be judged so harshly. Later in the same work we find an account of Jizhong's attempt to return home:

Jizhong wore Chinese clothes and looked south to the (Song) emperor's palace and called himself a subject who had not died [*wei si chen* 未死臣], and weeping he bowed and did not rise.

The picture is of a Jizhong who remained loyal to the Song, which faithfulness further mitigates his questionable behaviour in crossing the frontier. The name he gives himself in this text, 'a subject who had not died,' shows him subscribing to the moral code of loyalty even though he has broken it by taking service with the Liao rather than dying for the Song.

The range of viewpoints found here illustrates the fluidity of attitudes towards the practice of loyalty in the period between Jizhong's arrival in Liao and the compilation of the official histories. Although the earlier cases contribute a certain amount to the continuing discourse on loyalty, the difficult political circumstances of the Wudai rendered it hard to make clear judgements about loyalty. In addition, the position of the JW compilers, who had themselves all crossed from another regime to Song, disinclined them to treat their fellows too harshly.<sup>18</sup> It is only with the historiographers of the established Song, Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang, that we find criticism of crossings between the different Wudai regimes. Even then, where Ouyang Xiu dismisses the officials of the period with blanket condemnation, Sima Guang is a great deal more measured, and reserves his judgement and criticisms for Feng Dao 馮道.<sup>19</sup> The discourse to which all of these writers contributed is the subject of the last two chapters, but before moving on we must briefly consider the remainder of Jizhong's life.

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17. *Yuhu qinghua* 4:3b.

18. See Zhou Jun, Songchu 'erchen,' pp.126ff.

19. XW 54:611-2; TJ 291:9511-3.

### Service under the Liao and the treaty of Shanyuan

The CB and QG say that Jizhong was entrusted with increasingly important jobs under the Liao, while the LS credits the empress dowager with knowledge of Jizhong's worthiness and with getting him his first Liao appointment, as *hubushi* 戶部使 (tax commissioner) (§18.) Once again, the women of the imperial clan were influential in ensuring the employment and advancement of a Chinese.<sup>20</sup>

Not only did the empress dowager get Jizhong a job, the LS tells us that she also provided him with a good marriage, joining Jizhong with the clan of Kang Moji 康默記, an early arrival in Liao whose family were now well-established in the Liao bureaucracy. It is gratitude for these favours which is said to have made Jizhong energetic in his service to the Liao. The fact that Jizhong already had at least three, and probably four, sons at the time of his arrival in Liao did not prevent him from marrying again (§19), and there was another son by this union. We do not know if Jizhong was a widower, but even if his first wife were alive there was no question of her being sent for as Zhao Yanshou's wife had been, because she would have been in enemy, not allied, territory. The Kang marriage does suggest that Jizhong, even having not long arrived in Liao, did not anticipate ever getting back to Song, and it is quite possible that, regardless of his marital status in the south, this was a proper marriage and not the taking of a concubine. Certainly there are later cases of Song merchants living in Korea who had second families there while their first wives waited for them.<sup>21</sup>

From the southern sources (§26) we know that the regular envoys instituted after the treaty of Shanyuan would bring gifts for Jizhong. However, the LS biography places these presents *before* negotiations for the treaty even began. Hence, while the southern sources mark the opening of discussions with special gifts of bow and arrows; in the LS, these same gifts are set in the context of regular present-giving. The southern sources claim that Jizhong's letter opening negotiations was the first indication that he was still alive, but if the LS is right that gifts were sent to Jizhong before this, then that implies the Song knew more than their records are admitting. However, there is no way of proving this, and it is perhaps more likely that the anomaly has arisen by mistake.

Although Jizhong's role in the peace negotiations will not be discussed in detail, the course of events is summarised here as background to points of comparison with the other case studies. According to the southern sources (chiefly the CB), after gaining the

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20. Cf. Han Yanhui, Chapter 3.

21. Luo Jun 羅潛, *Baoqing si ming zhi* 寶慶四明志 j.6, quoted by Sung Shee, The contribution of Chinese merchants to the trade relations between Sung China and Koryo, *Chinese culture* 18:4 (1977), p.11. This is a recurrent phenomenon. Of the Guomindang soldiers who settled on Taiwan, a significant proportion remarried there, despite still having living wives on the Mainland. The lifting of travel restrictions made for some uncomfortable reunions.

trust of the Liao, Jizhong 'seized the opportunity to argue the benefits of a peace,' and succeeded because this tapped into the wishes of the empress dowager to end the fighting. He drafted a letter asking the Song to send an envoy to negotiate, and when this was refused, wrote another. When Zhenzong did agree to send an envoy, the person chosen, Cao Liyong 曹利用, was detained at Tianxiong 天雄 by the official in charge there, Wang Qinruo 王欽若. It was only after further exchanges of letters between Jizhong and the Song court that Liyong was released to go north, and thereafter peace was concluded with remarkable swiftness: according to the CB it took just four days of negotiations. The LS condenses this account and says that the initiative for peace came from the Song side (§21-24.)

Schwarz-Schilling points out how Jizhong's first communication not only set out the reasons for ending the war, but also justified his own conduct in taking service with the Liao.<sup>22</sup> Such justification was also advanced by Han Yanhui, whose stated reason was strictly practical: fear of Wang Jian 王緘. Yanhui appears confident that his rationale will be accepted by the Taiyuan Jin, and although he feels the need to explain his behaviour, he does not apologise for it. Jizhong's reasons suggest he was less self-assured (§21.) First he describes the battle in which he was captured, pointing out for how long he fought, the unpreparedness of the troops, the lack of supplies and the exhausting effects on his forces, the resumption of battle on the second day, and the non-appearance of reinforcements, leading to his capture. He goes on,

It is not only that Wang Chao and the others underestimated the enemy and had not planned carefully enough, it was also my fault (that I was captured.) The northern court, because I had previously served in the palace, and have borne frontier responsibilities, treats (me) with special favour, and places (me) amongst the various ministers. I often recall my parting audience last year, and the kind words which I personally received from your majesty, and (I) serve (the Liao) only in order to rest the people and end fighting. ....<sup>23</sup>

Jizhong is not merely explaining what he did, he is also trying to excuse it. He details the battle in order to scotch any accusations of cowardice, and he meliorates his criticisms of Wang Chao and the other commanders by frankly admitting his own share of responsibility for his capture. In assuring Zhenzong that he has not forgotten the favour received from him, Jizhong addresses the issue of his personal loyalty to the emperor as an individual. In arguing that his sole aim is to end hostilities, he appeals both to the general mood of war-weariness and, obliquely, to the Confucian principle that rulers and officials should seek the best interests of the people, choosing peace in preference to war. If we accept that Jizhong really did write something resembling what the CB quotes, this shows his own consciousness of, and subscription to, a standard of loyal behaviour far

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22. Schwarz-Schilling, p.41.

23. I have referred to Schwarz-Schilling, p.110, but the translation is my own.

higher than that practised by our other subjects. Where frontier crossing had been regarded as normal behaviour in earlier decades, and martyrdom considered extraordinary, now Jizhong felt he had fallen so far short of the expected standard that even as he justifies his actions, he apologises for not dying. This passage is a fine illustration of Song ambivalence towards the treaty of Shanyuan, and thus to Jizhong. The positive aspects of the peace (from the Song point of view) are reflected in efforts to show Jizhong's courage and continuing loyalty, but the uncertainty as to the long-term wisdom of the arrangement comes through in the indications that Jizhong ultimately failed the Song morality test.

The LS version of the opening of negotiations, found in Jizhong's biography, also refers to the benefit of the common people. Here, Song envoys bring Jizhong gifts of a bow, arrows, and a whip, accompanying an imperial directive to ask for peace. The text quoted opens, 'You yourself are in a high position and love to nurture the masses,' thus flattering Jizhong for Confucian virtues. More significantly, the text ends,

You can report secretly (to the Song), and if they [the Liao] consent to make peace, then at that time different envoys will immediately come and request it.

In requesting a secret report from Jizhong, the Song are acting in a tradition of inviting Liao Chinese to act in the interests of the Central Plains regimes.<sup>24</sup> Aside from Li Huan, Zhao Yanshou was also approached in this way. The Song seek to use Jizhong's inside information to ensure that their peace initiative stands the best chance of success, but the fact that this is reported in the LS not only shows the Song as eager for peace, it also suggests that any activities of Jizhong's on behalf of Song were not so secret after all, because the Liao seem to have known about them. If Jizhong had been set up as a Song spy, in informing the Liao of his Song contacts he is acting as a double agent. The dangers of such a double-cross were recognised, and the southern sources, in which the initiative comes from Jizhong, show clearly that however many professions of good faith he made, his initial approach was treated with mistrust by Song Zhenzong. Schwarz-Schilling argues that this was probably mostly for show: a face-saving tactic on Zhenzong's part.<sup>25</sup> Such reasoning does not detract from the possibility that Jizhong was a Song spy, but given that peace was the ultimate goal of both sides, espionage does not seem to be an appropriate rubric under which to consider these events. This is less a matter of espionage, than of the uncertainty in the sources about who Jizhong was really working for and where his loyalties lay.

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24. There is an article by a Chinese scholar which apparently argues that Wang Jizhong was a Song spy deliberately planted in the Liao court, but I have been unable to locate this.

25. Schwarz-Schilling, p.42.

The southern sources say that after the treaty established regular envoy exchanges, the Song missions regularly brought presents for Jizhong. There were precedents for this: Han Yanhui and Zhao Yanshou had both received regular gifts from the Central Plains regimes. In these two cases the presents can be explained by the senior positions of the recipients. Jizhong became a Liao military secretary (*shumishi* 樞密使) in 1019, but his rank in 1005 did not justify the sending of gifts, unless it was in recognition of his efforts in securing peace. Jizhong received the presents openly, so if he was being rewarded for helping Song, then it was only with the collusion of the Liao.

According to the DDSL/LPJ, CB and SS, Jizhong was quite open in expressing a desire to return to the south (§26.) He wept on receiving the Song gifts and sent back petitions with various Song envoys, asking to be recalled. Attempts to return south by one means or another are found in several of the case studies here, but this is the first instance of a request for a formal recall. Given the new framework for peaceful relations, Jizhong's request does not seem so unreasonable. There was also a precedent: Zhao Yanshou's wife had been allowed to move between the friendly states of Liao and Later Jin. These, however, were in an alliance based on personal relations in which Liao Taizong was the senior partner; the relationship between Liao and Song was one between equal *states*<sup>26</sup> whose emperors never met, and was structured strictly within the framework of the treaty of Shanyuan. The agreement included a provision for returning fugitives from the other side, and the sources state explicitly that it is 'because of the sworn treaty' that the Song emperor refused to grant what Jizhong asked. That Zhenzong would not ask for an exception to be made in Jizhong's case shows how important it was to him that the treaty not be immediately undermined, reflecting the strength of the imperial desire for peace. Zhenzong was not, however, inherently opposed to the idea of Jizhong's return, for according to the CB he also had the message conveyed that

if the ruler (of the Kitan) would let the minister go of his own volition, then a great payment would be made in thanks.

Such a volunteering of the initiative suggests how tentative was the Liao-Song relationship at this early stage. There is a distinct sense that despite the fixed terms of the treaty, there was still a great deal of working out of ground rules to be done, and Zhenzong did not want to be the one to upset things before an equilibrium had been reached. Thus it was Jizhong who paid the price for the peace he had worked so hard to bring about, when that peace, ironically, turned out to be the instrument which prevented him from getting what he wanted for himself. Faced with no opportunity of returning

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26. See for example Tao Jingshen, Sung-Liao relations: a case of diplomatic parity, *Chine ancienne* (1977), pp.319-22; Twitchett, Liao, pp.121-4.



home, Jizhong continued in Liao service, rising to high rank and being honoured with bestowal of the imperial name of Yelü.

The Song sources naturally skip over the remainder of Jizhong's career in Liao, but the LS biography gives details not only of his official posts, but also relates an anecdote demonstrating Jizhong's morality. In 1017, Liao Shengzong asked Jizhong for his assessment of the suitability of Xiao Hezhuo 蕭合卓 for the most senior job in the bureaucracy, that of *beiyuan shumishi* 北院樞密使 (commissioner of the military secretariat of the northern division) (§29.) Jizhong advised that,

Hezhuo, although he has scholarly ability, is ignorant of morality. Xiao Dilie's 蕭敵烈 ability and behaviour are both perfect, it is proper to employ (him.)

The emperor appointed Hezhuo anyway, but if anything this only emphasises the image of Jizhong speaking his mind and upholding the primacy of morality, even over scholarship, thus demonstrating some of the classical characteristics of a Confucian official. The biographies of Hezhuo and Dilie show that in arguing against the former and for the latter, Jizhong was only reiterating views widely held at court, but he was also suspected of having a factional interest in the appointment of Dilie, which is said to have prevented Dilie's selection. After the failure of the 1017 campaign against Koryo, led by Hezhuo, the emperor admitted that Jizhong 'was clever in understanding people;' in other words, that he had probably been right about Hezhuo.

Thus, in contrast to the ambivalent picture found in the southern sources, the LS gives Jizhong an orthodox treatment. His crossing is apparently painless, and he is noted for his particular service to the regime. Overall, he is depicted as an exemplar of the virtuous Confucian official, upright in character, defending morality, fulfilling his duty in the proper manner, and being proved right against the emperor. It is in combination with the southern sources that we uncover the more complex aspects of Jizhong's situation. His key role in the negotiations around Shanyuan suggests in him an ability to straddle the frontier, giving grounds for the contemporary comment quoted earlier that he was 'entirely loyal to the rulers of two states.' Jizhong, in working on behalf of south, was heir to the tradition claimed to have been established by Han Yanhui and his ilk. Jizhong's loyalty to the south seems to have been stronger than that of the earlier cases; he lived up to his name, 'continuing faithfulness.' In terms of activity levels, Jizhong surpassed even Li Huan, but he was not able to put his loyal feelings into practice save through any influence he managed to acquire in Liao. While it was changed political, rather than personal, circumstances which allowed him to use his position to bring about a peace, his individual situation did differ from that of earlier crossers to the extent that he tried to practise a higher ideal of loyalty. Yet when return to the south was denied him,

he, like his earlier counterparts, was apparently willing enough to serve the Liao. It is the roots of the ideas of loyalty variously employed by Jizhong and his fellow crossers which are the subject of the next chapter.

**Table 6 - Wang Jizhong: parallel texts**

<b>References</b>	SS	7:121, 125, 126; 257:8951; 278:9465; 279:9471-2 (biography), 9493 (commentary); 280:9507; 281:9520; 285:9614; 287:9658; 290:9705, 9710; 324:10474
	LS	14:158, 160; 15:172, 179; 16:185; 47:789; 81:1284-5 (biography), 1286, 1287 (commentary); 85:1314, 1316; 88:1340; 115:1521
	QG	7:63, 67; 13:143; 14:152
	DDSL	42:647-8 (biography)
	CB	45:971; 49:1066, 1067; 51:1125; 52:1137; 54:1190, 1192, 1196; 57:1265, 1268, 1269, 58:1278, 1279, 1282, 1283, 1285, 1286, 1291, 1294, 1296
	LPJ	18:686-7 (biography)
	LDN	10, 11
	LFN	22a
	LSJSBM	24:445-53?
	LSSY	20:391-2
	LSSYB	5:119
	QLW	106-7
	Songren yishi huibian	257
	SSJSBM	141
	SSXB	80:49

**Notes** See Table 2 - Han Yanhui: parallel texts

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ {}
1	place of origin Kaifeng 279:9471 biog	place of origin unknown 81:1284 biog			place of origin Kaifeng 42:647; 18:686 biog
2	father <i>wuqi zhihuishi</i> at Waqiaoguan, died there 279:9471 biog				father <i>junxiao</i> , guarding frontiers, died there 42:647; 18:686 biog
3	age 6 <i>dongxiban dianshe</i> 279:9471 biog				because father's death palace appointment {as retainer} 42:647; 18:686 biog
4	Zhenzong heir app <i>jishi zuoyou</i> 279:9471 biog  early on Zhao Anren: Jizhong served heir apparent 287:9658 Zhao Anren biog				Zhenzong heir app <i>jishi zuoyou</i> 42:647; 18:686 biog

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
5	prudence & virtue, personal confidence of emp 279:9471 biog				
6	Zhenzong accedd, 998 <i>neidian chongban</i> 279:9471 biog				
7				999:12, 21 Jan (1000) <i>mabu jun fu du juntou</i> ; md <i>ce xianfeng</i> 45:970	
8	successively up to <i>dianqian duyuhou</i> , Yunzhou <i>guanchashi</i> , Shenzhou <i>fu dubushu</i> , trans Zhen, Ding, Gaoyangguan <i>lu qianxia</i> , conc Hebei <i>du zhuanynshi</i> 279:9471 biog	Song, 960- Yunzhou prefect, <i>dianqian duyuhou</i> 81:1284 biog		1001:7, 1-2 Aug Yunzhou <i>guanchashi</i> ; md <i>du qianxia</i> , w Han Chongxun to assist Wang Xian & Wang Chao in charge of <i>zhuanynshi</i> 49:1066	{Zhenzong accedd, 998} up to Yunzhou <i>guanchashi</i> 42:647; 18:686 biog
9	successively moved to Gaoyangguan <i>fu dubushu</i> 279:9471 biog			1002:4, 2 June <i>dianqian duyuhou</i> ; md Gaoyangguan <i>xingying fu dubushu</i> 51:1122	
10	successively md Dingzhou <i>fu dubushu</i> 279:9471 biog			1002:6, 23 July <i>dianqian duyuhou</i> ; md Dingzhou <i>fu zhubo xingying dubushu</i> under Wang Chao 52:1137	
11	1003 tens of thous Kitan to Wangdu, Jizhong w Wang Chao, Sang Zan to relieve 279:9471 biog	1003 sent to camp at Wangdu in Ding 81:1284 biog	1003:3 Kitan attacked Song, Wang Chao, Sang Zan, Zhou Ying opposed them 7:66-7 annals	1003:4, 20 May Kitan invaded, Wang Chao summoned Sang Zan, Zhou Ying to assist 54:1190	c.998-1003 Kitan invaded 42:647; 18:686 biog

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
12	1003 fought Kitan at Kangcun into the night 279:9471 biog		1003:3 fought Song at Wangdu xian 7:67 annals	1003:4, 21 May Chao sent trps to fight Kitan 6 <i>li</i> S of Wangdu xian, Jizhong fought Kitan at Kangcun into the night 54:1190	c.998-1003 led Ding military to fight N of Wangdu 42:647; 18:686 biog
13	1003, next day enemy cut supply line, abandoned, dress different, recognised, surrounded tens deep, fought to the death 279:9471-2 biog		1003:3, next day 6 <i>li</i> S of xian, as <i>fubushu</i> led trps to fight to death, wore ritual clothing, recognised, surrounded tens deep 7:67 annals	1003:4, 22 May fought again, enemy cut supply line, wore ritual clothing, recognised, surrounded tens deep, fought to the death 54:1190	c.998-1003 fought hard to repay generosity {& kindness} of being md official, dress different, recognised, fought him 42:647; 18:686 biog
14	1003:4 fell into hands of the enemy at Wangdu 7:121 annals  1003 pushed back N to Baicheng, fell into enemy hands 279:9472 biog  Jizhong led troops, was captured 287:9658 Zhao Anren biog	1003:4 Yelü Nugua & Xiao Talin captured Jizhong at Wangdu 14:158 annals  1003 scouting w light horse, met <i>nanfu zaixiang</i> Yelü Nugua etc, captured 81:1284 biog  1003 Yelü Nugua fought Song, captured Jizhong at Wangdu, many prisoners & dead 85:1316 Nugua biog  <del>1002</del> Xiao Talin captured Wang Xianzhi (Jizhong), destroyed army at Suicheng 85:1314 Talin biog	1003:3, as above pushed back N to Baicheng, captured by Kitan 7:67 (cf. LS) annals  Wangdu battle 1003:3 Jizhong captured and taken away 7:67 annals  bef 1007 Jizhong and Kang Baoyi defeated by Liao 7:63 annals	1003:4, 22 May pushed back N to Baicheng, fell into enemy hands 54:1190	c.998-1003 several days no relief, so fell into {enemy} Kitan hands 42:647; 18:686 biog

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
15	1003:4 Hedong army sent to assist 7:121 annals  defeat at Wangdu 2 officials punished for retreating 278:9464 Wang Chao biog			emp heard of defeat ordered assistance, rewarded trps wounded in battle 54:1190	
16	Zhenzong heard news assumed Jizhong dead, md Datong <i>jiedu</i> , funeral aid, 4 sons officials 279:9472 biog			1003:5, 10 June emp thought Jizhong dead, md Datong <i>jiedushi</i> , conc <i>shizhong</i> , 4 sons officials 54:1193	at first assumed Jizhong dead, md Datong <i>jiedushi</i> , {sons (3) promoted} 42:647; 18:686 biog
17	willing to die, escaped through luck 279:9493 comm	did not die for country 81:1287 comm			
18	favoured and employed at N court, moral integrity deficient 279:9493 comm  Jizhong turned and served enemy, Yao Dongzhi praised talents 287:9658 Zhao Anren biog	c.1003 emp dow knew of worthiness, md <i>hubushi</i> 81:1284 biog	gradually employed nearer throne, given posts 7:67 annals	bef 1004:int 9 gradually trusted 57:1268	
19		c.1003 emp dow m him into Kang Moji clan, Jizhong energetic in return 81:1284 biog			
20		after 1003? Song envoys always brought gifts bcs was former official, Shengzong permitted this 81:1284 biog			

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
21	1004:int 9, 9 Nov J sent letter to Shi Pu to discuss peace 7:125 annals  st.1004-1008 Kitan asked for peace, Jizhong memo, Song knew he was there 279:9472 biog		1004:10 took advantage to urge peace, emp dow war-weary so agreed, sent mission w arrow and letter by Jizhong 7:67 annals	1004:int 9, 9 Nov took advantage to argue benefits of peace, emp dow war-weary, mission to Shi Pu w arrow, J's letter, secret report of own situation 57:1268	c.1004-1008 enemy {Kitan} md Jizhong {memo to}ask for peace 42:647; 18:686 biog
22	c.1004:9 Bi Shian persuaded emp to believe J's memorial requesting peace 281:9520 Bi Shian biog	1004:11, 31 Dec Song gifts to Jizhong & secret request to ask for peace 14:160 annals  1004 Song envoys w respects, gifts for J, imp directive to request peace 81:1284 biog	1004:10? Shi Pu reported all to Song court 7:67 annals	1004:int 9, c.9 Nov emp sent personal edict to Jizhong, he wanted Song to send first envoy, not yet allowed 57:1269	
23	1004:11, 7 Jan (1005) repeated memorials requesting peace, Song preparations 7:126 annals			1004:10, 9-10 Dec begged envoys be sent, Cao Liyong w letters for ruler, J 58:1278 <hr/> 1004:11, 3, 5 Jan (1005) Liyong detained at Tianxiong, Kit defs, J asked for peace again, Liyong still detained. Further attempts to get Liyong to go N 58:1283, 1285-6	
24	st.1004-1008 peace made, Jizhong important in this 279:9472 biog	1004:11, 31 Dec ordered to meet and agree peace 14:160 annals  1004 ordered to meet envoys, peace made 81:1284 biog  concluded N-S peace 81:1287 comm	1004:10? asked Zhenzong to send envoy, so Cao Liyong came 7:67 annals  st.983-1012 sent to make peace 13:143 empress Xiao biog	1004:12, 16-19 Jan (1005) met Liyong, negotiations concluded 58:1291	st.1004-1008 peace made, Jizhong important in this 42:647; 18:686-7 biog

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
25				1004:12, 21 & 27 Jan (1005) edict to J wanting Kit to release some pillaged population, J sent Kit response 58:1294, 1296	
26	each year envoys brought gifts, he wept, petitioned to be recalled to Song, refused 279:9472 biog			1006:3, 3 April envoys w birthday gifts, J wept, sent requesting summons to return, none issued, Song offered payment if Liao emp wished to return him 62:1391	st.1004-1008 envoys brought gifts, he wept, petitioned to be recalled to Song, refused 42:647; 18:687 biog
27	treated generously by Kitan 279:9472 biog	1004 md left Wuwei <i>shang jiangjun</i> 47:789 zhi  no slaves, so given 30 palace households, md left Wuwei <i>shang jiangjun</i> 81:1284 biog			treated generously by {enemy prince} ruler of Kitan 42:647; 18:687 biog
28		1013:1, 13 Feb md Zhongjing <i>liushou, jianjiao taishi</i> 15:172 annals  md Zhongjing <i>liushou</i> 81:1284 biog			



	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
29		<p>opinion on Xiao Hezhuo 81:1285 biog</p> <p>st.1014-1017 mocked Xiao Hezhuo's shortcomings, emp upset 81:1286 Hezhuo biog</p> <p>recommended Dilie as <i>shumishi</i>, suspected of factional interests 88:1340 Dilie biog</p>			
30		<p>1016 md <i>hanren xingong</i> <i>dubushu</i>, Langye <i>junwang</i> 81:1285 biog</p>			
31		<p>1017:5, 28 May md <i>fu dutong</i> under Xiao Hezhuo for Koryo campn 15:179 annals</p> <p>1017 md <i>fu dutong</i> under Xiao Hezhuo for Koryo campn 115:1521 Koryo</p> <p>1017:5 <i>xingjun fubushu</i> under Xiao Hezhuo 81:1285 biog</p>			
32		<p>army returned emp said J a gd judge of character 81:1285 biog</p> <p>mirror of character 81:1287 comm</p>			

	SS	LS	QG	CB	DDSL/LPJ
33	Yelü Xianzhong, Zongxin, md prince of Chu 279:9472 biog	1017 md prince of Chu, given Yelü name 81:1285 biog			name changed to Yelü Xianzhong, Zongxin, md prince of Wu 42:647-8; 18:687 biog
34		1019:2, 28 Mar md <i>nanyuan</i> <i>shumishi</i> 16:185 annals			
35		1022 retired 81:1285 biog			
36	not known what happened to him in the end 279:9472 biog	1022 died 81:1285 biog			not known what happened to him in the end 42:648 biog

**PART THREE**

**INTANGIBLE FRONTIERS**

## Chapter Eight

### The question of loyalty: *zhong* 忠 and the representation of crossing

So far we have discussed, in increasing detail, the circumstances in which people came to cross frontiers. Crossing frontiers involves changing allegiances, and this necessarily raises the question of loyalty. But whether an act is loyal or disloyal depends upon the perspective of the judge. The same deed can be judged loyal in one context but disloyal in another, and the passage of time can see the reversal of the verdict.<sup>1</sup> This is what happened to the Liao Chinese; although their case was never black-and-white, and the changes worked upon them are accordingly intermediate between extremes. In this chapter the changes will be examined in two parts. In Part 1 we briefly survey the concept of loyalty as it developed and changed through Chinese history up to the compilation of the LS. At least some of these ideas would have been available to those making decisions about crossing frontiers, and were subsequently drawn upon and developed further by those who wrote, and particularly those who rewrote, the records. During the tenth century itself, current concepts of loyalty could be applied between *any* two states, but in the course of successive re-recording down to the fourteenth century, it became clear that in the case of the Liao Chinese it was their service to the Kitan which was the concern of the historiographers, who balanced this with an increasing emphasis on the attachment of these people to the south. These developments are the subject of Part 2, which draws together findings from the case studies to survey the changing treatment in successive texts of frontier crossers to Liao.

#### Part 1 - The concept of *zhong* 忠

The first problem is the translation of the Chinese word *zhong* as 'loyalty.'<sup>2</sup> This is frequently taken to refer to a continuing adherence to a single leader or regime in times of difficulty, but it does not give anything like an adequate rendition of the range of concepts as understood both through time, and particularly in the texts under consideration here.

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1. See Morton Grodzins, *The loyal and the disloyal: social boundaries of patriotism and treason* (1956), pp.16-7. Although Grodzins is chiefly concerned with 'national loyalty' in the context of the Cold War, his analysis of the nature and functions of loyalty and the process of becoming 'disloyal' has general application.

2. This is true of Chinese-English dictionaries on both the mainland and in Taiwan. The Shangwu yinshuguan dictionary (PRC) gives 'loyal, devoted, honest' (p.908); the Dongya tushu chengsi yinhang's New practical dictionary (ROC) gives 'faithful, loyal, sincere, patriotic, loyalty, sincerity, devoted, honest' (1517, p.315) Mathews gives 'loyal, faithful, devoted, honest, patriotic;' and Giles, 'loyal, patriotic, faithful.'

We would expect an evolution in the meaning of any word in the moral code of any culture; the word *zhong*, along with the concepts attached to it, was no exception. Furthermore, within any particular set of circumstances the word and concepts of *zhong* could be, and were, employed in a highly flexible manner. The widespread and uncritical use of the modern meaning of *zhong*, within a context where 'loyalty' has acquired meanings associated with patriotism and nationalism, has erected an artificial obstacle to our understanding of officials who served more than one regime. The meaning of *zhong* is by no means clear. Each successive commentator on the texts has applied an understanding of the word as it was in their own day and thus overlaid earlier meanings with a gloss which is at best complicating. Here we are concerned to look at the different meanings rather than attempting to come to a single definition. How was *zhong* defined? How did interpretations change over time? How can these ideas be applied to the five individuals covered in the case studies? The attempt to answer these questions involves cutting through some of the accreted layers of historiographical opinion, both to distinguish between what was meant by the writers, and how that is interpreted now; and to separate perceivable historical events on the one hand, from the recording of those events on the other.

### The roots of meaning: *zhong* 忠 and legitimacy

The most important concept behind the early usage of the word *zhong* appears to be that of faithful service. Early versions of the graph for *zhong* appear on Zhou 周 bronzes, where the word means 'consciously devoted to the ruler.' This, it can be argued, implies the 'moral precept of loyalty,'<sup>3</sup> but we should perhaps be wary of the dangers of reading back modern meanings into symbols produced nearly 3000 years ago.

Nevertheless, *zhong* was already an important concept, and closely related to a number of other ideas crucial in the establishment of the earliest recorded Chinese polities. For our purposes, the most important of these was *zheng* 正, variously translated as 'correct and proper,' or 'orthodox.' *Zheng* seems to be rather similar in meaning to *zhong*, and the two words are often found together, when they mean 'orthodox.'<sup>4</sup> The association of the meaning of *zheng* and *zhong* suggests the essential point that it is only possible to be *zhong* to a legitimate regime. If someone is *zhong* to an

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3. Definition from *Zhengzhong xing yin yi zonghe da zidian* (The great Zhengzhong dictionary of picto-ideographical and phonetic roots of etymology and meanings), (Taiwan: Zhengzhong 1971), p.474, cited in Chen Chi-yun, *Orthodoxy as a mode of statecraft: the ancient concept of cheng, Orthodoxy in late imperial China* (1990), ed. Liu Kwang-ching, p.30. He cites K.C. Chang, *Shang Civilisation* (1980), pp.207-8 and fig.52 in support of this.

4. Chen, *Orthodoxy*, p.30.

illegitimate regime, then they are not *zhong*, but rebellious. This sounds simple enough, but it is not always easy to decide when a regime is legitimate.

Chen Chi-yun's discussion of the meaning of *zheng* concludes:

The etymology of the Chinese words for orthodox and its antonym .... indicates a nonmoral but goal-oriented root meaning that is concerned mainly with the result of the action, namely the successful versus the unsuccessful. Moral meaning was added later. The reference of *zheng* evolves from 1. a military action, which gives rise to 2. a political dominion, which is given 3. a moral justification.<sup>5</sup>

So in practical terms, it is military success alone which grants legitimacy.

Related to Chen's third stage of moral justification is the idea that the Mandate of heaven (*tianming* 天命) can be transferred away from an unworthy ruler to one possessed of the true *dao* 道. Hence whilst the regime in power legitimises itself by claiming to possess the Mandate, a rebel can equally claim that the Mandate has been transferred to them.<sup>6</sup> The only way of telling which one is right is to see which one wins. The problem is that for those in the situation, it is not feasible to just wait and see. In time of rebellion officials are required to act. When the situation becomes critical they are further required to make a decision and choose between ruler and rebel, in a situation where it is still impossible to know which leader or regime will be successful; for this knowledge comes only *after* the event. Hence it is never possible, in any one set of circumstances, to be absolutely sure that one's actions are in fact (going to be) considered *zhong*, even if it might happen that they appear to be so at the time. On the plus side, the concepts of *zheng* and the Mandate of heaven, with which *zhong* is inextricably bound up, are both ultimately impermanent, and this allows for a similar element of flexibility in the usage of *zhong*. The difficult moral choices created by the interplay of these three concepts were partly addressed in the development and use of the idea of *zhong* as a framework within which to structure an impossible dilemma.

### The consolidation of Confucian meanings during the Han 漢

The meanings derived from the identification and usage of the *zhong* graph on oracle bones and bronzes are given written definitions in the early Confucian works adopted as orthodox texts under the Han. In these we find specific examples which locate the meaning of the word *zhong* rather more precisely, and already with varying overtones. By the time of the Han, Confucius is said, in the *Lunyu* 論語, to have given the word the basic definition: 'when dealing with others do your best,'<sup>7</sup> and we also see this meaning

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5. Chen, *Orthodoxy*, p.31.

6. Chen, *Orthodoxy*, pp.33-4.

7. *Lunyu* 13:19, trans. D.C. Lau, (Penguin classics 1979) (hereafter Lau), p.120; cf. James Legge, *The Four books* (repr.1985), (hereafter Legge), 1:271: 'in intercourse with others, to be strictly sincere,' 與人忠.

in Zengzi's 曾子 self-examination, 'In transacting business for others, I may have been not faithful.'<sup>8</sup> The *Zuo zhuan* 左傳 gives a particular nuance to this definition by saying, 'to be without consideration for oneself is *zhong*.'<sup>9</sup> Historically, this notion of doing one's best without thought for oneself has been the most important aspect of the meaning, but it split early on into two quite distinct branches, founded upon different practical applications of the single concept.

### *Moral loyalty*

The first branch was a principled, and in some sense intellectual, approach to the idea. The *Shu* 書 (Book of history) makes clear that *zhong* is that quality which fits one for service to a lord: 'To occupy the high places it is enough to be illustrious, to be one of the lower people it is enough to be *zhong*.'<sup>10</sup> The *Xunzi* 荀子 makes the same point, whilst also expressing one of the important dilemmas associated with the concept. 'Yu Shun 虞舜 and Xiao Ji 孝己 were filial, but their relatives did not love them; Bi Gan 比干 and Zi Xu 子胥 were *zhong*, but their lords did not employ them.'<sup>11</sup> Hence, even if one possessed the requisite qualities for serving a lord, that lord was not obliged to have the *dao* to recognise one's talents, and if outspokenness resulted in exile, this interpretation of *zhong* demanded that the banished official simply wait for a better time.

Confucius was very clear that the relationship between ruler and minister was a reciprocal one, and should be governed by *yi* 義 or correct principle.

A prince should employ his ministers according the rules of propriety [*li* 禮]; ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness [*zhong*].<sup>12</sup>

Principled opposition to rulers who broke the 'rules of propriety,' and thus showed themselves lacking the *dao* necessary to be a true king, was praiseworthy in Confucius's mind, as shown by his approbation of the actions of the brothers Wei 微, Ji 箕 and Bi Gan in the sufferings brought by their opposition to their immoral lord. Such opposition (as well as faithful service to those with *dao*) could be defined by Confucians as *zhong*.

8. *Lunyu* 1:4, trans. Legge, 1:139, 為人謀，而不忠乎。

9. *Zuo zhuan*, Chenggong 9th year. Quoted in *Hanyu da cidian* 7:414, 無私，忠也。

10. *Shu*, *Yi xun* 伊訓, quoted in *Hanyu da cidian* 7:414.

11. *Xunzi*, quoted in *Hanyu da cidian* 7:414; *Ciyuan*, p.1104. Classically, the dilemma was that of Qu Yuan 屈原, who was exiled because his *zhong* consisted in speaking his mind even when his ruler did not want to hear it. See Schneider, *Madman of Ch'u*, which mentions several of the *zhong* heroes of antiquity.

12. *Lunyu* 3:19, trans. Legge, 1:161. Also *Lunyu* 2:20, 'Let him [the ruler] be filial and kind to all; then they will be faithful to him,' 孝慈，則忠, Legge, 1:152.

*Political or dynastic loyalty*

The other branch of meaning appears to have been enshrined in the *Zhou shu* 周書,<sup>13</sup> which included a section providing definitions for the canonisation titles awarded posthumously to exemplary individuals, of which *zhong* was one. The *Zhou shu* explicitly adds an element of physical bravery, requiring that to be worthy of the title an individual had to risk their own person in the service of their lord, and without attempting to evade danger. The canonisation system was to continue into the Wudai and beyond, with a very similar definition of this 'political loyalty' or 'dynastic loyalty.'

*The uses of loyalty*

The two branches of meaning distinguished above can be said to reflect the differing viewpoints of ministers and masters. From Confucius onwards, ministers were often keen to defend their positions with relation to their lords. They were particularly jealous of their right to speak out against immorality, which, in association with *zhong*, was elevated to a responsibility. The first branch of the meaning of *zhong* supports the independent position of the minister over against the lord. Under this interpretation, officials had the authority to suggest that a ruler had or lacked *dao* by agreeing or refusing to serve them. Officials could thus not only express their independence and individuality, but could do so from the moral high ground. The second branch of meaning is more attractive to rulers, demanding, as it does, that the faithfulness of officials extends to their putting their lives on the line if necessary, whether in a continuing loyalty to a regime under threat, or in a 'premature' loyalty to an unproven claimant to the Mandate. As such, the second branch was an expression of the official's interdependence with the state, by means of an attachment to the ruler, whether 'rebel' or 'legitimate.'<sup>14</sup> Accordingly, it was this second branch of meaning which was enshrined as the official definition of *zhong*, through the institution of canonisation titles, while the first branch survived in less-clearly defined traditions of folklore and legend around figures such as Qu Yuan 屈原, the famous 'loyal' minister of Chu 楚. The vehicles for both meanings were already set in motion in early dynastic times.

Despite the clear distinction thus drawn between the two sets of meanings, we should be constantly aware that they have common roots, and it is only in the divergent practice of the same principle that a distinction can be made between them. In this context, it also

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13. This, at least, was the Tang view, based upon the contents of the *Ji Zhong Zhou shu* 汲冢周書 a work dated to the Zhou and unearthed by chance in 281. See David McMullen, The cult of Ch'i T'ai-kung and T'ang attitudes to the military, *Tang studies* 7 (1989), p.80.

14. On the other hand, the decision to hold out against all odds was also an expression of individualism, by going against the prevailing military trend.



makes sense to see the two branches of meaning as a further expression of the *wen-wu* 文武 division.

This divergent practice also has a sanction attributed to Confucius himself, in an incident which already indicates the importance of a continuing dialogue on this subject, in the effort to mediate the dilemmas of real individuals in actual situations. The idea that one should die in the service of one's lord was clearly already embedded by the time of Confucius. It is the confident assumption of one of Confucius's disciples, who supposed that the Qi 齊 minister Guan Zhong 管仲 could not have had *ren* 仁 because he failed to die for his master Prince Jiu 公子糾. Not only that, but he went on to serve the very Duke Huan 桓公 who had killed Prince Jiu. Confucius subverts the universality of the assumption by setting Guan Zhong's achievements against this one shortcoming.

It was due to Guan Zhong that Duke Huan was able, without a show of force, to assemble the feudal lords nine times. Such was his *ren*. Such was his *ren*. .... [He] helped Duke Huan to become the leader of the feudal lords and to save the empire from collapse. To this day, the common people still enjoy the benefits of his acts. Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair down and folding our robes to the left. Surely he was not like the common man or woman who, in their petty faithfulness, commit suicide in a ditch without anyone taking any notice.<sup>15</sup>

The Guan Zhong story was a famous one, with its ability to mediate deriving precisely from the possibility inhering for different interpretations. Confucius's positive response to Zhong on the occasions just cited did not prevent him from criticising Zhong for using rites above his station.<sup>16</sup>

Other Confucians took the story of Guan Zhong in an entirely different light. Mencius believed that any leader could become a true king and so was critical of Zhong for allowing Duke Huan to remain a mere leader when he should have made him a true king. Where the overriding need is for a true king, the means are secondary, and Mencius does not even consider the issue of whether Zhong should have died for prince Jiu. Contemporaries of Mencius<sup>17</sup> saw Zhong as a model for bringing order to chaos. Xunzi, accepting that true kings were rare and that a second-best ruler could still bring some order, regarded Guan Zhong as a *gongchen* 功臣 or 'accomplished minister,' ranked middle in worth between the sage minister and the rebellious or flatterer. It was, however, still clear to Xunzi that whilst Guan Zhong could be praised for his

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15. *Lunyu* 14:17-8, trans. Lau, pp.126-7 (cf. Legge, 1:282-3.) According to the preceding argument, in defending Zhong, Confucius can be said to be taking the minister's part against the definition of *zhong* naturally favoured by rulers. At the same time, the pragmatism of his defence would not have offended a ruler.

16. The following paragraph derives heavily from Hoyt Tillman, The development of tension between virtue and achievement in early Confucianism: attitudes towards Kuan Chung and hegemon (*pa*) as conceptual symbols, *Philosophy east and west* 31:1 (1981), esp. pp.20-5.

17. Stated by Tillman, Virtue and achievement, p.21. He does not say who they were.

achievements, his lack of the great virtues of *ren* and integrity<sup>18</sup> rendered him unfit for the highest position of minister of a true king.

Hence for those in situations involving a change of regime or wider disorder, the Guan Zhong story, in particular, offered reassurance that there were other options than dying for a defeated master, reflected in different interpretations of *zhong*, although it was plain that taking one of these alternative courses would probably disqualify an official from being ranked amongst the truly virtuous. The line an individual official took through this dilemma, set out in the Guan Zhong story, would of course depend upon the particular circumstances, but a great deal of the response to those circumstances would be decided by the individual's own view of themselves in relation to the aspects of the Confucian 'tradition' in which they had been brought up.<sup>19</sup>

### Ideal and reality during the Disunion 魏晉南北朝

After the raising of Confucianism to canonical status during the Han, the subsequent three-and-a-half centuries of the Disunion provided the first opportunity to test out the ideas of imperially-endorsed Confucianism on the question of *zhong*. In a survey such as this it is not possible to cover every comment on the subject, hence we will draw our observations from one of the best-known works surviving from the period, Yan Zhitui's 顏之推 *Yan shi jiaxun* 顏氏家訓, the 'Family instructions for the Yan clan.'<sup>20</sup> Yan was of noble family, and looked back with some pride to his grandfather under the Qi 齊. This ancestor, when Qi was overthrown in 502, had starved himself to death in protest,<sup>21</sup> thus displaying a classical interpretation of refusenik *zhong*, expressing both individualism and continued support for the previous regime. By contrast, Yan himself served four dynasties, and lived to see the reunification, ending his days under the Sui 隋.<sup>22</sup> Yan was familiar with the Confucian classics<sup>23</sup> and their comments on *zhong*, and he had a family connection with the heroic practice of the highest standards of that virtue. He clearly admires this quality above many others, praising a 'southern barbarian' who,

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18. Tillman does not make clear what character is translated by this word.

19. For partial discussion see Margaret Ng, Internal shame as a moral sanction, *Journal of Chinese philosophy* 8:1 (1981), pp.75-86.

20. Yan Zhitui, *Yan shi jiaxun*, in *Baizi quanshu* j.51. See also full translation: Teng Ssu-yü, *Family instructions for the Yen clan* (1968), (hereafter Teng.)

21. Yan Zhitui's grandfather was Yan Jianyuan 顏見遠. His actions are recorded in the biography of his son, Zhitui's father, Yan Xie 顏協, in the *Nan shi* 南史 72:21 and *Liang shu* 梁書 50:26-7. Cited by Teng, pp.xv n. 1n, 96n.

22. His four periods of service were under the following dynasties: Liang 梁 549-554; Northern Qi 北齊 556-577; Northern Zhou 北周 577-581; Sui 581-591. Teng, p.xxiii.

23. Teng notes that Yan was especially well-versed in the *Zhou li* 周禮 and *Zuo zhuan*. He also gives full references for biographical material on Yan, p.xviii & n.

when his master's enemies demanded to know where his master had fled to, was beaten to death without telling.<sup>24</sup> He also states that

to lose one's own life in the protection of the whole family, and to sacrifice oneself in order to save the nation: the *junzi* 君子 does not regret such acts.<sup>25</sup>

On the other hand he is entirely pragmatic, and despite his espousal of Confucian virtues and the example of his illustrious forebears,<sup>26</sup> for himself he had evidently made his peace with his own conduct, and he passed on what he had learned to his sons in the *Instructions*. Although he strongly advocated the proper fulfilment of duties, an important basic interpretation of *zhong*, his work is full of warnings that it is best to keep one's head down. He advised his sons against pushing themselves forward, whether with unsolicited advice or in competition for a post, and he warns of the dangers of opportunism in taking high office.<sup>27</sup> His final position on the issue of serving different regimes is this:

Not to bend (the knee) before two (imperial) families was the integrity of Yi 夷 and Qi 齊; to refuse to serve the wrongful ruler was the principle of Yi 伊 and Ji 箕. Since the Chunqiu period there have been many families annexed and nations conquered; and thus the relationship between a prince and a minister cannot be permanently maintained. However, when a *junzi* breaks friendship with a person, he should never speak ill of the latter. If suddenly he has to bend his knee in serving another person, he should not change his thoughts toward his former chief, whether the chief still exists or not. When Chen Kongzhang 陳孔璋 was writing under [Yuan] Shao 袁紹, he called [Cao] Cao 曹操 a jackal or wolf; while later writing official proclamations for the Wei 魏 kingdom, he regarded [Yuan] Shao as a venomous serpent. In these times this was what the (current) ruler ordered and he did not have any control over it; nevertheless, this is a great source of trouble for men of letters. You must tactfully avoid it.<sup>28</sup>

This balance between awareness of the ideal and a pragmatic acceptance that given the circumstances one cannot live up to it, is resolved here by accepting external necessity whilst maintaining internal integrity. This resolution is one which had direct application to the next period of disunion: the late ninth and tenth centuries.

24. *Yan shi jiaxun* 1:11b and Teng, p.73.

25. *Yan shi jiaxun* 2:3b, translation adapted from Teng, p.135.

26. One is tempted to wonder whether such a grandfather as Yan Jianyuan did not exert an oppressive influence.

27. On the fulfilment of duties: 'if you are in a position where you have to speak, you ought to perform the duty of giving the emperor admonitions. You should not shun your duty, take your ease, cast down your head and close your ears. But you should "in every possible way wait on and nourish him,"' (*Yan shi jiaxun* 2:2a; Teng, p.120.) On keeping your head down: 'Princely law-abiding scholars would not submit memorials. Modern people with integrity and virtue would all feel ashamed to do so.... the *Biao ji* chapter says, "In the service of a ruler, [(for) a minister] whose place is remote from [the court] to remonstrate is an act of sycophancy; for one whose place is near the ruler not to remonstrate is to hold his office idly for the sake of gain.'" (*Yan shi jiaxun* 2:1b-2a; Teng, pp.119-20.) On the dangers of opportunism: 'In this time of chaos I have seen many who utilised the opportunity to obtain wealth and position by luck. In the morning they took charge of important affairs, at night they were buried in graves; on the first day of a month they were as joyful as Zhuo 卓 and Cheng 程, on the fifteenth they wept like Yan 顏 and Yuan 原. This did not merely happen to five or ten. Be careful, be careful.' (*Yan shi jiaxun* 2:3a; Teng, p.127.)

28. *Yan shi jiaxun* 1:14a, translation adapted from Teng, pp.92-3.

### A range of interpretations in the Tang

Between these two periods of disunion was the Tang: a dynasty celebrated as China's golden age. Despite the implications of stability in that designation the Tang had its share of upheaval, and accordingly provides a series of changing interpretations of *zhong* in practice.<sup>29</sup> As the people of the Wudai period drew heavily from Tang models and structures, the Tang case will be considered in some detail as a base against which to measure any change in how the concept was used and understood in the Wudai.

The official Tang definitions for *zhong* are conveniently listed in the *Tang hui yao* (THY) section on canonisation titles.<sup>30</sup>

To place oneself in danger in the service of one's lord is called *zhong*.

To place oneself in danger for the love of one's lord is called *zhong*.

To surrender one's position to someone more worthy and be completely faithful is called *zhong*.

To place oneself in danger as a gift to the state is called *zhong*.

To be concerned for the state and not think of one's family is called *zhong*.

To be completely unmoving in good times and bad is called *zhong*.

In times of calamity not to rebel is called *zhong*.

To live peacefully without remembering (past grudges) is called *zhong*.

To be incorrupt and upright, just and impartial is called *zhong*.<sup>31</sup>

Various *topoi* emerge in the biographies of those canonised *zhong*, such as energetic remonstrance, the demonstration of great filial piety, virtue unrecognised, and refusal to serve, but overall, the most important interpretation of *zhong* seems to be that involving military valour.<sup>32</sup> From the definitions given in the THY, and the lives of those granted the title in practice, it seems that in most circumstances being *zhong* was a risky business, regardless of whether the official concerned was in an inherently dangerous situation (for instance on the battlefield) or not. Indeed, an essential part of the definition seems to be that one behaves in an upright and proper manner in precisely those situations where it is dangerous to do so, at least inasmuch as it is unusual in one's own day. Hence if all around you were corrupt, but you were willing to speak out and risk at least your career prospects, that could be *zhong*, but if all around were already upright, your behaviour would simply be what was expected. Mere proper behaviour, without some degree of danger, however small, does not constitute *zhong*. There has to be some element of nonconformity, of running counter to the tide for the best of motives. As such, the

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29. Tang attitudes to the question of *zhong* are worthy of extensive study in their own right, for which there is not space here. I am indebted to David McMullen for his observations on *zhong* in this period (personal communication), many of which are followed in this section.

30. THY compiled 961.

31. THY 79:1461.

32. From a random sample of 21 out of 47 *zhong* title-holders scattered chronologically through the main section of the JTS biographies, over half are clearly in the military valour category, while rather less than a third are included for their *zhong* remonstrance, and have little or no involvement in military campaigns. The remaining sixth show a mixture of the two strands, with neither clearly predominating.

requirement to be *zhong* was simply a specific application of Confucian ideas regarding the unconventionality of the true *junzi*,<sup>33</sup> which, through the system of canonisation titles, became institutionalised.

Despite these apparently fixed definitions, we can also see in the Tang a retrospective emphasis of different aspects of *zhong* at different times, in a manner which seems to be largely dictated by the legitimisation needs of the dynasty. The biographies of *zhongyi* 忠義, 'loyal and upright,' officials in the JTS fall into three groups: the foundation period of the Tang; the period c.684-712 including the reign of Empress Wu Zetian 武則天 (690-705); and the An Lushan 安祿山 rebellions.<sup>34</sup> In the founding period 11 out of 14 biographies are of people who exhibited great valour, often to the point of death, in the maintenance of their allegiance to the Tang against rebels and bandits. The kind of military *zhong* found in these cases was crucial to the success of a would-be dynastic founder, whose legitimacy was bolstered significantly by the steadfast allegiance of others. But we should also note that all the people in this group are, by definition, those who changed sides, abandoning their allegiance to the Sui in order to join the new dynasty promised by those who would turn out to be the founders of the Tang. The Later Jin compilers of the JTS were happy to praise those who transferred their loyalty to the Tang, because in thus reinforcing the legitimacy of their predecessor, they also argued for the legitimacy of the current dynasty. The paradox which this creates for those having to make decisions on the spot is the one in which the tenth-century frontier crossers were also trapped.

Only three of the 14 *zhongyi* officials from the reign of Wu Zetian are shown to exhibit military valour. By far the majority are included for showing forms of non-military *zhong* (such as fearless memorialisation, suffering false accusations, and protecting members of the imperial family against plots or calumny) which reflect the stresses of court life in this period: it was the moral aspect of *zhong* which was valued. In the first half of the eighth century the Tang dynasty was firmly established and unquestionably legitimate, fostering a self-confidence amongst the ruling élite reflected in a period of immense cultural achievement. Difficult decisions about where to place one's allegiance did not have to be made, and reflection upon the quality of *zhong* seems to have been restricted to genres such as the frontier poetry of Cen Shen 岑參 and his ilk.<sup>35</sup>

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33. As seen in the life of Confucius himself. See for instance, Robert Henricks, The hero pattern and the life of Confucius, *Journal of Chinese studies* 1:3 (1984), pp.241-60.

34. JTS j.187 A & B. The origins of the JTS are not without distortions, but few of these are traceable now. For an exhaustive discussion of the sources for the JTS and their relationships to each other, see Twitchett, *Writing of history*.

35. The range of work produced in the pre-rebellion period is admirably discussed by David McMullen, Historical and literary theory in the mid-eighth century, *Perspectives on the T'ang* (1973), ed. Denis Twitchett, pp.307-42. The 'frontier school' which includes Cen Shen was a category created after the Song; Marie Chan,

It was thus retained within the bounds of the first strand of meaning identified here; a 'moral loyalty' associated with unjustly exiled officials.

The An Lushan rebellions provided a testing time for the conception and practice of the second branch of the meaning of *zhong*, and this period supplies half of the total number of *zhongyi* biographies.<sup>36</sup> 18 of the 28 exhibited military valour; more than from the other two groups put together, but even at this time, faithful displays of courage were still not the only thing to be regarded as *zhong*. The group includes fearless memorialists, the deeply filial, people who attempted to maintain respect for the Tang court in their regional positions, and those who refused to serve either rebel or court and retired from public life. Although the size of the threat produced a suitable proportion of courageous officials devoted to the Tang, nevertheless this was really no more than was expected of them, for by the time of the rebellions, the Tang dynasty was not the challenger of established power, but the challenged. As An Lushan ultimately failed, there was no question afterwards that he and his followers were rebels: his military activities against the Tang court are called a rebellion in our sources because they were written after the Tang house had been restored to the capitals. If Lushan had established a lasting dynasty, he would not have been called a rebel, but the new holder of the Mandate, so in this respect, the rebellions can be seen as a failed dynastic foundation. As such, we can see that the choices were identical to those found in the period around a successful transfer of the Mandate: in both situations individuals faced the same impossible task of deciding in advance who was going to be the *de facto*, and therefore legitimate, ruler. Had An Lushan succeeded, we would expect to have seen the formalised praise of those exhibiting *zhong* to *him* appear in his dynastic history much as it does in the JTS. As it was, the recovery of the Tang brought with it, retrospectively, a greatly increased concern with *zhong* and with encouraging *zhong* behaviour.

### *The aftermath of the An Lushan rebellions*

By the ninth century, exemplars of dynastic loyalty from the An Lushan period, such as Duan Xiushi 段秀實, Guo Ziyi 郭子儀, Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿, and Zhang Xun 張巡, were among several well-known to a wide audience through semi-popular biographies.<sup>37</sup> Most of these *zhong* heroes died martyr's deaths, and any official looking for patterns of upright behaviour would have had no shortage of examples in circulation at the time. *Zhong* heroes from earlier periods also entered the wider imagination, and in the case of Qi Taigong 齊太公, the Tang imperial house even promoted an official cult in his

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*Cen Shen* (1983), p.75.

36. There was also a rash of posthumous promotions after the rebellion. McMullen, Ch'i T'ai-kung, p.78n.

37. David McMullen, personal communication.

honour, which was continued by at least some of the Wudai regimes.<sup>38</sup> Duan Xiushi, Guo Ziyi and Yan Zhenqing were canonised *zhong*,<sup>39</sup> and in their lives we see an emphasis on the kind of *zhong* involving military valour and stubborn faithfulness to the death.<sup>40</sup> The very stress given to these figures is perhaps suggestive of a somewhat different reality, and in fact, many Tang officials fled during the rebellions, going south to an exile which gave them cause to reconsider their outlook.<sup>41</sup> However, not all of them could flee and numbers of the officials in the capitals submitted to the rebels and took service under them, while others in the provinces, finding themselves in rebel-held territory, did the same.<sup>42</sup> Most hurried to return to their allegiance to the Tang once the capitals were recovered, but the suppression of rebellions took another five years, and in an atmosphere suggestive of witch-hunting, the 'collaborators' had to suffer deliberately humiliating treatment, followed by trial for treason, and in many cases the punishment of exile, before they were allowed back into the fold.<sup>43</sup>

One of those who 'fell into rebel hands,' was the intellectual Li Hua 李華 (c.710-c.767.) He was evidently traumatised by the experience and although eventually welcomed back into Tang service, he refused to take any official post, feeling that his integrity had been irredeemably compromised by the breach of allegiance implied by his service for the rebels.<sup>44</sup> In this and similar cases we can see the seeds of the problem which was going to explode into practically a universal one in the Wudai period, but Li Hua's conscience plagued him at a time when the issue of *zhong* had once again become clear-cut. The Tang forces had won, the dynasty was restored, and, now blessed with

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38. In 788, a group aiming to downgrade the status of the cult criticised Qi Taigong for abandoning Yin 殷 for Zhou. See McMullen, Ch'i T'ai-kung, p.98. This provides a further example of the vigour and uses of the debate over *zhong* in the aftermath of the An Lushan rebellion.

39. The doubts about Zhang Xun's virtue were enough to keep him from receiving a *zhong* title, but his JTS biography appears in the *zhongyi* section, JTS 187B:4899-4902.

40. They are also noted for their fearless remonstrance, for it is fitting that these most important amongst the exemplary should be recorded as absolute paragons. The emphasis remains upon martial loyalty and (usually) violent deaths.

41. See E.G. Pulleyblank, Neo-Confucianism and neo-Legalism in T'ang intellectual life, 755-805, *The Confucian persuasion* (1960), ed. Arthur Wright, pp.77-114 for discussion of the background to this exodus and the main schools of thought.

42. McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.316, cites a figure of 300 as an example. This is a reference to the more than 300 officials, headed by Chen Xilie 陳希烈, who turned out to welcome the forces loyal to the Tang who had retaken Luoyang 洛陽 (Dongjing 東京.) TJ 220:7042. Examples of those noted as serving the rebels and/or as returning their allegiance to the Tang could be multiplied from a variety of sources.

43. The treatment of the 'collaborators' is described in the monograph on law, JTS 50:2151-2, and given dates and context by JTS 10:247-11:270, 316; TJ 220:7041-222:7136. A problem with the sources for this section of the monograph on law is pointed out by Twitchett, *Writing of history*, p.236.

44. Li Hua himself sets out his feelings in surviving poetry. See QTS 153:1587-8 and McMullen, Historical and literary theory, p.317.

hindsight, Li Hua had no difficulty in knowing whom he *should* have served during the rebellion.

He was not alone in holding this view of collaborative actions: there is evidence of resentment towards those who were considered thus to have helped end the halcyon days of the pre-rebellion period.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, Dugu Ji 獨孤及 (725-777) admired Li Hua's writing for its manifestation of loyalty and filial piety.<sup>46</sup> In so doing he separated Li Hua's laudable inner qualities from his circumstantial external actions, and did not deem it necessary to condemn Li as Li had condemned himself.<sup>47</sup> We will find echoes of this ability to distinguish internal intent from the acts of necessity, as recommended by Yan Zhitui, in some treatments of the first generation Liao Chinese.

Dugu Ji also considered the *zhong* issue from a more theoretical standpoint, via commentary on the behaviour of Ji Zha 季札, who three times refused to take the throne of Wu 吳.<sup>48</sup> Dugu acknowledged Zha's concern to 'preserve his integrity,' but felt that he had failed the state by his refusal to help Zhou and keep the 'barbarians' under control. Dugu emphasised the duty of service over the demands of personal morality, and thus lent his support to the second strand of *zhong*, dealing with political or dynastic loyalty. At around the same time, Yuan Jie 元結 produced an essay on Guan Zhong, whom he thought overpraised.<sup>49</sup> Yuan felt that instead of going over to Qi, Guan should have remained *zhong* to the Zhou, arguing that had he done so, Zhou would have survived and the rise of Qin 秦 been prevented. This is an even more explicit statement of the second, political, conception of *zhong*. This intense post-rebellion discussion of *zhong* within the framework of the second branch of its meaning contrasts with the lesser pre-rebellion focus on the strand concerned with 'moral loyalty.'<sup>50</sup>

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45. McMullen, *Historical and literary theory*, p.326 locates examples of this view in QTW 336:14a; 315:9a. It is also noted by Peter Bol, *'This culture of ours: intellectual transitions in T'ang and Sung China'* (1992), p.115, that Jia Zhi 賈至 accused the Tang officials of having lost their vision of a moral order and of having never acquired the principles of ethical behaviour, such that they 'lacked the wherewithal to stay firm in the face of the An Lushan and Shi Siming 史思明 (d.761) rebellions. An Lushan "gave one shout and all within the four seas were disturbed."' This was perhaps a scapegoating of civil officials for a military situation that the increasingly civil establishment simply could not control.

46. Bol, *Intellectual transitions*, p.116. Bol does not say what character he is translating as 'loyalty.'

47. Li Hua's JTS biography was expanded in the XTS (McMullen, *Historical and literary theory*, p.320), so Ouyang Xiu also appears to have seen no insoluble problem in his 'collaboration.' This contrasts with Ouyang's view of the Wudai crossers (see below), who in his eyes generally lacked redeeming *wen* 文 virtues.

48. In his *Essay on Ji Zha of Wu* 吳季子札論 QTW 389:10a-11a. Information in this paragraph is derived from McMullen, *Historical and literary theory*, p.328-9. Dugu Ji seems to have had a particular interest in defending the actions of those whose *zhong* was doubted. See, for example, his unsuccessful argument in favour of Lu Yi 盧奕 being granted the canonisation title *zhong*, JTS 187B:4894 (*zhongyi* section.)

49. *Essay on Guan Zhong* 管仲論, written 757. QTW 382:9b-12a.

50. Although in addition to these products of the 'official' definition of *zhong*, there was a flourishing in the genre of literature concerning the difficulties of 'retired scholars,' contributing to the myth associated with Qu Yuan. See Schneider, *Madman of Ch'u*, p.50ff.



Whilst there was a renewed emphasis on the importance of dynastic loyalty, there was some debate as to how fanatical this should be. In 757:12 there were discussions over whether the Tang loyalist Zhang Xun should be considered virtuous.<sup>51</sup> Xun had been so determined not to be starved out by rebels that he and his troops are said to have killed and eaten the entire non-combatant population of their besieged city.<sup>52</sup> In the aftermath, some questioned whether this had not been somewhat excessive behaviour, and suggested that it may have been better for him to have surrendered and preserved more life. The emperor settled this question with an edict saying unequivocally that Zhang's actions were undoubtedly meritorious. Given the recent danger to the imperial house it is not surprising that the restored dynasty should be concerned to praise precisely those actions which were the most extreme in their expression of loyalty to the state.

### Ideas of *zhong* in the Wudai

The constraints under which the compilers of the JTS produced their work are reflected in the complete absence from the *zhongyi* section of any individual who lived after the An Lushan rebellions.<sup>53</sup> This is unfortunate as the Huang Chao 黃巢 rebellions surely could have produced some *zhong* exemplars. However, given that many of the founders of the Wudai regimes were either leaders or direct descendants of leaders during this confused period, to give examples of faithfulness to the Tang at that point in the Tang History would undermine the legitimacy of the Wudai regimes and thus have precisely the opposite effect to that which a Standard History was supposed to produce. As noted earlier, the *zhongyi* biographies from the founding period of the Tang do not include people who remained loyal to the Sui, but only those who, having changed sides, were loyal to the new dynasty.

The *zhong* canonisation titles given in the Wudai show a much stronger emphasis on military valour, with all but one of eleven noted for this quality above all others.<sup>54</sup> The Wudai regimes never got beyond their various founding periods, so it is not surprising that they should emphasise military valour in their interpretation of *zhong*, as this would correspond with the legitimisation needs of the various founders of the Wudai regimes.

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51. TJ 220:7046-7.

52. Apparently amounting to 20 or 30,000 people by the time the city fell. Xun had encouraged his troops to the necessity of this course of action by first killing and eating his own concubine. The rebels were said to have had respect for Xun, but as he clearly would not serve them, they could only kill him. See his biography, JTS 187B:4900-2. The THY does not record him as receiving a canonisation title.

53. This is partly due to an absence of material. See Twitchett, *Writing of history*, passim.

54. The list is in WDHY 12:209-10. All but Wang Chucun 王處存 (JTS 182:4699) have JW biographies. Lu Zhi 盧質 is the single case showing non-military *zhong*, JW 93:1227-9; XW 56:643.

### Ideas of *zhong* in the Wudai-Song transition

When it came to the compilation of the JW in 973-4 it was necessary for the Song compilers to make judgements on those who had changed sides during the Wudai. But as we have seen in the case studies, the Later Jin historiographers produced little condemnation of side-changing in either texts or commentaries, nor any explicit discussion of the issue. At this time, only 13 years into the Song and still some way from consolidation, the officials involved in the historiographical project had themselves changed their allegiance to the Song from some previous regime. Many would also have served more than one of the Wudai or Ten Kingdoms. The compilation of the dynastic history was an important element in the legitimisation of the new regime, and that legitimacy relied in part on the extent to which the new dynasty was able to attract the service of the officials of its predecessor. Given their own circumstances, it is not surprising that the JW compilers were notably non-judgmental in their treatment of changes of allegiance by the officials of the Wudai. This is the same situation noted above as a problem for the compilers of the JTS. In the Wudai-Song transition we are fortunate to have a contemporary commentator on the difficulties involved.

The noted Southern Tang 南唐 poet Xu Xuan 徐鉉 joined the Song when Southern Tang was conquered in 975. He was fortunate to join a regime which turned out to be successful. His biography in the SS reads as that of a memorialising *zhong* official, and contains a formulaic passage in which his virtue of *zhong* is recognised and respected by the new dynastic founder.<sup>55</sup> Taking literary office under Song Taizu 宋太祖, Xu set out a highly pragmatic version of the relationship between lord and minister in three discussions appended to his collected works.<sup>56</sup> He believed that the relationship was one of mutual benefit: the lord needs the reflected merit and skills of the official; the official serves in pursuit of the wealth and honour which lords can give them. Accordingly, the ruler-minister relationship is complementary, not like that between superior and inferior or father and son. The minister may choose whether to serve a ruler according to whether the ruler has *dao* or not. A king with *dao* will naturally select worthy ministers and the minister then has the responsibility to advise and support the chosen ruler, but in fact, the definition of possession of *dao* comes down to how the ruler treats the minister:

He who treats the minister as a teacher is a king, he who treats the minister as a friend-to-be-taught is an oppressor.<sup>57</sup>

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55. Biography in SS 441:13044-9. The recognition passage is on p.13045.

56. The *Jun chen lun* 君臣論, *Chi chen lun* 持臣論 and *Shi chen lun* 師臣論. In *Xu gong wen ji buyi* 徐公文集補遺 SBBY edn. The *Xu gong wenji* without the appendix is also part of the SBCK, vol. 44, Shanghai shangwu yinshuguan. The account here is largely taken from that given in Zhou Jun, Songchu 'erchen,' esp. pp.123-4.

57. Quoted in Zhou Jun, Songchu 'erchen,' p.124. No reference given.

This leaves the minister at absolute liberty to abandon a ruler believed to lack *dao*, and as Zhou Jun observes, this means that those who had served more than one dynasty were not seen to have lost their integrity, but had simply abandoned unworthy rulers. Such an interpretation is highly reminiscent of the views of the early Confucianists, and reflects a return to the first strand of *zhong*, that of 'moral loyalty.' Xu Xuan was using the interpretation of *zhong* favoured by ministers, but coming when they did, Xu's arguments had the effect of bolstering the legitimacy of the new regime. In fact, his explanation elides, or recombines, the two main strands in the meaning of *zhong*. The political and pragmatic necessity to change sides, itself an immoral act, is converted, by retrospective appeal to moral loyalty, into an action inspired by dynastic loyalty, but to the new, not the old, regime. Xu thus provides, from within the tradition of discussion of *zhong*, a justification for those who successfully changed sides. In so doing he provided a further demonstration of the flexibility inherent in the formulation of the concept of *zhong*, which enabled an interpretation to suit any situation. This view also effectively pardons all Wudai side-changers, for these regimes had to be legitimate for the Song to be considered their successor,<sup>58</sup> and if they were legitimate, then it was expected that officials would be *zhong* towards them.

### Neo-Confucianism: a change of stance

A century later the Song was in its turn securely established. In such a period of relative security and confidence for the dynasty, we would expect *zhong* to be interpreted more according to its moral than its political strand. In fact, some writers show a drastically changed retrospective attitude towards the ministers of the Wudai, focussing especially on Feng Dao 馮道,<sup>59</sup> who was to become the archetypal side-changing minister. Criticism of him was symptomatic of the beginnings of a shift to an increasingly absolute view of *zhong*, much closer to the patriotic loyalty which has come to be the commonly understood meaning of the word today. As many of the sources for the tenth century come from this period, the views held by the relevant historians must be considered.

Sima Guang in the TJ, and Ouyang Xiu in the XW, discuss *zhong* with reference to Feng Dao. Ouyang says,

I have found in the Wudai three gentlemen of perfect integrity and fifteen ministers who laid down their lives; but (I) blame those scholars who, adhering to Confucianism, call themselves followers of the ancients, and yet accept salaries and serve the state in great numbers; but if the virtues of faithfulness 忠 and uprightness 義 were manifested solely by the military men who died in battle, how could it be that there were really none such amongst the Confucians? Is it not that those scholars who were of high principles, detesting the disorder of the times, hid from the

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58. See Chan, *Official historiography*, pp.74ff; and Davis, *Historiography as politics*, pp.37ff.

59. He was rehabilitated by Wang Gungwu in 1962. Feng Tao: an essay on Confucian loyalty, *Confucian personalities*, edd. Arthur Wright & Denis Twitchett, pp.123-45.

world and were unwilling to come out? Or that those who ruled the *tianxia* 天下 were unworthy of (their) attention, so that in no case could they get them [the hiding Confucians] to come forward? Confucius said on this: 'In a village of ten houses, there will certainly be some faithfulness 忠 and integrity.' How could these be empty words!<sup>60</sup>

Ouyang implicitly devalues the military *zhong* displayed by *zhong* heroes of the Wudai by his argument that this *zhong* by itself was insufficient to any age.<sup>61</sup> The type of *zhong* he prefers is that high principle which should keep virtuous Confucians in reclusion during times of disorder, protesting the immorality of their age through their refusal to serve. This is another aspect of the 'moral' definition of *zhong* used earlier by Xu Xuan, but now with a completely opposite cast placed on it, such that those defended by Xu Xuan are condemned by Ouyang.

Sima Guang, who quotes most of Ouyang's passage, takes the argument, and the meaning of *zhong*, a stage further. Where Ouyang is quite clearly drawing the respected distinction between becoming a recluse and taking service at all, Sima makes a link not just with serving at all, nor with valiant military service against a rebel, but with serving two masters, and the unfortunate Feng Dao is pilloried to make an example.

.... in the home there are husbands and wives, outside (in the world) there are rulers and ministers. Wives (should) follow their husbands, and not change [remarry] throughout their whole lives; ministers (should) serve their rulers and should not change their allegiance [*er* 貳] even if (it means) their deaths; these are cardinal principles of human morality. If some abrogate them, there is no greater chaos than this! .... [I] consider that an upright woman does not follow two husbands and a faithful 忠 minister does not serve two rulers. When a woman is not upright, although she still has the beauty of her gorgeous appearance and the skill of her weaving, this is not enough for her to be considered virtuous; when a minister is not faithful, although he still has great talents and knowledge and the excellence of his administrative actions, this is not enough for him to be considered honourable. Why is this? It is because they have shown themselves deficient in virtue. Dao being a grand councillor to five dynasties and eight surnames in succession, was like an innkeeper watching travellers pass by; they would be enemies at daybreak and ruler and minister by evening. He changed his face and transformed his words and never once was he ashamed. With virtue like this, although he might have had some small good points, how can he be worthy of praise? .... While the emperors followed one another closely in their rise and fall, Dao prospered as before. He is the worst of treacherous officials.<sup>62</sup>

Ouyang and Sima agree that there are at least two sides to any conflict, and that one could not have a civil war unless officials were willing to abandon their integrity and ignore any sense of shame in order to go and serve masters other than their original lord. It is assumed that this original lord must be the legitimate one, and must continue to be so. Hence lack of integrity readily leads to disloyal behaviour because it allows for the changing of master. The notion of the transfer of the Mandate is nowhere to be seen.

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60. XW 54:611-2.

61. On the other hand, in his revision of the *zhongyi* biographies for the XTS, the range of behaviour treated as *zhong* is greatly reduced, with the memorialists and others being left out and others substituted, leaving a definition of *zhong* almost exclusively confined to military valour.

62. TJ 291:9511-3. Translation partially adapted from Wang, Feng Tao, pp.123, 140.

The stinging condemnation of Feng Dao does not seem justified by the circumstances, unlike, for instance, the vengeful treatment of those who had served the An Lushan rebels. Where the latter was the immediate response, fuelled largely by panic, to the close shave the Tang dynasty had just had, the attitudes expressed by historians such as Ouyang and Sima were formed upon returning to the historical account at a distance allowing cool reappraisal. Ouyang and Sima wrote in a stable dynasty; the transfer of the Mandate due to internal upheaval was far from their minds, whilst external dangers were increasingly exercising them. The source of danger had shifted from rebels to foreigners. Living under the terms of the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵, there was a foreign power available on which to heap all blame, so it is odd that Ouyang and Sima pick on Feng Dao rather than on a Liao Chinese, who could easily have been characterised as traitorous. In fact, so much do Ouyang and Sima concentrate on the number of regimes which Feng Dao served, that they make nothing at all of his brief service to the Liao. The focus here is on the issue of integrity and two masters, regardless of which particular two masters they happened to be.

These developments in the meanings of *zhong* remove the flexibility in the concept traced here for the earlier period. The actions of the Song loyalists at the fall of both Northern and Southern Song showed that the idea of *zhong* was developing further, from a sense of integrity demanding service to a single house into a notion of a *loyalism* related to proto-nationalism.<sup>63</sup> Those resisting the Mongols seem to have been particularly conscious of their loyalist role, and Jennifer Jay has argued recently that there is a 'construction of loyalism' in the records left by the loyalists themselves which ensured a 'fixing' of Song loyalism 'as a paradigm of virtues unchanged through the passage of time.'<sup>64</sup> The Yuan 元, Ming 明, and Qing 清 all had their loyalists,<sup>65</sup> and loyalty, overlaid by ideas of nationalism and patriotism, remains an issue into the present day.<sup>66</sup>

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63. See Rolf Trauzettel, Sung patriotism as a first step toward Chinese nationalism, *Crisis and prosperity in Sung China* (1975), ed. John Haeger, pp.202ff; also Julia Ching, Neo-Confucian utopian theory and political ethics, *Monumenta serica* 30 (1972-3), pp.37ff.

64. Jennifer Jay, *Memoirs and official accounts: the historiography of the Song loyalists*, HJAS 50:2 (1990), p.611, and *A change in dynasties: loyalism in thirteenth-century China* (1991.)

65. Yuan loyalists included Yang Weizhen: Davis, *Historiography as politics*, p.50 & n; Edmund Worthy in *Dictionary of Ming biography, 1368-1644*, p.1550. The Qing regime was not fully secure from Ming loyalists until 1681: Jacques Gernet, *A history of Chinese civilisation* (1982), pp.467-71. Qing loyalists focussed around Puyi: eg. Pamela Crossley, *Orphan warriors: three Manchu generations and the end of the Qing world*, ch.6.

66. For an example of the completeness with which the Song idea of a loyalist definition of loyalty has dominated the thinking of the best scholars, see James T.C. Liu, Yüeh Fei (1103-41) and China's heritage of loyalty, JAS 31:2 (1972), pp.291-7. This article also indicates the kind of pressures and tensions under which Chinese scholars can find themselves when considering the subject of loyalty.

## Part 2 - The actions and historiography of the Liao Chinese

The survey given here of the shifting concept of *zhong* shows the range of behaviours allowed within what was a highly accommodating framework. Particular attention has been paid to the facet of *zhong* which employed the idea of the transfer of the Mandate to legitimise the abandonment of one lord for another. It is clear that the behaviour of those who pledged allegiance to the Song was permissible on this basis. Those who crossed between Central Plains regimes in the Wudai would have come under that same rubric, save for the short-lived nature of the dynasties they joined. This brevity meant that the Wudai subsequently suffered a troubled legitimacy, so that even though they had to be recognised in order for the Song to make good its claims, it was uncertain whether it was possible to be loyal to them.

Inasmuch as the Liao was simply another north China regime, the first generation Liao Chinese could also potentially be treated according to the same standard, but halfway through the century the Liao conquered a relatively unified north China, and those Chinese who crossed to Liao subsequently appear far more uncomfortable with their situation than had their predecessors. Song attitudes with regard to *zhong* were already hardening by the beginning of the eleventh century, and as these attitudes became increasingly uncompromising, Song rewriters of history grew uncomfortable with side-changers. One significant response to this was the intense criticism of Feng Dao noted above. Furthermore, because of the ambivalence towards the Liao resulting from the treaty of Shanyuan, the same rewriters were uncertain as to how to treat the Liao Chinese, and this comes through in the changing emphases to be found in the successive sources which we have dealt with here.

Given the climate of heightened morality amongst the Song literati who were responsible for producing so many of the sources which pertain to the tenth century, we might expect the later records to display outright condemnation of the Liao Chinese. Surely in Song eyes such people, who did not simply join an internal rebel but took service under foreigners, were guilty of the worst kind of disloyalty? Had they not betrayed ruler, state and their own ethnic group?<sup>67</sup> According to such a view, we might think to find virtually all the Liao Chinese simply omitted from the southern records altogether, with perhaps a handful of counter-examples showing the wickedness of working for the Liao and the misfortune that would accompany it. This viewpoint could be expressed, as we shall see in the case of Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽, but in fact, only Ouyang Xiu's XW goes so far as to refuse a full biography to *any* Liao Chinese, and even he grants them at least thumbnail sketches in the appendices on barbarians

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67. The question of ethnicity is discussed in the next chapter.

四夷附錄.<sup>68</sup> As we have seen, the remainder of the southern sources give full accounts of individual Liao Chinese, and the successful careers of these people could not by any stretch of the imagination allow them to be seen as counter-examples.

In fact, the individuals concerned are treated exactly the same as any other worthy official, often with stress on their moral qualities. These include Han Yanhui 韓延徽 maintaining his dignity as envoy and refusing to bow to Liao Taizu, for which Yanhui suffered banishment as a herder of flocks.<sup>69</sup> In the TJ and QG Yanhui is also noted for speaking out on behalf of the Later Tang envoy Yao Kun 姚坤, whom Taizu wanted to execute. Zhang Li 張礪 is lauded in the earlier texts for his implied criticism of the prince Jiji 李繼岌 over the execution of Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜, and from the TJ onwards his criticisms of wrongdoing bring the wrath of the powerful upon him, ending in his death. Even Zhao Yanshou, in some sources, is noted to have spoken out in order to save the surrendered Later Jin army. The absence of the two later subjects from this list has a significance which we shall come to in due course.

A quality common to several of the first generation is filial piety, which has been noted above as a form of behaviour potentially qualifying somebody as *zhong*.<sup>70</sup> The connection is made explicitly by Zhang Pi 張仝, recorded in the JTS *zhongyi* biographies:

if I am a filial son to my family, then I will be a faithful [*zhong*] minister within the state.<sup>71</sup>

In these circumstances filial piety is expressed almost exclusively with reference to a mother, who almost always appears to be widowed, or at least separated from her husband by the demands of his postings. Han Yanhui visited his mother before he left Jin after falling out with Wang Jian 王緘. Zhang Li was noted for taking his filial mourning obligations to an extreme by giving his father's beloved concubine the same treatment as he had given his mother. Gao Xun 高勳 argued for lenience with regard to Li Huan's 李澣 behaviour in fleeing Liao by saying that he went only because he so missed his mother, who was over 80. This latter case is transparently using filial piety as an excuse, and Han Yanhui admits in his explanatory letter to Jin that he had used his mother as a pretext to get himself out of a difficult position.<sup>72</sup>

68. XW j.72-3.

69. References back to the case studies can be located via the tables appended to the relevant chapters, for which reason full cross-references are omitted in what follows.

70. See pp.268ff.

71. JTS 187B:4909.

72. The continued usefulness of the 'mother excuse' as a means of getting out of trouble is attested by a British commentary from the nineteenth century:

The Imperial Government dare not refuse leave of absence to a mandarin if he, as an only son, requires it in order to tend his widowed mother during her declining years; even though the government may

However, more than all these conventional virtues, the aspect which is stressed most in successive southern texts is the attachment of the Liao Chinese to the south. This contrasts with the pictures of the same individuals as found in the LS. It is these developments which are discussed below for four of our case study subjects; Zhao Yanshou will be covered separately.

### Zhang Li

Zhang Li presents the clearest picture of how the emphases change, and his case will be discussed in most detail. In the earliest text, the JW, Li comes across as a normal biographical subject, displaying many of the Confucian virtues. The JW includes details absent from later works, such as his recommendation and financial assistance of the talented, and his display of filial piety mentioned above. He was also prepared to speak out for what he believed to be right, as when he demanded the execution of the rebel Kang Yanxiao 康延孝, but his advice to Liao Taizong on not employing Kitan to rule the Central Plains, which so offended Xiao Han 蕭翰, appears in the JW only amongst the accusations Han hurls at Li during their confrontation.

Most importantly, throughout the account of Li's life there is an emphasis on personal loyalty, to individual superiors, at every important stage of his life. He helped his old sponsor Li Yu 李愚 to obtain a post at the court of the Tang restoration; he wept at the illegal execution of Guo Chongtao, who is said to have recommended Li for a post on the Shu campaign; and when his former commander Zhao Yanshou was refused the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom, it was Li who proposed that Yanshou be compensated with a number of posts. He also demonstrated a degree of loyalty to the Middle Kingdom in his attempt to escape, but upon his recapture he appears to give up any idea of return home, and while this story rounds off the JW biography, it does not dominate the account.

In contrast to the balanced and detailed account of Zhang Li in the JW, the XW presents a drastically abbreviated picture in which Li is shown to have literary talent, but which concentrates on his transferral to and service of Liao. The escape attempt is included but there is nothing further to emphasise his loyal nature. Moreover, Ouyang Xiu adds an incident in which Li is blamed by the Liao emperor for the destruction of the south, and shortly afterwards he is summoned by the new Liao ruler, Shizong, and apparently removed from his post.

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know that the real cause of his asking for leave, is to escape from some impending official difficulty. Thomas Taylor Meadows, British civil service interpreter before and during the Taiping Rebellion, quoted without reference in Yang Lien-sheng, *Female rulers in imperial China*, HJAS 23 (1960-1), p.47.



The TJ omits the accounts of Li's great filial piety and early demonstrations of virtue. It also drops his personal loyalty to Li Yu. Apart from the loyalty apparently inherent in his escape attempt, it is here that Li's advice to employ Chinese officials is placed in chronological sequence. The reduced enumeration of his general virtues serves to place more emphasis on his continuing attachment to the south.

The QG account includes only two events from Li's life before he entered Liao, one of which is his principled weeping for his wrongly executed superior.<sup>73</sup> The QG then selects from the incidents in Li's later life in order to emphasise his personal loyalty and his belief that Chinese should rule in the Middle Kingdom. It omits his transfer of service to Guo Chongtao's deputy, Ren Huan 任圜, reduces the number of occasions on which he speaks out, and does not include the incident in which he is blamed for the destruction of the Middle Kingdom. As a result, his attempt to escape south is given still further prominence.

Hence, in working through the southern texts we find an increasingly abbreviated picture of Li, with the Confucian virtues being the first to go and with a steady reduction in the number of incidents showing his personal loyalty. The most lasting elements of his story are precisely those showing his attachment to the south, and particularly his explanation for his escape attempt, giving his view of the north:

I am a Chinese, and [Chinese] food, drink and clothes are not at all the same as those here: living like this I might as well be dead.

### **Han Yanhui**

A brief account in the XW, the earliest of the main texts for Yanhui, shows his principled nature as he refuses obeisance to the Liao emperor and his subsequent humiliation as a herdsman, until his worth is recognised. Fully half of the account is devoted to a description of his return to Liao after his escape, and the image is of a minister who ultimately gave his adherence to the Liao.

The expanded account of Yanhui found in the TJ adds significantly to the picture of him. The Shulü empress 述律后 is seen to recognise Yanhui's virtue, and his pretext of visiting his mother is transformed into a genuine visit by the news that he completed it. The QG gives almost exactly the same picture, but exhibits its tendency to hagiography by placing Yanhui alongside Sun He 孫鶴 as a remonstrator with the tyrannical Liu Shouguang 劉守光. These new emphases bring the image of Yanhui's general virtue up to the level expected of a normal biography.

More important than this is the even greater emphasis, in the same texts, of Yanhui's continued attachment to the south. Accounts of his escape and return appear in the TJ and

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73. The QG mistakes the person involved in each case; see Chapter 4.

twice in the QG, but where the XW shows Yanhui ultimately giving his allegiance to the Liao, in the TJ and QG we find an account of Yanhui's letter to the Taiyuan Jin explaining his actions, declaring his attachment to the south and promising to ensure that the Liao will not 'govern in the south.' It is these works which add Yanhui's assistance in the settlement of large numbers of captured Chinese, providing them with wives and working to ensure them a livelihood under stable government. Later on, he saves the life of Yao Kun, and the TJ observes a continuing connection with the south in Yanhui's regular receipt of gifts from the Later Jin. In contrast to the XW, the overall picture in the neo-Confucian works is of a Chinese who, though he returned to the north, still remained ultimately loyal to the Central Plains regimes, and did what he could on their behalf.

### **Li Huan**

The scanty JW account of Li Huan records two main elements which show a balance between general commendation and a continued loyalty to the south. Huan is said to have literary talent, though it is important to note that no moral qualities are mentioned. After the fall of Bian in 947 he apparently reported to the Zhou court on the state of Liao.

The XW pays scant attention to Huan, but what it does say is telling. Not only does it mention no moral qualities, it makes specific Huan's lack of them by implying that it was his drunkenness which gave Jin Gaozu an excuse to abolish the Hanlin academy. Subsequently it says that he went north after the fall of Bian, but nothing is said about any continued loyalty. These haphazard accounts are partially amended in the TJ, which repeats the allegation of drunkenness, and thus implies moral deficiency, but balances this with a newly detailed account of Huan's espionage on behalf of the south, thus emphasising his continued allegiance to the Central Plains regimes.

The SS removes any reference to Huan's drunkenness, and at the same time makes even more of Huan's espionage,<sup>74</sup> but perhaps surprisingly, mentions his escape only in passing. Nevertheless, the emphasis here is very definitely on Huan's loyalty to the south, and it is implied that he did a good job, perhaps for some considerable time, as a southern agent in the Liao court. The fact that his morality is no longer questioned creates a consistently positive picture of him.

### **Wang Jizhong**

The portrayals of Wang Jizhong reflect an increasingly uncomfortable attitude towards frontier crossing. The DDSL and LPJ begin by showing Jizhong with virtue reflected from his father's apparently heroic death on the northern frontier. Jizhong repaid the favour he had received by fighting hard against the Liao when he was himself posted to

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74. The CFYG has the most detailed account of all, demonstrating how far Huan would go on behalf of Zhou.

the northern frontier. The Song believed him to have died heroically, but subsequently the Liao made him ask for peace and he became the architect of the treaty of Shanyuan. His continued loyalty, in the form of a wish to return home, was frustrated by the very treaty he had just helped to make.

The CB provides the most detailed account of Jizhong's hard fighting to try to avoid capture by the Liao, and of his request to return south. Now he is not made to ask for peace but actively encourages the Liao to ask for negotiations. Furthermore, his own discomfort at his position is reflected in his sending south a long letter apologising for his service to the Liao, using as justification his desire 'to rest the people and end fighting.' The QG, which abridges the CB account, omits this letter, but a report of the incident does appear in the SS. It is also the SS which seems most concerned to shift the blame for Jizhong's crossing, heightening the danger he faced in the battle and accusing his fellow generals of cowardice.

Although the CB, followed by the SS, gives a catalogue of Jizhong's posts before his capture, in the southern sources generally there is a notable absence of comment upon his inherent moral qualities. The most we find is the SS remark that he gained the personal confidence of the future Zhenzong. Lacking other laudable aspects to his character, Jizhong's entire reputation rests upon his resistance to capture and his efforts towards the peace treaty. Although his attachment to the south is undoubted by any source but the QG, his case was one which troubled later commentators, as shown by the number of sources in which it is considered, and by the ambivalence of the appraisals, several of which criticise him for failing to die for his cause.

Hence all four of the subjects above are shown in the southern texts to have a continuing attachment to the Middle Kingdom. They all make efforts to return there and from their positions in Liao they sometimes act in the interests of the south. From this evidence we could suggest that whilst the JW tends to give a full picture stressing the usual virtues, and the XW effectively damns all the Liao Chinese by noting them only in terms of their service to the Liao, the TJ and QG seem to provide for the possibility that although Chinese did work for foreigners, they were not necessarily all bad, and that by remaining loyal to the south in at least some of their actions - and thus retaining their personal integrity - they could perhaps be judged to have retained their virtue. In the SS we see indications that there was a change in views over time, as the two cases with records in that source are not shown to have any virtue independent of their loyalty to the south. In the SS, CB and other Song and Yuan sources there also seems to be a growing ambivalence to the literally borderline case of Wang Jizhong.

### **Attachment to the south and the LS**

If these people were so loyal to the Middle Kingdom, how is it that they rate biographies in the LS? And not only do they rate biographies, but even the escape attempts remain. However, there are new emphases too.

Zhang Li's moral stance against Xiao Han is retained in the LS, and his willingness to speak out is recorded, but overall he appears as just another Chinese giving good service to Liao. Most importantly, in contrast to the southern loyalty retained throughout the texts so far, there is now no reference to loyalty to anyone except the Liao emperor, and although Li's escape attempt remains, he explains himself without implying that death would be preferable to life in Liao.

For Yanhui, the LS hammers home the picture of him as formulator of the Liao administrative system, such that he appears to have created it singlehandedly. This stresses faithful service, but events showing the sincerity of his filial piety are omitted, along with anything showing his practical attachment to the southern regimes: he does not promise to keep the Liao out of Taiyuan, and he does not save any Chinese lives. In addition it is not explicitly noted that he receives better treatment after his return to Liao, rather it is made clear that the Liao emperor firmly expects Yanhui to return and, unlike in the earlier sources, he is not surprised nor overjoyed when Yanhui does come back. Instead, when Yanhui returns to Liao after his escape there is an explicit declaration of loyalty to the Liao emperor. The overall picture is of a transference of loyalty to the Liao, balanced by the observation that Yanhui wrote poetry about his sadness at being away from home.

The LS image of Li Huan is less clear, but whereas the earlier sources do not mention the moment of his entry into Liao service, the LS says that Huan 'pledged allegiance' to Liao. The LS nevertheless allows for a continued attachment to the south, now seen to be in the form of an escape attempt at the invitation of his older brother Tao 李濤. It is when this fails that we see perhaps the most bizarre addition in this account: that of Huan's repeated attempts at suicide. This version shows both a pledging of allegiance to the Liao and also what could be read as an extreme loyalty to the south. Although it is likely that Huan's suicide attempts were motivated chiefly by fear of the unpredictable emperor Muzong, Muzong perceived only that Huan was disloyal to him. This could be taken to imply Huan's continued attachment to the south, but in the end he did not refuse a return to office when it was offered.

Lastly, the LS version of Wang Jizhong's life removes references to his heroism, and the loyalty implied by it, saying only that he was captured while on a scouting mission. It goes on to say that he served Liao energetically in order to repay the kindnesses he had

been shown, and we see him later fighting for the Liao against Koryo. The overall picture here is of a transference of loyalty to the Liao.

In all four cases, some, though by no means all, of the incidents showing a continued attachment to the south were cut in the LS, but at the same time, it appears that the LS compilers were willing to include biographies of individuals who demonstrated their continuing attachment to the Middle Kingdom, *provided* that they could in some way be shown to have allegiance to the Liao *as well*. As a result, the LS shows itself to be unexpectedly tolerant of loyalty to the Middle Kingdom. At least some of the Chinese compilers of the LS under the Yuan were sympathetic to those showing continued attachment to the south,<sup>75</sup> but that such references were not completely edited out suggests that the Mongol emperors may have been as understanding of such cultural loyalties as the Liao emperors seem to have been.<sup>76</sup>

### Zhao Yanshou

Despite the generous treatment given to the cases above, it is clear that feeling against those working for a non-Chinese dynasty could run high. One particularly striking example is the exchange between Zhao Yanshou and the prefect Shen Yun 沈贇 at Qizhou 祁州 in 945, when Shen Yun says that he

would rather die for country and family, and certainly will not imitate what you have done.

Because it first appears in the JW, this cannot be simply a neo-Confucian emphasis. Yun's criticisms that Zhao Yanshou (and Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞) were unashamed of their treacherous conduct do sound like neo-Confucian criticisms of frontier crossers, but then the Zhaos are easy targets. The JW and TJ give a reasonably balanced picture of them, pointing out Dejun's sound service in his regional posting, and Yanshou's period in high office, but it is impossible to ignore that Dejun negotiated with the Liao for control of the empire and that later Yanshou led the Liao armies to conquer the Jin on the promise of the emperorship of the Middle Kingdom if he succeeded. The two Zhaos were unquestionably traitors to the Middle Kingdom in the conventional sense, and accordingly, it is Yanshou who is confronted for his treachery by Shen Yun.<sup>77</sup> The JW has built in its criticism of the Zhaos, and this makes it far more obvious what it is that

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75. Jay, *Change in dynasties*, p.71.

76. For a concise discussion of the current state of the debate over the extent of censorship in the Yuan, see Jay, *Historiography of loyalists*, pp.598-604, reprising *Change in dynasties*, pp.71-9.

77. The JW reports that the Liao empress dowager shamed Dejun for seeking to be Son of heaven. In the TJ and later sources, this account is greatly amplified to include criticism for Dejun's failure to serve his master (the emperor of Later Tang), and a recognition of his errors by Dejun, who 'hung his head in shame.' For references see Table 4, §52.

the LS has to change: these incidents of contemporary criticism simply do not feature. In these clear-cut cases there is no subtlety in the images presented by either side.

That it was thus entirely possible for the earlier as well as the later sources to tear into 'traitors' only emphasises the contrasting treatment of the other four examples. Perhaps with a couple of unequivocal 'traitor' figures on whom to hang all the acrimony, the less prominent officials were able to escape criticism. Furthermore, Jay's overall conclusion that there is a spectrum of behaviour amongst the Southern Song loyalists, ranging from martyrdom to collaboration, indicates that even with the increased importance of *zhong* under the Song, which was such that 'doubtful' cases were included under that same rubric, the flexibility in the practical definition of the word remained, even as the theoretical definition became rigid.

It was, however, the theoretical definition by which the Song and Yuan historiographers judged the Liao Chinese, who did not benefit from such a self-conscious recording movement as did the Southern Song loyalists. We have seen how the *same* code could be used to justify both those who crossed and those who did not. Accordingly, it should be clear that the behaviour of the Liao Chinese did not, in itself, run counter to the established, available interpretations of *zhong*. These people did not consciously seek to betray their lords, rather their pragmatic behaviour was completely in line with the practical options available within the concept of *zhong*. The pattern of what they did was conventional enough, but they were recorded according to changed, harsher standards: they lived according to the norms of political loyalty, but were judged on their moral loyalty.

Nevertheless, the same sources which show Yanshou's wickedness also focus progressively upon precisely those aspects in the lives of the remaining Liao Chinese which show the virtue of *zhong*, however tenuously, strongly suggesting a less sophisticated version of the 'construction of loyalty' demonstrated by Jay for the Southern Song loyalists. The chief component of this virtue is felt to be their continued attachment to the south, expressed in their efforts to carry on being of service to the southern regimes even as they take positions under the Liao. In the earlier cases of Han Yanhui and Zhang Li, the claims for such attachment are hard to take seriously when set against the overall pattern of their lives, but with Li Huan a change is perceptible, and by the time we come to the case of Wang Jizhong it is clear that there really was a sense of belonging in the south, even though Jizhong's efforts to express it are not enough to satisfy the increased demands of the Song historiographers. Whilst it is reasonable enough to identify in Wang Jizhong and Li Huan some kind of ethnic consciousness, in trying to show how the earlier figures were attached to the south the sources imply a

sense of place in them which appears to be far less strong than close examination would find warranted. On this note we move on to the next chapter.

## Chapter Nine

# The question of ethnicity: From pragmatism to the defining of an ethnic frontier

The previous chapter has dealt with the ethical constructs available in the tenth century within which acts of crossing from one regime to another could be framed, and with the representation of that act and its consequences in the records. As we have seen, *zhong* 忠 was an important concept when it came to recording events, but it only rarely had any bearing on the concrete acts of individuals. It did not prevent Chinese from crossing to Liao, or from giving faithful service once they were there. We have noticed changes in the approach to *zhong* both in the course of the tenth century and subsequently, but these changes are such that they cannot be explained solely from within the theory of *zhong* itself. The concept of *zhong* alone does not explain the variation in the overall pattern of crossings, nor the changes in the concerns of individuals considered here in detail. There must have been another factor.

Those who crossed to Liao have often been regarded as disloyal to their origins in China. Because they are identified as Chinese, it is assumed that they had a consistent sense of Chinese identity, and that this should have been strong enough to make them stay loyal. However, we have already seen that the concept of loyalty was, in the first half of the century at least, largely divorced from perceptions of ethnic origins. In this chapter it will be argued that whilst a continuing sense of ethnic identity can be perceived, the *use* of that identity varied considerably. As a factor in decision-making, Chinese identity did not always have the same importance. It was not necessarily a primary concern, and concepts and consciousnesses of ethnic identity could be selectively ignored or utilised in accordance with the needs of individual and governmental self-interest.<sup>1</sup> Earlier approaches to the question of the Liao Chinese and Chinese attitudes towards the Liao have tended to deal with only one side of the frontier and have produced apparently contradictory findings. This chapter will trace the essential link between the use or non-use of ethnic identity, whether by individuals or governments, and the development of unitary, politically consolidated states in both north and south. It is this connection which enables sense to be made out of contradictions, and which also helps to explain the changes in the approach towards *zhong*.

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1. The degree to which the constructions of 'race' and loyalty could be manipulated by later governments (governments which had a greater consciousness of these matters) has been suggested by Pamela Crossley, *Chinese-martial banners*, pp.63-107.



### Ethnic ideas and ethnic mixing in Chinese history

Passing reference has been made to the increasingly overt connection, from the Song onwards, between ideas of loyalty and attitudes concerning ethnicity. The Southern Song loyalists left a plethora of anti-Mongol statements in their writings; increasingly anti-foreign sentiments helped the founding of Ming and the Ming loyalists; and the Republic was established beneath an anti-Manchu banner.<sup>2</sup> The use of ethnic ideas in that millennium had dramatic effects, but we should be clear that ethnic ideas in themselves were nothing new in Chinese history.

Beginning with Confucius, we can draw out the implications for ethnic attitudes in his remarks about Guan Zhong 管仲 quoted in the previous chapter. There, an important element in the justification of Zhong's 'disloyalty' is the remark,

Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair down and folding our robes to the left.

These were practices of people living beyond the Chinese cultural reach, so in other words, Confucius is saying that but for Guan Zhong, 'we' - the Chinese - might have become barbarians. That salvation from foreigners can be set against breach of a moral imperative such as *zhong* suggests at least the potential importance of ethnic ideas at an early stage of Chinese history.<sup>3</sup> Where the disorder of the Wudai appears so far to have brought greater flexibility of action and attitude, the greater disorder of the Chunqiu 春秋 period appears to produce in Confucius the opposite reaction.

There is not space to go into this here, but it is worth bearing in mind that Confucian ideas did not become canonical until the Han 漢, by which time a unified Chinese empire was deeply concerned about the neighbouring Xiongnu 匈奴 empire.<sup>4</sup> The Han considered the Xiongnu as having the 'heart of a wild animal,' and it is fair to say that 'the mythicised Han view of Sino-Xiongnu relations has served as the "model" by which other sino-foreign relations [have been] gauged since the writing of the Han dynastic

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2. For Song anti-Mongol writings: Jay, *Change in dynasties*, pp.70-1. Ming and Republican anti-foreignism is so well-known that there is no need to document it here.

3. Frank Dikötter, *The discourse of race in modern China* (1992), pp.3ff, has argued against 'the delusive myth of a Chinese antiquity that abandoned racial standards in favour of a concept of cultural universalism in which all barbarians could ultimately participate.'

4. It is possible that the argument that follows in this chapter could be applied equally to the Han-Xiongnu period; certainly current scholarship argues for their interdependence in more than one area, see Barfield, *Perilous frontier*, ch.2, Sophia-Karin Psarras, *Perilous myths* (review of Barfield, op. cit.), *Early China* 17 (1992), pp.240ff.

histories.<sup>5</sup> One aspect of this is that later writers would sometimes refer to the current 'barbarian menace' not by their own names but as 'Xiongnu'.<sup>6</sup>

Conventionally, the Disunion 魏晉南北朝 is said to have seen the first serious mixing of the northern population as the Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏 emperor Wendi 文帝 (r.471-499) encouraged Tuoba-Chinese aristocratic intermarriage as part of his sinicisation policy.<sup>7</sup> This started a 'trend towards cultural synthesis' against which there soon followed a Chinese reaction, which can be seen, for instance, in the emphasis placed by the Northern Qi 北齊 (550-577) compiler of the *Wei shu* 魏書 upon 'Chinese' virtues in the *lienü* 列女 biographies.<sup>8</sup> The Sui 隋 are conventionally praised for 'put[ting] an end to the empires of non-Chinese origin in North China,'<sup>9</sup> but the Tang 唐 imperial house was in all likelihood of mixed blood,<sup>10</sup> and certainly practised a mixed culture, to the extent that Barfield can call Tang Taizong 唐太宗 a 'Chinese khaghan' for his ability to rule sedentary and nomadic peoples with equal success.<sup>11</sup> Despite, or rather because of, the mingling of people and cultures which continued through the Tang, certain ninth-century thinkers, notably Han Yu 韓愈, became deeply concerned with the definition of and distinction between what was *hua* 華 (Chinese, civilised) and what was *hu* 胡 (foreign, uncivilised).<sup>12</sup>

These very brief observations suggest an alternation between extensive ethnic mingling and the reassertion of 'Chinese' ways which can be seen echoed in the Wudai and early Song. As I have suggested, and hope to explain below, *hua-hu* distinctions were not a concern of the first half of the tenth century, but began to return during the second.

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5. Sophia-Karin Psarras, personal communication. See also vol.2 of her thesis, *Chinois et Xiongnu à l'époque Han: rapports culturels, rapports politiques* (Ph.D. diss. Université de Paris VII, 1990.)

6. Eg. discussions in the early Song, CB 28:637; 31:702; 32:712; 45:972ff; 46:999ff; 50:1086-8, 1094ff; et al. Sometimes 'Xiongnu' refers to the Kitan, sometimes to the Xi Xia 西夏 leader Li Jiqian 李繼遷.

7. Gernet, *History of Chinese civilisation*, p.193. Eberhard, *Conquerors and rulers*, ch.2, holds that the 'ruling group' of the early Zhou 周 dynasty (1122-771 B.C.) was dominated by non-Chinese tribal leaders.

8. Jennifer Holmgren, *Widow chastity in the Northern Dynasties: the lienü biographies in the Wei shu*, *Papers on Far Eastern history* 23 (1981), pp.185-6.

9. Gernet, p.235.

10. CHC 3:1, p.151 & n, citing Chen Yinke, *Tangdai zhengzhi shi shulun gao* (1944), repr. in *Chen Yinke xiansheng lunji* (Taipei 1971), pp.109-17.

11. Barfield, *Perilous frontier*, pp.139ff.

12. Charles Hartman, *Han Yü and the T'ang search for unity* (1986), ch.2, esp. pp.129ff.

### Present-day scholarship on tenth-century attitudes

Scholarly consideration of the Liao has often bracketed it with other 'alien regimes.' Although there is no doubt that there remained real cultural differences between the Kitan and the Chinese both in the north and the south (for instance, the Kitan continued to speak, and sometimes write, their own Kitan language, they continued to eat food which the Chinese found at best strange, and the briefest glance at archaeological remains shows continuing distinctions between the material culture of the Kitan and the Chinese),<sup>13</sup> these continuing differences between the cultures have been passed over, and debate has centred around the degree of sinicisation shown by the Liao and the reasons for it. This trend has been common amongst both Chinese and Western historians, though it has been more pronounced in China.<sup>14</sup> Present-day Chinese historians point to the very large numbers of Chinese who came under Liao control in the tenth century, and tend to argue that such movements of population necessitated major changes in the economic, political and even social structure of the Kitan people, which continued throughout the dynasty. Such changes include the adoption of much of the Tang system of administration, the wearing of Chinese-style clothing by the imperial family and the officials of the southern division, adherence to Buddhism, adoption of the Confucian thought-system and formalised reverence of the sage, an increased interest in scholarly and learned pursuits, and even, it is claimed, widespread use of the Chinese language among the common people.<sup>15</sup>

Although one might well take issue with the general interpretation that the sinicising influence of the Liao Chinese was an unqualified positive development towards Liao 'feudalisation,' nevertheless one would not want to deny that the Liao did indeed, as time went on, adopt more Chinese-style institutions. But this 'process of sinicisation' did not bring any decrease in the consciousness of difference between Liao and the southern

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13. This is recorded in the LS and was made amply clear by Wittfogel and Feng, despite their arguments for a synthetic 'third culture.' WF pp.16-20 (summary), 219-25. Luo Jizu, Qidan ren de yinshi, *Liao Jin Qidan Nüzhen shi yanjiu dongtai* 1986:1, pp.38-9, despite taking issue with Western claims for continuing differences in food, ends up showing precisely that. Some of the most striking archaeological evidence is from the Kulun 庫倫 tomb-paintings, which show marked differences in dress and hairstyles: Wang Jianqun & Chen Xiangwei, *Kulun Liaodai bihua mu* (1989.)

14. There is a large literature in Chinese on the sinicising influence of the Liao Chinese, which is uncritically regarded as an entirely positive development. For instance, Yin Keming, Qidan hanhua; Liang Shuqin, Cong chutu wenwu kan Liaodai Qidan zu dui Han zu wenhua de xishou he jicheng, *Liao Jin Qidan Nüzhen shi yanjiu dongtai* 1986:1, pp.40-43; Ren Chongyue, Liaodai Qidanzu dui Hanzu wenhua de xishou he jicheng, *Zhongzhou xuekan* 1983:3, pp.95-99, 88; Yao Congwu, Qidan hanhua. Most of this literature explains Liao sinicisation in terms of political advantage, which demanded the winning over of the Chinese governing classes. Only passing reference, if any, is made to the likelihood of a *mixing* of cultures, with 'influence' flowing southwards as well as northwards, although Yao Congwu's article (originally published 1952) is more balanced than most later works. Pamela Crossley, in particular, has written about the unhelpfulness of the extraordinarily persistent sinicisation framework: Thinking about ethnicity in early modern China, *Late imperial China* 11:1 (1990), pp.1-35.

15. See Chinese articles cited in previous note.

regimes, at least in the early Song. From the southern side of the frontier, the attitudes of the Song official classes towards the Liao have been examined by Wang Gungwu and Tao Jingshen.<sup>16</sup> From their work, chiefly with literary materials, it is clear that during the latter part of the tenth century there was a continuing perception of the differences between Chinese and Kitan, with no reduction over time in the use of derogatory names for the Kitan in materials not intended for their consumption.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, they have found that Song language expresses 'increasingly hostile Chinese attitudes toward non-Chinese cultures and the "inferior" people such cultures produced.'<sup>18</sup>

If we take actions as partly indicative of attitudes, then this increasing hostility seems to connect with the change in attitudes to loyalty illustrated in the cases of Wang Jizhong 王繼忠 and Li Huan 李澣, as well as fitting with the broader findings presented in Chapter 2. There we saw significant changes in the range of options taken, and therefore perceived, by people in frontier situations faced with the decision to serve foreigners or not. In the earlier part of the century there were many crossings by persons of higher status who had a certain amount of input into the decision, but after the fall of Northern Han more crossings were involuntary and involved people lower down the social scale.

What is curious is that such a development away from taking service with Liao should be growing even as Liao came to look more like one of the southern regimes. If Chinese practices and institutions were what mattered, then it should have been easier, not harder, for Chinese voluntarily to take service with the Liao.<sup>19</sup> Yet if we look ahead to the more heavily studied eleventh and early twelfth centuries, we see that while certain Chinese practices and institutions became more firmly established in Liao, simultaneously the Song court became increasingly irredentist, a trend culminating in the Song-Jin 金 alliance against Liao in 1115. The idea of sinicisation lacks the explanatory power to deal with such apparent contradictions; indeed it is itself part of the problem. There are, however, ideas from the study of ethnicity, and particularly ethnocentrism, which have proved helpful. From the information presented in the earlier chapters we can make the case that the changes in perceived options are intimately related to developments in the political situation.

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16. The two main articles are Wang Gungwu, *The rhetoric of a lesser empire: early Sung relations with its neighbors*, and Tao Jing-shen, *Barbarians or northerners: Northern Sung images of the Khitans*, which reach broadly the same conclusions from different approaches to the materials. Both are in Rossabi, *China among equals*, pp.47-65, 66-86.

17. Tao, *Barbarians or northerners*, pp.72-4.

18. Wang, *Rhetoric*, p.48.

19. A recent article has argued that this logic was successfully applied with the Chinese who were already in Liao. The early Liao 'process of sinicisation' is seen as a response to Liao Chinese resistance to serving 'barbarians,' and is said to have eventually won them over. Meng Guangyao, *Huayi zhi bian*.

### Ethnicity and ethnocentrism

'Ethnicity' and 'ethnic identity' are used as synonyms here. The meaning of 'ethnicity' in the sociological and anthropological literature remains problematical, if not controversial.<sup>20</sup> A theory exists for almost every eventuality, but overall there is a 'paradigmatic crisis.' We can, however, say two things which ethnicity is not. Firstly, it does not mean anything defined in racial terms. As is now becoming widely recognised, ethnic differences have only a coincidental relationship with so-called racial differences.<sup>21</sup>

In any case, intermarriage such as that found on the north China frontier, most notably in the Tang imperial house, destroys any possibility of there being any kind of 'pure race.' We have already seen that where we can identify people as Chinese, Shatuo 沙陀, or Turkish 突厥, such 'racial' identities give little indication as to likely behaviour. Secondly, the objective definition of ethnic identity in terms of cultural practices has also been shown to be impractical, because shared practices are not necessarily taken to bestow a shared identity, as the Manchus found to their cost at the end of the Qing 清.<sup>22</sup>

It appears that at present there are two contrasting notions of what 'identity,' including ethnic identity, means. Either it is something essential 'which an individual or a group has in and of itself,' or something 'only existing in a context of oppositions and relativities':<sup>23</sup> we define ourselves with reference to the 'Other.' Although these two notions apparently sit uneasily together, we will see both of them operating in tenth-century north China. In the case of the first generation Liao Chinese, although a sense of Chinese identity does seem to have continuous *existence*, it is not necessarily *used*, but is brought to the fore or pushed into the background in a context of oppositions, which are often consciously fostered by governments.

This process is one of those provided for by some theories derived from the concept of ethnocentrism. This was an early expression of the idea of definition in terms of the Other, and was the name given to the attitudes, often negative attitudes, of an 'ingroup' towards foreigners or 'outsiders' comprising an 'outgroup.' Ethnocentrism is, if you like, the expression of a felt identity by one particular group (an ethnic identity) in terms of other groups which are specifically *not* identified with. It arises, then, out of a sense of ethnic identity, and in turn contributes to the maintenance of that ethnic identity. In its

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20. 'Conceptual ambiguity still constitutes the prevalent picture.' Azril Bacal, *Ethnicity in the social sciences: a view and review of the literature on ethnicity* (1991), p.11. For a deeper discussion, with reference to China, see Crossley, *Thinking about ethnicity*.

21. The sociologist Michael Banton has written extensively on race as a construct created independently of biological fact. See, for instance, his *Racial theories* (1987.) Geneticists back this up; see Steve Jones, *The language of the genes* (1994), esp. ch.13.

22. The best known exposition of this point is probably Fredrik Barth, ed. *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organisation of cultural difference* (1969.) For the Manchus see Crossley, *Orphan warriors*.

23. Tonkin et al, *History and ethnicity*, p.11.

turn, ethnocentrism helps to define ethnic identities: both those of the ingroup and, via ingroup views, those of outgroups as well.<sup>24</sup> Although currently the concept of ethnocentrism appears to be unfashionable in social scientific circles, it has proved useful here because, unlike ethnicity, it is conceived of as being *necessarily* dynamic in nature, and necessarily involving both sides of any given 'ethnic frontier.' It thus enables the discussion to be shifted away from descriptions of changing structures on one side, to the relation of processes involving both. It is hoped that this will give a better understanding of what was going on.

I shall trace the processes in three sections.<sup>25</sup> Firstly: in the early decades of the tenth century ethnic identity existed, but was an irrelevance in the face of the immediate need for survival in constantly changing situations. Then: in the middle of the century the ritual subordination of north China to Liao created tensions in the south which led to war and the Liao conquest of Later Jin in 947. Finally: this provoked the revival of ethnic consciousness as one tool in the legitimisation of a *centralising state*.

### 1. Frontier groups in the early tenth century, c.900-936<sup>26</sup>

#### *Redrawing the frontier*

We begin by characterising the situation on the early tenth-century frontier. The sources necessarily think in terms of conventional political-cultural divisions based upon a generalised frontier line established by the ancient tradition of Qin Shihuang's 秦始皇 wall; by the tenth century that tradition was already over a thousand years old. The ideal was that people identified as 'Chinese' should not cross that frontier to serve those beyond it, and there are a few tenth-century examples, such as Shen Yun 沈贇, of those who actually lived up to that ideal. Yet there are also many examples, set out in the preceding chapters, of behaviour showing active cooperation with the Liao, more of which come from the first half of the century. Such people are still regarded by the sources as being Chinese, and so are their descendants, even after they have been in Liao for several generations.<sup>27</sup> They were still placed on the southern side of what we might

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24. A comprehensive discussion of the theories deriving from the concept of ethnocentrism can be found in Robert LeVine & Donald Campbell, edd. *Ethnocentrism: theories of conflict, ethnic attitudes and group behavior* (1972) (hereafter LeVine & Campbell.)

25. As we will inevitably be revisiting some of the events described in Chapter 1, the three sections here mirror the major divisions there, for ease of reference.

26. The dates in these headings are approximate, and are supplied only for the purpose of giving the reader some points of orientation.

27. This emphasis varies with the sources. The LS biography of Han Derang 韓德讓 (third generation) does not give any ethnic origin, only mentioning that his grandfather was Han Zhigu 韓知古, but the QG is careful to point out that Derang was 'originally a Han.' LS 82:1289; QG 18:174. Meng Guangyao, *Huayi zhi bian*, pp.63, 68, sets out several cases of Liao Chinese who very actively retained their Chinese identity.

call an 'identity frontier,' which meant that this could run in a very different place from the 'traditional' or even the 'political' frontier.

Frontier regions throughout history are frequently studied in terms of centre-periphery relations.<sup>28</sup> This assumes that we are dealing with entities focussed upon a 'central government' of some kind. Power relationships are considered to taper in their strength from the centre outwards to the 'frontier.' At this often imaginary line (sometimes acknowledged as a zone) a different (though similarly structured), neighbouring entity begins. In the case of tenth-century north China we need to define 'centre' from a political point of view; it has nothing inherently to do with the physical location of the 'capital.' A 'centre' is a power-group which held, or was soon to hold, the imperial dignity, for which it required a widespread and powerful combination of support, consent and tacit agreement, in which regional backing was crucial.<sup>29</sup> They thus include, besides the more obvious candidates, the Taiyuan Jin (the pre-dynastic Later Tang) and the Kitan-Liao regime.

For the early tenth century it does not help to think of the Great Wall as the frontier in a centre-periphery situation. We need to rethink. In the frontier provinces anybody holding an official post, from regional level down to junior military commanders, could become a leader possessing more or less autonomy. There are countless such cases. Although the situation was confused by the two or more 'centres' being themselves major players in the frontier region, nevertheless the local leaders on both 'sides' of the traditional frontier had a great deal more in common with each other than they had with the nominal 'centres.' The local leaders shared similar ambitions. After survival, these included chiefly the retention of posts and individual or familial power, and perhaps the extension of these. These leaders also shared similar problems, and as such minor players could not survive without some kind of backing, their concerns boiled down to the practicalities of which 'centre' was best going to provide for the fulfilment of their ambitions. We can thus define the local frontier leaders as a group seeking advantage from the 'centres.' Accordingly, we can draw a new, working boundary, putting a line around the local leaders on both 'sides' of the conventional frontier. This separates them, at least conceptually, from the 'centres,' between which is created a frontier region, itself now central.

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28. For a consideration of comparative frontiers in approximately the same period, see Bartlett & MacKay, *Medieval frontier societies*; for this same north China frontier, a millennium later, see Marjorie Dryburgh, *Song Zheyuan, the Nanjing government and the north China question in Sino-Japanese relations, 1935-1937*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Durham, 1993.

29. This should not be underestimated: the activities and authority of the centre were so circumscribed by the need for provincial support, and by limited resources (possession of which itself depended not a little on that same provincial support) that the centre could not be quite the dominating factor it is often assumed to be.

In doing this, we have effectively redefined our groups. Previously we had ‘the Chinese’ versus ‘the Liao.’ The Chinese group embraced a confusing mixture including people to whom the frontier was no more than a distant ‘problem,’ and crossing it largely a matter of theory, as well as those to whom the frontier was an everyday reality, and crossing it a realistic option. The redefined ‘frontier’ group contains people on both sides of the old frontier: the inhabitants of the frontier zone, from both sides of the traditional frontier. The other new group consists of the ‘centres’ amongst which the frontier zone inhabitants can, in certain circumstances, pick and choose their allegiances, and along with the various so-called ‘Chinese’ powers, it also includes the Liao.

For the sake of making a comprehensible definition we have not yet considered individuals, but the only difference between them and leaders was that individuals had recourse to a wider range of authorities, embracing both ‘centres’ and minor leaders. A further level of complexity is that the minor leaders, being in the middle of the power-scale, could be both patrons to those weaker than themselves and receivers of patronage not just from ‘centres’ but from other minor leaders stronger than themselves. Thus was created a fine network of constantly shifting allegiances functioning at all political levels for which we have information.

### *Pragmatism*

It is characteristic of the early tenth century that people at all levels would turn to whoever would help them in their immediate situation, with an almost complete disregard of other considerations, notably the issues of loyalty and ethnicity. Most of the early tenth-century frontier leaders sought support at one time or another from other powers they perceived to be significantly stronger than themselves, and such powers could readily include the Liao. Appeals to the Liao elicited varying responses, but in all cases, the ‘foreignness’ of the Liao was an irrelevance.

The number of voluntary crossings shown on the graphs in Chapter 2 shows the prevalence of this behaviour earlier in the century. Even if we consider only the more significant players of the time, there are many examples. In 908 Li Cunxu 李存勖 (a Shatuo Turk), future founder of Later Tang, bribed the Kitan Abaoji 阿保機 (Liao Taizu) to send cavalry to serve against the Liang 梁 (Chinese.) The Liao were noted for their cavalry skills, so they were an obvious source of mercenaries.<sup>30</sup> At the end of 913, Liu Shouguang 刘守光 (a Chinese) was besieged in Youzhou 幽州 by Taiyuan Jin (Shatuo) troops, and his followers were deserting him on all sides. Having exhausted all other sources of support, Shouguang now made a last-ditch appeal to the Kitan Liao. Did

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30. TJ 266:8694. These examples are placed in a fuller context in Chapter 1.



Shouguang perhaps turn to them last because they were non-Chinese? It appears not, because according to Liao sources, the emperor Taizu himself had led an attack on Shouguang only the year before, and relations between them had not improved since. Taizu was reportedly suspicious of this latest request, and refused to help his erstwhile enemy.<sup>31</sup> He probably also saw no reason to get involved in an obviously lost cause.

The small northern power of Yiwu 義武 was sandwiched between Liang and Taiyuan Jin. The Yiwu *jiedushi* Wang Chuzhi 王處直 (Chinese) received his governorship from the Jin (Shatuo), but in 921 he became concerned at his overlord's encroachment into the neighbouring small power of Zhao 趙, and sent 'bribes' to Liao with a request for help. The Jin now clearly had the upper hand against Liang, and Chuzhi is said to have 'feared' only Jin and Liao, discounting the Liang (Chinese) as a source of support.<sup>32</sup> That left Liao, and the fact that it was foreign did not come into the equation at all. Requests for help were made according to the perceived strength of the regime, not its ethnic composition.

These examples illustrate a common behaviour pattern of the time, apparently reflecting an attitude which paid no attention to ethnicity. At the same time, from our detailed studies of individuals, there is evidence for a continuing sense of Chinese identity strong enough to influence actions. The cases of Han Yanhui 韓延徽 and Zhang Li 張礪 are commonly taken as examples of the attachment of the Liao Chinese to their homeland, and so they are, but only up to a point. In fact they demonstrate the flexibility of approach available in the early tenth century.

Han Yanhui (Chinese) flees Liao for unstated reasons; an opportunity to describe him as unhappy in Liao is missed, although it could be that this would automatically be assumed to be the reason. In contrast to the unexplained departure from Liao, we are told very clearly that Yanhui leaves Taiyuan Jin (Shatuo) because of the antipathy of Wang Jian 王緘 (Chinese.) Yanhui does not apparently consider a move to Liang (Chinese), although it claimed the imperial dignity at the time, and controlled the Central Plains including the ancient capitals. He is instead sanguine about his return to Liao, confident of his inestimable value to Liao Taizu. He tells his friend Wang Deming 王德明,

Those (Kitan), ever since I came (away), have been as if their hands and eyes were damaged; when I now go (back) there, those hands and eyes will be whole again; how could they allow me to be harmed!<sup>33</sup>

In returning to Liao, Yanhui is taking a wholly pragmatic approach based upon his certainty of secure employment and recognition. Ethnic considerations never arise, and

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31. TJ 268:8777.

32. TJ 271:8868-9.

33. TJ 269:8811 et al, see Table 2, §21.

we saw in the previous chapter how the emphasis on Yanhui's continuing attachment to the south is an apologetic creation of later sources based on very little hard evidence.

Zhang Li's case is less immediately a matter of pragmatism because of the smokescreen of his declaration regarding his ethnic identity: he says very clearly, 'I am a Chinese,' and this was pounced upon by later compilers.<sup>34</sup> But in fact, the practical upshot of Li's lamentation is that he gets better treatment from the Liao, and it is possible that his claim to cultural unhappiness there was an oblique method of improving his pay and conditions. After this incident we hear no more of Li attempting to escape, even though, given his later career, he would probably have had other opportunities. Not only did he not repeat his escape attempt, but he is credited with helping to plan the conquest of Later Jin in 946-7. Like Han Yanhui, Li appears to have been operating on the basis of personal advantage, in which case his exploitation of the ethnic argument to achieve his ends shows a very high degree of sophistication in the use of available concepts.

This manipulation of current ideas suggests a further point about both Yanhui and Li. Although they were more educated than many of their fellows, they were no more likely to act in accordance with the set of Confucian norms of behaviour which were later laid down as orthodoxy. If anything, their education would have given them more choices in their interpretation of Confucian ideology, and more tools with which to justify their chosen course of action.

In this period the Chinese in north China lived in the constant presence of people clearly identified as Shatuo, Bohai 渤海, Kitan, et al. If ethnicity had been a major issue then we would expect the challenge to Chinese identity represented by these people to have produced some kind of reaction amongst the Chinese. That this appears not to have been the case may be because in north China the Chinese were still a majority and their culture (albeit modified by contact with non-Chinese) still the dominant one. By contrast, the Liao Chinese were members of a subordinate group in a state where the dominant group was largely ethnically defined and culturally different. This meant that the Liao Chinese, moving from a region in which their ethnic group was the dominant one, to a region where it was subordinated, necessarily acquired a more clearly-defined ethnic identity simply because of the contrast in their situation: they had become the minority.

The behaviour of individuals on the north China frontier in the tenth century was characterised by an intensely pragmatic approach not confined to China or the tenth century.<sup>35</sup> Those who crossed into Liao voluntarily were almost all attracted by the

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34. Chapter 4, Table 5, §27.

35. There is a striking case from modern Africa, cited in the anthropological literature, of a Gusii man captured by the enemy Kipsigis, who fought on the Kipsigis side against the Gusii before escaping back to his own people, who received him without difficulty. The researchers found that the Gusii

did not regard him as a traitor or turncoat and, in fact, their vocabulary did not include equivalent terms.

success, at least the relative success, of the regime there, when compared with the Chinese regimes.<sup>36</sup> This success found its practical expression in the rewards handed out to those who joined up, and it is more than likely that those who crossed voluntarily were aware of the likelihood of generous reward before they made their decision. Those who were supposedly less willing to give their allegiance to a foreigner were also 'seduced' by the rewards which they received. The Liao emperors were well aware of the principle, that, in crude terms, everybody has their price. More important still, the Liao ruling group, though dominated by members of the Kitan-Uighur imperial-consort clans, was never closed to members of other ethnic groups, as demonstrated by the important positions achieved by Han Yanhui, Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽, and later dominant figures such as Han Derang 韓德讓. Although the move from a confident majority to a subordinated minority position might have helped to bring out awareness of ethnic identity amongst the Liao Chinese, the individual benefits of such a move more often than not outweighed any abstract considerations.

From this evidence, we can see that early tenth-century crossings between the different regimes of north China took no account of whether the crosser or the regime was of Han or Shatuo or Kitan or whatever other descent. The rationale for crossing was not constructed upon an ethnic basis; whatever the felt definition of 'Chinese' ethnic identity, those who crossed to Liao were not rejecting that identity; they did not seek to take on 'Liao' identity, but rather were 'blind' to the ethnic differences between the two conventional groupings. In most cases they were simply following their likely best fortunes. In the early tenth century, ethnic identity was very rarely, if ever, invoked as a reason for giving or withholding allegiance, and the enormous extent of frontier-crossing to Liao in the early tenth century would also seem to demonstrate that whilst there could be an awareness of ethnic identity, this was not employed to create any attitude of ethnocentrism.

The anthropologists LeVine and Campbell discuss the relationship of ethnocentrism to the level of political development achieved by a group or a state, arguing that a 'well-bounded state' requires a certain level of ethnocentrism for its existence. They suggest that where a state has collapsed and there is fragmentation, then although the old, necessarily ethnocentric, 'ideology of statehood' will be retained in name and theory, in

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Loyalty did not seem to be conceived of in terms that transcended current residence and strategic advantage, although for most persons at most times these would coincide with membership in the Gusii ethnic group .... // This surprising state of affairs along a tense boundary between two sharply differentiated peoples, .... suggests that such boundaries may not have received adequate attention in anthropological research. (LeVine & Campbell, pp.94-5.)

This case could be retold with the names changed to 'Chinese' and 'Liao,' without a hint of anachronism or inappropriateness.

36. According to LeVine & Campbell, pp.63-5, factors influencing choice of group include wealth, power, prestige, or success in war. Grodzins summarises his similar, if more holistic, view, *Loyal and disloyal*, pp.5-7.

practice the level of ethnocentrism will be greatly reduced.<sup>37</sup> Hence when the Tang empire broke up, competing regional leaders of Han, Shatuo and Kitan descent attempted to set themselves up as 'emperors' of 'dynasties,' following the Tang pattern. They did this without reference to the preliminary studies on *hua-hu* differences produced by Han Yu and others a century before. Despite these early efforts, the ideologies and other bases for the rule of individual leaders were not, in the early tenth century, based upon identification with a particular ethnic group. It is not that these identities did not exist or were not recognised, but what we see is almost a suppression of ethnic identities such as 'Shatuo' in favour of a continuation of the concept of the 'Middle Kingdom.' The fact that it was Shatuo Turks who led the efforts to restore the Tang is not dwelt upon in the sources, though neither is it concealed. It is possible that the Shatuo were really more different than our sources would have us believe,<sup>38</sup> and that they have been 'adopted' as Chinese by later writers anxious to show the legitimacy, and the Chinese-ness, of their own dynasty's line of descent, but if the consciousness of ethnic identity were so finely tuned in the early tenth century itself, then we might expect a clearer expression of this in the behaviour of frontier people towards Liao. As it is, the enormous extent of frontier-crossing to Liao in the early tenth century would seem to demonstrate that there are no ethnocentric attitudes here.

## 2. The revival of ethnic consciousness, c.936-950

Although in the early tenth century ethnic identity was more or less irrelevant, and ethnocentrism non-existent, during the Later Jin a transformation of attitudes to the Liao seems to have begun. This is not least because political relations between the Central Plains and Liao were redefined when in 936 Shi Jingtang 石敬瑭 turned to Liao Taizong for help in his bid to replace the Later Tang. In one sense this was simply another incidence of the situation we have discussed above, in which weaker powers turned to stronger ones for support in attaining their immediate goals. The cases of Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞 and Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠, who also sought Liao support for their ambitions at this time, were examples of this pattern, except that the balance of power was shifting around them, putting a different cast upon their actions.<sup>39</sup> Up until now, Liao support had been requested and granted for the purposes of maintaining regional positions, usually against a threat from a larger power. In 936, the request was for Liao support not just for the defence of regional autonomy, but in a bid for empire. In return, the Liao emperor

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37. LeVine & Campbell, p.100.

38. Eberhard sets out the cultural distinctiveness of the Shatuo in *Conquerors and rulers*, ch. 6.

39. See Chapter 8 for discussion of how this could happen.

was offered not just the usual ‘bribes,’ but annual payments, the territory of the Sixteen prefectures, and a father-son relationship with Shi Jingtang.

Some people were quick to see the implications of this raising of the stakes. With the accession of Li Cunxu to the throne in the Central Plains in 923, the Taiyuan Jin had been united with Liang, and the number of ‘centres’ reduced to two. For a minor regional power to receive positions from the Liao as one of at least three centres was one thing, but to effectively subordinate one centre to the only other one was altogether different. Almost immediately after the deal with Liao was proposed there were objections to the extent of the repayment offered. Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 said,

Calling yourself his minister 臣 is permissible, but serving him as your father is going too far. Bribe him with generous gifts of gold and silk and be pleased with yourself that you get his army to come, but there is no need to promise him land and fields; I fear that on some future day this will bring calamity upon the Middle Kingdom, and your regrets will know no end.<sup>40</sup>

This advice was disregarded, and for the remaining five-and-a-half years of Shi Jingtang’s life he worked hard to maintain good relations with Liao. In this period there was a dramatic fall-off in crossings or appeals to Liao, with only three which were not directly related to the fulfilment of the Liao-Jin bargain.<sup>41</sup> This change reflects the importance of opposition between centres as a provider of alternative authority which could support the discontented. This is not to say that there was no discontent. On the contrary, Jingtang spent almost his entire reign engaged in putting down rebellions, but the lack of an external supporter for this internal unrest was undoubtedly a factor in ensuring that the rebellions did not succeed.<sup>42</sup>

When Shi Chonggui 石重貴 (Jin Chudi 晉出帝) succeeded his father in 942:6, it was expected that in informing the Liao he would refer to himself as Taizong’s ‘subject’ and ‘grandson.’ Jing Yanguang 景延廣 objected to his emperor being the ‘subject’ of another state and it was Chudi’s refusal to use this term that provoked the war. Jing Yanguang’s objection is the opposite of Liu Zhiyuan’s: Zhiyuan objected to ‘grandson,’ Yanguang to ‘subject,’ suggesting that the content of the deal was a good deal less important than what was represented by it. There is little doubt that the real issue here was the question of seniority: the whole intellectual and cultural tradition sustaining the ‘Middle Kingdom’ was threatened by the submission to an external power. Yet although the distinction between internal and external was traditionally most clearly articulated with

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40. TJ 280:9146.

41. Even these three are related to the deal less directly: Table 1, #62 (opposition to Liao), 64 (Zhao Yanshou’s wife), 68 (rebellion against Jin.)

42. See Chapter 1. According to TJ 281:9194, the nearest the Liao came to supporting a rebel was when they talked with a Yang Guangyuan disgruntled at Sang Weihuan’s 桑維翰 efforts to divide Guangyuan’s army. No concrete events are recorded as following these talks.

reference to the northern 'barbarians,' this ready-made framework was not used by Jing Yanguang in his arguments. In his long speech to the Liao official Qiao Rong 喬榮, Yanguang said,

Go home and tell your lord that the former emperor was established by the northern court, and therefore called himself a subject and submitted reports, but the present emperor was established by the Middle Kingdom, and the reason that he submits to the northern court is just because he does not dare overlook the treaties of the former emperor. As a neighbour, calling himself grandson is enough; there is no reason for him to call himself (your) subject. {The emperor of the northern court should not believe Zhao Yanshou's deceptions and beguilements and insult the Middle Kingdom. The soldiers and horses of the Middle Kingdom, you have seen with your own eyes.} If the grandfather [Liao Taizong] gets angry, then let him come and fight; his grandson [Jin Chudi] has 100,000 naked swords: enough to receive him. Do not regret it when the day comes that he is defeated by this grandson and laughed at by all under heaven!<sup>43</sup>

As he was effectively making a declaration of war, Yanguang could presumably have said anything he liked about the Kitan. He did not have to be polite about them being barbarians when he was already threatening to destroy them. Yet an argument based upon territorial or more overtly 'ethnic' matters is nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, the sentiment expressed shows the clear *political* opposition established in Yanguang's mind at least, between the Central Plains and Liao.

Yanguang's provocative speech should also be seen in the context of a changed regional situation. Once the two main regimes had entered into a formal relationship, there were few outlets for ambition. It was no longer possible for regional officials to establish themselves in the kind of autonomous provincial governments which had characterised north China since the An Lushan rebellions. Lacking the scope for independent action in the regions, individuals now had to channel their aspirations through the court of the regime to which they were subject. Where great generals had held regional posts enabling them to be the immediate actors on the spot, creating 'foreign affairs' by their actions in their own provinces, after about 936 their scope for action was more limited, and they could only contribute to the making of 'foreign policy' at court. Yet although their individual freedom of action was constrained by having to work within a court, the importance of the decisions made was that much greater. The events produced by the policies could be more far-reaching and profound than had been possible before the Liao-Jin alliance, because they involved the whole of large regimes and not just individual provinces.

Thus it was that Jing Yanguang precipitated a war between Liao and Jin which swiftly went out of control, and his policies ended up losing the Jin empire to a Liao invasion. This was enthusiastically supported and led by the Liao Chinese Zhao Yanshou, who coveted the emperorship of the Central Plains for himself, as his father had done before

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43. TJ 283:9253-4. Translated with reference to Yang Lien-sheng, Posthumous letter, pp.425-6. {} show parts omitted in QG 2:22.

him. Ironically, it could be argued that it was the machinations of individual influential *Chinese* at both courts which provoked the war and thus, ultimately, lay behind the growth of anti-foreign feeling in the south, and was really very little to do with the Kitan themselves.

By the beginning of 947, the whole picture had changed again. The Liao occupied the Central Plains, including the capital, and court and provincial officials had all submitted. Even Liu Zhiyuan had played safe and sent letters to Liao vouchsafing his good faith. However, he soon changed his mind about the desirability of submission to the Liao, sighing that

The *rongdi* 戎狄 barbarians have invaded and insulted us, and the Central Plains have no lord, they have made the provincial governors give their adherence to foreigners; I am a noble governor, if I am virtuous then I should be ashamed!<sup>44</sup>

At this time Liao Taizong was emperor of the Central Plains in Daliang 大梁-Bian 汴. Hence Zhiyuan, in lamenting the leaderless state of the Central Plains, appears to be expressing a deeply-felt, and evidently readily-available concept that a foreign ruler of the Middle Kingdom is no ruler at all. That he was not alone in this feeling is demonstrated by the numerous risings against the Kitan which followed in the same month.<sup>45</sup> These were only the first, and the Liao proved unable to hold what they had taken. As they departed, so Zhiyuan established his Later Han dynasty.

To a certain extent, the source for the remarks here has set up Zhiyuan's earlier worries about the Liao-Jin deal in order that Zhiyuan can now say 'I told you so.' Those earlier comments exhibit basically the same concerns as were behind Jing Yanguang's aggressive stance towards Liao. The subordination of parts of north China to external powers might be acceptable, but the subjugation of the entire Middle Kingdom to them was not. Jing Yanguang had the confidence of '100,000 naked swords' behind him and therefore had no need to frame even his most insulting statements in any other than political and military terms. Liu Zhiyuan was surveying a conquered state under military occupation. At such a low ebb to have expressed political and military arguments like Yanguang's would have been pointless, if not laughable; whereas to talk about barbarians and revive a sense of shared identity in the Central Plains did not require political success for its force to be felt. In fact, one strand of ethnicity theory would argue that it is precisely in situations such as conquest that ethnicity becomes, or is made, a significant factor.<sup>46</sup> There is a sense that if Zhiyuan is to have anything practical to say at all in this

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44. TJ 286:9339.

45. TJ 286:93-40-45, *passim*.

46. Orlando Patterson, *Ethnic chauvinism: the reactionary impulse* (1977), pp.57ff.

disastrous situation, he has no other recourse but to the ancient concepts of ethnic identity, revived now for use in the creation of ethnocentrism.

Hence although the war itself had nothing to do with ethnic identity, it paved the way for a strengthening of ethnic awareness and the development of ethnocentrism. The conquest distinguished between the two sides most effectively by providing a real external threat which was conducive to the fostering of anti-foreign feeling.<sup>47</sup> The first concrete expression of this renewed emotion was the driving out of the Liao garrisons, which happened piecemeal all over the Central Plains within the space of a few months. Nevertheless, the widespread reaction against Liao rule did not mean that Liu Zhiyuan was welcomed with open arms. His short dynasty faced many rebellions, and with the return of opposition between northern and southern regimes, two of the rebels, Du Chongwei 杜重威 and Li Shouzhen 李守貞, turned to the Liao for help.<sup>48</sup> This almost instantaneous reversion, by some, to pre-alliance modes of behaviour suggests that there was still some scope for the pursuit of regional self-interest in the post-conquest disorder, and that any ethnocentrism was still only in its youth.

These political changes did not just affect the ruling classes. It was suggested in Chapter 2 that the common people were perhaps more consistently resistant to crossing to Liao than were their masters.<sup>49</sup> Most notable are the detailed accounts of the common soldiers' distress at the news that Du Chongwei was planning to surrender in 946:12. We cannot know whether the ordinary troops were conscious of all the implications of Liao rule in the Central Plains, but there may have been longer-established reasons for their objections. The advantages of working for the Liao which accrued to those in a position to be useful at a high level were not so apparent or available to the commoner, whose best hope in serving the Liao (other than being left alone) was to be resettled on new land, though probably in an unfamiliar place. Not being in a position to reap immediate benefits from crossing to the Liao, the common people had little reason to be flexible in their approach to the Kitan.

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47. LeVine & Campbell, pp.29-33.

48. With unhappy results, as both were killed. Du Chongwei, TJ 287:9369; Li Shouzhen, TJ 288:9391.

49. This picture may itself be suspect. It is possible that the 'virtue' of the common people is being set up as a rebuke to the official classes who are said by Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang to have looked only to their own immediate interests. TJ 285:9318-9.



### 3. Polarisation and legitimisation, c.947-1005

These faltering beginnings bring us to a final phase, in which ethnic identity becomes an element in the justification of rule and thus forms part of an emergent<sup>50</sup> ethnocentrism which accompanied the political changes of the period.

The Liao conquest and the ending of the balance of power existing under Shi Jingtang's rule turned the two groups from cooperating neighbours, working along roughly the same axis, into enemies whose opposition was necessary to the consolidation and continuation of both their states. As Han was replaced by Zhou, which then became the Song, the territory of the Middle Kingdom expanded. Meanwhile the Liao emperors were working on the consolidation of their realm, chiefly by adopting selected Chinese-style institutions. As the states grew and became more complex, there was an increasing need for active legitimisation of the ruling regimes. An important element in legitimisation is the public definition of where the boundaries of the state lie, and a powerful way to do this is to define one's own state in the context of its neighbours. Accordingly an opposition is set up between internal and external, and ethnocentrism increases. This process is intensified if there is any perception of external threat,<sup>51</sup> and the end result is a pair of ideologically opposed states meeting at, and divided by, a distinct frontier line.

We are considering this issue in relation to Chinese who crossed into Liao, so our perspective is chiefly from the south. The Liao's potential as an external threat had been plainly demonstrated by the conquest of 947, making subsequent Central Plains regimes increasingly self-conscious and deliberate in their efforts to pull north China together. In 952 Zhou Taizu 周太祖 appealed to ancient moral foundations by sacrificing to Confucius, a practice which had fallen into disuse. In 961 Zhou Shizong's *shilu* 周世宗實錄 were completed and Song Taizu 宋太祖 had the *Tang hui yao* 唐會要 compiled, followed two years later by the *Wudai hui yao* 五代會要.<sup>52</sup> Similar legitimating acts continued throughout the rest of the century, but at least equally important were the programmes of reunification followed by both Zhou and Song emperors. These can be tracked by their well-known results, ending with the fall of Northern Han in 979. Accompanying every stage of expansion, and every pause in between, was a continuing discussion of the best means of dealing with the northern barbarians. The CB is littered with a large selection of the memorials which contributed to

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50. It is tempting to say 're-emergent,' but this assumes too much about the processes operating in earlier periods, and accordingly I refer here only to the case in question.

51. LeVine & Campbell, pp.99ff, and restatement of Sumner's definition of ethnocentrism (William Sumner, *Folkways* (1906), pp.7ff.

52. JW 112:1482 (sacrifice) and CB 2:39 (*Tang hui yao*), 2:53 (*shilu*); 4:97 (*Wudai hui yao*.) The Liao also reinforced their legitimacy in the Chinese mode, for instance, a calendar was presented in 961:5 (LS 6:77) and in 983:11 rewards were given to commoners demonstrating filial piety (LS 10:112.)

this debate. As related by Tao Jingshen and Wang Gungwu, the new realism with which Song officials approached relations with Liao did not reduce the widespread use of derogatory names for the Kitan, at least in internal documents. Such names emphasised a negative approach to non-membership of the group identified as Chinese, and thus reinforced the feeling of internal solidarity which enabled emperors to appeal to the inhabitants of the Central Plains in the name of defence against an external danger. At the same time, by setting themselves up as the defenders against this danger the Central Plains emperors also enhanced their legitimacy as rulers. The Song emperors were able to make use of old ideas about 'barbarians,' revived and reworked to suit contemporary circumstances and dynastic needs. The strength of and need for the ideology were such that the change happened even as the Liao were adopting more Chinese-style institutions.

As the division between Song and Liao became more closely defined, so the frontier prefectures - no longer provinces - lost their character as a separate region and became more like the peripheral areas of central powers. One example of this is that more communications were now channelled through envoys as representatives of the court. These bypassed the frontier prefects and governors who, by virtue of their extensive contacts at the local level, had formerly acted as the conduits for communication between the two sides. Local contacts did continue to have some importance (for instance, it was border prefects who exchanged the first diplomatic communications between Liao and Song in 974),<sup>53</sup> but as the individual influence and authority of those holding posts on the frontier diminished, so the contacts they had decreased in significance. The increased direct contact between centres reduced the number of people who had personal contact with the other side, and allowed the easier propagation of ethnocentric ideas.

We can see evidence for the results of these attitudes in the pattern of crossings. Under the Song, there was only one individual, voluntary crossing to Liao, and that by a fugitive from justice.<sup>54</sup> This is suggestive not only of the reduced opportunities available under a centralising regime, but also of a growing trend in the Central Plains to prefer attachment to Chinese regimes. There were still many crossings in total, but these are closely associated with major campaigns, and comprise mostly involuntary crossings where groups of soldiers were captured as a result of battle. These people did not choose to cross to Liao, even in the limited senses we defined in Chapter 2. This trend also suggests that the difference between the attitudes of the élite and the masses has been reduced. No longer do the ruling élite appear less ethnocentric than their people.

The cases of Li Huan and Wang Jizhong illustrate some of the practical effects associated with the hardening of the frontier line. Despite being treated well, Li Huan

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53. CB 15:328; SS 3:43; cf. LS 8:94, which says that the Song sent envoys, presumably to the court.

54. The case of Li Xu 李緒, Table 1, #216.

appears to have retained an identification with the southern regimes that was a good deal more active than anything we saw from the early part of the century, as demonstrated by his espionage activities, and his escape and suicide attempts. Huan was only released from Fengguo temple 奉國寺 after he demonstrated his literary abilities, and it is clear that although these were felt to be considerable, such talents were not in such short supply that Huan could be sure of employment. In this his case contrasts markedly with those of Han Yanhui and Zhang Li. They had been so sure of their positions that they could almost bargain over their terms of service, and Yanhui was even able to choose his master. Li Huan had no bargaining power and his choices were very much more limited. In supplying information and gambling on an escape south, he was risking the severest penalties, to the extent that having failed, suicide seemed like a reasonable alternative. The fact that he still took those risks is indicative of very strong negative feelings about serving the Liao; there is little sign of the pragmatism of earlier years.

Wang Jizhong's case is rather different. Unlike Li Huan, he does appear to have been in demand; certainly the Liao heaped him with rewards and offices from the moment he arrived. Nevertheless, Jizhong appears to have retained a preference for serving the Song, prompting his unsuccessful request to be recalled there. Whether he ever stopped longing for the south we do not know, but his continued service, in the highest posts and with much reward, suggests at least some acceptance of his situation. On the other hand, it was perhaps the only sensible option. He could have declined to serve, but to do so required a private income, and in any case, the conclusion of the treaty was prompting many long-term refusenik Liao Chinese to come out of retreat and re-enter public life.<sup>55</sup> Escape was out of the question because the treaty contained a clause pledging to return fugitives, so even had he reached the south, he would have been sent back again. In this respect, Jizhong had even fewer choices than Li Huan, which is a direct reflection of the fixed definition which had now been given to the frontier.

We have come a long way from the notional frontier region with which we began. There, multiple regimes conducted constantly shifting relationships without reference to ethnic identities, and the individual had many choices of where to give allegiance. As the number of competing powers diminished, so did the choices. As regimes increased in complexity, so ethnocentrism grew as an aspect of legitimation, accompanied by a strengthening sense of ethnic identity. After the fall of Northern Han it is no longer possible to think of the frontier as a separate region. The 'centres' have reduced in number to only two, and their edges have advanced across the notional frontier area until they meet in a single line. This was fixed by the treaty of Shanyuan 澶淵, and the

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55. Meng Guangyao, *Huayi zhi bian*, p.68.

allegiances operating at that point were made permanent. Thereafter, the diplomatically-maintained peace between Liao and Song did not prevent the spread and intensification of strong feelings against the Liao, which culminated in the almost gleeful agreement of the ill-fated Song alliance with the Jurchen Jin.

Faced with this shift from the irrelevance to the revival of ethnic identities, it is vital to remember that ethnicity in itself had no *inherent* significance, despite its constant existence. Ethnic identity was a concept which could acquire considerable power when used as an instrument to enhance the position of a particular group when it was advantageous to do so; it could be ignored or emphasised at will. From the evidence here it is clear that conflict between *political* communities, rather than ethnic ones, was of most significance.<sup>56</sup> It is this which explains how the increasing adoption of Chinese-style institutions by the Liao could be accompanied by an increasing, rather than a decreasing, ethnic awareness in the southern regimes. The degree to which the Liao were sinicised was not the important issue; what mattered to the southern regimes was their own self-definition, upon which was based the authority of the centralising states of Zhou and Song. The maintenance of that definition, and ultimately the functioning of the Central Plains states, required that the Zhou and Song cling to the differences between themselves and the Liao even as those differences were diminishing. The similarities in political structure and ideology between the two states had been crystallised when Liao Taizong declared himself the son of Heaven 天子 in Daliang in 947. To the southern regimes, that put the whole contest onto a different level. It was now not just frontier regions which were stake, but the whole *tianxia* 天下. Faced with such a threat, the southern regimes needed all the help they could muster. A renewed and enhanced awareness of ethnic identity was a valuable resource in the creation of legitimating, state-defining, ethnocentric ideas, and it is these ideas which also lay behind the increasingly rigid definition of *zhong*.

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56. LeVine & Campbell, p.57.

## Conclusions

The Western understanding of the 'Frontier' is of a place wild and free: potentially dangerous, but exciting and full of scope for the initiative.<sup>1</sup> The Chinese conventionally saw the frontier not as a place of adventure and opportunity, but of difference, unrewarded hardship, and fear. It was associated with the punishment of exile, and we know most about it from those who were sent there unwillingly and then wrote poetry expressing how unhappy they were. What we have found here, though, is that there were some Chinese who not only were able to live successfully in the frontier zone, but were also able to see opportunities there, and exploit them. The court tended to associate such adaptation with disorder, and, fearing that such people were too close to the 'barbarians' in every way, sought to bring them back under central control as soon as possible. As far as the court was concerned, the frontier was another world.

From what we have seen, that world was one in which frontier crossing constituted normal behaviour and was regarded pragmatically. Changing sides was simply one of many strategies open to people on the frontier and was widely used, without regard for the ethnic composition of the regimes involved. In the first half of the tenth century, the interaction of factors in north China, including breakdown of central control and the consequent struggle for legitimation, the presence of many realistic alternatives for officials seeking positions of power combined with widespread opportunities to choose, and an ethical system which necessarily gave some sanction to changing sides, resulted in a seller's market for the services of officials. In these circumstances, a certain group of individual officials, most notable amongst them Han Yanhui 韓延徽, found themselves with the unusual opportunity to enjoy freedoms which usually remained at the level of theory, and could rarely be exercised in the form of active choices.

Yet the practical choices made by these individuals could not but contribute to an evolving system of governmental institutions which had long been endowed with moral force. The connection between the concepts of loyalty and legitimacy meant that every time an official took service with a ruler, they were adding to the legitimacy of that ruler. Furthermore, although in tenth-century China the morality of loyalty at first had no ethnic connotations, in the course of the century it came to be entwined with considerations of identity through an increase in ethnocentric ideas. A growing concern with the frontier discussed it as a 'problem' area, the existence of which was itself a significant factor behind the creation of a Han identity associated with specific territory and bolstered by an ideology of single-master loyalty and loyalism. And as loyalty came to be defined in ethnic terms, and more complex states increased their need for legitimation, so choice

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1. Stated most famously by Frederick Jackson Turner, *The significance of the frontier in American history*, *The Frontier in American history* (1920), esp. pp.30ff.

contracted. This was partly a matter of practicality as the number of competing regimes decreased and it became clearer where the real power lay. But it was also a question of moral or emotional demands. As the holders of that growing central power laid increasing stress on the ethical and symbolic bases of their claim to legitimacy, they demanded - and received - a loyalty which was structured largely with reference to the enemy over the northern frontier. And by the latter years of the tenth century that enemy was increasingly characterised as not just coincidentally foreign, but as an insatiable barbarian. The irony that the early flagbearers for Chinese identity - Liu Zhiyuan 劉知遠 and the Later Han - were not themselves Chinese is worthy of further study.

The disorder of the early tenth century offered a rare opportunity for certain people to act in a more individual manner, but by the end of the century there had been a contraction of choice. It would be wrong, however, automatically to associate individual choices with freedom, and automatically to assume that the reduction of that choice is a bad thing. In the earlier part of the century people on the frontier had a great many choices, but they were also placed in positions where they were *compelled* to choose: they had no choice but to make a choice. The existence of a few cases of diehard loyalty indicates that such choices were not always easy, so whether those placed in a position of choosing therefore had more freedom than those for whom the choice did not exist is a nice philosophical point. Certainly some individuals embraced the opportunities that came with the unusually wide range of options available, although with mixed success, as can be seen in the life of Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽. Others appear to have felt compromised to the extent that they had to justify their behaviour, as did Han Yanhui, although we must remain sceptical about the appearance of such stories in later sources. Still others seem to have made accommodations with both conscience and reality, and this is perhaps best expressed by Zhang Li's 張礪 declaration of discomfort with the different culture of the north, followed by years of faithful service. Such cases illuminate the issue of slavery. The fact that Han Yanhui calmly and deliberately returned to Liao makes it extremely unlikely that the official classes at least, can have been enslaved in any meaningful way. Whatever the legal technicalities of their status, they must have seen anything they chose as an improvement on their former position.<sup>2</sup>

However, such pragmatism came less easily as the century went on, governments became fewer and attitudes less flexible. Increasingly, loyalty became an unambiguous issue on which no compromise was available. Accompanying this change was a clearer sense of the role of ethnic identity in forming and maintaining that loyalty: Chineseness was no longer separable from loyalty. The agonies apparently suffered by Li Huan 李澣,

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2. Cf. WF pp.196-9.

and the sadness implied in Wang Jizhong's 王繼忠 resignation to his fate show how much more difficult the choices had become. It was no longer a case of choosing between several options each regarded as legitimate at the time, but a question of deciding whether or not to serve the enemy, where the only real alternative was death. Although many in the early tenth century seem to have responded to the challenges of their situation with practical imagination, it was, ironically, partly their actions in enhancing the legitimacy of regimes by serving them, which helped to strengthen those regimes and thus bring about the very tightening of control which denied their successors these choices. Yet absence of choice also implied stability, and if there is a strong enough desire for that then restrictions can be more easily tolerated.

Comparison of the sources shows up the ambivalence in the situations of the crossers at the time, and the continuing, indeed the deepening, ambivalence in the attitudes to them of later generations, who felt the need to make clear-cut statements about people for whom life, available options and 'right' decisions were anything but clear-cut. This ambivalence was but an intermediate stage, because by the time the official histories of Liao and Song were compiled, the growth of orthodoxy had turned the act of frontier crossing from one of necessary pragmatism into something which necessarily contravened moral codes. The concerns of the later recorders were less with the difficulties of the choices faced by people in the tenth century, than with the wrongness, in their eyes, of what had been chosen. Frontier crossing had become the inverse of the orthodoxy of state (some would say 'national') and ethnic loyalty, and deviance was created from what had been normality.

The concern with the kind of 'ethnic loyalty' expressed by the commentaries critical of Wang Jizhong also created a contradiction, because tenth-century frontier crossers were both too numerous to ignore and clearly identified as Chinese. The Song rhetoric which condemned Feng Dao 馮道 claimed to dismiss almost the entire generation of Wudai officials, but whatever the faults of those officials who served only Wudai regimes, those who took permanent service with the Liao are shown in the later sources to retain some degree of integrity, where integrity was equated with loyalty to the Middle Kingdom. Hence there is a sense in which they become, in the later sources, martyrs to the Chinese cause, and thus contribute to a developing ethnocentrism.

It is in this shifting perspective through the texts that we can see how what was meant by 'China' and 'Chineseness' was constructed by those in charge of recording history. Though apparently glib, it is literally true to say that the Chinese are who they say they are, and their identity means what they want it to mean. If we borrow from anthropology the idea of the 'conceptualisation of ethnicity as a resource,' we see that

Ethnicity may be a resource in the making of a group's history, but the process of categorisation, .... illustrates that the superior capacity of some groups to define the circumstances under which that history is made is a crucial feature of asymmetrical power relations. Ethnicity is not, therefore, merely a counter resource to some other basis of power chances; it is deeply embedded in the overall power relations of the society, ....<sup>3</sup>

Several Shatuo leaders were accepted as legitimate rulers of the Central Plains in the course of the Wudai, and it was one of them who took up (or revived) ethnic identity as a resource against what was felt as the oppression of the Liao invasion. The Han-led regimes which followed increasingly promoted ethnocentric attitudes, and their historians recreated the past in their own cultural image. They claimed the Shatuo for their own - as sinicised Chinese - despite the continuing cultural differences between them. The fact that it was the Han historians who did the categorisation of groups enabled them to define history in their own terms and thus sustain an asymmetrical power relationship with themselves ranked higher than the Liao. The power endowed by this historiographical activity is suggested by the extraordinary survival, in the face of repeated assaults, of "sinicisation" as a habit of thought among China scholars,' as noted by Pamela Crossley.<sup>4</sup>

That the Liao were not claimed as Chinese in the same way as the Shatuo has much to do with their lack of success in holding the Central Plains. But it is at least equally important that the Liao never recognised the centrality of the Middle Kingdom. Unlike the Jurchen Jin and the Mongols, the Liao showed no signs of wishing to relocate themselves southwards: Liao Taizong conquered and then headed home. The removal of the Middle Kingdom from the centre of Liao concern not only enabled the driving out of the conquerors, but by not recognising the power of history, the Liao allowed the Chinese to recover their monopoly of that area, and by historiographical means to recreate their own cultural dominance for the benefit of future generations. It is in the area of this construction of history, and with it the ideas of 'China' and 'Chineseness,' that the most fruitful directions for further research lie.

This thesis has been querying the idea of 'the frontier' as a single, neat line on a map, and what began as an examination of *a* frontier turns out to be an exploration of multiple frontiers. These frontiers - drawn according to geography, military strength, culture, loyalty, ethnic identity, conceptual issues or sheer personal advantage - existed simultaneously but often did not coincide. Not only that, but the location of those frontiers was changing in the course of the tenth century and some of them were moved

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3. David Mason, Introduction, *Theories of race and ethnic relations* (1986), edd. J. Rex & D. Mason, p.9, discussing the work of Sandra Wallman, Ethnicity and the boundary process in context, pp.226-33.

4. Thinking about ethnicity, p.4.



again by successive generations. We have tried to maintain a focus throughout upon real people in real situations. Through these stories, to quote Richard Guisso,

.... we acquire .... renewed respect and understanding for .... the 'actors' in social structure, for those people whose calculation of advantage and disadvantage for themselves, whose strategies, whose compromises with fate, give social structure its primary interest. Perhaps our deepest experience of recognition is the encounter with so many individuals. It is the cumulative effect of so many stories of actual people .... that conveys a sense of degrees of human freedom, of options taken and refused, of the exercise of aspiration and will - even if sometimes within patterns of severe constraint. .... It is this complexity and ambivalence of moral experience that brings us close to the Chinese, and makes these histories of Chinese .... immediately relevant to our own moral existence.<sup>5</sup>

In living their lives the Liao Chinese were applying various understandings of various frontiers depending upon the circumstances they were in, and the same person could refer to different frontiers, or different understandings of the same frontier, at different times. Different understandings again have been applied by historians, including, inevitably, this one. These multiple interpretations of the frontier suggest a fluidity in the concept in practice which enabled individuals to find some sense of order in a confusing world, while the reinterpretations of successive historians indicate continuing efforts to derive order from confusion, this time by the attempt to draw together multiple frontiers into a single line. In this context, rather than rejecting the tidy impression given by cartography as entirely false, we can see its vision of the frontier as simply one more interpretation amongst the many discussed here.

The changes traced here between our earliest source, the JW, and the official history of the Liao, the LS, reinforce the point that Chinese historians, like historians everywhere, were no more objective than their time and place would allow. The changes, in some cases even the manipulation, remind us again of how careful we need to be even with sources regarded as reliable, like the TJ. The surviving sources all had specific interests in seeing the frontier in a certain light, and the comparative case studies undertaken here show how the picture has been skewed progressively to emphasise *one* aspect of the frontier story above all others. These results show the value of the methodology applied, and also the wealth of information which can be found in the annals and biographies. These materials do not tell us only about the development of institutions; neither are they merely formulaic.

We have discussed the many and shifting political frontiers of tenth-century north China, revealing an undercurrent of the need for legitimation and the changing role of individuals in providing it. We have looked at actual crossings of an actual frontier in general and particular. And we have related all this to the movements in the boundaries around the concepts of loyalty and identity, where the link with ethnocentrism brings us

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5. *Women in China: current directions in historical scholarship* (1982), Introduction, p.ix.

back to the need for legitimation. It has not been my aim to 'prove' whether the Liao Chinese were loyal or disloyal to the Central Plains regimes; rather I suggest that they acted within a tradition capable of accommodating exactly what they did at the time they did it, but which then called it loyalty or disloyalty depending on the outcome of events and the needs of later times. Our picture of the Liao Chinese has been too much filtered through the judgements of successive historians. They, desiring to categorise, attempted to make these stories of pragmatism and accommodation fit into a theoretical ideal based not on the real situations of real people in a turbulent time, but on the fears and distinctions which developed around the establishment of a fixed frontier and the clear division of the immediate universe into 'us' and 'not us,' 'Chinese' and 'barbarian.' In expressing their desire to bring order out of disorder, the historians, too, reveal their humanity.

## Chronology

- 895 Li Keyong (Taiyuan Jin) supports Liu Rengong for appointment as Youzhou *jiedushi*, Rengong starts raiding Kitan territory
- 897:7 Liu Rengong refuses Li Keyong's request to send troops, with excuse of Kitan raid
- 900 Zhu Wen (Henan) recommends Wang Chuzhi to be Yiwu *jiedushi*  
Wen attacks Liu Rengong, Rengong asks Li Keyong for help
- 901 Abaoji made commander-in-chief of Kitan tribal confederation, Zhu Wen controls many Tang provinces
- 902 LS records its first Kitan raid on north China
- 903:12 Liu Rengong captures Abaoji's brother-in-law
- 905/907 Abaoji and Li Keyong swear brotherhood for attack on Zhu Wen/Liu Rengong, raids stop
- 905 Kitan raid on Youzhou
- 906 Abaoji attacks Liu Rengong, sends gifts to Zhu Wen  
Zhu Wen attacks Rengong, Rengong sends to Li Keyong for help, Ding Hui surrenders Lu
- 907:1 Abaoji takes the title of emperor  
:4 Zhu Wen founds Later Liang (Taizu), replacing Tang, Abaoji sends envoys, Li Keyong resents this  
Liu Rengong's son, Shouguang, imprisons his father, submits to Liang, is confirmed as *jiedushi*  
Shouguang's brother Shouqi flees Pingzhou governorship, to Kitan/Hedong  
:11 Shouguang's brother Shouwen, (Jin) Yichang *jiedushi*, asks Liang to punish Shouguang
- 908:2 Li Keyong dies, succeeded by son Cunxu. Cunxu requests Liao help against Liang siege of Luzhou  
:5 Abaoji asks Liang for investiture, Liang seek promise for help against Li Cunxu, Cunxu asks for help against Liang  
Liu Shouwen attacks Liu Shouguang, who requests help from Li Cunxu
- 909 Liu Shouwen hires Kitan help, is captured by Liu Shouguang  
:6 Shouguang offers Liang the pacification of Li Cunxu (Taiyuan Jin), offers Cunxu the destruction of Liang  
:7 Liang make Shouguang prince of Yan
- 910 Liu Shouguang secures his position in Youzhou
- 911 Liu Shouguang appeased with titles, but declares himself emperor of Yan in Youzhou; Kitan take Pingzhou, Li Cunxu sends punitive forces  
Kitan twice send envoys to Liang  
:10-11 Shouguang aggressive towards Jin, invades Yiwu, *jiedushi* Wang Chuzhi got Jin help
- 912:1 Jin army reaches Youzhou (Abaoji attacked Youzhou?), Liu Shouguang got Liang help  
:6 Zhu Yougui kills Zhu Wen to become Liang emperor (Modi)  
:7 Kitan take Pingzhou, send envoys to Liang
- 913:2 Zhu Youzhen succeeded brother Yougui as Liang emperor
- 914 Liu Shouguang crushed, Youzhou comes under Jin control
- 915:3 WeiBo *jiedushi* Yang Shihou dies, garrison rebels
- 916:2 Abaoji (Liao Taizu) adopts a reign era title, Liang continued to send envoys  
:8 Kitan take (Jin) Yuzhou  
Li Cunxu revives cooperation with Kitan
- 917:2 Lu Wenjin kills Xinzhou<sub>1</sub> *jiedushi*, crosses to Kitan, made Youzhou *liuhou*, (Jin) Youzhou *jiedushi* Zhou Dewei holds out successfully
- 921:2 Zhang Wenli takes semi-autonomous Chengde over to Kitan, asks Liang for help, asks Li Cunxu for confirmation, subsequently sought Kitan backing but killed by Jin, son held out in Zhenzhou

- Yiwu governor Wang Chuzhi seeks Liao help against Jin aggression in Chengde, son Wang Du usurps Chuzhi as *liuhou*, confirmed by Liang, Chengde asked Chuzhi for help, Kitan assistance attacked Wang Du in Dingzhou, Du sent for Jin help
- 922 Wang Du and Jin defeat Liao, Zhenzhou falls to Jin  
Kitan raids on Youzhou (to 925)
- 923:4 Li Cunxu of Taiyuan Jin founds Later Tang (Zhuangzong), replacing Liang
- 925:2 Tang appoint Zhao Dejun as Youzhou *jiedushi*  
Tang conquer Shu  
Kitan make peace with Tang, attack Bohai
- 926:2-4 Mutiny of WeiBo army, Li Siyuan to suppress, acclaimed emperor (Mingzong) by troops  
:7 Liao Taizu dies, succession problems for Deguang (Taizong)  
:8 Kitan subjugate Bohai  
:10 Lu Wenjin takes (Liao) Lulong back to Tang
- 927:9 Kitan peace with Tang
- 928 Kitan recover Lulong  
:5 Yiwu (Dingzhou) *jiedushi* Wang Du seeks Liao help against Tang  
:8 (Liao) Lulong *jiedushi* Zhang Xichong takes army to Tang
- 929:2 Dingzhou falls to Zhou Dewei, Yiwu comes under Tang control
- 930:11 Abaoji's son Yelü Bei flees to Tang
- 932:11 Fearing Kitan were planning major attack, Tang appoint Shi Jingtang to several northern governorships
- 933:11 Tang thwart prince Li Congrong's coup  
Tang Mingzong dies, Li Conghou (Mindi) succeeds
- 934:4 Mindi tries to transfer Li Congke, Congke rebels, becomes emperor (Feidi), Yelü Bei (Li Zanhua) asks Liao to punish Feidi  
:9 Continuous Kitan raids begin
- 936:5 Tang try to transfer Shi Jingtang, who rebels
- 936:7 Shi Jingtang's capital Taiyuan-Jinyang besieged, asked for Kitan help, offers 16 prefectures, becomes son and subject to Liao Taizong, founds Later Jin (Gaozu), replacing Tang, with control of all north China
- 937:3 Tianxiong *jiedushi* Fan Yanguang requests Kitan help  
:6 Yanguang rebels, pardoned, moved to Tianping
- 940 Tuyuhun flee Liao for Jin, Gaozu returns them
- 941:6 Chengde *jiedushi* An Chongrong demands war on Kitan, this refused but Jin envoy detained by Liao  
:12 Chongrong rebels, Liao release envoy, Chongrong executed, head sent to Kitan
- 942:6 Gaozu dies, succeeded by son (Chudi), in informing Liao refuses to call himself subject
- 943:9 Jin minister Jing Yanguang sends insulting message to Liao, preparations for war begin  
:12 (Jin) Pinglu *jiedushi* Yang Guangyuan and Liao minister Zhao Yanshou urge Liao to attack, Yanshou promised emperorship of Middle Kingdom
- 944:1 Liao take Beizhou, refuse Chudi's request for peace  
:2 Yang Guangyuan joins Liao, Liao army defeated, Guangyuan killed
- 945 Jin defeat Liao at Yangcheng, offer to accept designation as subject but refuse new Liao demands  
Presentation of JTS
- 946:6 Sun Fangjian in Dingzhou encourages Liao invasion  
:10-11 Liao defeat Jin imperial armies under Du Chongwei, advance south  
:12 Chongwei surrenders, surrendered Jin general Zhang Yanze takes capital Bianzhou for Liao

- 947:1 Liao Taizong enters Bian, declares Great Liao dynasty in Central Plains, Jin court personnel transferred north, Liao formally establish some Chinese-style administrative institutions
- :2 Liu Zhiyuan declares self emperor, orders all circuits against Kitan, widespread risings against conquerors
- :3 Liao Taizong heads north
- :4 Taizong dies, Wuyu (Shizong) succeeds against claim by Zhao Yanshou, Liao withdraw after 5 months' occupation
- :6 Liu Zhiyuan enters Bian, founds Later Han (Gaozu), replacing Jin
- :7 Du Chongwei submits to Gaozu, rebels at attempt to transfer him
- :8 Liao governor Mada abandons Hengzhou for Dingzhou when Han attack assisted from within city
- 948:1 Du Chongwei surrenders, executed
- :2 Han Gaozu dies, succeeded by son (Yindi)  
Liao try to transfer Sun Fangjian from Dingzhou, he returns to southern allegiance, Mada abandons Dingzhou, all former Jin territory recovered by Han
- :3 3 rebellions against Han crushed in the absence of requested Liao assistance
- 950:4 Han appoint Guo Wei to deal with Kitan raids
- :11 Wei rebels, establishes new emperor, then himself proclaimed emperor by army
- 951:1 Guo Wei founds Later Zhou (Taizu), replacing Han, Liu Chong founds Northern Han (Shizu) in Taiyuan, makes alliance with Liao for recovery of Central Plains
- :9 Liao Shizong assassinated, Liao-Han attack on Zhou delayed, cousin succeeds (Muzong)  
Murong Yanchao rebels, weakened by withdrawal of allies including Liao
- 952:9 Zhou Taizu bans raids on Liao
- 954:1 Zhou Taizu dies, succeeded by Chai Rong (Shizong)
- :3 Zhou defeat Han-Liao force at Gaoping, Liao attacks much reduced
- :11 Han Shizu dies, succeeded by Liu Chengjun (Ruizong)
- 955:11 Zhou attack Southern Tang, Liao refuse Tang request for help
- 958:4 Liao recommence frontier raiding
- :5 Southern Tang falls to Zhou
- 959:spring Zhou Shizong takes three passes in 16 prefectures
- :6 Shizong dies, succeeded by child (Gongdi)
- 960:1 News of Liao attacks, Zhou army demands adult leadership, insists Zhao Kuangyin become emperor, Kuangyin founds Song (Taizu), replacing Zhou
- 961:9 Liao general Jieli surrenders to Song
- :10 Song ban cross-border raids
- 962 Song frontier appointments to allow conquest of south
- 963 Liao-Han relations soured by Han refusal to pay subsidies, patched up
- 964:1 Liao helped Han resist Song attack
- 966:1 Separate Liao and Han raids on Song
- 968:7 Han Ruizong dies, succeeded by Liu Jien (Shaozhu), then Liu Jiyan (Yingwudi)
- :9 Liao save Han from Song attack
- 969:2 Liao Muzong murdered, cousin accedes (Jingzong)
- :5 Song besiege Taiyuan-Jinyang, defeat Liao relief force but withdraw
- :10 16 Kitan tribal groups give allegiance to Song
- 974 Liao-Song peace talks, envoy exchanges begin  
Presentation of JW
- 976 Song Taizu dies, succeeded by brother (Taizong)

- 979:3 Song attack Han, defeat Liao relief force
- :5 Han Yingwudi submits to Song, Liao defeat Song at Gaoliang, Liao-Song  
envoy exchanges cease
- :9 Liao attack south, defeated at Mancheng
- 980 Sporadic Liao-Song warfare
- 982:9 Liao Jingzong dies, succeeded by son (Shengzong), Liao and Song dealing  
with internal affairs
- 986:1 Song-Korean alliance attacks Liao
- :3 Liao defeat Song at Juma river
- 986:2 Dingnan *liuhou* Li Jiqian offers submission, confirmed as *jiedushi*
- :7 Liao gain upper hand in war
- 988:11 Song recovery begins
- 989:7 Song drive off Liao, direct hostilities cease, opposition continues by proxy  
in Dingnan, Koryo etc
- 994:9 Song Taizong requests formal peace, refused
- 995:1 Han Dewei leads large raid on Song
- 997 Song Taizong dies, succeeded by son (Zhenzong)
- 999:winter Final phase of Liao-Song war begins, inconclusive fighting
- 1004:int 9 Peace talks begin
- :12 Treaty of Shanyuan concluded (1005), armies withdraw, treaty fixes and  
seals frontier, establishes regular envoy exchanges
- 1013 Presentation of CFYG
- 1073 Presentation of XW
- 1084 Presentation of TJ
- 1183 Presentation of CB
- 1247? Presentation of QG
- 1344 Presentation of LS

## Glossary of titles

Ranks given in brackets, where known. T= rank under Tang S= rank under Song

bei mian xingying zhaotaoshi	北面行營招討使	expeditionary punitive commissioner for the northern region
beiyuan shumishi	北院樞密使	commissioner of the military secretariat of the northern division
bingbu shilang	兵部侍郎	vice-minister of the ministry of war (4a)
bingbu yuanwailang	兵部員外郎	bureau vice-director in the ministry of war (usually 6b)
boyi	白衣	unofficial laudatory reference to a new <i>jinshi</i> graduate
canjun	參軍	adjutant
Chongwen linggong	崇文令公	manager of the Institute for the veneration of literature (honorific)
cishi	刺史	prefect (3b-4a)
da chengxiang	大丞相	grand counsellor/councillor-in-chief (prestige)
da xueshi	大學士	grand academician (prestige)
dianqian duyuhou	殿前都虞候	inspector-in-chief of the palace armies
dianzhi {shi}	殿直 (侍)	palace attendant
dongxiban dianshi	東西班殿侍	palace attendant in the companies of the east and west
du zhihuishi	都指揮使	commander-in-chief
dubushu	都部署	chief administrator of the imperial quarters
dudu	都督	supreme commander-in-chief (1-3)
dudu zhongwai zhu junshi	都督中外諸軍事	supreme commander-in-chief of the affairs of all the armies
dutong panguan	都統判官	administrative assistant to the campaign commander
duyuhou	都虞候	inspector-in-chief
fangyushi	防禦使	defence commissioner (given to certain prefects)
fu dubushu	副都部署	vice-administrator of the imperial quarters
fu zhaotaoshi	副招討使	deputy punitive commissioner
fuma duwei	駙馬都尉	imperial son-in-law
fushi	副使	vice-commissioner
gemen shi	閤門使	commissioner of memorial reception staff
gongbu shilang	工部侍郎	vice-minister of the ministry of works (4a)
guancha duzhishi	觀察度支使	surveillance and revenue commissioner
guanchashi	觀察使	surveillance commissioner
Hanersi	漢兒司	Chinese bureau
Hanlin	翰林	Hanlin academy
Hanlin xueshi	翰林學士	Hanlin academician
Hanlin xueshi chengzhi	翰林學士承旨	Hanlin academician recipient of edicts
hubushi	戶部使	tax commissioner
jianjiao taishi	檢校太師	acting grand preceptor
jianjun	監軍	army supervisor
jiaoshulang	校書郎	editor in the palace library (9a1)
jiedu fushi	節度副使	deputy governor
jiedushi	節度使	military governor
jinshi	進士	metropolitan graduate
jishi zuoyou	給事左右	executive assistant-attendant
Jixian dian	集賢殿	Academy of scholarly worthies
Jixian jiaoli	集賢校理	sub-editor in the Academy of scholarly worthies (unranked)
juzi	舉子	provincial graduate (unofficial)

lianshuai	連帥	provincial governor (unofficial)
libu	禮部	ministry of rites
libu langzhong	禮部郎中	bureau director in the ministry of rites (5a)
libu shangshu	禮部尚書	minister of the ministry of rites (T:3a/S:2b)
libu shangshu	吏部尚書	minister of the ministry of personnel (T:3a/S:2b)
libu yuanwailang	禮部員外郎	bureau vice-director in the ministry of rites (usually 6b)
libu yuanwailang	吏部員外郎	bureau vice-director in the ministry of personnel (usually 6b)
liuhou	留後	successor governor
liushou	留守	vicegerent
lu shangshu shi	錄尚書事	overseer of the department of state affairs
lushi canjun	錄事參軍	administrative supervisor
menxia	門下	imperial chancellery
menxia shilang	門下侍郎	vice-director of the imperial chancellery (T:3a/S:3b)
mouzhu	謀主	planner
nan mian xingying zhaotao fushi	南面行營招討副使	deputy expeditionary punitive commissioner for the southern region
nan mian xingying zhaotaoshi	南面行營招討使	expeditionary punitive commissioner for the southern region
nanfu zaixiang	南府宰相	grand councillor of the southern administration
neidian chongban	內殿崇班	imperial palace warder
neiguan	內官	central appointment - in the palace as opposed to the capital or the capital as opposed to the provinces
pan liujun zhuwei shi	判六軍諸衛事	controller of the six armies and the guards
panguan	判官	administrative assistant
pingzhangshi	平章事	manager of affairs (see <i>tong zhongshu menxia pingzhangshi</i> )
puye	僕射	vice-director of the department of state affairs
qiju lang	起居郎	imperial diarist (T:6b1, in chancellery/L:rank unclear)
quan shumi zhi xueshi	權樞密直學士	provisional auxiliary academician in the secretariat of military affairs
sansishi	三司使	state fiscal commissioner
shangshu	尚書	department of state affairs
shangshu bibu langzhong	尚書比部郎中	director of the bureau of review in the ministry of justice in the department of state affairs (T:5b/S:6b)
shangshu sheng	尚書省	department of state affairs
shangshuling	尚書令	director of the department of state affairs (T:2a/S:1a)
shi guan	史館	History institute
shiyi	拾遺	reminder (8b1)
shizhong	侍中	T/S: director of the imperial chancellery (T:2a/S:1a) L: attendant (senior official in herds offices)
shumi fushi	樞密副使	vice-commissioner of the military secretariat
shumishi	樞密使	commissioner of the military secretariat (1b) (military secretary)
shumiyuan	樞密院	military secretariat
sima	司馬	adjutant



taizi taizi taishi	太子 太子太師	heir apparent grand preceptor of the heir apparent (usually 1b)
tianxia bingma da yuanshuai tong zhongshu menxia pingzhangshi	天下兵馬大元帥 同中書門下平章事	grand commander-in-chief of the empire jointly manager of affairs with the secretariat and chancellery
tongpingzhangshi	同平章事	abbreviation of <i>tong zhongshu menxia pingzhangshi</i> , above
tongshi wenxue wuqi zhihuishi xi ting shumishi	通事 文學 武騎指揮使 西廳樞密使	interpreter (usually unranked) instructor commander of cavalry commissioner of the military secretariat (variation)
xiang xingying dubushu	相 行營都部署	grand councillor administrator of the expeditionary imperial quarters
xuanhui (nan/bei) shi	宣徽 (南北) 使	commissioner of the (southern/northern) court of palace attendants
xuanhui shi xuanhui yuan	宣徽使 宣徽院	commissioner of the court of palace attendants W: court of palace attendants; L: court ceremonial institute
Xuanzheng dian xueshi xueshi chengzhi	宣政殿學士 學士承旨	academician of the Xuanzheng palace academician recipient of edicts (abbreviation of <i>Hanlin xueshi chengzhi</i> )
xunguan you shiyi yuanshuai zaixiang zhangjunshu zhangshuji zhaotaoshi zhengshiling zhengshisheng zhihou yuan zhihuishi zhizhigao	巡官 右拾遺 元帥 宰相 掌軍書 掌書記 招討使 政事令 政事省 祗候院 指揮使 知制誥	inspector right reminder (8b, in secretariat) marshal grand councillor variation of <i>zhangshuji</i> , below chief secretary punitive commissioner director of the department of administration department of administration court of ushers commander T: participant in the drafting of proclamations; S: drafter
zhongshu zhongshu sheren zhongshu shilang pingzhangshi	中書 中書舍人 中書侍郎平章事	imperial secretariat secretariat drafters (T:5a/S:4a) manager of affairs and vice-director of the imperial secretariat (T:3a/S:3b)
zhongshuling zhu dao xingying dutong zong shannan shi	中書令 諸道行營都統 總山南事	director of the imperial secretariat overall expeditionary campaign commander administrator-general of affairs south of the mountains
zongguan zuo sanqi changshi zuo wuwei shang jiangjun	總管 左散騎常侍 左武衛上將軍	area commander-in-chief left policy advisor (3a, in chancellery) generalissimo of the left guard (T:2b/S:2b,3a; prestige)
zuoyou buque	左右補闕	rectifier of omissions (7b1, in chancellery (L) and secretariat (R))

## Character list

Abaoji (Liao Taizu) 阿保機	Daibei 代北
An Chonghui 安重誨	Daizhou 代州
An Chongrong 安重榮	Daliang (Bianzhou) 大梁
An, concubine dowager 安	Dangxiang (Tangut) 党項
An Lushan 安祿山	dao 道
An Shenqi 安審琦	Datong 大同
An Shuqian 安叔千	Dengzhou 鄧州
Anci 安次	Dezhou 德州
Anguo 安國	dili zhi 地理志
Anyang shui 安陽水	Ding Hui 丁會
appendices on barbarians 四夷附錄	Ding Shenqi 丁審琦
Baicheng 白城	Dingnan 定難
baiguan zhi 百官志	Dingnian ji 丁年集
Beijing 北京	Dingzhou 定州
Beiping wang 北平王	Disunion 魏晉南北朝
beiren 北人	Dizhou 棣州
beirong 北戎	Dong Wenqi (Hua Wenqi) 董溫琪
Beizhou 貝州	Dongdan 東丹
Bi Gan 比干	Dongjing 東京
Bianzhou (Daliang) 汴州	Dou Mengzheng 竇夢徵
biao 表	Du Chongwei (Du Wei) 杜重威
Bo Sheng 白昇	Du Hongsui 杜弘璉
Bohai 渤海	Du Wei (Du Chongwei) 杜威
Botuanwei cun 白團衛村	Du Zhimin 杜知敏
Bozhou 博州	Duan Xiushi 段秀實
Cai Xingyu 蔡行遇	Duanming dian 端明殿
Cangzhou 滄州	Dugu Ji 獨孤及
Cao Bin 曹彬	Dunhuang 敦煌
Cao Cao 曹操	Duoluo 多羅
Cao Liyong 曹利用	er 貳
Cen Shen 岑參	fan 番
Chai Rong (Zhou Shizong) 柴榮	Fan Yanguang 范延光
Chang Xian 常顯	Fang Hao 房勣
Chang'an 長安	Fang Tai 方太
Changling fu 長嶺府	Feng Dao 馮道
Changshan 常山	Feng, empress 馮
chen 臣	Feng Yu 馮玉
Chen Chuyao 陳處堯	Fengguo si 奉國寺
Chen Da 陳達	Fengxiang 鳳翔
Chen Daren 陳大任	fu 賦
Chen Jiru 陳繼儒	Fu Tinghan 傅廷翰
Chen Kongzhang 陳孔璋	Fu Yanlun 符彥倫
Chen Xilie 陳希烈	Fu Yanqing 符彥卿
Cheng 程	Fuyang 滎陽
Chengde 成德	Fuzhou 府州
Chenqiao 陳橋	Gao Tangying (Gao Yanying) 高唐英
Chi chen lun 持臣論	Gao Xingzhou 高行周
Chigang 赤岡	Gao Xun 高勳
Chong, lady 种	Gao Yanying (Gao Tangying) 高彥英
Chongwen hall 崇文館	Gaohe 高河
Chu 楚 (c.704-506 B.C.)	Gaoliang he 高梁河
Chunqiu 春秋 (722-481 B.C.)	Gaoping 高平
Cizhou 磁州	Gaoyang 高陽
Da Yan 大燕	Gaoyangguan 高陽關
Da Yinzhuan 大諷譏	gaoyuan 高原

Geng Shaozhong 耿紹忠  
 Geng Yanyi 耿延毅  
 gongchen 功臣  
 Guan Zhong 管仲  
 Guan Zhong lun 管仲論  
 gui 歸  
 Guide 歸德  
 Guizhou 嬌州  
 Gujin shi hua 古今詩話  
 Guo Chongtao 郭崇韜  
 Guo Chongwei 郭崇威  
 Guo Rong 郭榮  
 Guo Shourong 郭守榮  
 Guo Wei (Zhou Taizu) 郭威  
 Guo Ziyi 郭子儀  
 han 漢  
 Han 漢 (206 B.C.-A.D. 220)  
 Han Derang 韓德讓  
 Han Deshu 韓德樞  
 Han Dewei 韓德威  
 Han Gaozu (Liu Zhiyuan) 漢高祖  
 Han Mengyin 韓夢殷  
 Han Yanhui 韓延徽  
 Han Yindi (Liu Chengyou) 漢隱帝  
 Han Yu 韓愈  
 Han Zhigu 韓知古  
 hanren 漢人  
 Hanzhou 漢州  
 He Chongjian 何重建  
 He Fuyin 何福殷  
 He Jiyun 何繼筠  
 He Lingtu 賀令圖  
 He Ning 和凝  
 Hebei 河北  
 Hedong 河東  
 Hejian 河間  
 Hejian wang 河間王  
 Henan 河南  
 Hendejin 痕德堇  
 Hengshan 恆山  
 Hengzhou 恆州  
 Hexi 河西  
 Heyang 河陽  
 Hezhong 河中  
 Hong jian lu 宏簡錄  
 Hou Yi 侯益  
 hu 胡  
 Hu Qiong 胡瓊  
 Hu Sanxing 胡三省  
 hua 華  
 Hua Wenqi (Dong Wenqi) 華溫琪  
 Hua Zhaoyin 華昭胤  
 Huainan 淮南  
 Huan, Duke 桓公  
 Huang Chao 黃巢

Huang he 黃河  
 Huang he (Yellow River) 黃河  
 Huangfu Yu 皇甫遇  
 Huanzhou 寰州  
 Huitong 會同 (938-947)  
 huo 獲  
 Hutuo shui 滹沱水  
 Ji 箕  
 Ji Zha 季札  
 Ji zhong Zhou shu 汲冢周書  
 Jia Changchao 賈昌朝  
 Jia Zhi 賈至  
 jiao ken yi 教墾藝  
 (jiedu) liuhou 節度留後  
 jiedushi 節度使  
 Jieli (Yelü Jieli) 解里  
 Jieli 解利  
 Jin 晉  
 Jin (Jurchen) 金 (1115-1234)  
 Jin Chudi (Shi Chonggui) 晉出帝  
 Jin Gaozu (Shi Jingtang) 晉高祖  
 Jin Shaodi (Shi Chonggui) 晉少帝  
 Jin'an zhai 晉安寨  
 Jing Yanguang 景延廣  
 Jingzhou 涇州  
 Jingzhou 景州  
 jinshi 進士  
 Jinwang (Li Keyong) 晉王  
 Jinyang 晉陽  
 Jinzhou 晉州  
 Jisu 雞蘇  
 Jiu guo zhi 九國志  
 Jiu, Prince 公子糾  
 Jizhou<sub>1</sub> 薊州  
 Jizhou<sub>2</sub> 冀州  
 Juma he 巨馬河  
 Jun chen lun 君臣論  
 junzi 君子  
 Jurchen 女真  
 Kaifeng 開封  
 Kang Moji 康默記  
 Kang Yanxiao 康延孝  
 Kang Yicheng 康義誠  
 Kang Zhaoyi 康昭裔  
 Kangcun 康村  
 Kitan 契丹  
 Koryo 高麗  
 Kulun 庫倫  
 Langshan 狼山  
 laobaixing 老百姓  
 Leshou 樂壽  
 li 禮  
 li 里  
 Li Chongmei 李重美  
 Li Conghou (Tang Mindi) 李從厚

- Li Congke (Tang Feidi (Modi), Luwang) 李從珂  
 Li Congrong 李從榮  
 Li Congyi 李從益  
 Li Cunxu (Tang Zhuangzong) 李存勗  
 Li, empress dowager 李  
 Li Guangmei 李光美  
 Li Hua 李華  
 Li Huan 李勣  
 Li Hui 李回  
 Li Jida 李繼達  
 Li Jiji (Weiwang) 李繼岌  
 Li Jilong 李繼隆  
 Li Jipeng (Zhao Baozhong) 李繼捧  
 Li Jiqian (Zhao Baoji) 李繼遷  
 Li Jitao 李繼韜  
 Li Keyong (Jinwang) 李克用  
 Li Ling 李陵  
 Li Renfu 李仁福  
 Li Shaobin 李紹斌  
 Li Shaochen 李紹琛  
 Li Shouzhen 李守貞  
 Li Shu 李恕  
 Li Sian 李思安  
 Li Siben 李嗣本  
 Li Sibi 李嗣弼  
 Li Siyuan (Tang Mingzong) 李嗣源  
 Li Song 李崧  
 Li Tao 李濤  
 Li Xu 李緒  
 Li Yantao 李彥韜  
 Li Yanxi 李延襲  
 Li Yi 李懌  
 Li Yichao 李彝超  
 Li Yin 李殷  
 Li Yixing 李彝興  
 Li Yiyin 李彝殷  
 Li Yu 李愚  
 Li Yuanhao 李元昊  
 Li Yun 李筠  
 Li Zanhua (Yelü Bei) 李贊華  
 Liang 梁  
 Liang Hui 梁暉  
 Liang Modi (Zhu Youzhen) 梁末帝  
 Liang shu 梁書  
 Liang Taizu (Zhu Quanzhong, Zhu Wen) 梁太祖  
 Liao 遼  
 Liao Jingzong (Xian) 遼景宗  
 Liao Muzong (Shulü) 遼穆宗  
 Liao Shengzong (Yelü Longxu) 遼聖宗  
 Liao Shizong (Wuyu) 遼世宗  
 Liao Taizong (Yelü Deguang) 遼太宗  
 Liao Taizu (Abaoji) 遼太祖  
 Liaoning 遼寧  
 Liaozhou 遼州  
 lienü 列女  
 Lihu 李胡  
 Linzhou 麟州  
 Lingzhou 靈州  
 Liu Chengjun (Bei Han Ruizong) 劉承鈞  
 Liu Chengyou (Han Yindi) 劉承祐  
 Liu Chong (Bei Han Shizu) 劉崇  
 Liu Chuo 劉綽  
 Liu Hanzhang 劉漢章  
 Liu Jien (Bei Han Shaozhu) 劉繼恩  
 Liu Jiwen 劉繼文  
 Liu Jiye 劉繼業  
 Liu Jiyan (Bei Han Yingwu) 劉繼元  
 Liu Kang 劉邠  
 Liu Ping 劉平  
 Liu Rengong 劉仁恭  
 Liu Shouguang 劉守光  
 Liu Shouqi 劉守奇  
 Liu Shouwen 劉守文  
 Liu Wensou 劉溫叟  
 Liu Xu 劉煦  
 Liu Xun 劉訓  
 Liu Yanhan 劉延翰  
 Liu Yanlang 劉延朗  
 Liu Yin 劉殷  
 Liu Yuan 劉昶  
 Liu Zaiming 劉在明  
 Liu Zhiyuan (Han Gaozu) 劉知遠  
 Liu Zuo 劉祚  
 liuhou (jiedu liuhou) 留後  
 Liyang 黎陽  
 Lizhou 利州  
 Lu Guoyong 盧國用  
 Lu Jun 盧俊  
 Lu Wenji 盧文紀  
 Lu Wenjin 盧文進  
 Lu Yi 盧奕  
 Lu Zhaolin 盧照鄰  
 Lu Zhi 盧質  
 Luancheng 樂城  
 Lugu 魯郭  
 Lugu gong 魯國公  
 Lulong (Youzhou) 盧龍  
 Lunyu 論語  
 Luo Binwang 駱賓王  
 Luoyang 洛陽  
 Luozhong ji yi lu 洛中紀異錄  
 Luwang (Li Congke, Tang Feidi) 廢王  
 Luzhou (Shangdang) 潞州  
 Ma Yinqing 馬胤卿  
 Mada 麻苔  
 Majiadu 馬家渡  
 Majiakou 麻家口  
 Mancheng 滿城  
 Meng Hanqiong 孟漢瓊  
 Meng qiu 蒙求

Meng Youfu 孟有孚	Ruzhou 汝州
Mengchen 夢臣	Sai Xiangyu 塞項羽
Ming 明 (1368-1644)	Sang Weihang 桑維翰
Mingzhou 洺州	Sang Zan 桑贊
Mozhou 莫州	Sha Yanyun 沙彥珣
Muguajian 木瓜澗	Shandong 山東
Murong Yanchao 慕容彥超	Shangdang (Luzhou) 上黨
nan bei er wang 南北二王	Shangjing 上京
Nan shi 南史	Shanyuan 澶淵
Nanjing 南京	Shanzhou 澶州
Nansongmen 南松門	Shao Ke 邵珂
Neiqiu 內丘	Shatuo 沙陀
Nie, lady 聶氏	Shen Shijun (Shen Yun) 沈使君
Northern Han 北漢 (951-979)	Shen Yun (Shen Shijun) 沈贊
(Northern) Han Ruizong (Liu Chengjun) 漢睿宗	Shenzhou 深州
(Northern) Han Shaozhu (Liu Jien) 漢少主	shi 詩
(Northern) Han Shizu (Liu Chong) 漢世祖	Shi chen lun 師臣論
(Northern) Han Yingwu (Liu Jiyuan) 漢英武	Shi Chonggui (Jin Chudi, Jin Shaodi) 石重貴
Northern Qi 北齊 (550-577)	Shi Chongrui 石重睿
Northern Song 北宋 (960-1126)	Shi Hongzhao 史弘肇
Northern Zhou 北周	Shi Jingtang (Jin Gaozu) 石敬瑭
Pan Mei 潘美	Shi Kuangwei 史匡威
Pan Yunian 潘聿撚	Shi Siming 史思明
panfu 叛附	Shi Xunzhi 史洵直
panxiang 叛降	Shi Yanbao 石延寶
Pei Xin 裴信	Shi Yanxu 石延煦
pianwen 駢文	shilu 實錄
pijiang 裨將	Shiwei 室韋
Pinglu 平盧	Shu 書
Pingzhou 平州	Shu 蜀
Qi 岐	Shucheng 束城
Qi 齊	Shulu (Liao Muzong) 述律
Qi Taigong 齊太公	Shulu empress 述律后
Qi Xingben 齊行本	Shun 舜
Qian Liu 錢鏐	Shunzhou 順州
Qianlong 乾隆 (1736-1796)	Shuozhou 朔州
Qiao Rong 喬榮	Sixteen Prefectures 十六州
Qicheng 戚城	Song 宋 (960-1276)
Qidan (Kitan) 契丹	Song Bo 宋白
qin 擒	Song Shun 宋順
Qin 秦 (221-206 B.C.)	Song Taizong (Zhao Kuangyi) 宋太宗
Qin Shihuang 秦始皇 (221-210 B.C.)	Song Taizu (Zhao Kuangyin) 宋太祖
Qing 清 (1644-1911)	Song Yanyun 宋彥筠
Qingtai 清泰 (934-936)	Song Yao 宋瑤
Qingzhou 青州	Song Zhenzong (Zhao Heng) 宋真宗
Qinwang 秦王	Songzhou 宋州
Qizhou 祁州	Southern Song 南宋
Qu Yuan 屈原	Southern Tang 南唐
ren 仁	Su Wu 蘇武
Ren Huan 任圜	Su Yijian 蘇易簡
Rixin 日新	sui 隨
rongdi 戎狄	sui 歲
rongwang 戎王	Sui 隋 (581-618)
rusheng 儒生	Suicheng 遂城
Ruzhou 儒州	Sun Fangjian 孫方簡

- Sun He 孫鶴  
 Taining 泰寧  
 Taiyuan 太原  
 Taizhou 泰州  
 Taizong huangdi tongyi zhi tu 太宗皇帝統一之圖  
 Tang 唐 (618-907)  
 Tang Dezong 唐德宗 (r. 779-805)  
 Tang Feidi (Luwang, Li Congke) 唐廢帝  
 Tang Mindi (Li Conghou) 唐閔帝  
 Tang Mingzong (Li Siyuan) 唐明宗  
 Tang Modi ((Feidi), Li Congke, Luwang) 唐末帝  
 Tang Muzong 唐穆宗 (r. 820-824)  
 Tang Taizong 唐太宗 (r. 626-649)  
 Tang Wuzong 唐武宗 (r. 940-846)  
 Tang Xianzong 唐憲宗 (r. 805-820)  
 Tang Xuanzong 唐宣宗 (r. 846-859)  
 Tang yu lu 唐余錄  
 Tang Zhuangzong (Li Cunxu) 唐莊宗  
 Tangut (Dangxiang) 党項  
 Tanzhou 檀州  
 Taoshan 桃山  
 Tian Chongba 田重霸  
 Tian Fengji 田逢吉  
 Tiancheng 天成 (926-930)  
 Tianfu 天福 (936-944)  
 tianming 天命  
 Tianping 天平  
 tianxia 天下  
 Tianxiong 天雄  
 tianzi (son of Heaven) 天子  
 Tiao 蓼  
 Tongguang 同光 (923-926)  
 Tuanboyu 團柏谷  
 Tuoba Wei 拓跋魏 (386-502)  
 Tuque (Turk) 突厥  
 Tuyuhun 吐谷渾  
 Uigur 回鶻  
 waiguo 外國  
 wang 王  
 Wang Bo 王勃  
 Wang Bo 王勃  
 Wang Chao 王超  
 Wang Chong 王琬  
 Wang Chucun 王處存  
 Wang Chuzhi 王處直  
 Wang Deming (Zhang Wenli) 王德明  
 Wang Du 王都  
 Wang Hui 王暉  
 Wang Jian 王緘  
 Wang Jien 王繼恩  
 Wang Jingchong 王景崇  
 Wang Jizhong 王繼忠  
 Wang Qinruo 王欽若  
 Wang Quanbin 王全斌  
 Wang Rong 王鎔  
 Wang Shufei 王淑妃  
 Wang Song 王松  
 Wang Wei 王威  
 Wang Wenzheng gong bilu 王文正公筆錄  
 Wang Yanqiu 王晏球  
 Wang Yu 王郁  
 Wang Ze 王澤  
 Wang Zhou 王周  
 Wangdu 望都  
 Waqiaoguan 瓦橋關  
 wei 慰  
 Wei 微  
 Wei 魏  
 Wei Desheng 衛德升  
 Wei Lin 魏璘  
 wei ren mou, er bu zhong hu  
 為人謀，而不忠乎。與人忠  
 Wei shu 魏書  
 wei si chen 未死臣  
 Wei Wendi 魏文帝 (r. 471-499)  
 WeiBo 魏博  
 Weiwang 偉王  
 Weiwang 魏王  
 Weizhou (Yedu) 魏州  
 wen 文  
 wen-wu 文武  
 Wenan 文安  
 Wu 吳  
 Wu Bo 武白  
 Wu Ji zi Zha lun 吳季子札論  
 Wu Luan 吳鑾  
 wu si, zhong ye 無私，忠也  
 Wu Zetian 武則天 (690-705)  
 Wudai 五代 (907-959)  
 Wudai tongjian 五代通鑑  
 Wuhuang 武皇  
 Wuqing xian 武清縣  
 Wuyu (Liao Shizong) 兀欲  
 Wuyue 吳越  
 Wuzhou 武州  
 Xi 奚  
 Xi Xia 西夏  
 Xialie 匣列  
 Xian (Liao Jingzong) 賢  
 xian yu 陷于  
 Xiang Yansi 向延嗣  
 Xiangzhou 相州  
 Xianping 咸平 (998-1004)  
 Xiao ci, ze zhong 孝慈，則忠  
 Xiao Dilie 蕭敵烈  
 Xiao Haizhen 蕭海貞  
 Xiao Han 蕭翰  
 Xiao Hezhuo 蕭合卓  
 Xiao Ji 孝己  
 Xiao Meigude 蕭眉古得

Xiao Siwen 蕭思溫  
 Xiazhou 夏州  
 Xichuan 西川  
 Xin Zhongfu 辛仲甫  
 Xingping gongzhu 興平公主  
 Xingzhou 邢州  
 Xinle 新樂  
 Xinzhou<sub>1</sub> 新州  
 Xinzhou<sub>2</sub> 忻州  
 Xiongnu 匈奴  
 Xiongwu 雄武  
 Xiongzhou 雄州  
 Xishan 西山  
 Xitang (Xitang dian) 西湯  
 Xitang dian (Xitang) 西唐店  
 Xizhou 隰州  
 Xu gong wen ji buyi 徐公文集補遺  
 Xu Hanlin zhi 續翰林志  
 Xu Taifu 徐台符  
 Xu Xuan 徐鉉  
 Xu Xuan wenji buyi 徐鉉文集補遺  
 Xuanwu jun 宣武軍  
 Xuanzheng dian 宣政殿  
 Xunzi 荀子  
 Yan 燕  
 Yan 顏  
 Yan Jianyuan 顏見遠  
 Yan Xie 顏協  
 Yan Zhenqing 顏真卿  
 Yanwang 燕王  
 Yang Chengxin 楊承信  
 Yang Chongjin 楊重進  
 Yang Guangyuan 楊光遠  
 Yang Gun 楊袞  
 Yang Jiong 楊炯  
 Yang Jiye (Yang Ye) 楊繼業  
 Yang Ningshi 楊凝式  
 Yang Shihou 楊師厚  
 Yang Yanxun 楊彥詢  
 Yang Ye (Yang Jiye) 楊業  
 Yangcheng 陽城  
 Yangtuan cheng 楊團城  
 Yanmenguan 鴈門關  
 Yanzhou 延州  
 Yanzhou 兗州  
 Yao Dongzhi 姚東之  
 Yao Hanying 姚漢英  
 Yao Kun 姚坤  
 Yedu (Weizhou) 鄴都  
 Yellow River (Huang he) 黃河  
 Yelü Balide 耶律拔里得  
 Yelü Bei (Li Zanhua) 耶律倍  
 Yelü Deguang (Liao Taizong) 耶律德光  
 Yelü Jieli 耶律解里  
 Yelü Langwu 耶律郎五

Yelü Longxu (Liao Shengzong) 耶律隆緒  
 Yelü Nugua 耶律奴瓜  
 Yi 伊  
 Yi 夷  
 yi 義  
 Yi xun 伊訓  
 Yichang 義昌  
 YiDing 易定  
 Yijinguan 益津關  
 Yin 殷  
 Yin Jilun 尹繼倫  
 Yin Jufan 尹居璠  
 Yingli 應曆 (951-969)  
 Yingtian empress dowager 應天太后  
 Yingzhou<sub>1</sub> 瀛州  
 Yingzhou<sub>2</sub> 應州  
 Yingzhou<sub>3</sub> 營州  
 Yinshan 陰山  
 Yinzhou 銀州  
 Yiwu 義武  
 Yixian 義縣  
 Yizhou 易州  
 Youzhou (Lulong) 幽州  
 Yu 禹  
 Yu Chongyuan 魚崇遠  
 Yu Jing 余靖  
 yu ren zhong 與人忠  
 Yu xiong Tao shu 與兄壽書  
 Yu Shun 虞舜  
 Yuan 元 (1276-1368)  
 Yuan 原  
 Yuan Jie 元結  
 Yuan Shao 袁紹  
 Yuancheng 元城  
 Yukouguan 淤口關  
 Yulin dian 榆林店  
 yuyue 于越  
 Yuzhou 蔚州  
 Yunzhou<sub>1</sub> 雲州  
 Yunzhou<sub>2</sub> 鄆州  
 Zengzi 曾子  
 Zezhou 澤州  
 Zhai Guangye 翟光鄴  
 Zhang Bao 張寶  
 Zhang Chong 張崇  
 Zhang Chujin 張處瑾  
 Zhang Hang 張沆  
 Zhang Hui 張暉  
 Zhang Jingda 張敬達  
 Zhang Li 張礪  
 Zhang Lingzhao 張令昭  
 Zhang Pi 張仵  
 Zhang Qing 張慶  
 Zhang Wenli (Wang Deming) 張文禮

Zhang Xichong 張希崇  
 Zhang Xun 張巡  
 Zhang Yanchao 張彥超  
 Zhang Yanlang 張延朗  
 Zhang Yanze 張彥澤  
 Zhang Yun 張允  
 Zhang Zuo 張祚  
 Zhanguo ce 戰國策  
 Zhangwu 彰武  
 Zhangyi 彰義  
 Zhao 趙  
 Zhao Anren 趙安仁  
 Zhao Ba 趙霸  
 Zhao Baoji (Li Jiqian) 趙保吉  
 Zhao Baozhong (Li Jipeng) 趙保忠  
 Zhao Chong 趙崇  
 Zhao Dejun 趙德鈞  
 Zhao Feng 趙鳳  
 Zhao Heng (Song Zhenzong) 趙恆  
 Zhao Kuangyi (Song Taizong) 趙匡義  
 Zhao Kuangyin (Song Taizu) 趙匡胤  
 Zhao Kuangzan 趙匡贊  
 Zhao, lady 趙氏  
 Zhao Shangjiao 趙上交  
 Zhao Siwan 趙思綰  
 Zhao Siwen 趙思溫  
 Zhao Yanshou 趙延壽  
 Zhao Ying 趙瑩  
 Zhao Yuan 趙遠  
 Zhao Zan 趙贊  
 Zhaowang 趙王  
 Zhaoyi 昭義  
 Zhaozhou 趙州  
 Zhe Congyuan 折從遠  
 zheng 正  
 Zhenming 貞明 (915-921)  
 Zhenwu 振武  
 Zhenzhou 鎮州  
 zhi 志  
 zhong 忠  
 Zhongdu qiao 中渡橋  
 Zhongguo (Middle Kingdom) 中國  
 Zhongjing 中京  
 Zhongshan 中山  
 Zhongwu 忠武  
 Zhongxing dian 中興殿  
 zhongyi 忠義  
 Zhongyuan (Central Plains) 中原  
 Zhou 周  
 Zhou Dewei 周德威  
 Zhou Guang 周廣  
 Zhou Jing 周靖  
 Zhou li 周禮  
 Zhou Mi 周密  
 Zhou Ru 周儒

Zhou Shizong (Chai Rong) 周世宗  
 Zhou shu 周書  
 Zhou Taizu (Guo Wei) 周太祖  
 Zhou Ying 周瑩  
 Zhu Hongzhao 朱弘昭  
 Zhu Quanzhong (Zhu Wen, Liang Taizu) 朱全忠  
 Zhu Wen (Zhu Quanzhong, Liang Taizu) 朱溫  
 Zhu Yougui 朱友珪  
 Zhu Youzhen (Liang Modi) 朱友貞  
 Zhuo 卓  
 Zhuozhou 涿州  
 zi 字  
 Zi Xu 子胥  
 Zuo zhuan 左傳  
 Zuzhou 祖州



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